Online Appendix of

Group decision rules and group rationality under risk

Baillon, Aurélien, Han Bleichrodt, Ning Liu, & Peter P. Wakker

Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The

Netherlands

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A. Robustness with respect to the clustering of standard errors and to the coding of choices for minority subjects

The following three tables display alternative specifications for the regression reported for group vs. individual choices in Table 8, 9 and 10 respectively. The first row indicates whether we analyzed the choice made by the group in stage 2 of the M-treatment or the choice reported by each group member (a minority subject could indicate disagreement). The second row indicates whether standard errors were clustered at the individual participant level or at the group level.

Choices in stage 2 for the M-treatment	group	reported	reported
Standard errors clustered by	groups	individuals	groups
stage2	.06*	.06	.06*
stage3	.13***	.13**	.13***
majority	09	09	09
unanimity	17	17*	17
stage2*majority	.02	.02	.02
stage2*unanimity	16	16	16
stage3*majority	02	02	02
stage3*unanimity	11	11	11
majority*dominance_discussion	.24**	.24**	.24**
unanimity*dominance_discussion	.12	.12	.12
stage2*majority*dominance_discussion	.44***	.44***	.44***

Table A1: Alternative probit regressions for the NTSD tasks (Group vs. individual choices)

stage2*unanimity*dominance_discussion	.84***	.84***	.84***
stage3*majority*dominance_discussion	.34**	.34***	.34**
stage3*unanimity*dominance_discussion	.47***	.47***	.47***
No. of observations	2340	2340	2340
Wald chi2	255.73	149.69	255.73
p-value	0.00	0.00	0.00
<i>p-value</i>			

Note: Reported numbers are the marginal effects at the means of covariates.

* indicates significant at 10% (two-sided test)

** indicates significant at 5% (two-sided test)

Choices in stage 2 for the	*	group			reported			reported	
M-treatment		group			reported			reported	
Errors clustered by		groups			individuals			groups	
Choice pattern	SS	RR	RS	SS	RR	RS	SS	RR	RS
stage2	0.02	0.08	-0.10**	0.02	0.08	-0.10*	0.02	0.08	-0.10**
stage3	0.06**	-0.01	-0.06	0.06**	-0.01	-0.06	0.06**	-0.01	-0.06
majority	-0.02	-0.04	0.07	-0.02	-0.04	0.07	-0.02	-0.04	0.07
unanimity	-0.04	-0.02	0.07	-0.04	-0.02	0.07	-0.04	-0.02	0.07
stage2*majority	-0.10*	0.03	0.07	-0.09**	0.05	0.03	-0.09*	0.05	0.03
stage2*unanimity	-0.29***	0.25***	0.04	-0.29***	0.25***	0.04	-0.29***	0.25***	0.04
stage3*majority	-0.05	0.00	0.05	-0.05	0.00	0.05	-0.05	0.00	0.05
stage3*unanimity	-0.05	-0.00	0.05	-0.04	-0.00	0.05	-0.05	-0.00	0.05
No. of observations		1481			1481			1481	
Wald chi2		79.40			90.12			85.04	
p-value		0.00			0.00			0.00	

Table A2: Alternative multinomial probit results on CC tasks

Note: Reported numbers are the marginal effects at the means of covariates.

* indicates significant at 10% (two-sided test)

** indicates significant at 5% (two-sided test)

Choices in stage 2 for the M-treatment		group reported						reported				
Errors clustered by		groups		i	ndividuals							
Choice pattern	SS	RR	SR	SS	RR	SR	SS	RR	SR			
stage2	-0.04	0.05	-0.01	-0.04	0.05	-0.01	-0.04	0.05	-0.01			
stage3	-0.00	0.05	-0.05	-0.00	0.05	-0.05	-0.00	0.05	-0.05			
majority	-0.07	0.05	0.02	-0.07	0.05	0.02	-0.07	0.05	0.02			
unanimity	-0.10	0.03	0.07	-0.10*	0.04	0.07	-0.10	0.03	0.07			
stage2*majority	-0.19**	0.03	0.16*	-0.15***	0.03	0.12*	-0.15***	0.03	0.12*			
stage2*unanimity	-0.19**	0.04	0.14*	-0.19***	0.04	0.15*	-0.19**	0.04	0.15*			
stage3*majority	-0.08	0.01	0.07	-0.08	0.01	0.07	-0.08	0.01	0.07			
stage3*unanimity	-0.10*	0.02	0.09	-0.10*	0.02	0.09	-0.10*	0.02	0.09			
No. of observations		2202			2197	,		2197	,			
Wald chi2		41.52			54.74			41.52				
p-value		0.00			0.00			0.00				

Table A3: Alternative multinomial probit results on CR tasks

Note: Reported numbers are the marginal effects at the means of covariates.

* indicates significant at 10% (two-sided test)

** indicates significant at 5% (two-sided test)

B. Logit regressions

The following three tables are the logit equivalents of Tables 8, 9, and 10.

Table B1:	Logit reg	pressions	for the	NTSD	tasks
			101 0110	11102	

	Group	vs.	Group	vs.
	individual	choices	simulated	choices
stage2	.06	(.04)	.14**	(.07)
stage3	.13**	(.06)		
majority	09	(.09)	05	(.17)
unanimity	17*	(.10)	18	(.18)
stage2*majority	.02	(.07)	.01	(.12)
stage2*unanimity	16	(.11)	14	(.15)
stage3*majority	02	(.08)		
stage3*unanimity	10	(.09)		
majority*dominance_discussion	.24**	(.11)	.35*	(.18)
unanimity*dominance_discussion	.12	(.12)	.08	(.19)
stage2*majority*dominance_discussion	.50***	(.17)	.64**	(.31)
stage2*unanimity*dominance_discussion	.92***	(.18)	.96***	(.26)
stage3*majority*dominance_discussion	.38***	(.15)		
stage3*unanimity*dominance_discussion	.48***	(.14)		
<i>No.</i> of observations	2340		520	
Wald chi2	119.87		55.19	
<i>p-value</i>	0.00		0.00	

Note: Reported numbers are the marginal effects at the means of covariates, followed by significance and clustered standard errors between brackets. The standard errors in the left column are clustered at the individual level, and those in the right column are clustered at the group level.

* indicates significant at 10% (two-sided test) ** indicates significant at 5% (two-sided test)

	Group vs	s. individua	l choices	G	roup vs. sim	ulated
Choice pattern	SS	RR	RS	SS	choices RR	RS
stage2	.02	.08	11*	.02	.12	13
siuge2	(.02)	(.05)	(.05)	(.03)	(.10)	(.11)
stage3	.06**	(.03)	(.03) 05	(.03)	(.10)	(.11)
514805	(.03)	(.06)	(.06)			
majority	02	05	.07	01	03	.04
	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.13)	(.12)
unanimity	04	02	.07	16	.04	.12
	(.06)	(.07)	(.08)	(.11)	(.13)	(.13)
stage2*majority	10**	.03	.07	06	.02	.04
	(.05)	(.07)	(.08)	(.06)	(.14)	(.14)
stage2*unanimity	34	.26	.08	09	.17	08
-	***	***	(.08)	(.06)	(.13)	(.13)
	(.08)	(.08)				
stage3*majority	05	00	.05			
	(.04)	(.07)	(.07)			
stage3*unanimity	04	01	.05			
	(.06)	(.08)	(.08)			
No. of		1481			350	
observations						
Wald chi2		74.07			30.14	
p-value		0.00			0.00	

Table B2: Multinomial logit regressions for the CC tasks

Note: Reported numbers are the marginal effects at the means of covariates, followed by significance and clustered standard errors between brackets. The standard errors in the left three columns are clustered at the individual level, and those in the right three columns are clustered at the group level.

* indicates significant at 10% (two-sided test)

** indicates significant at 5% (two-sided test)

	Group vs	. individual	choices	G	roup vs. sim choices	ulated
Choice pattern	SS	RR	SR	SS	RR	SR
stage2	04	.05	02	03	.03	00
0	(.03)	(.04)	(.06)	(.04)	(.06)	(.10)
stage3	00	.05	05			
	(.03)	(.05)	(.05)			
majority	06	.05	.01	06	.03	.03
	(.06)	(.08)	(.08)	(.09)	(.12)	(.13)
unanimity	10*	.03	.06	08	07	.16
	(.06)	(.08)	(.08)	(.09)	(.12)	(.13)
stage2*majority	20	.03	.17**	11	.06	.05
	***	(.06)	(.08)	(.09)	(.08)	(.13)
	(.07)					
stage2*unanimity	20***	.05	.16**	12	.15*	03
	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.09)	(.09)	(.12)
stage3*majority	08	.01	.07			
	(.06)	(.06)	(.08)			
stage3*unanimity	11*	.02	.09			
	(.06)	(.06)	(.08)			
No. of		2202			505	
observations						
Wald chi2		47.69			23.11	
p-value		0.00			0.01	

Table B3: Multinomial logit regressions for the CR tasks

Note: Reported numbers are the marginal effects at the means of covariates, followed by significance and clustered standard errors between brackets. The standard errors in the left three columns are clustered at the individual level, and those in the right three columns are clustered at the group level.

* indicates significant at 10% (two-sided test)

** indicates significant at 5% (two-sided test)

C. Multinomial regressions including rare patterns

The following two tables report the results of multinomial probit regressions as in Tables 9 and 10, but including also the rare choice patterns (SR in the CC tasks and RS in the CR tasks). Scarce choice patterns made it impossible to compute the Wald statistics and to estimate the coefficients in one of the regressions. In all other cases, the results remain very similar to those reported in Tables 9 and 10.

	Group vs	s. individua	l choices	G	roup vs. sim	ulated
					choices	
Choice pattern	SS	RR	RS	SS	RR	RS
stage2	.02	.08	10*	.02	.13	11
-	(.02)	(.05)	(.05)	(.03)	(.10)	(.10)
stage3	.07**	.00	04			
	(.03)	(.05)	(.05)			
majority	02	04	.07	00	00	.07
	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.12)	(.12)
unanimity	04	03	.06	14	.04	.12
	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.09)	(.12)	(.12)
stage2*majority	10**	.02	.05	07	01	01
	(.05)	(.07)	(.08)	(.06)	(.13)	(.14)
stage2*unanimity	27	.26	.05	08	.17	10
	***	***	(.08)	(.05)	(.13)	(.12)
	(.06)	(.08)				
stage3*majority	06	02	.02			
	(.04)	(.07)	(.07)			
stage3*unanimity	05	02	.03			
0	(.05)	(.07)	(.07)			
No. of		1557			364	
observations						
Wald chi2		-			-	
p-value		-			-	

Table C1: Multinomial probit regressions for the CC tasks

Note: Reported numbers are the marginal effects at the means of covariates, followed by significance and clustered standard errors between brackets. The standard errors in the left three columns are clustered at the individual level, and those in the right three columns are clustered at the group level.

* indicates significant at 10% (two-sided test)

** indicates significant at 5% (two-sided test)

*** indicates significant at 1% (two-sided test)

The number of observations in the left columns is (4+3+3)*156 - 3 (missing

value)=1557; the number of observations in the right columns is (4+3)*52=364. The three

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missing values did not influence the simulated result because two of the three missing values did not affect the majority choice (the other two agree) and the third missing value occurred in stage 3 (not analyzed).

	Group vs	. individual	choices	Group vs. simulated choices					
Choice pattern	SS	RR	SR	SS	RR	SR			
stage2	03	.05	01	•	•	•			
	(.03)	(.04)	(.05)						
stage3	01	.04	05						
	(.03)	(.05)	(.05)						
majority	08	.04	01						
	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)						
unanimity	10*	.03	.05						
	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)						
stage2*majority	16***	.05	.19**						
	(.06)	(.06)	(.08)						
stage2*unanimity	16***	.05	.16**						
	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)						
stage3*majority	06	.02	.09						
	(.05)	(.06)	(.07)						
stage3*unanimity	09*	.03	.10						
	(.05)	(.06)	(.07)						
No. of		2336			519				
observations									
Wald chi2		97.02			-				
p-value		0.00			-				

Table C2: Multinomial probit regressions for the CR tasks

Note: Reported numbers are the marginal effects at the means of covariates, followed by significance and clustered standard errors between brackets. The standard errors in the left three columns are clustered at the individual level, and those in the right three columns are clustered at the group level.

* indicates significant at 10% (two-sided test)

** indicates significant at 5% (two-sided test)

*** indicates significant at 1% (two-sided test)

The number of observations in the left columns is 5*3*156 - 4 (missing value)=2336; the number of observations in the right columns is 5*2*52-1=519. The three out of four missing values in the individual answers did not influence the simulated result because the other two members in the given sessions agreed on one choice and therefore determined the majority choice.

D. Examples of instructions and decision sheets


D1. Instruction – stage 1 (for all treatments)

Welcome to this experiment. This is an economics experiment that explores how people make decisions under risk. You will be asked to choose between pairs of lotteries. Your payment for participating consists of a sure amount of \in 5 and additional money that depends on your choices. At the end of the entire experiment, we will randomly draw one of the questions you answered, and play it for real to determine the additional money. Your extra winnings range between \in 0 and \in 50 with an average of \in 10. Each of the questions that you answer in the experiment is equally likely to be drawn and played for real.

You are asked to choose between pairs of lotteries, Lottery A and Lottery B, which are presented as follows.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A			€10				€0														
Lottery B	€0 €14																				

The lotteries are resolved by throwing a 20-sided die with each number between 1 and 20 equally likely to come up. Lottery A pays $\in 10$ if a number between 1 and 5 comes up and nothing otherwise. Lottery B pays $\in 14$ if a number between 17 and 20 comes up and nothing otherwise.



There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your personal preferences, so please choose according to your preferences. Keep in mind that every choice could be played out for real at the end of the experiment, and determines the money you will receive. It is therefore in your best interest to always choose the lottery you prefer. Before we start, please answer the following training questions that help you become familiar with the experimental task.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A										€	13										
Lottery B		€18																€	0		

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A				€	8									€	0						
Lottery B								€	0									€ž	25		

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A						€	0							€4	15		€ 30		€8		
Lottery	€	€1	۱5			€45								€	0						
В	8																				

The following are the decision questions for you to answer. *Please DO NOT talk with each other.* If you have any question during the experiment, then please raise your hand. Good luck!

D2. Instruction – stage 2 (control treatment)

You will be asked similar questions as you answered previously. Let us repeat that all of the questions you answer are equally likely to be drawn and be played for real.

You are going to make decisions between pairs of lotteries, Lottery A and Lottery B, which are presented in tables as follows.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A			€10										€0								
Lottery								€	0									€:	14		
В																					

The following are the decision questions for you to answer. *Please DO NOT talk with each other*. If you have any question during the experiment, then please raise your hand. Good luck!

D3. Instruction – stage 2 (majority treatment)

You will be asked similar questions as you answered previously. Let us repeat that all of the questions you answer are equally likely to be drawn and be played for real.

You are going to make decisions between pairs of lotteries, Lottery A and Lottery B, which are presented in tables as follows.

									0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	
Lo ttery A			€8	.5								€	0							
Lo ttery B								€0										11.2	` ¬	
	T	• 1			1	•	1	1	.1			1'	1 1	1	1	1		1 (C .1	

To indicate your choice, please mark the corresponding blank box at the end of the row. Please write the mark that indicates your own choice on the sheet, as in the following example. The lottery chosen by the majority of you, two or three of you, is the group choice.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery			€7						_				€0							-	XB
Lottery								€	0									€9	.25		Δ

If one of the questions of this kind, which you three answer together, was drawn at the end of the experiment, this drawn question will be played for real for all of you and will determine your payoffs. For example, in the above example the group choice is Lottery A. If the number on the die is between 1 and 5each of you will receive \in 7, otherwise each of you receives nothing.

The following are the decision questions for you to answer. *Please feel free to discuss with your group members when making the decisions within this part*. If you have any question during the experiment, then please raise your hand. Good luck!

D4. Instruction – stage 2 (unanimity treatment)


You will be asked similar questions as you answered previously. Let us repeat that all of the questions you answer are equally likely to be drawn and be played for real.

You are going to make decisions between pairs of lotteries, Lottery A and Lottery B, which are presented in tables as follows.

							0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	
Lo ttery A	•	€8	.5							€	0							
Lo ttery B						€0									€	11.2	25	

To indicate your choice, please mark the corresponding blank box at the end of the row. Please write the mark that indicates your own choice on the sheet, as in the following example.

You need to reach full agreement on your group choices. *A choice without all three marks agreeing on it will not be seen as a valid one and will not be paid.* The following example shows a valid group choice of Lottery A.



If one of the questions of this kind, which you three answer together, was drawn at the end of the experiment, this drawn question will be played for real for all of you and will determine your payoffs. For example, in the above example the group choice is Lottery A. If the number on the die is between 1 and 5each of you will receive \notin 7, otherwise each of you receives nothing.

The following are the decision questions for you to answer. *Please feel free to discuss with your group members when making the decisions within this part*. If you have any question during the experiment, then please raise your hand. Good luck!

D5. Instruction – stage 3 (for all treatments)

You will be asked similar questions as you answered previously. Let us repeat that all of the questions you answer are equally likely to be drawn and be played for real.

The following are the decision questions for you to answer. *Please DO NOT talk with each other.* If you have any question during the experiment, then please raise your hand. Good luck!

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A	ery €8 €0																				
Lottery								€	0									€2	20		
В																					

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A			€15.5							•			€0								
Lottery								€	0									€2	1.5		
В																					

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A										€1	5.5										
Lottery B								€2	1.5									€	0		

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A										€	10										
Lottery B		€	0							€	10							€4	10		

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery										€	10										
А																					
Lottery								€1	L4									€	0		
В																					

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A										€	10										
Lottery			€:	10							€	0						€4	45		
В																					

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A		€13																			
Lottery B								€:	18									€	0		

9 10 11 12 13

7 8

€0

€40

D6. Decision sheet for one stage (1-3)

1 2 3 4 5 6

€ 5

€12

Lottery

А

Lottery

В

14 15

€40

€0

16 17 18 19 20

€ 28

€5

15/17

16/17	
10/1/	

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A						€	0				€4	15		€ 25		€10					
Lottery B	€ 10	€	15			€45								€	0						

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A					€10										€0						
Lottery								€	0									€4	10		
В																					

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A				€1	10									€	0						
Lottery B								€	0									€4	10		

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Ī	Lottery						€	0							€4	15		€		€8		
	А																	30				
ſ	Lottery	€	€2	15			€45								€	0						
	В	8																				

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A										€1	7.5										
Lottery B								€2	24									€	0		

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	1
Lottery			€10										€0								1
А																					
Lottery								€	0									€1	L4		1
В																				ļ	

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lott A	· ´	€10 €0																				
Lott E	,								€	0									€4	15		

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A			€13										€0								
Lottery B								€	0									۔	18		

(2-2	3)																				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A										€:	10										
Lottery B			€0								€10							€4	40		

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery						€	0				€3	85		€		€8					
A																	30				
Lottery	€	€1	12			€35								€	0						
В	8																				

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A			€17.5										€0								
Lottery	€0 €24																				
В																					

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A										€:	19										
Lottery B								€ž	25									€	0		

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	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A			€19										€0								
Lottery	€0													€:	25						
В																					

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A	€0													€4	10		€ 25		€5		
Lottery	€ €10 €40													€	0						
В	5																				

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A										€	8										
Lottery B																					

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A										€	8										
Lottery B	€0 €8 €20																				

(3-																					
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
Lottery A	€8 €0																				
Lottery B								€	0									€	20		

Online Appendix