

Social Indicators Research Series 82

Alex C. Michalos *Editor*

The Pope of Happiness

A Festschrift for Ruut Veenhoven

 Springer

Social Indicators Research Series

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The Pope of Happiness

A Festschrift for Ruut Veenhoven

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Preface

Some years ago, I sent a note to Ruut saying something like “People seldom take the time to tell their scholarly friends how much they have learned from them and how much they feel lucky to have known them”. Ruut wrote back sending thanks and saying that he would be sure to tell his mother. I’m sure the thanks were sincere. I had a good laugh and still have a happy memory about the mother part of his response. In any case, Ruut, this festschrift is another treat for you and your mother, and actually, for me and probably your friends who have contributed to it.

When I have been asked what a festschrift is I usually say it’s the sort of thing a little drummer boy would do for someone admired if the boy could write but couldn’t play a drum. Scholars use the festschrift to celebrate other scholars. Socrates said he would talk to stones if he thought they would listen. With a festschrift, we honour someone by giving her or him a piece of our mind assuming it will be as much of a joy to the receiver as it is to the giver.

When I thought about preparing this collection, it occurred to me that many of our friends (Ruut’s and mine) are a bit long in the tooth, as horse breeders say. They are in various stages of retirement, with various levels of denial, and various levels of infrastructural support, energy and time. In order to accommodate folks who, for one reason or another, can’t produce a scholarly article right now but would like to join in the celebration, I suggested that letters would also be welcome. It was impossible for me to know everyone who might want to contribute to the collection, but I tried to cast my net as broadly as possible, including friends and former students from around the world.

I think I first read something by Ruut in the 1970s. It was a submission to *Social Indicators Research*. My policy throughout the 40 years that I edited the journal was such that whenever I had a submission that seemed to me to be extraordinarily good, I would invite the author to join the editorial board. I remember being told by a professor at Princeton that his department only added members if they thought the person was the best in the world. I asked him if he thought anyone believed him, but I don’t recall his response. Anyhow, he did give me an idea of how to add editorial board members. I don’t know if anyone I appointed to the board was the best in the

world, but Ruut was certainly extraordinary and that was certainly good enough for *SIR*.

I think I first met Ruut in 1986 in New Delhi at a meeting of the Working Group on Social Indicators of the International Sociological Association. Fortunately, we have a photo of some participants at that meeting and it is included at the end of this collection. Some of the authors of chapters in the collection are also in that photo.

I only recall one thing about that meeting. When we were going around the room with self-introductions, a woman said she was not particularly interested in social indicators but she had shopped around for sessions to attend and she came to ours because she thought we were having more fun than anyone else. We probably were, except several people had stomach problems from something they ate.

I also recall standing in the street after the meeting and running into Ruut. My wife and I were heading home, but he said he was off to Kathmandu. Something about this guy in shirtsleeves on a very hot day sauntering off to the mountains reminded me of a Chaplin film with the indestructible little tramp gingerly bopping along off to somewhere deep in a mountain range. As I recall, he (Chaplin, not Ruut) turned up in a cabin boiling his shoe and eating its laces like spaghetti. Years later Ruut told me he had been to Bhutan to help with the development of their Gross National Happiness Index. At the time, they had no data, but I'm sure they profited from Pope Ruut's blessing on their work.

In 1999, Ruut came to Ed Diener and me with the idea for a new journal for happiness research. Ed thought that serious scholars might avoid a journal devoted to studying happiness because they would think it was a trivial topic. He thought we would do much better with 'subjective well-being' in the title rather than 'happiness'. I thought that because there was a journal called 'Pain' and one called 'Death', one with 'happiness' in the title was overdue. So, we voted and gave birth to the *Journal of Happiness Studies*. The plan was to take turns serving as Editor in Chief, beginning with Ruut. As it turned out, Ruut volunteered to take my turn too.

When I was working at the University of Guelph, students who knew about my research called me 'Dr. Happy'. The president of the university was a soil scientist, affectionately known as 'Dr. Dirt'. Someone told me he knew a garbage researcher whose students called him 'Dr. Shit'. You might wonder how the label 'Pope' was fixed to Ruut. Well, sometime in the early 1970s I met Friedhelm Gehrman, a new *SIR* board member. He greeted me with "Ah, the Pope of happiness." and I responded with "Ah, not me. Veenhoven is the Pope of happiness". It just seemed to me then as now that Ruut was more interested in happiness than I or anyone else was, or is, for that matter. I guess we could have hit upon 'the king' or 'the chairman of the board', but Friedhelm picked 'the Pope' and that still seems right to me.

Finally, Ruut, I hope this volume contributes to your happiness as much as your friendship and scholarship has contributed to all of ours.

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Chapter 1

Ruut Veenhoven's Livability Concept and Children's Happiness Around the Globe



Sergiu Bălăţescu

Introduction

I was deep into Ruut Veenhoven's views long before meeting him in person in 2001. Doing my first year of bachelor training in Sociology at the University of Bucharest I came across his books *Conditions of happiness* and *Happiness in nations*. While I already had some contact with this topic by doing fieldwork for the newly established Romanian Institute of Quality of Life, Ruut's systematic approach to the variation of happiness entirely captivated me. I became passionate by the sociological approach to happiness research and this was the main focus my doctoral program. Later I learned that Ruut donated copies of his works to the Central University Libraries in Central and Eastern Europe. He planted seeds and these were germinating. When I finally visited him, I was already writing my thesis on *Happiness in the Social Context of Romanian Post-communist Transition*.

In 2001, when I had the chance to receive an international travel grant, my choice was obvious, so I spent three months at the World Database of Happiness at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. As an Eastern European PhD student, having the occasion to visit this monument of knowledge that was Ruut's work was like being a child locked for many nights alone in a candy store (although I suppose that many other happiness researchers with access to more sources than me felt the same). But it was much more than being alone with what I like: staying each day in Ruut's office was a privilege. Not only that he had the time, patience and generosity to "show me the ropes" of an academic career in QOL research, and to introduce me to people and institutions, but also the daily interactions, all the discussions we had meant for me a huge advance in knowledge. Not to speak about his tonic personality that simply

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emanate enthusiasm and happiness. Overall, this experience was probably the most important factor that shaped my career.

Further interaction with him, as friend and sometimes collaborator to his projects, kept me feeling privileged. We met in many occasions, including when he visited Romania. And the result was somehow unexpected: although I went to him to propose my social constructionist point of view on happiness, in most of my works I found myself arguing in the same line with his livability theory. Not only because I found his approach the most sociological in a field otherwise dominated by psychologists. But also because I believe his theory was proven to explain changes in levels and structure of happiness in our societies. Linking happiness with satisfaction of needs was a basic approach that explain most of variation in time of subjective well-being in post-communist societies. While trying to find evidence of public mood influences that would explain variation of the subjective well-being levels in post-communist Romania, I was in the end reaching the same conclusions as Ruut when he was answering to the question: *Are the Russians as Unhappy as they say they are?* Yes, like in case of Russia, the Romanian's discontent in the 1990s, apart from any cultural trait or comparison effect, was strongly predicted by the "troublesome transitions" (Veenhoven 2001, p. 111) that were taking place in my country.

Somehow my research trajectory intersected with Ruut's even beyond that, and I found myself exploring many correlates of happiness in which he was also interested, such as freedom, participation and tolerance. Moreover, I also became interested in methods of converting levels from happiness scales with different numbers of response options.

The interest in well-being of children and adolescents that conduced to my participation in the first international survey on child well-being (Children's Worlds) made me came across (and actually participate in the production of) data that at a first glance would not support Ruut's claims. In international comparisons, happiness of children was unexpectedly, and even annoyingly for some researchers, not correlated with the same variables like adult happiness (for example, with GDP). However, a closer look at the data suggest that it may also fit the livability theory. And that once again highlights the massive theoretical importance of Ruut's work.

Background

About fifty years ago, the scientific world witnessed an explosive development in the field of research on quality of life. Starting with the surveys run by Bradburn and Noll (1969) at NORC, the public opinion barometers introduced items that measure life satisfaction, defined as the overall assessment that a person make of his or her life. This social indicator came to be included in the major public opinion barometers (for a review see Michalos et al. 2009). Dedicated quality of life surveys have been introduced, for example in Europe (Eurofound 2014). As a result, we benefit from a

high quantity of data on life satisfaction, ranging from several decades and covering most of the countries in the world.

This was an incentive for the international comparative studies on happiness in nations, most of them collected by Ruut Veenhoven within his major project of the World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven 1995). Among the many correlations that can be easily studied with the use of this collection, one of the most frequent is that between GDP and happiness (Veenhoven 1997–2010). The amount of data provides us with the firm knowledge that there is a strong correlation between the wealth of nations, measured by GDP per capita, and levels of happiness of their adult members (Schyns 2003; Deaton 2008; Zagorski et al. 2014). In other words, the divide between rich and poor societies has been translated into the divide between happy and unhappy societies.

Children's well-being research, on the other hand, was scarce and localized. Most of public opinion barometers use respondents over 18 years (and only some of them over 15). International studies with school children such as PISA target children above 14. Thus, children under this age were largely excluded from systematic international comparisons. The first global study that targeted this group was the Children's Worlds project (www.isciweb.org). The data collected within this study is a good premise for an international effort to compare levels and correlates of subjective well-being in children.

Comparative studies based on this data show a different picture of the international distribution of life satisfaction in children. It seems there is no similar correlation at national level between GDP and subjective well-being of children (Bradshaw and Rees 2015). For example, it was found that children in medium-income countries (such as Romania, Columbia, and Turkey) have the highest levels of measured happiness within the whole sample (Bălăţescu and Bacter 2016). On the other hand, children from some wealthy societies (South Korea, UK) are among the unhappiest (Rees and Main 2015).

In the following I will try to show how Ruut Veenhoven's livability theory (1993) can help to advance the understanding of correlates of child well-being. I will argue that apart from its merits in linking subjective well-being with fulfilment of needs, which makes it probably the only major sociological paradigm of variation of subjective well-being, the concept of livability proves its usefulness by its dual nature: not only the offerings of society matter for individual happiness, but also its requests (Veenhoven 2000). I will argue that this would explain why in countries with highly challenging and competitive school systems (South Korea, Great Britain), children are under strong pressure, which lowers their levels of happiness (Rees and Main 2015). Then I will present a suggestion for testing the livability theory to explain national variations in children's happiness.

Research in Children's Subjective Well-being: Implications

Subjective well-being of children became a subject for research and public policy only recently. According to Ben-Arieh (2008), three developments count as explanations for this fact. First, the normative framework provided by the United Nation's Convention on the Rights of the Child, that stated four very important principles: *nondiscrimination* (article 2), *the best interest of the child* (article 3), *survival vs. development* (article 6), and *respecting the view of the child* (article 12). Second, the "New" Sociology of Childhood, according to which, being in a permanent interaction with their environment, children "play an active role in creating their well-being by balancing the different factors, developing and making use of resources, and responding to stress" (Ben-Arieh 2008, p. 6). Finally, The Ecology of Child Development, which focuses on *microsystem*, *mesosystem*, and *exosystem* of the children's lives, three dynamic and interdependent instances. "In interacting with the different systems and subsystems, children and their families encounter both barriers and facilitators. These barriers and facilitators can, in many respects, be considered indicators of child well-being" (Ben-Arieh 2008, pp. 6–7).

The research on the subjective well-being of children has many implications on methodological, theoretical and policy levels. Methodological implications are linked with the relevance and reliability of children's answers. The theoretical implications deal with the discrepancy between the determinants of SWB in children compared to those in adults. The policy implications start with the question if we can go beyond the rights of children framework and we can design policies for children happiness. In the following I will mostly discuss the methodological and theoretical implications.

Methodological Implications

Casas (2009) offers a suggestive illustration on the methodological dilemmas raised by the research on subjective well-being of children. Today, he claims, we ask questions such as: "May (subjective) information given by *children and adolescents* have any relevance at macro-social level?", "Are subjective data from *children and adolescents* valid and reliable?", and "Could that data from *children and adolescents* be useful for political decision-making?". However, warns the author, these were exactly the same questions which asked more than 40 years ago, but about adults. And the response of the scientific community was a "yes", as will probably will be the case with the questions about children.

The results of the Children's Worlds project provide some practical answers to these methodological questions. Started in 2009 by a group of researchers, mainly from the International Society for Child Indicators (ISCI), it produced in 2011 a first wave with 34,500 children from 14 countries—8, 10, and 12 years. Between 2013 and 2014 a second wave was realized. It was financed by Jacobs foundation and it

included more than 56.000 children from 21 countries, with national representative samples for each data group. The third wave started in 2017 and involves more than 35 countries (** 2011).

The questionnaire includes items on household composition, material well-being, relationships with friends and other people, the area in which children live, school, health, leisure time and self. Factual data are completed with opinion questions and several satisfaction scales such as one-item life satisfaction scale (OLS), but also the *Multidimensional Life Satisfaction Scale for Children* (SLSS—Huebner 1994), the *Brief Multidimensional Student Life Satisfaction Scale* (BMSLS—Cummins and Lau 2005), an adapted Personal Wellbeing Index scale with 9 items (PWI-SC9—Casas et al. 2012), and the Russell's Core Affect scale (Russell 1980). All these items showed a good reliability (Casas 2016) although the potential for international comparison of some psychometric scales is limited (Casas and Rees 2015).

Theoretical Implications

One of the most important and puzzling results of the second wave of the survey was the mismatch between the determinants of SWB of adults and children at country levels. Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of GDP per capita (2012) and life satisfaction of children of 10 and 12 years collected in 2013, as computed from data published by Rees and Main (2015).

No linear model could fit the data. The relationship between the GDP per capita and life satisfaction would rather fit a cubic equation (R^2 cubic = 0.255—see Fig. 1.2). This seems to be the result of a third variable or to reflect more complex dependency between the two variables.

Bradshaw and Rees (2015) have tried to find this third variable. They tested 100 social, economic, political, religious and cultural indicators at national level which they correlated with average life satisfaction of children from the countries participating in the study. Results were “frustrating”: only inflation is positively correlated with SWB of children, but in a “perverse direction” (the higher the inflation in a country the higher the children's levels of subjective well-being). This leads them to the conclusions that “macro explanations for subjective well-being are either bizarre or end up as chicken pox”.¹

Our knowledge on the subject faces the main challenge of explaining why are the determinants of children's SWB different than those for adults. For that, in my opinion, a very productive way is to propose a sociological explanation. In recent years, strong research efforts were directed towards a more refined and deep

¹In a later article, the same authors found a positive correlation between national averages of adult subjective well-being and children subjective well-being but only excluding Romania and South Korea. They also conclude that their “attempts to analyze the macro factors associated with between country differences in mean subjective well-being scores is hampered by the relatively small number of countries in the sample” (Bradshaw and Rees 2017, p. 11).




Fig. 1.1 GDP per capita (2012) and life satisfaction of children from the age groups of 10 and 12 years (built from the data computed by Rees and Main (2015))

understanding of children’s lives. Children subjective well-being reflect their different values and aspirations, agency types and environmental conditions than those of adults (Fattore et al. 2017). Based on the concept of ‘livability’ introduced by Veenhoven (1993) I will suggest a correlate that would explain the variation of national averages of children subjective well-being.

Veenhoven’s Livability: Applications to Determinants of Children’s Happiness

The term “livability” was introduced by Ruut Veenhoven (1993) to explain the determinants of happiness. “Livability of a nation was defined as the fit of its provisions and requirements to needs and capacities of its citizens” (Veenhoven 1996, p. 7). Thus, the concept fits into the environmental chances of life. In his model of “the four qualities of life”, livability lies at the intersection between life chances (conditions for a good life) and external qualities, that means it is an external input to one’s live (see Fig. 1.3).




Fig. 1.2 GDP per capita (2012) and life satisfaction of children from the age groups of 10 and 12 years (based on the data computed by Rees and Main (2015))

| | Outer qualities | Inner qualities |
|--------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| Life chances | Livability of environment | Life-ability of the person |
| Life results | Utility of life | Appreciation of life |

Fig. 1.3 The four qualities of life (Veenhoven 2000, p. 6)

While generally linked with standard of life and wealth of society, livability is, according to Ruut Veenhoven, “a better word, because it refers explicitly to a characteristic of the environment and does not have the limited connotation of material conditions” (Veenhoven 2000, p. 2).

Indeed, this concept refers to the degree to which the offers of society fit the needs of the inhabitants. In this respect, one of the objectives of further research is to focus

on the discrepancy between the needs of the children compared with those of the adults. For example, standard of living and social relationships are among the best predictors of happiness in adult life. On the contrary, the results of the Children's Worlds project show that satisfaction with freedom is the highest predictor of subjective well-being SWB in children, while material aspects have only a low influence (Bradshaw and Rees 2017).

To explain these results, we should focus on the constraints of children's lives, in order to properly understand their perceived needs and how these influence their happiness. Children have a very limited freedom; their lives are mostly governed by their parents or tutors. Thus, it is conceivable that freedom and autonomy become particularly salient for their subjective well-being. And this in turn starts to be recognized by theorists and policy makers: "It can be argued that the widening of the idea of the individual's right to freedom, as part of modernity, to various groups—slaves and women—has more recently extended to children as well" (Fattore et al. 2017, p. 69).

This is linked with another, very important aspect of the concept of livability, which makes it very useful in explaining why are big differences between predictors of subjective well-being in children and those in adults. According to Ruut Veenhoven, this concept involves also a fit between the requests of the societies and the capabilities of their members. As we know, for children and adolescents the most important challenge in terms of effort and skills is school. Thus, it may be understandable that in countries with very competitive school systems children are unhappier irrespective of the material wealth of these societies.

South Korea is an excellent case study that reflects the new South-Asian educational model. Giving the need for insertion of the graduates in a very competitive economy, the school system prepares children for a series of very difficult exams. Children have to take extra classes under the supervisor of parents. South Korean teenagers spend more time studying than adolescents in other OECD countries and at the same time are the unhappiest among those of countries surveyed by this organization, as shown by the PISA studies (OECD 2019). This confirms the findings of a study realized by Yonsei University with over 6400 teenagers and some hint towards the fact that teenagers are too busy with their studies and feel insecure and cannot establish their own identity at this critical age (Song 2011). The Asian specific authoritarian parental style that put pressure on children to learn, namely "helicopter parenting" (LeMoyné and Buchanan 2011) or "tiger parenting" (Chua 2011), is supposed to accentuate academic stress with negative effects on their mental health.

This case study should nevertheless be confirmed by large correlational studies. In their interpretation of the PISA results the authors of OECD group recognize the worries about "the culture of overwork in education, where high achievement equals hours of homework, catch-up classes, after-school lessons, long school terms and frequent testing". Adolescents, they write, "just like adults, need time every day to unwind and interact with their peers. Too much pressure in schools might mean that students feel compelled to spend more time studying, leaving less time for these non-academic activities, at the expense of students' quality of life" (OECD 2017,




Fig. 1.4 Life satisfaction and percentage of students who study 60 hours or more per week. Source: plotted data from PISA 2015 Results (Volume III) Students' Well-Being (Table III.3.6 Time spent studying in and out of school and life satisfaction) (OECD 2017)

p. 75). However, when comparing life satisfaction of the “hard learners” with the other categories of teenagers, they found that the direction and level of differences differs from one country to another.

But what is the case for the 15 countries involved in the wave 2 of Children's worlds studies that gave such puzzling results? In the following I analyzed the national level averages of the life satisfaction from the PISA 2015 study with the percentage of students who study less than 40 hours per week, respective 60 hours or more per week. If Ruut Veenhoven's model is correct, higher requirements from society would be negatively correlated with subjective well-being.

Only 9 countries out of 15 have in PISA 2015 available data for all these variables. In the following I will display the correlation between the self-reported weekly time of study and life satisfaction.

As we can see from Fig. 1.4, overwork negatively pays, and countries with larger proportions of adolescents who study more than 60 hours per week have lower life satisfaction. 36% of the variation in average life satisfaction is predicted by this percent.

On the contrary, the relationship of life satisfaction with the percent of “short time learners” is also significant: 25% of the variation in average life satisfaction is




Fig. 1.5 Life satisfaction and percentage of students who learn less than 40 hours a week. Source: plotted data from PISA 2015 Results (Volume III) Students' Well-Being (Table III.3.6 Time spent studying in and out of school and life satisfaction) (OECD 2017)

predicted by the percent of adolescent in the country that study less than 40 hours per week (Fig. 1.5).

In summary, average study overload explains up to a third of the variation in happiness levels at least for 9 of the 15 countries included in the second wave of Children's worlds study. This is consistent with the results that children living in societies with more demanding school systems and a more authoritarian family approach to learning are unhappier irrespective of the material wealth of these societies. In children's views happiness is governed by different laws that of adult happiness. As Ruut Veenhoven would put it, livability of a society is not limited to the material conditions, and includes also factors linked with demands of modern societies.

Conclusions

Since the first international comparative studies on happiness in nation, it became an established knowledge that there is a strong correlation between the wealth of nations (GDP per capita) and the levels of happiness of their adult members. Thus,

the divide between rich and poor societies was translated into the divide between happy and unhappy societies.

However, the results of the first global study on children's well-being (Children's World (www.isciweb.org), financed by Jacobs foundation, $n > 35.000$ within 15 countries, age 8–13) could not produce a similar correlation at national level between GDP and subjective well-being of children. For example, it was found that children in medium-income countries (such as Romania and Columbia) have the highest levels of measured happiness within the whole sample while children from some wealthy societies (South Korea, Great Britain) are among the unhappiest. In order to solve this puzzle I suggest that we should examine a much larger array of societal factors which contribute to subjective well-being (considered by Veenhoven (1993) under the name 'livability'). The concept of livability is dual in nature: not only the offerings of society matters for individual happiness, but also its demands (Veenhoven 2000). I argue that this would explain why in countries with highly challenging and competitive school systems (South Korea, Great Britain), children are under strong pressure, which lowers their levels of happiness (Rees and Main 2015).

These are only suggestions and a careful empirical exploration of these variables should follow. If this hypothesis is confirmed, the counter-productive effect of study overload has in my opinion important policy implications. These should include, but are not limited to interventions of increasing the efficiency the learning process by making it more intensive and less time extensive, actions to make duty (school) more pleasant for adolescents, and interventions to increase happiness in schools.

We also raise the question on how social indicators research should adapt in order to be able to inform and inspire changes in educational policies and also in happiness policy regarding children? This calls for a closer look to the children's indicators in order to target the happiness of children and adolescents and to build the "new child-centered domains in quality of life research" (Ben-Arieh 2000).

Whatever the challenges posed by the interpretation of the results on determinants of happiness, one fact is clear: Ruut Veenhoven's theory of livability is not only important in explaining changes in levels and structure of adult happiness in contemporary societies but also offers a framework to explain children and adolescent happiness. And that once again highlights the massive theoretical importance of his work.

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Chapter 2

Pursuing Happiness on the Road Less Traveled



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Introduction

‘Traveling makes men wiser, but less happy’, wrote Thomas Jefferson (1787) in a letter to his cousin. One of the problems for travelers is the Mona-Lisa-effect. If you visit the Louvre in Paris, you may expect something of an epiphany when you will be confronted with Leonardo Da Vinci’s most famous painting. In reality the painting looks exactly the same as the picture of it on a biscuit tin. Disappointment sets in and is the consequence of huge expectations. This essay explores the question if traveling can be happier if we allow ourselves to be surprised more often. A lack of advance preparation may be of help.

The super-rich provide an illustration of our own behavior during holidays. For those who have had their fill of the world’s most luxurious cruises, there is now the 24 day tour past the world’s most exquisite highlights. The delights include Copacabana-beach in Rio de Janeiro, the Galapagos Islands and observing mountain gorillas in Rwanda. Fifty passengers travel to these destinations by private jet, sleeping in five star hotels, eating Michelin starred meals and free champagne. Additionally, guests can call on the various expedition services provided at any time from the ‘expedition-doctor’, guides and other attendants. According to the Guardian, this voyage costs € 128.000 a person when two people travel together. Those who want a single room have to pay a € 10.000 surcharge (Neate 2020).

This description of this highly efficient tour shows us our free time has become part of the experience economy. Whenever we have a day off, we no longer fold out our chairs at the side of the road to just sit down and enjoy some peace and quiet,

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instead, we want each and every moment of our lives to be special (Andersson 2007). For this reason, people often opt for a package holiday. We want our rental car to stand ready at our destination and we like it if our route has already been planned by someone who knows the area like the back of their hand. This way we see the popular tourist attractions and are assured of a decent bed and good breakfast at every hotel. Even the memories we want to create are planned in advance. Think of highlights such as whale safaris, sitting in a jacuzzi while gazing at the northern light or drinking the coconut milk straight from the shelf on a secluded beach.

Holidays should offer us the highest high's that are within reach of our financial situation. Generally speaking, we actually succeed at achieving this rather well. On average, we feel happier during holidays, and we experience an increase in vigor for a short period of time after a trip. Daily life quickly brings us back to normal levels, but we are not plagued by the regret Jefferson feared (Nawijn et al. 2010; Veenhoven 2020).

Psychiatrist Dirk de Wachter (2019) would say that the search for ultimate holiday happiness is for a large degree about 'Me, me, me!'. In times of climate change maybe we should take the maximum capacity of our nerves into account. Nerve cells grow numb responding to continuous powerful stimuli. A nerve that has adapted to strong stimulation, will give off weakened signals to the rest of the nervous system. This phenomenon also applies the other way around when there is a lack of stimuli: nerve cells become more sensitive. In such a case, small stimuli are enough to trigger a response (Kandel et al. 1991). This phenomenon is called hedonistic adaptation when the pleasure center of our brains are involved. The good stuff induces less pleasure with repeated exposure (Lyubomirsky 2010). Raymond Chandler put it like this: 'The first kiss is magic. The second is intimate. The third is routine.' The self-made billionaire on the hunt for the ultimate experience will, when he or she succeeds, experience the same rush of freedom and delight as he or she experienced as a child camping at a lake with parents. Yet this will be only if he or she is lucky. Maybe observing the mountain gorillas will be a letdown because the animals are sleeping when the rich tourist arrives to see them in their duly planned hour. Unfortunately, the tourists cannot stay and watch for a little longer, as they must move on to the next highlight. Not a minute must be wasted. Combine this feeling with jetlag and maybe one would arrive at the conclusion that the ultimate experience tour was something of a letdown.

The catch in the search for more exotic and luxurious pleasure is that our experiences are not only dependent on the stimuli, but also on our expectations. We are especially happy when an event exceeds our expectations (Frijda 1988). A clean shower with plenty of warm water feels like heaven while camping, but the same shared sanitary facilities would be unacceptable to us in a five star hotel.

The search for 'the' optimal experience is partly neutralized by the rising expectations that are accompanied by such efforts. If I would encounter a wolf while walking my dogs in the forests of the Veluwe near my house, where wolves have not roamed for decades, I would be exhilarated, or terrified if it decided to move in my direction, but when I see an entire pack of wolves in a zoo, I shrug the experience off as just another group of canines.

The Mona-Lisa-Effect

I came up with the term Mona-Lisa-effect to describe disappointing highlights, after 16-year-old I went to Paris with my sister for the first time. My father had offered us a ride, because he had to work in the City of Lights for one day. We created a race against time: Could we make it to the Eiffel tower, the Arc du Triomphe, Montmartre, the Notre Dame, the Sacré-Coeur and the Louvre in a single day? Inside of the Louvre, we rushed to see the world's most famous painting: the Mona Lisa. It was hard to see behind the hordes of visitors. It was not that large and it looked exactly the same as the picture of it on my Mom's biscuit tin. Disappointed, I left the Louvre. Looking back at this moment forty years later, I think that I could not really see the beauty of her smile straight from the Renaissance era, because I was expecting something of an epiphany.

An open, curious mindset without too many expectations could enrich moments of happiness. During travels, the unexpected moments are usually my favorites. Slowly, an idea formed in my mind. Maybe I could derive more pleasure from my holidays if I focused less on what I wanted to experience, while changing my mentality to be more open to enjoying the unexpected.

So, when I was planning my latest holiday, I faced a problem. I wanted to travel by bike to Santiago di Compostela, but I already knew too many people who had immensely enjoyed doing so, and I had read several travel journals and seen various films and documentaries on the destination (Albers 2007). I found myself full of anticipatory fun, but how would I actually enjoy the travel, when I had been looking forward to it for the past fifteen years?

The solution presented itself when I decided that it would be a great idea to get myself a handy app or navigational aid for the journey. I would only have to download the route, and the machine would lead me past peaceful villages and secluded pathways. I faced the problem of having to pick the best navigation aid out of a huge variety of options. In the end, I succumbed to choice overload (Schwartz 2004). Impulsively, I decided to go to the other extreme. I would travel without a map, like people in the Dark ages. If one wanted to reach Santiago from the Netherlands, all one would have to do is follow the coast. You would take quite the detour in Bretagne, but fortunately that is a part of France I would not mind to see a bit more of. With the help of google maps I found that it would take me five weeks to reach my destination, if I could keep up a pace of a hundred kilometers a day.

For this journey, I decided not to search for ultimate pleasure, but for an abundance of the mundane. I would try to not strive for that which I wanted most, but to desire that which I would have (Larsen and McKibban 2008): a long holiday, a lovely partner to travel with me, a lot of beautiful views of the sea, and the thrill of a hint of uncertainty. Did this help me to achieve a bit of extra happiness?

Missing Our Target

As expected, travelling without a map had its disadvantages. Close to home, it turned out that Dordrecht was a much larger city than expected, and my own sense of direction kept leading us back into it. The world is filled with roads and paths and some seem to start in the right direction, but eventually curve back to a different destination. In Dordrecht, I found this frustrating, but not having a map or app turned out to be a concealed advantage. When you follow your own sense of direction in unknown territory, you usually do not even notice all the extra kilometers you make. Ignorance is bliss.

A large disadvantage of this way of travelling was that we never reached our destination. We did not get lost entirely. You ask locals for help and you just follow their directions. The experience that so many people were willing to help me, was heartwarming. Sadly, when our time was up, we had just reached the Spanish border. We chalked not reaching our destination down to the fault of the extremely hot summer weather.

Looking back, one of the things that stands out is that frustrations were tied to the highlights of the journey. The night when we could not find a camp site we rolled out our sleeping bags in a field with a nice view of a beach. The next morning, we discovered that the surfers were already up, en masse at around seven a.m. for the best waves. Another night without a place to sleep, we were invited to spend the night in the garden of strangers who had a pool in their backyard.

I was most stressed out when we couldn't find how to cross the *Pont de Normandie*, a bridge that would take us 200 meters above the Seine. The bridge contains a highway, but also a small path for bicycles and bikes right next to it, where cars and lorries were allowed to travel 'only' 90 kilometers an hour. We kept searching for the entrance to this path, but could only find a way onto the highway for cars only, or we could pass below the bridge to the wrong direction. Cheating by using *google maps* sent us back to the ramp that was allowed for cars only. Eventually we looked so desperate that a small Renault stopped to ask us what was wrong. The woman inside showed us the way to a small path that wasn't indicated anywhere in the surrounding area. She drove in front of us at a pace we could keep up with for at least 8 kilometers. Thankful, but also frightened because of the height and the fast-moving vehicles way to close for comfort at our side, we finally crossed the bridge. In the end, we did not pay a high price for embracing the unexpected.

The Miracle of Being on the Right Track

Travelling without a map or planned route also had the expected advantages of the unexpected. Somewhere in the middle of nowhere in France we saw a small sign that said 'coffee' at the driveway of someone's home. We parked our bikes against a barn

and rang the bell as we saw a parasol in the garden. Inside, there was not only a fully decorated pub, but also some kind of strange museum which was filled to the brim with old billboards, spray bottles, teapots and other stuff one could expect to find at a flea market. The stuff covered every square inch. The owner did not really feel like chatting, but she did tell us that we were the first customers of the day. Some days there would be no visitors at all, and other days as many as six. The coffee was delicious and I felt like I had stumbled upon a hidden treasure. When we left, I saw plaques hanging outside on the wall, indicating in which popular travel guides this place was mentioned. The place was no longer our unique find, and thunderstruck I considered if it was worth going out of our way for the visit. The place was as wacky as denoted in the travel guides, but I realized that I would have seen it as so much rubbish if I had read about it beforehand. The extraordinary pub had lost the extra appeal.

The best part of our trip was that the ‘no-worry, we’ll see what we run into’ attitude to travelling that led me to the realization of how many beautiful places the world has to offer. If you do not know where to go, you’ll automatically pay more attention to your surroundings. An unexpected source of joy were the many signs we encountered that pointed to Santiago di Compostela, these comforted us that we were still on the right track, and that we somehow, in our own way, were part of something bigger.

I definitely think we experienced our journey with a bit more of a fresh outlook, but the biggest advantage was that we did not have a fixed schedule. We just woke up without an alarm, ate whenever we started to feel hungry and kept going until it was too hot to do so. We continued on our bike in the evening and searched for a place to stay the night when dusk started to fall. We could simply autonomously follow our own impulses, and we pretended we could afford the expenditure of time (Mogilner and Norton 2016).

The Sacré-Coeur-Effect

The search for the unexpected was worth it in our book. Lack of planning can counter the Mona-Lisa-effect, but, to be fair, I have also experienced highlights at moments when the Mona-Lisa-effect could have kicked in. After crossing the bridge across the Seine that I mentioned earlier, we sat down at a café terrace at the harbor of Honfleur. Having traveled in France quite often, I had been here at least ten times before, however, every time I go back here I am surprised at the sheer beauty and cozy business of this place. I know exactly what to expect, yet I enjoyed it all the same. Maybe, I should dub this the Sacré-Coeur-effect, after the same first visit to Paris with my sister. This because I can remember the joy I felt when I saw the white cream-cake of a church just as well as the disappointment I experienced in the Louvre.

The Sacré-Coeur-effect springs forth from the fact that happiness is not completely relative to or dependent on expectations. Most people who have fulfilled

their basic needs of relatedness, competence and autonomy feel happy. The pursuit of the greatest happiness of the greatest number is not a dead-end. Those who have their needs met, generally feel happy (Veenhoven 2010). If your mindset can help you to enjoy the ordinary, why would you not also experience delight in the harbor of Honfleur.

The Road Less Traveled

Looking back at our cycling journey, I think of it as a successful attempt to escape the competitive aspects of the experience economy. We tried simply to enjoy the mundane, in things like coffee, cycling, sun and our changing surroundings. While travelling, we simplified life to where we would go at the next intersection, where we would find food and where we would stay the night. Was travelling without a map a handy trick that helped to intensify this experience?

I wonder whether my journey was more fulfilling than the tour around the highlights of the world of the super-rich. It is tempting to cite Robert Frost (1874–1963) here, to pat myself on the shoulder: *Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—I took the one less traveled by, / And that has made all the difference.* These words perfectly capture the essence of the glorious feeling of having done something unique, different and better than what other people have done or will do.

Close reading of Frost's poem indicates that delight in the road less traveled is just a trick of our memory. The walker at the crossroads had two roads before that looked the same, and that the traveler only imagined his route to be unique afterwards, because the path had been less worn by travelers (Orr 2015). Probably both myself after my basic biking tour and someone who has flown in a private jet around the world will cite Frost to prove that our own journey was the most happy. The happiness that one garners from travelling is not just dependent on the way one travels, it is especially dependent on the way that one makes the journey remarkable for one's self. One can experience new travels, on well-known paths (Jansen 2012).

People searching for the simple joys of travelling and people who search for the highest highs the world has to offer, will both end up having the idea that their journey was more special than that of the other group. The Mona-Lisa-effect will add to the law of diminishing returns of extra spending on happiness for the tour around the highlights of the world, but the Sacré-Coeur-effect and having needs met, will suffice to make the journey pleasurable, especially if the journey is sufficiently stimulating to body and mind, and not just focused on passive consumption (Sheldon and Lyubomirsky 2019). In the end, research shows that people can afford to be materialistic when it comes to happiness when they have a lot of money (Sirgy et al. 2019).

It is comforting to know however, that happiness in travels is also achievable for modest budgets. It can be achieved for those who worry about climate change, by simply getting on a bike, and going on a poorly prepared journey with an open mindset. Those who want to follow the advice of Jefferson to pursue their own

happiness, do not have to stay at home, especially if we travel to train our ability to savor both ordinary and special occasions (Bryant and Veroff 2007). We need not fear that the wisdom we may acquire on the road of our choosing will make us sad (Bergsma and Ardel 2012).

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Chapter 3

Have the Dutch Become Happier? And What about the Dutch ‘Happiness Professor’, Ruut Veenhoven?



Jeroen Boelhouwer

What is Happiness and can It Be Measured?

It is fairly logical for an article about happiness to begin with the question: what is happiness? The question that immediately follows is then: how can happiness be measured?¹ First, what is happiness? There are several possible answers to this question, all of which crop up regularly in the scientific debate. One way of measuring happiness is to look at people’s satisfaction in different areas of life, such as their home, their work, their income or their circle of friends (Veenhoven 1996). Another perspective focuses on positive and negative emotions and the desired balance between them (Diener and Suh 1997). Yet another approach is the eudemonic perspective, which is based around the concept of ‘flourishing’ (Huppert et al. 2009).

A term that is related to happiness is ‘quality of life’. Veenhoven (2000) distinguishes four quadrants of quality of life (Table 3.1). The quadrants distinguish between life chances and outcomes on the one hand and internal and external qualities on the other. We then have to choose which quadrant suits best. In the words of Veenhoven (2004): “Which of these four meanings of the word happiness is most appropriate as an end-goal? I think [appreciation of life]. Commonly policy aims at improving life-chances by, for example, providing better housing or education, as indicated in the upper half of [Table 3.1]. Yet more is not always better and some opportunities may be more critical than others. The problem is that we need a criterion to assign priorities among the many life-chances policymakers want to

¹This logic is also evident from many articles written by Ruut Veenhoven, which often begin with precisely these two questions.

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Table 3.1 Four quadrants of quality of life

| | Outer qualities | Inner qualities |
|--------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| Life chances | Livability of environment | Life-ability of a person |
| Life results | Utility of life | Appreciation of life |

Source: Veenhoven (2000)

improve. That criterion should be found in the outcomes of life, as shown in the lower half of [Table 3.1]. There, ‘utility’ provides no workable criterion, since external effects are many and can be valued differently. ‘Satisfaction with life’ is a better criterion, since it reflects the degree to which external living conditions ‘fit’ with inner life-abilities.”

Following Veenhovens line of reasoning, in this article we use the term ‘happiness’ in the sense of appreciation of life, or life satisfaction.

We also use the overarching term ‘quality of life’ in this article to make clear that it is important to look not only at happiness, but also at what people actually have and do in their lives. Happiness is then equivalent to subjective quality of life, which is ranged alongside objective quality of life. Elements that make up objective quality of life include people’s housing situation, health status and leisure time use. Looking at objective and subjective aspects together produces a complete picture of quality of life (Noll 2002; Veenhoven 2002a; Stiglitz et al. 2009). That is the approach taken in this article.

The next question is how to measure happiness. Here again, there are several possibilities, naturally depending on which perspective of happiness is adopted. Some argue that happiness can only be measured using a set of questions (for example asking about different areas of life or different emotions). Others argue that one question is enough, for example using the Cantrill ladder (Helliwell et al. 2019) or a question about happiness or life satisfaction (Veenhoven 2002a). In this article we opt for this latter approach. Our principal measure of happiness is based on the question: ‘How happy are you as a person?’. That is not necessarily a better question than those which focus on satisfaction with life, but by using it we are able to go further back in time using the time series at our disposal.²

To measure objective quality of life, we look at a number of separate indicators in this article and summarise the main trends using the Life Situation Index developed by SCP in 1974. We will discuss the content of this index in more detail later.

The purpose of this article is to review how happiness in the Netherlands has developed and what this might tell us about the happiness of the Dutch sociologist and ‘happiness professor’ Ruut Veenhoven. We will come to this at the end of the article. First, we explore a number of key determinants of happiness: social conditions and individual opportunities. We then look at how objective quality of life has changed before examining trends in happiness in general and in Ruut Veenhoven’s happiness in particular.

²There is a correlation though between the questions about happiness and life satisfaction. In 2017 the correlation coefficient was 0.63 (Boelhouwer 2017a).




Fig. 3.1 Trend in GDP since 1974 (index figures). Based on GDP in euro's, price level 2010. (Source: CBS (2020))

Improved Social Conditions and Individual Opportunities

GDP...

We know from research that differences in happiness can be partly ascribed to differences in social conditions and opportunities (Veenhoven 2002b). First, we look at the economy. As regards conditions, the Netherlands is in a good position, both compared with other countries and over time. In fact, things are getting better and better. We can measure this in the first place by how the economy is performing and developing.

Measured by GDP, the Dutch economy has grown strongly since 1974 (Fig. 3.1). Although a few economic crises have caused dips along the way, in general the Netherlands is in a much better position today than 45 years ago.

The Netherlands is also doing well by international standards: measured by GDP, figures from the World Bank show that the Dutch economy is the 17th biggest in the world, whereas in terms of population size it ranks only 66th. The Dutch economy

also performs well on the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index, coming in fourth place.³

...and Beyond

But how well a country is doing depends on more than economic performance alone. Veenhoven has shown that the absence of corruption, quality of governance and all manner of freedoms are also important for subjective well-being. Here again we see the Netherlands scoring highly in the international rankings, for example the Corruption Perception Index, where the Netherlands is in eighth place (the higher the position, the lower the corruption, TI 2019). That position has remained fairly stable since measurements began in 1995, when the Netherlands was in ninth place. The Netherlands also achieves a consistently high score on all manner of freedoms. If we take the data produced by Freedomhouse as a basis, which looks at political rights and civil liberties, the Netherlands has been classified as 'free' since the very first measurement in 1972 (Freedomhouse 2020).

As well as social conditions, individual opportunities are also an important aspect of quality of life. The Human Development Index uses summary measures to indicate a nation's health (life expectancy), opportunities (education level) and income (GDP). Here again, the Netherlands has scored consistently highly since measurements began in 1990 (Fig. 3.2), with rankings amongst the top 10 countries of the world.

Compared with GDP, it seems that the other indicators have improved less, though it is still the case that the Netherlands was and is in a consistently good position. The 'beyond GDP' indicators are probably relevant not only for happiness, but also for economic growth.

Moreover, rankings such as these do not make clear what the trends have been within the Netherlands itself (if all countries improve their performance to the same degree (in a positive or negative sense), or remain stable, little changes in the rankings). Whether it is actually the case that nothing has changed in the opportunities that the Dutch have, is something we can explore by zooming in on the situation for the Netherlands itself. We then see that there have indeed been some major changes. Dutch household income was for example substantially higher in 2017 than in 1990; to what extent this is due to changes in the compilation of the statistics is difficult to determine precisely, but Table 3.2 portrays a sharp rise in income (with a fall averaging 6% between 2007 and 2014 as a result of the economic and financial crisis during that period).

³The World Economic Forum defines competitiveness as: "the set of institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country." (<https://www.weforum.org/reports/how-to-end-a-decade-of-lost-productivity-growth>).




Fig. 3.2 Trend in the Human Development Index for the Netherlands (1990–2018). (Source: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/>)

Table 3.2 Trend in standardised average income, 1990–2017 (in euros $\times 1000$ per year; 2016 prices)

| | 1990 | 2000 | 2007 | 2014 | 2017 |
|--------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| All households | 22.4 | 24.4 | 24.6 | 27.9 | 27.7 |
| | 1990–2000 | 2000–2007 | 2007–2014 | 2000–2014 | 2014–2017 |
| Income changes (%) | 9 | 13 | –6 | 7 | 5 |

Due to statistical changes it is not possible to compare incomes in 2017 with those in 1990. Comparisons are only possible for the periods referred to in the income changes row

Source: Wildeboer-Schut and Ras (2017)

As well as their incomes, the education level of the Dutch has also risen sharply over the last 25 years (Fig. 3.3a). In 1990, just over 20% of the Dutch population had a degree-level education; in 2016 that had risen to slightly more than 35%. Dutch life expectancy also increased between 1990 and 2016 (Fig. 3.3b), from 73.8 to 79.9 years for men and from 80.1 to 83.1 years for women. During the same period, life expectancy in good health and life expectancy without physical disabilities also increased (Kooiker 2017).





Fig. 3.3 Changes in education level and life expectancy in the Netherlands, 1990–2016. (a) Education level of Dutch population rising steadily. Education level attained, persons aged 25–64 years, 1990–2016 (in percentages). (b) Clear rise in life expectancy visible since 2003, especially in men. Trend in life expectancy at birth, by sex, 1990–2016 (in life years). (Source: Bijl et al. (2017))

Improved Objective Quality of Life

Social conditions and individual opportunities in the Netherlands have thus improved markedly. The question then is whether these improvements have led to a better quality of life. As stated, we draw a distinction between objective and subjective quality of life (Noll 2002; Stiglitz et al. 2009; Boelhouwer 2010). Objective quality of life is concerned with a person’s life situation (what do people have and what do they do?), while subjective quality of life is about how people evaluate their lives and whether they are happy.

We will look first at objective quality of life. In that measure, too, there has been a great improvement over the last 25 years, as illustrated for example by the increased share of homeowners and the fall in the share of people living in very small homes (Kullberg and Ras 2017).⁴ One key development has been the enormous increase in computer ownership and the wide penetration of access to the Internet. Less than a third (30%) of the Dutch population had a computer at home in 1990, but this had risen to 96% in 2013 (Roeters et al. 2017). Access to the Internet was not generally available in 1990; it was not until 1993 that the Internet became something that people could use at home. Since then, it has become widespread: in 1995 only 4% of the Dutch had access to the Internet; by 2013 this had risen to 97%.

The Dutch also take an increasing number of holidays, especially foreign holidays; the average number of foreign holidays rose from 0.7 in 1990 to 1.04 in 2016 (Roeters et al. 2017).

Participation in sport by Dutch people aged between 12 and 79 years also increased between 1990 and 2016. In 1991 roughly 40% of the Dutch frequently took part in sport; after 2000 this increased to more than half.⁵ There has been no further increase in this figure recent years, however (but also no decline).

The fact that we do not see a continuous improvement in objective quality of life across the board is also apparent from the unchanged proportion of Dutch people who engage in volunteering. This proportion has fluctuated over the last 25 years between 25% and 30% (Van Houwelingen and Dekker 2017).⁶ We have also seen an increase in recent years in the percentage of people with poor mental well-being (from 9% in 2008 to 12% in 2018) (Marangos and Kooiker 2019).⁷

Trends in objective quality of life can be summarised in a single indicator, the SCP Life Situation Index, developed by SCP in 1974. The Index contains data on

⁴‘Very small’ here means having a small living room and few bedrooms. Our definition thus differs slightly from the Eurostat indicator for overcrowding, but those figures, too, show that the Dutch have ample living space.

⁵Here again, the measures have changed. In 2007, a frequent sports participant was someone who took part at least 40 weeks per year; thereafter, the measure was changed to someone who participates on a weekly basis.

⁶Compared with other European countries, however, the share of volunteers in the Netherlands is high.

⁷Mental well-being is measured here using the Mental Health Inventory 5 (MHI 5).




Fig. 3.4 Life situation of the Dutch better in 2017 than in 1974. Trend in objective quality of life (measured using the Life Situation Index), persons aged 18 years and older, 1974–2018 (in index figures, 1997 = 100). The two vertical lines represent trend-breaks in the data. The first was caused by a change in the sample design, the second by a switch from a verbal to a written questionnaire. See also note 8. (Source: Source: CBS (LSS'74-'86; DLO'89-'93; POLS-SLI'97-'02); SCP (CV'04-'06); SCP/CBS (CV'08-'18))

eight key social domains: health (degree of impairment due to a disability or chronic disease); housing situation (including home size and type); social and public participation (volunteering, loneliness); participation in sport; living standards (ownership of consumer durables); mobility (car and public transport); sociocultural leisure activities (including cultural participation and hobbies); and holiday behaviour (see Boelhouwer 2010 for an extensive description of the Index). The Index thus enables us to portray trends in quality of life over a period of 45 years.⁸ This reveals that objective quality of life is better today than it was 45 years ago (Fig. 3.4),

⁸Over the last 45 years there have been two trend-breaks in the data: once on the transition to a completely new sample design (between 1993 and 1997) and once when a transition was made from a verbal to a written questionnaire (2004). The impact on objectifiable indicators such as housing or leisure time use are not significant (except in the case of happiness or loneliness). Changes can lead to reduced comparability over time; but they are also useful because they enable indicators to be kept up to date and relevant. In the Life Situation Index we have repaired the trend-breaks by assuming no changes took place between the trend-break years for the Netherlands as a whole. Changes in separate, individual social groups can then still be identified (in relation to the general trend). See also Boelhouwer (2017b).




Fig. 3.5 The Dutch are consistently happy. Trend in average happiness in the Netherlands (1977–2018, in percentages). The vertical line represent a trend-break in the data caused by a switch from a verbal to a written questionnaire. (Source: CBS (LSS’74-’86; DLO’89-’93; POLS-SLI’97-’02); SCP (CV’04-’06); SCP/CBS (CV’08-’18))

notwithstanding a few dips related to economic crises, around 1980 and after 2010. There is a time lag before the effects of these economic crises manifest themselves in people’s lives, and their impact on life situation therefore comes after the actual crisis years. Although quality of life declined after the most recent crisis and has not yet fully recovered, it is still better than it was 45 years ago.

Little Change in Subjective Quality of Life

As we have seen, objective quality of life in the Netherlands has improved over the last 25 years. What about subjective quality of life? To enable us to answer this question, we have access to figures dating back to 1976 (Fig. 3.5). For a good interpretation, we actually need to break this long period down into two segments. The cut-off point is then 2003: before that year, the data were collected in verbal surveys; after 2003, data collection was through written questionnaires. This caused the biggest dip in happiness. That said, we see virtually no movement in the happiness of the Dutch in either period—the pattern is fairly stable. However, based on data from the World Database of Happiness, which combines several surveys, we see a picture of a very slow and gradual but still significant increase in life satisfaction between 1946 and 2015 (Veenhoven 2016). In Fig. 3.5, extrapolating the trend in the period 1976–2003 reveals the same slight increase.

Here again, the Netherlands performs well by international standards, consistently ranking in the top five happiest countries (Helliwell et al. 2019).

The good social conditions and personal opportunities thus not only enable the Dutch economy to flourish, but also mean that the Dutch themselves are happy. One notable caveat here is that, although the improvements in social conditions have led to strong growth in the economy, they have not resulted in a big surge in happiness. Interesting debates have been conducted on the relationship between economic developments and happiness, and about the ‘Easterlin paradox’ (Easterlin 1995; Hagerty and Veenhoven 2003; Veenhoven and Vergunst 2014). To some extent, the differences depend on the period under consideration, but also on the scale in which the variables are expressed: GDP can continue to rise indefinitely, but happiness cannot—it is bounded by a scale maximum. The closer the average approaches that maximum, the smaller the scope for further increases.

Stubborn Differences between Groups

So far, we have looked at country averages and average scores for the Netherlands. However, there are also differences within countries based on factors such as age, income or education level. People with a high income, a good education, a paid job and good health have a better quality of life than their counterparts without these resources. This applies both for objective and subjective quality of life (Boelhouwer and Vonk 2019, see also Veenhoven 2002a). The differences between groups fluctuate slightly over time, but are stubborn, with no observable structural decline.

One notable trend that can be observed in the Netherlands in recent years in subjective quality of life is that, while the share of people who are very happy is rising (+2%-point in the past 10 years), so is the share of people who are not happy (+4%-point in the past 10 years, see Boelhouwer and Vonk 2019). We also observe a reduction in the life satisfaction of people whose objective quality of life has been good in recent years (Fig. 3.6). One possible explanation for this could be that this group are particularly susceptible to the uncertainty about what the future will bring and feel they have less and less control over their lives (Wennekers et al. 2019). The degree to which people feel they have control over their lives correlates very closely with how satisfied they are with their lives (Boelhouwer and Vonk 2019).⁹

There are in fact very few people in the Netherlands who are doing well by objective criteria yet who are not satisfied with their lives (1%, ‘*dissonance*’ as Zapf (1984) puts it), or whose objective quality of life is not very good yet who are still satisfied with their lives (‘adaptation’: also 1%; see Boelhouwer and Vonk 2019,

⁹Perceived control (also referred to as ‘mastery’) is measured on a scale comprising five items: I have little control over the things that happen to me; some of my problems are impossible for me to solve; there is little I can do to change important things in my life; I often feel helpless when dealing with problems in life; I sometimes feel that I am just the plaything of life. Together, these items form a scale: Cronbach’s alpha 0.83.




Fig. 3.6 Reduced satisfaction with life among people with a poor life situation, but unchanged for other groups. Satisfaction with life of people with a good and poor life situation, 2008–2018 (in average scores out of 10). (Source: SCP/CBS (SLI’08—CV/SLI’10/’11-17/’18))

derived from Zapf 1984). The correlation between objective and subjective quality of life has actually increased over the last 25 years, from a correlation coefficient of 0.21 in 1990 to 0.33 in 2017 (Boelhouwer 2017a).

How will Ruut Veenhoven’s Life Satisfaction Have Developed?

We now know that the Dutch are very happy on average, that the social conditions and individual opportunities have improved, but that this has not led to a marked increase in happiness on average. There are however differences between groups, sometimes large but always stubborn. Can we use these data to say something about the happiness of Ruut Veenhoven, and how that has developed over time?

The foregoing paragraphs show that we in the Netherlands know a great deal about happiness and about the broader quality of life. However, in order to know about Ruut Veenhoven’s happiness and how it has developed over the last 45 years, we would need to have questioned him at regular intervals. If that has indeed happened, the data have not been placed in the public domain. An alternative could be found in panel research, in which we tracked people who are more or




Fig. 3.7 Trend in the happiness of non-vulnerable people in the Netherlands (1977–2018, in percentages). (Source: CBS (LSS’74-’86; DLO’89-’93; POLS-SLI’97-’02); SCP (CV’04-’06); SCP/CBS (CV’08-’18))

less comparable with Veenhoven over time. Sadly, such panel data are also not available in the Netherlands. Nonetheless, in order to be able to say something about how happy Veenhoven ought to be, we are forced to rely on the groups we have distinguished in this article. By comparing the characteristics of these groups with those of Veenhoven, we can obtain an idea of his happiness and how it has developed. We also know that an accumulation of disadvantage leads to lower happiness and an accumulation of advantage leads to greater happiness.

Veenhoven is sometimes called the ‘happiness professor’ in the Netherlands, clearly suggesting that he has a good education and a job. On that basis, we can safely assume that his income will also not be unreasonable. If we combine these data, we may expect that Veenhoven is a happy person. The combination of these elements places him in the category of ‘non-vulnerable’ Dutch citizens; more than 90% of this ‘non-vulnerable’ group have been found to be happy since 1976 (Fig. 3.7).

The figure also shows that average happiness of this group rises at most, and taking a slightly generous view, only slightly. However, as we have no panel data we do not yet know for certain whether Veenhoven has become happier over the years. If we were to think about it on a pleasant Sunday afternoon, we would probably come to the conclusion that Veenhoven must have become slightly happier during the course of his life. Just think about it: during his life his income has increased, he has left the least happy phase of life behind—there are no longer any children living

at home—he has secured employment and his work has moreover become much more important.

He himself said the following about this topic in a newspaper interview in 2019: “I would score my life a good eight out of ten, but I haven’t always been happy. I’ve also had times when things have been difficult. As a teenager I had some bad times, and the divorce I went through was also not a pleasant experience.” (AD 2019). However, his continuing contribution to research (stretching back more than 45 years!), placing happiness on the agenda and making it relevant for policy is without doubt worth a solid 10 out of 10.

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Chapter 4

The Forgotten Dimensions of Social Capital: Evidence from Quality of Life Studies



Gaël Brulé

Introduction

In order to produce outputs of quality, a research field must be reflexive and allow a decent dose of self-criticism to allow confrontation and enable discussion nodes to be delineated. A healthy mix of dissensus and consensus is the recipe for the emergence of this debate. While too much dissensus makes any discussion ground unstable, uncritical consensus can lead to blind spots. The equilibrium and disequilibrium created by consensuses and dissensuses lead to a particular epistemological flavor. Veenhoven (2008) brilliantly showed that sociology was overpolarized towards negative problems, comparative approaches and mental constructs leading to blind spots in accepting measures such as Subjective Well-being (SWB). Similar exercises have been done for economics (Van Heck 2013) or philosophy (Lagerspetz 1998). One might immediately wonder what is the epistemological flavor of quality of life studies. The field has emerged around a shift in social sciences, positive psychology and an appeal towards looking at “what goes well”. This positive attitude does not mean that there is no contradiction in the field. Critical papers have been numerous in the field of QOL studies, with many reflexive papers (see e.g. Rapley 2004, Sirgy 2006, Veenhoven 2008) or in some particular parts of the field (Adunuri and Feldman 2014, Dakin et al. 2018) or methodological issues (see e.g. Brulé and Maggino 2017; de Jonge et al. 2017). Numerous confrontations arose around the effects of GDP (Veenhoven and Vergunst 2014) or lack of (Easterlin 1974) or homeostatic approaches (Cummins 2016) or the scaring effects of certain life events (Clark and Oswald 1994). Still, it is possible that some parts of the field reflect an overly positive attitude. If fields such as sociology have, as showed by Veenhoven, a

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bias towards what goes wrong, do QOL studies lean on the other side, i.e. are quality of life studies too positive? To question this, I will take the example of social capital. It is a relevant concept to study because it was both covered by critical and enthusiastic approaches, from constructivist and deconstructivist perspectives. Together with economic considerations such as GDP or income, social capital has been one of the most vivid subjects within quality of life studies. Although it has been proxied in various ways, scholars have been looking at the influences and the interactions between the social bonds and SWB. More specifically, I observe the use of social capital in the field of QOL studies and outside.

Social Capital: One Term, Three Main Conceptions

Although several conceptions exist of social capital exist (Baker, Belliveau et al., Burt, Knoke, Lin) with interconnections (see Appendix A), the three main concepts cited are those of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam (Guðmundsson and Mikiewicz 2012; Bryer 2014; Claridge 2004). Several criteria have been used to characterize the different conceptions of social capital, the scale, the structure and the main constituents. Social capital has been observed at a micro, meso and macro scale. The individual can be the owner of it (Bourdieu 1986) or in the opposite a user of capital which is located at the societal level (Putnam), while Coleman locates in an intermediary position¹ which has been criticized for being vague (Portes 1998; Lin 2001; Ponthieux 2004). Further, it has stemmed from the perspective of functionalism or conflict theory and resulted in different conceptualization, one horizontal, function-driven and one vertical, struggle-driven (see e.g. Ferlander 2007). The significance of horizontal networks has long been emphasized in the literature (e.g. Coleman 1990), in particular with reference to social support, that is emotional, informational or instrumental help between network members. Putnam (1993) has focused on voluntary associations, claiming that they bring ‘equivalent status and power’. The vertical dimension refers to differences in status, power and prestige. According to Bourdieu, social capital is a resource in the class and power struggle that can be used in different fields. Following this vertical conception, as well as the operationalization of Lin (1982) most researchers in the field have drawn on the occupational prestige scales to construct position generator measures. A large brush would thus paint Coleman and Putnam on the horizontal axis and Bourdieu on the vertical one (Dangschat 2017), although reality is a bit more nuanced. As for the constituents, Putnam explicitly define norms, participation and trust, whereas the operationalization of Bourdieu and Coleman are less clear. One could describe social capital in the Bourdieusian perspective as linked to the power and prestige of the

¹“Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations between persons and among persons. It is lodged neither in individuals nor in physical implements of production” (Coleman 1990, p. 1020).

Table 4.1 Main characteristics of social capital as defined by Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam

| | Bourdieu | Coleman | Putnam |
|--------------|--|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Location | Individual | Individual/structure | Structure |
| Scale | Micro | Multiple | Macro |
| Dimensions | Vertical | Horizontal | Horizontal |
| Constituents | Power and prestige of individual network | Norms, network size, social support | Norms, participation, trust |

social network one has access to whereas the Colemanian perspective could include reciprocal norms, network size and social support. The main characteristics are observed in Table 4.1.

Method

To determine the scope of empirical literature related to social capital and QOL literature, I adopt the systematic review method (SR), with a focus on two specific areas: the theoretical link to the three main authors and the operationalization. Consistent with the procedures of a comprehensive SR, three strategies were used to locate all existing peer-reviewed studies related to social capital within the following disciplines: economics, sociology, positive psychology and QOL studies in general. First, I use the bibliographic database Scopus from 2000 to the present. The selected bibliographic databases were searched from 2000 to the present, given that the majority of the social capital literature has been produced after major institutions such as the World Bank or the OECD gained interest in the topic and tapped into the seminal work of the late 1980s and 1990s. Second, a manual search was conducted in both dissertations and academic journals related to social capital over the past two decades (2000 to the present). Selected journals include both economic, sociological and Quality of Life sources (Journal of Happiness Studies, Social Indicators Research, Applied Research in Quality of Life). Third and related, I used the snowball technique to identify additional studies and references cited in the bibliographies from the articles that had been previously selected.

The methodology adopted to distinguish between relevant and non-relevant empirical literature concerning social capital consisted of four selection criteria. The study was included in the review if: (1) it examined social capital and its effects on SWB; (2) it utilised quantitative, qualitative or both methods to assess levels of social capital; (3) it identified indicators of social capital at the macro, meso or individual levels. Because I am interested to see how social capital is depicted in the literature, I only keep articles that explicitly use social capital and not possibly related concepts, such as social connections or social cohesion, unless they are used to proxy social capital (I discuss possible limitations of these choices in the discussion). Similarly, I only take articles that mention SWB or life satisfaction, two central concepts, in order to circumscribe a clear perimeter.

An initial search of Scopus using <‘SWB’ AND ‘social capital’ OR ‘life satisfaction’ AND ‘social capital’> in the title, keyword and abstract fields returned 211 results, which shows the multiple interactions existing. Once filtering for papers with an operationalized social capital and containing more than a quick reference to the concept in the literature review, the SR used to examine empirical literature on social capital produced 70 pertinent, peer-reviewed studies that complied with these criteria. To evaluate the quality of empirical research within the selected cohort, the studies were categorized per type of operationalization, starting with the three main conceptualizations described, but letting also other emerge. As for the vertical conception, I observe if differences in status, power or prestige are mentioned whereas for the horizontal conception, whether pressure or strains are mentioned.

In order to triangulate the results obtained for QOL studies, I compare it to another field to see whether they pertain to quality of life studies or if they represent a global phenomenon. Comparing the percentage of papers dedicated to negative aspects within QOL studies and in another field enables us to compare with other fields. Because most of the theorists of social capital are sociologists (that is true for Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman, Robert Putnam is a political scientist), I compare the landscape of social capital within QOL studies with the landscape in sociology. I use < ‘social capital’ AND ‘sociology’> and observe the horizontal, vertical and conflictual dimensions of social capital. The same period is observed (2000–2019) in which I took randomly 70 articles (out of 1369 results) to compare to the previous search, reflecting the same diversity of years, i.e. 2000–2019.

Results

The results show a rather clear picture. Out of the 70 papers that combine social capital and SWB, all of them use at least one indicator of horizontal social capital, often depicted in a Putnamian way (participation, trust) or Coleman (social support). When observing the effects of the facets of social capital on SWB, only four studies (5%) observe the effects of a vertical conception and five (7%) the effects of relational constraints (for the former, Inglehart and Klingemann 2000; Hudson 2006; Leung et al. 2011; Huang and Western 2011; Huang et al. 2019 and for the latter, Hudson 2006; Kroll 2008; Huang and Western 2011; Kuhn and Brulé 2018; Huang et al. 2019). Among the Putnamian constituents of social capital, trust (in people in general or in institutions) is the most used proxy, together with various forms of participation (volunteering, membership in a sport or political club, religious attendance, frequency of meeting friends and family). The results of the SR method are presented in Table 4.2.

Comparing the distribution between the various types of social capital in QOL studies with sociological studies reveal wide disparities as shown in Table 4.3. In sociology, the horizontal and vertical dimensions are in balanced proportions with 59% (present in 41 studies out of 70) and 41% (present in 29 studies out of 70) for

Table 4.2 Papers extracted from the systematic review method

| | Social participation | Social support | Trust | Positional | Relation constrains |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------|-------|------------|---------------------|
| Number of use (out of 70 papers) | 42 | 17 | 42 | 4 | 5 |
| % | 60 | 24 | 60 | 5 | 7 |

Table 4.3 Social capital in QOL compared to sociology

| | QOL studies (%) | Sociology (%) |
|------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Horizontal | 100 | 59 |
| Vertical | 5 | 41 |
| Conflicts | 7 | 20 |

the horizontal and vertical dimensions. The conflictual aspects of social capital represent 20% (14 out of 70) of the studies.

Discussion

The picture that arises from the perspective of SWB shows a body of literature largely taping in a Putnamian (and Colemanian) conception of social capital (visible in Appendix A). Most articles measure social capital through volunteering, social participation, trust and sometimes social support. Other dimensions of social capital, such as vertical differentiation and tensions, largely documented respectively in sociological and psychological traditions, are largely left apart. A notable exception is the work of Huang (Huang and Western 2011; Huang et al. 2019) who show that differentiation, relational constraints and costs of maintaining relationships are side effects that can be negatively associated with subjective well-being. Many researchers and sociologists have criticized this over-reliance and overuse of Putnam’s social capital constructs as they have been criticized for lacking depth. Additionally, the measures used to operationalize the Putnamian social capital constructs often focus only on a few dimensions of his theory; generalized trust, shared norms and values, reciprocity, and civic engagement. These proxies have been criticized for simultaneously being overly theoretically broad and limited in their measurement. It was said that measuring the number of foundations is a better proxy of the willingness to invest money than of social capital (Portes 1998; Ponthieux 2004). Similarly, one could argue that religious attendance proxies better the degree of religiousness of people than the social capital per se. In many regards, the macro level variables used measure things that have little to do with social capital. The overemphasis on the work of Putnam has somewhat overshadowed the work of the other theorists. For instance, Carpiano (2005) argues that public health and social epidemiological research has historically relied too heavily on Putnam’s theory on the role of social capital and health. Carpiano asserts that due to the over

reliance on Putnam's concept of social capital, public health literature has overlooked three important aspects of social capital. These include: "(1) the actual or potential resources that inhere within neighborhood social networks, (2) the differential abilities of residents to access such resources for pursuing actions, and (3) the potential negative aspects of social capital that may be detrimental to health" (Carpiano 2005, p. 568). Carpiano and others (Portes 1998; Muntaner and Lynch 2002; De Filippis 2001) argue that. We observe this skewed distribution towards Putnamian approach and question three phenomena: the lack of consideration of relational constrains, of the verticality of social capital and a possible romantic bias.

The Lack of Consideration for Relational Constrains of Social Capital

The positive mechanisms associated with beneficial outcomes include social attachments and social support. Negative network mechanisms (i.e. mechanisms which are associated with worse SWB) are exclusion of outsiders, relational constraints, pressure or "downward levelling norms" (Portes 1998, p. 17). They represent the "dark side" of social networking experience.

Overprotection (i.e. control) is already covered in early sociological writings. According to Norbert Elias, the narrowness of the communitarian circles give birth to a life that constantly touches the borders of boredom, the absence of personal satisfaction being reinforced by the "pressure and the ineluctability of the social control that members apply on one another". Bennet Berger state that "the dark side of the community is the perpetual fight for limited resources and for the power of reinterpreting the common culture, somewhat ambiguous, in a way that guaranties optimal conformity and continuity of the members" and further "there are two ways that a community maintains its cohesion: through symbolic means through which the idea of community and its unity are expressed and defined by the group, and on the other hand the institutions, activities and circumstances that give purpose to a social environment in a practical manner."

Further, the strength of social norms and peer pressure can lead to negative life outcomes, such as criminality, dropping out of education, substance addiction, or other outcomes. Furthermore, research has shown that a range of phenomena from depression, to obesity and smoking can spread through networks even between people who do not spend time together (i.e. at several degrees of separation).

Within QOL studies, overprotection (i.e. control) is briefly mentioned in a paper of Shek and Sun (2014) maternal over-control or over-protection constrains adolescents' decision-making autonomy and limits their exposure to responsibilities and opportunities, which lead to their increased risk of maladjustment for late adolescence. Yang et al. (2008) show that the impact may be more pronounced in the Chinese families where there is a strong emphasis on parental control. However,

paternal care and warm emotion, as well as paternal overprotection, were positively associated with Chinese adolescents' subjective well-being. Kuhn and Brulé (2018) show that individuals with a dense social network experienced a larger drop in life satisfaction when facing bereavement.

The Lack of Vertical Dimension

The elements of exclusion, distinction, and restriction, which are inherent in social capital and social interactions, have been ignored and overlooked (Daly and Silver 2008). More generally, the prevalent contemporary theories of social capital with its emphasis on horizontal ties can be described as neo-capitalist theories (Lin 2001). This has led some scholars to pledge for "bringing Bourdieu back in" to mainstream analysis (Fine 2010).

This has been developed by Christoforou (2017): "we observed that the Putnamian tradition deeply influenced contemporary social capital research by providing concepts and indicators of social capital based on individuals' civic participation" before acknowledging further the "need to explicitly address inequalities and power and implement ways to make networks and governance structures more inclusive and participatory. To explore these dynamics, I return to the Bourdieusian tradition which adopts a network-based approach."

To understand how the Putnamian conception became so dominant rather than Bourdieu's and hence the absence of vertical conception of social capital, it is important to trace back the role of main theorists as well as the main institutions that act as transmission channels. Two influential international institutions of economic governance played a major role in placing Putnam in the lead position of social capital, in a "winner takes it all" type of dynamic: the World Bank and the OECD. The World Bank declares social capital central to the research agenda. To do so, they pick the latest available conception of Putnam, which had a certain popular success at the time. The OECD (2001, p. 41) gives a definition of social capital, consistent with that of Putnam (2000), as "networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups". Indeed, according to OECD, "Bourdieu's perspective, in particular, uses the concept of social capital in a relatively narrow sense to explain societal inequalities and class-based hierarchies". Moreover, they underline that "Bourdieu's use of the concept of social capital remained largely metaphorical rather than analytical (Schuller et al. 2000)". Scrivens and Smith (2013) show that (the Putnamian concept) can be observed at an individual or a collective level, it can be categorized for what it is and for what it does, i.e. for its structure and for its function. Showing a clear empirical penchant, the OECD filters de facto non anglo-saxon or non-empirical approaches, although Bourdieu's (or Lin's) approaches are also possible to operationalize.

A Romantic Bias?

According to Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), social capital studies appeared in the line of community studies, imbued with a romantic conception of social capital. But, as Hermans (2013) puts it, “even if Nahapiet and Ghoshal recognized that “social capital is not a universally beneficial resource”, they decided to include in their framework only the positive influence of social capital on knowledge combination and exchange” (p. 43). As we saw, the dark sides of social capital have been largely avoided. Gabbay and Lenders (1999) suggests to replace hierarchy with formal differentiation in the system of Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), suggesting a need to integrate the differentiating part of social capital. According to Schreker (2006), since the beginning of community studies, community is represented as being warm and close versus the society being cold and distant. This was illustrated by Berger (1988) “the community is warm, humid and intimate; the society is cold, dry and formal”. According to these authors, the field “community” is emerging from a romantic vision of living together and from the fear of the destructive forces of industrialization: “whereas in a community, men are linked in spite of any separation, there are in the society separated in spite of any link”. Not only does it stem from a particular historical perspective, but according to Miller (2004), social capital is culturally bound to a Northern American ethos. As Julien puts it, “while there has been much discussion in recent decades on the nature of social capital and its importance in online interactions, it is my contention that these discussions have been dominated by the American Communitarian tradition”. In that tradition, social capital is seen primarily a public good, rather than a class good (Daly and Silver 2008; Huysman and Wulf 2004). Therefore, the Putnamian conception has been seen as “romantic” (Siisianen 2000).

Portes (1998) notes that the research literature on social capital strongly emphasizes its positive consequences, with good things emerging out of sociability whereas bad things are more commonly associated with the behavior of homo economicus. According to Portes (2010), “the same mechanisms appropriable by individuals and groups as social capital can have other, less desirable consequences. It is important to emphasize them for two reasons: first, to avoid the trap of presenting community networks, social control, and collective sanctions as unmixed blessings; second, to keep the analysis within the bounds of serious sociological analysis rather than moralizing statements”. Veenhoven notes that the fact that social participation creates social capital that can be used to produce SWB is a “tendency [. . .] to put different varieties of the good in one hat” (Veenhoven 2008, p. 53).


This study faces several limitations. As any SR, the results depend strongly of the terms sought. Possibly, other terms are used to seek for vertical and conflictual aspects of social relationships. A slightly different picture could emerge with other key words. However, the difference of picture between QOL studies and sociology for instance would be unlikely to change much. The, I chose to compare the QOL field with sociology, because many social capital theorists stem from sociology. Sociology is not a reference point and as shown by Veenhoven (2014) it has too a

particular epistemological flavor. Other comparison fields could lead to slightly different pictures.

Conclusion

Heavily used, approached from multiple perspectives, the trajectories of the conceptions of social capital inform us as much on the need to capture the dynamics of socialization as on the epistemological currents that favor one or another conception. Scholars and institutions seem to have chosen social capital as defined by Putnam, both for epistemological, pragmatic and possibly romantic or ideologically-driven reasons. However, the relative absence of the vertical conceptions as well as of the dark sides of social capital show a lack of critical views on the concept used. As only a critical field can produce sound research, more research is needed to capture the multiple dimensions of social capital and its imbrications with quality of life outcomes.

Appendix A (Source: Claridge 2004)



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Chapter 5

Urban-Rural Happiness Differentials in The Netherlands



Martijn J. Burger

Introduction

I met Ruut Veenhoven in 2012, just after the establishment of the Erasmus Happiness Economics Research Organisation. Ruut had been working on happiness studies for over 40 years, while I just finished by PhD in regional economics and economic geography at the Erasmus School of Economics. In our first joint paper (Burger et al. 2015), we combined our research interests and examined whether there is a genetic component in the happiness differences across nations. Over the years, we conducted several studies together, amongst others on commuting (Lancée et al. 2017), happiness awareness (Veenhoven 2018), the Easterlin paradox in South Korea (Slag et al. 2019), and the Arab Spring (Arampatzi et al. 2018).

When I recently explored the literature on urban-rural differentials in subjective well-being, I came across an early work of Ruut on this topic. In his work, he argues that although the city dwellers in Western countries are slightly less happy, this difference is probably not explained by a lower liveability of cities, but by selective migration since it is the unhappier part of the countryside in the Western world that tends to move to the city (Veenhoven 1994). In this regard, cities in the Western world typically have relatively more singles, unemployed, and migrants, which tend to reduce the average happiness levels of cities.

The timely study of Veenhoven (1994) is inherently related to the recent discussion of the urban happiness paradox in *Western countries* or the phenomenon that people living in rural areas return higher levels of subjective well-being than people living in cities do (Burger et al. 2020; see Fig. 5.1) and that average happiness

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


Fig. 5.1 Urban-rural differences in life evaluations by country GDP per capita. (Source: Burger et al. (2020). Note: $N = 149$ countries. Figures are weighted averages using sampling and population weights. No control variables are used. $R^2 = 0.25$. Quadratic term is insignificant ($t = 1.16$))

declines with city size (Okulicz-Kozaryn 2017). This would be paradoxical because modern cities are the economic powerhouses of Western economies and considered the most attractive places to live (as evidenced, for example, by housing prices) (Morrison 2020; Hoogerbrugge and Burger 2020). Although various researchers tried to explain urban-rural differences in life satisfaction (e.g., Sørensen 2014; Morrison and Weckroth 2018; Okulicz-Kozaryn and Mazelis 2018), they did not find conclusive evidence what drives the urban-rural differences in subjective well-being (Burger et al. 2020). On the one hand, place effects can explain relative urban unhappiness in the Western world. Although cities offer better employment opportunities and more amenities, urban environments can reduce residents’ subjective well-being due to typical urban problems—like crime, congestion and inequality—causing lower levels of individual subjective well-being (Okulicz-Kozaryn 2015). At the same time, the conditions of living in a rural environment—like a quieter, greener and more socially cohesive environment—might explain higher levels of

subjective well-being levels in rural areas compared to their urban counterparts. In addition, due to technological developments, many residents in rural areas are no longer dependent upon farming and the recent expansion of urban centres means that many rural residents live and work nowadays in close proximity to these centres. Accordingly, rural residents are able to ‘borrow’ the positive effects of much larger cities, while being relatively protected from negative urbanization externalities (Meijers and Burger 2017).

On the other hand, selection and composition may play a role in that cities in developed countries typically have relatively more singles, unemployed, and international migrants, which tend to reduce the average subjective well-being levels in cities. Although these selection and composition effects can be driven by socio-economic differences between urban and rural households who have lived in the same type of environment all their lives, in part these selection and composition effects might be explained by selective migration patterns. In the latter case, people with lower levels of subjective well-being might move towards large cities while smaller cities, suburbs or villages mainly attract people with higher levels of subjective well-being (Veenhoven 1994; Hoogerbrugge and Burger 2020).

In this exploratory note, I examine Veenhoven’s thesis that selection and composition effects play a role in explaining geographical differences in subjective well-being in the Netherlands. As indicated in the World Happiness Report 2020, the Netherlands can be characterized as one of the few countries in the world in which the urban population is less happy than the rural population (Burger et al. 2020). Can relative urban unhappiness in the Netherlands to some extent be explained by cities hosting and attracting different kinds of people?

Local Happiness in the Netherlands

In this study, we follow Veenhoven’s conceptualization of happiness (Veenhoven 2000) and define happiness as the degree to which an individual judges the overall quality of his/her own life as a whole favourably, which can include both cognitive evaluations (e.g., life evaluation) and emotional evaluations (e.g., hedonic affect).

To examine urban-rural differences in happiness in the Netherlands, we first make use of three data collections provided by Statistics Netherlands: Permanent Living Conditions Survey [Permanent Onderzoek Leefsituatie 2001–2009, Health Survey [Gezondheidsenquête] 2010–2015 and the survey on Social Cohesion and Wellbeing [Sociale Samenhang en Welzijn] 2013–2015. More than 200,000 respondents have completed these surveys over the period 2001–2015. To study happiness, we looked at an average over a longer period of time in order to get a more accurate estimate of the average happiness level for more than 400 Dutch municipalities (i.e. local areas in the Netherlands). In addition, looking over a longer period of time provides us with a means to examine the trend in happiness in urban and rural areas.

The following subjective well-being questions were asked in the above-mentioned studies:




Fig. 5.2 Urban-rural happiness differential in The Netherlands, 2001–2015

1. Satisfaction with life (cognitive evaluation)—Can you indicate on a scale from 0 to 10 to what extent you are satisfied with the life that you now lead? A 0 stands for completely unsatisfied and a 10 stands for completely satisfied.
2. Happiness evaluation (total judgment)—Can you indicate on a scale from 0 to 10 to what extent you consider yourself a happy person? A 0 stands for very unhappy and a 10 for very happy.
3. Hedonic happiness (affective evaluation)—How often did you feel happy in the past four weeks? 1 = never; 2 = seldom; 3 = sometimes; 4 = often; 5 = usually; 6 = all the time.

Below we present the three partial scores are combined into one score. The score is expressed in terms of the proportion of residents who feel happy. A respondent is considered happy when he or she reports a 7 or higher on the life satisfaction scale (question 1) and happiness evaluation scale (question 2) or a 4 or higher on hedonic happiness (question 3).

Figure 5.2 shows the average happiness of inhabitants by degree of urbanization. Here, we distinguish between municipalities that are extremely urban (more than 2500 addresses per square kilometre), very urban (1500–2500 addresses per square kilometre), moderately urban (1000–1500 addresses per square kilometre), slightly urban (500–1000 addresses per kilometre), and not urban at all (less than 500 addresses per square kilometre).

Based on Fig. 5.2, the following observations can be made:

- Average happiness declines with degree of urbanization.




Fig. 5.3 Happiness in the largest municipalities (>100.000 inhabitants) in The Netherlands

- Inhabitants of extremely and very urban municipalities are generally happier than inhabitants of areas that are moderately, slightly or not urban ($p < 0.01$). Where in non-urban areas well over 90% of the inhabitants is happy, this percentage is typically below 85% in extremely urban areas.
 - Urban-rural differentials tend to become slightly smaller over time
- The above findings are in line with the recent results for the Netherlands as reported in the World Happiness Report 2020 (Burger et al. 2020).

If we move to the level of local areas and focus on the 50 largest municipalities in the Netherlands (typically more than 50.000 inhabitants; see Burger et al. 2015 and Fig. 5.3), we see a similar picture in that the largest municipalities are less happy. In the top of the ranking we see medium-sized towns like Ede, Alphen aan den Rijn, Amstelveen, Amersfoort and Gouda, which have not only an urban core, but also rural residential areas within their municipal boundaries. The least happy cities are the largest cities in the Netherlands. In Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague more than 17% of the population does not consider themselves happy. A further analysis of differences between the largest municipalities shows that the main explanation for differences in happiness between municipalities lies in the composition of the population: larger municipalities have relatively a higher share of non-western immigrants, singles and people with disabilities. These groups report typically lower levels of subjective well-being. At the same time, residential attractiveness

(amenities present in a city) is also positive, but explains only a small amount of the variation between the municipalities (see also Burger et al. 2015).

Further Exploring Urban-Rural Happiness Differentials

Our analysis on local happiness in The Netherlands indicated that selection and composition effects may play a role in explain urban-rural happiness differentials. In order to further explore this, we utilize data from the Dutch Household Survey 1995–2018, a panel administered by CentERdata. Households that have participated in one year are asked to participate in subsequent years as well. For this research, we use a dataset consisting of the panel data of the DHS waves 1995–2018. The panel data is unbalanced: the surveys are filled out by 3.750 households on average per year. In total, 118,000 individuals have participated in the waves used, although not all individuals have participated in all modules in all years. Overall, our sample consists of 52,617 observations from 13,843 individuals for which we have sufficient information on the key variables of interest.

Relevant to the aim of this chapter, we explore whether degree of urbanization is associated with SWB, where we focus on the global judgments. Respondents were asked to respond to the following general happiness questions: (1) “All in all, to what extent do you consider yourself a happy person?” and is measured on a scale from “1 = very unhappy” to “5 = very happy” and (2). On average and in line with other SWB surveys in the Netherlands (Veenhoven 2018), happy (64%) or very happy (21%) are the most provided answers on this questions, while in 14% of the cases the respondent reported to be neither happy nor unhappy. The answer categories unhappy and very unhappy were only limitedly used.

To look at the relative importance of selection and composition effects in explaining the urban-rural differential in The Netherlands, we examine (1) to what extent the degree of urbanization explains variation in subjective well-being and (2) to what extent this effect is mediated by time-variant and time-invariant personal characteristics, such as marital and employment status. More specifically, we estimate the following model:

$$H_{it} = \alpha_i + U_{it} + \beta X_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where H_{it} denotes the happiness of individual i in period t . The variable U denotes the place of residence of individual i in period t which can range from extremely urban to non-urban. We use here the same classification as in the previous section. X_{it} is a vector of time-varying personal characteristics. We control for a series of individual and household variables that have been associated with people’s happiness in previous research such as age, gender, employment status, education level, marital status, number of children in the household, and income (see Appendix for an overview). Finally, ε_{it} is a stochastic error term.

Table 5.1 Regression results on the association between the degree of urbanization and happiness

| Dependent variable: happiness | (1) Random effects | (2) Random effects | (3) Fixed effects | (4) Ordinal probit RE | (5) Ordinal probit RE |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Degree of urbanization | | | | | |
| Not urban | | | | | |
| Slightly urban | -0.00 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.04 (0.05) | -0.33 (0.05)** | -0.12 (0.05)* |
| Moderately urban | -0.03 (0.01)# | -0.02 (0.01) | -0.07 (0.04) | -0.23 (0.04)** | -0.13 (0.04)** |
| Very urban | -0.08 (0.01)** | -0.04 (0.01)** | 0.02 (0.03) | -0.08 (0.04) | -0.06 (0.04) |
| Extremely urban | -0.11 (0.02)** | -0.04 (0.02)** | -0.04 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.05) | -0.02 (0.04) |
| Individual/household time-varying variables | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Individual fixed effects | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Observations | 52,617 | 52,617 | 52,617 | 52,617 | 52,617 |
| Number of individuals | 13,843 | 13,843 | 13,843 | 13,843 | 13,843 |

The effects of most individual and household variables are in line with earlier research on the determinants of subjective well-being. Unemployed and single people as well as people with a lower income and a lower level of education are significantly less happy. Full estimations are available upon request

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.01$, # $p < 0.10$

To examine whether urban unhappiness might be driven by composition and selection effects, we first present simple random effects models in which we look at the association between happiness and degree of urbanization, without adding any individual and household variables. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 5.1 and in line with other studies on the Netherlands, we find a considerably lower happiness levels of people living in extremely urban areas compared to people living in non-urban areas (Table 5.1, Model 1). However, after adding individual and household variables (Table 5.1, Model 2), the association between degree of urbanization and happiness becomes less pronounced, signifying that at least part of the urban-rural differential in happiness is driven by a composition effect. When we turn to the fixed-effect (see Table 5.1, Model 3) estimations, which control for (unobserved) time-invariant characteristics such as personality and ethnicity, there appears to be no clear relationship anymore between happiness and degree of urbanization. Similar results are found when re-estimating Models 1 and 2 using an ordinal probit random effects estimator (Models 4 and 5 in Table 5.1).

Concluding Remarks

All in all, our findings suggest that after controlling for many time-variant and time-invariant personal characteristics, the effect of degree of urbanization on happiness is diminished, which indicates that selection and composition effects may play a role in explaining the urban-rural happiness differential. Cities typically have relatively more singles, unemployed, and migrants. Although these people downplay the average happiness levels of cities, they still might be better off in the city than on the countryside.

Our findings do not mean that place effects do not play a role. For example, the World Happiness Report 2020 (Burger et al. 2020) showed that higher rural happiness in Northern and Western Europe and the Anglo-Saxon is particularly explained by higher degrees of community attachment and housing affordability. Instead, urban-rural differentials are a complex interplay of place-based and people-based effects. The unravelling of spatial differences in happiness then also deserves more attention in future research.

Appendix: Descriptions of the Variables Included in the Analysis

| Variables | Measure | Question | Answer categories |
|------------------------|-----------|---|---|
| Dependent variable | | | |
| Happiness | 1–5 | All in all, to what extent do you consider yourself a happy person? | (1) very unhappy, (2) unhappy, (3) neither unhappy nor happy, (4) happy, or (5) very happy ^a |
| Independent variables | | | |
| Degree of urbanization | 1–5 | –; filled out by interviewer | (1) very high degree of urbanization, (2) high degree of urbanization, (3) moderate degree of urbanization, (4) low degree of urbanization, or (5) very low degree of urbanization |
| Gender | | Gender | Male, female |
| Age | | Age | |
| Education level | 1,2,3 | Highest level of education completed | (1) low education (ISCED 2011 classification 0–2), (2) medium education (ISCED 2011 classification 3–4), or (3) high education (ISCED 2011 classification 5–8) ^b |
| Marital status | 1,2,3,4,5 | Composition of the household. The respondent: | (1) is living by himself/herself, (2) is living together with partner, no child(ren) living at home, (3) is living together with partner, child(ren) living at home, (4) is living without a partner, but with child(ren), or (5) other |

(continued)

| Variables | Measure | Question | Answer categories |
|---------------------|-----------|--|---|
| Occupational status | 1,2,3,4,5 | Primary occupation | (1) “too young, has no occupation yet” or “student”, (2) “employed on a contractual basis”, “works in own business” or “free profession, freelance, self-employed”, (3) “looking for work after having lost job”, “looking for first-time work”, “(partly) disabled”, “unpaid work, keeping benefit payments”, “works as a volunteer”, “other occupation”, (4) works in own household, or (5) retired |
| Income | | Aggregated net income of the household | Gross income (salary, profits own business, retirement income, unemployment and illness benefits) + government scholarship + parental support for studies + family support + rent allowance + child alimony + partner alimony + interest + rent + inheritances –/– taxes. |
| Year | | Year in which the survey took place | 1995–2018 |

^aThe 285 respondents choosing the answering option “Don’t know” were left out of the common sample, leaving 53,566 respondents

^bAnswering categories were clustered in low, medium and high education following the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) as created by UNESCO, following the correspondence between ISCED 1997 and ISCED 2011, as both these standards were applicable in the year of the time series of the research (Eurostat 2018) (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1978984/6037342/Comparability_ISCED_2011_ISCED_1997.pdf)

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Chapter 6

Happiness or Life Satisfaction? The Case of Children



Ferran Casas and Mònica González-Carrasco

As far as the first author remembers, I met Ruut the first time in Prince George Conference, organised by Alex Michalos in the North British Columbia University. The two of us met him also in the II international ISQOLS conference in Girona, 2000.

In our academic relationships with Ruut he always demonstrated an outstanding availability, both for his colleagues (he always answered any request very fast) and for students. He always accepted foreign students to stay for some period in his university and was very popular among our students for investing his time in supporting them.

Ruut is well known for his preference for the concept “happiness”—against the main stream, usually using “life satisfaction”—as QOL indicator (Veenhoven, 1996a; 1996b; 2003; 2009; 2014). However, he often pointed out that for him these concepts could be used as synonymous, and in fact he did, and also, depending on the context, he considered them as equivalents to “quality of life” or “subjective well-being”. In his own words: “*When used in a broad sense, the word happiness is synonymous with ‘quality of life’ or ‘well-being’.* In this meaning it denotes that life is good, but does not specify what is good about life” (Veenhoven, 2009, page 2). “*Enduring satisfaction with one’s life-as-a-whole is called ‘life satisfaction’ and also commonly referred to as ‘happiness’ and as ‘subjective well-being’.* I do use the word happiness in this meaning, and will use it interchangeably with ‘life-satisfaction’” (Veenhoven, 2009, p. 4).

As researchers on children’s and adolescents’ well-being, we noticed, time ago, that children in most countries of the world have also shown preference for the word “happiness”, rather than “satisfaction”. Many children told us that satisfaction is a more “adults’ word” than happiness. In a personal communication (28th March

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2016) to the first author Ruut explained that according to his conceptualization, responses to happiness or life satisfaction items by children will be largely driven by the affective component, while the best measure of the cognitive component should be the answer to the item “I have what I want in life”, because the observed pattern of responses to this item invites to explanations in terms of cultural relativity of aspirations.

He also suggested that previously to ask on own happiness, we should anchor the question by asking some potential comparison standards, i.e.: the best and worst possible life (like the previous questions in the original Cantril’s Ladder). That brought us to the idea of exploring the use of subjects’ own remembrances of their life pathway based on a reflection of the key (anchoring) points they perceive on that pathway, inviting them to become aware of how their well-being has evolved over time and how this relates to the life events they have experienced (Aymerich and Casas 2020).

In our research with children the recent years we have included different items on happiness and on life satisfaction in the questionnaires, including questions related to “life as a whole” and on satisfaction and happiness the recent 2 weeks, in order to distinguish between a more overall evaluation (supposed to be more cognitive) and more recent affective states.

In this paper we are going to present a descriptive analysis of the answers given by children to these different questions using data from two very different data collections: an international survey in 18 countries, and a 5-years longitudinal study in Catalonia (Spain).

The second wave of the international survey named Children’s Worlds project (www.isciweb.org) collected data of children in 18 countries and included 4 such questions, in different places of the questionnaires. Sample size is $N = 20,936$. Mean scores are presented in Table 6.1 by country and in Fig. 6.1 for the overall aggregated sample. In Table 6.1 we can see that scores are usually higher when asking about overall life satisfaction than when asking about happiness or satisfaction during the recent 2 weeks, but not in all countries (exceptions are Spain, Malta and South-Africa for the 10-year-olds and Nepal for the 12-year-olds).

In Fig. 6.1, using the aggregated data of the 18 countries, we see that the overall scores for all four items are very similar, and the decreasing-shape of the scores from 10 to 12 years of age is reflected in the scores of all of them.

In Table 6.2 we can see the mean scores of a sample of $N = 1696$ children in a 5-year term when answering to four different items, which are not exactly the same than in the previous research. In general, with following Year of data collection (up-down), scores tend to decrease for all items, and the oldest the children are, they also decrease (right-left), with very few exceptions (Fig. 6.2). Although the shape of the scores is rather similar, the answer to “How happy you are (2 last weeks)” displays the highest scores.

Although correlations among the scores of the four items from each Year data collection are mostly above .5, due to the big sample size effect, the difference between the scores of each item are always significant. Differences of each item scores by Year of data collection and by year of birth of the children are always significant as well.

Table 6.1 Mean scores on different satisfaction and happiness items in 18 countries

| Age Group | Country of survey | Satisfaction with: Your life as a whole ^b | How happy have you been feeling during the last 2 weeks ^c | Last 2 weeks: How often feeling satisfied ^d | Last 2 weeks: How often feeling happy ^c |
|--------------------|-----------------------|--|--|--|--|
| 10 | Algeria ^a | 9.21 | 8.78 | 9.09 | 9.17 |
| | Nepal | 8.65 | 8.64 | 8.41 | 8.64 |
| | Estonia | 9.20 | 8.16 | 8.48 | 8.67 |
| | Spain ^a | 9.28 | 9.02 | 9.04 | 9.37 |
| | Colombia ^a | 9.49 | 9.20 | 9.36 | 9.38 |
| | Turkey ^a | 9.58 | 9.30 | 9.48 | 9.51 |
| | Ethiopia | 8.72 | 8.62 | 8.27 | 8.58 |
| | S Korea | 8.60 | 8.24 | 8.39 | 8.45 |
| | Germany | 9.08 | 8.30 | 8.53 | 8.71 |
| | UK ^a | 8.87 | | 8.16 | 8.81 |
| | Israel | 9.18 | 8.64 | 8.84 | 8.99 |
| | Romania | 9.59 | 9.34 | 9.40 | 9.40 |
| | Norway | 9.20 | 8.88 | 9.10 | 9.03 |
| | Poland ^a | 9.21 | 8.86 | 8.92 | 8.97 |
| | S Africa ^a | 8.64 | 8.67 | 8.42 | 9.08 |
| | Malta | 9.11 | 8.66 | 8.51 | 9.16 |
| | Finland | 9.17 | 8.93 | 9.04 | 9.06 |
| Italy ^a | 9.23 | 8.90 | 8.72 | 9.11 | |
| Total | 9.09 | 8.74 | 8.77 | 8.97 | |
| 12 | Algeria ^a | 9.04 | 8.48 | 8.72 | 8.91 |
| | Nepal | 8.41 | 8.51 | 8.49 | 8.50 |
| | Estonia | 8.77 | 7.69 | 7.69 | 8.03 |
| | Spain ^a | 8.80 | 8.39 | 8.44 | 8.70 |
| | Colombia ^a | 9.39 | 8.81 | 8.93 | 8.94 |
| | Turkey ^a | 8.96 | 8.46 | 8.83 | 8.88 |
| | Ethiopia | 8.68 | 8.30 | 7.86 | 8.38 |
| | S Korea | 7.56 | 7.40 | 7.42 | 7.52 |
| | Germany | 8.48 | 7.61 | 7.87 | 7.90 |
| | UK ^a | 8.44 | | 7.81 | 8.39 |
| | Israel | 9.21 | 8.63 | 8.89 | 8.93 |
| | Romania | 9.48 | 9.12 | 9.24 | 9.34 |
| | Norway | 8.82 | 8.67 | 8.78 | 8.65 |
| | Poland ^a | 8.42 | 8.13 | 8.26 | 8.23 |
| | S Africa ^a | 8.60 | 8.05 | 7.94 | 8.55 |
| | Malta | 9.04 | 8.50 | 8.54 | 8.93 |
| | Finland | 8.93 | 8.63 | 8.74 | 8.74 |
| Italy ^a | 8.69 | 8.15 | 8.07 | 8.38 | |
| Total | 8.69 | 8.27 | 8.30 | 8.50 | |

Representative samples. 10- and 12-year-olds. N = 20,936

^aSamples are representative of only some regions of the countries, not of the overall country

(continued)

^bHow satisfied are you with each of the following things in your life? Your life as a whole (0 = Not at all satisfied/10 = Completely satisfied)

^cOverall, how happy have you been feeling during the last 2 weeks? (0 = Not at all happy/10 = Completely happy)

^dBelow is a list of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Please read each of the words and check the box that best describes how you felt during the last 2 weeks: Satisfied (0 = Not at all/10= A lot)

^eBelow is a list of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Please read each of the words and check the box that best describes how you felt during the last 2 weeks: Happy (0 = Not at all/10= A lot)




Fig. 6.1 Mean scores on different satisfaction and happiness items using the aggregated sample for 18 countries. Children’s Worlds second wave

Discussion

Interesting reflections arise from the results just described. First of all, the fact that there are more differences for the SWB indicators used in the Children’s Worlds project among countries than when considering the aggregated data makes us think that there are socio-cultural variables that may be leading to a different interpretation of these indicators among the participating children. Secondly, it is possible that the temporary anchorage of some indicators in this same project (2 weeks) as opposed to the lack of temporary anchorage of others, also suggests that this is a factor that may also be influencing children’s responses, so it should be further explored in this direction. Nor can the debate evade an issue that has often been addressed in the literature, namely the temporal stability of responses, even to the same questionnaire, and the influence that previous questions may have on the questions being answered at that time. Both questions may also be relevant to understanding the results obtained.

Table 6.2 5-year mean scores evolution of 4 items on life satisfaction and happiness for a sample of children born between 1998 and 2005

| | Year | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Overall life satisfaction ^a | 1 | 8.09 | 8.44 | 8.91 | 9.16 | 9.36 | | | |
| | 2 | 7.90 | 8.11 | 8.27 | 8.90 | 9.16 | | | |
| | 3 | 7.96 | 7.77 | 7.82 | 8.39 | 8.26 | 9.10 | 8.97 | 8.92 |
| | 4 | 7.61 | 7.75 | 7.78 | 8.05 | 8.19 | 8.66 | 8.96 | 9.10 |
| | 5 | | 7.81 | 7.99 | 7.99 | 7.98 | 8.27 | 8.72 | 9.23 |
| Overall happiness ^b | 1 | 7.98 | 8.25 | 8.80 | 9.20 | 9.36 | | | |
| | 2 | 7.77 | 8.09 | 8.33 | 8.80 | 9.18 | | | |
| | 3 | 7.76 | 7.75 | 7.76 | 8.21 | 8.28 | 8.96 | 9.12 | 9.58 |
| | 4 | 7.55 | 7.52 | 7.87 | 7.96 | 7.97 | 8.51 | 8.90 | 9.24 |
| | 5 | | 7.88 | 7.80 | 7.90 | 7.94 | 8.26 | 8.73 | 9.21 |
| Are you satisfied? ^c | 1 | 8.08 | 8.27 | 8.75 | 8.95 | 8.97 | | | |
| | 2 | 7.65 | 7.86 | 8.30 | 8.64 | 9.07 | | | |
| | 3 | 7.56 | 7.44 | 7.67 | 8.06 | 8.08 | 8.79 | 8.88 | 9.38 |
| | 4 | 7.48 | 7.20 | 7.71 | 7.64 | 7.98 | 8.46 | 8.88 | 9.01 |
| | 5 | | 7.31 | 7.40 | 7.68 | 7.80 | 8.13 | 8.67 | 9.15 |
| Are you happy? ^d | 1 | 8.45 | 8.56 | 9.15 | 9.38 | 9.56 | | | |
| | 2 | 8.07 | 8.34 | 8.70 | 8.91 | 9.43 | | | |
| | 3 | 8.06 | 7.96 | 8.00 | 8.50 | 8.65 | 9.21 | 9.44 | 9.41 |
| | 4 | 7.89 | 7.60 | 7.92 | 8.05 | 8.33 | 8.83 | 9.25 | 9.43 |
| | 5 | | 8.00 | 7.93 | 8.18 | 8.06 | 8.48 | 9.09 | 9.48 |

N = 1696

^aSo far, how satisfied are you with each of these things in your life? All your life considered globally (0 = *Not at all satisfied* /10 = *Completely satisfied*)

^bConsidering your life as a whole, you could say you are: 0 = *Extremely unhappy*/10 = *Extremely happy*

^cWhen you think of your life, in general terms, the following set of feelings describes how you feel; Satisfied (0= *Not at all*/ 10 = *Very clearly*)

^dWhen you think of your life, in general terms, the following set of feelings describes how you feel; Happy (0= *Not at all*/ 10 = *Very clearly*)

With regard to the longitudinal study, it should be noted that all the indicators considered are sensitive to the decrease in well-being as adolescence progresses, this being the most remarkable result, although they show differences in their degree of sensitivity to capture this decrease.

The results obtained in the two studies show in some way that the debate about how similar or different the concepts of happiness and satisfaction are is even more complex than one might think so far in terms of the child and adolescent population, for which the use of the terms satisfaction and happiness may not be exactly the same as for adults. In the interpretation that the participants make of both indicators, we hypothesize that factors such as the temporal anchorage of these, the type of questions that they have answered up to now, how the indicator is formulated concretely, socio-cultural differences that we still do not know very well, and the evolutionary moment in which they are, may be intervening.




Fig. 6.2 5-year mean scores evolution of 4 items on life satisfaction and happiness for a sample of children born between 1998 and 2005. $N = 1696$

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Chapter 7

Ruut Veenhoven: Worthy Recipient of the Golden Triangle of Happiness



Robert A. Cummins

Preface The International Society of Quality-of-Life Studies, under the leadership of Joe Sirgy, has attracted many of our most significant QOL researchers to its ranks. Interestingly, a high proportion of these very engaged people also contribute their time and energy to the organization by accepting voluntary administrative roles. Such engagement greatly facilitates administrative operations. Less obviously it also facilitates the presence of these luminaries at ISQOLS conferences, thereby providing a focus of attraction for registrants. Among these stalwarts, whose appearance always generates excitement, is long-time ISQOLS member and Director of the World Database of Happiness, Ruut Veenhoven. Always engaging and supportive to his students and colleagues, this Doyen of Happiness gains the respect of all who know him as a person and as a scholar. Two such conferences particularly stay in my mind. One was wandering the submerged streets of Venice in our gumboots. The other, falling off [Ruut almost, me actual] our Official-Table chairs at the conference dinner provided by [undisclosed, somewhere in China] university after being required to toast a few too many dignitaries, friends of the President, the President's relatives, worthy causes, . . . I am honoured to contribute to Ruut's Festschrift.

Introduction

The definition of Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) is a contentious issue. However, in common scientific usage, the term is used synonymously with 'happiness' and 'life satisfaction' (e.g., Kozma et al. 2000). All three terms refer to a single construct and, when measured through self-report, all three are highly correlated (Anglim et al.

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2015). This rather forgiving aspect of SWB measurement is also reflected in three of the scales used for its measurement.

SWB is usually measured through semi-abstract questions of ‘satisfaction’, most commonly by some slight variation on the single question devised by Andrews and Withey (1976, p. 66) as ‘How do you feel about your life as a whole?’ (Global Life Satisfaction: GLS). While this measure yields valid SWB data, single items have rather poor reliability. So, to correct for this deficit, two multi-item scales have been devised.

The first, and most popular of these, is the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS: Diener et al. 1985), while the second is the Personal Wellbeing Index (PWI: International Wellbeing Group 2013). While both scales are psychometrically adequate measures of SWB, and both are based on GLS, their construction follows quite different principles.

The five-item SWLS is constructed as a reflective scale, in which the items (observed variables) are perceived as reflecting the underlying construct (latent variable). That is, the construct (SWB) is determining the nature of the items that reflect its character. As such, the scale items are derived from factor analysis to form a relatively homogeneous factor that reflects the construct. The seven-item PWI, on the other hand, is constructed as a Formative Index (as it is referred to, rather than a scale) (International Wellbeing Group 2013). Here, the latent variable is *caused by*, rather than reflecting, the composite items. That is, the items determine the nature of the index. Such items are derived from multiple regression, on the basis of their contribution to GLS, which represents their combined latent construct.

While the reflective and formative method of instrument construction are very different from one another, both scales were designed as multiple-item measures of GLS (Cummins 2002; Diener et al. 1985). And in this both have succeeded. The result is that data from the three instruments GLS, SWLS and PWI are all highly correlated and, for most purposes can be considered equivalent measures of SWB.

So the nomenclature and measurement issues, raised so far, present SWB as a coherent construct, which makes it amenable to scientific investigation. But there is another measure that informs about the difference between these scales, and which concerns their validity: or what these instruments are actually measuring. This new measure is Homeostatically Protected Mood (HPMood).

The origin of HPMood came from Davern et al. (2007). They report a study, based on the Circumplex Model of affect (Russell 1980), to determine the minimum set of affects that account for variance in SWB. They found that 64% of the variance in SWB was accounted for by six affects, indicating that SWB is a highly affective construct. Many subsequent studies have been conducted into the properties of HPMood, and its character is currently understood as follows:

1. The current scale comprises three affects as happy, content and alert (Cummins et al. 2018).
2. These three affects comprise the phenotype of a genotypic setpoint. The level of this setpoint is an individual difference and does not change (Capic et al. 2018; Cummins et al. 2014).

3. HPMood is normally the dominating component of SWB, accounting for over half of the measured variance (Cummins et al. 2020). It comprises a steady, positive-activated background to consciousness.
4. The remainder of the measured variance in SWB is emotion, caused by percepts informing the brain of external stimuli, and internal thoughts. This generated emotion is usually stronger than the level of HPMood at any moment of waking consciousness. Thus, a self-reflective response to the felt level of ‘life satisfaction’, is normally dominated by emotion. It is for this reason that the level of SWB shows variation over time.
5. The measured level of SWB does vary, but is normally held within a narrow range around its setpoint for each person. This control is effected by a system of homeostasis that limits emotional reactions by attenuating their duration and intensity (Cummins 2017).

In the context of this homeostasis theory, two special properties of SWB can be explained. These are its stability and its performance as a domain-based scale.

SWB is Normally Stable and Positive

The above description of HPMood is consistent with the general stability of measured SWB, both for populations and for individuals. This stability is caused by the combination of unchanging HPMood and the attendant homeostatic system. Homeostasis attempts to keep emotion, and therefore SWB, close to setpoint for each person. However, as has been commonly noted, measured SWB can also show considerable variation. The circumstances causing such instability occur when homeostatic control is compromised. This may be due to either a strongly felt emotion that exceeds homeostatic capacity, or reduced homeostatic resources. On such occasions, the substantial deviation of SWB from setpoint is normally brief, due to stimulus decay or homeostatic recovery, but under extreme conditions will last until such recovery can be effected. The dominant, normal profile for SWB, however, is a remarkable level of stability.

One practical application of this stability has been to generate normative ranges for SWB using means and standard deviations. For this purpose, data are transformed into a standard 0–100 percentage-point (pp) format as described in the manual for the Personal Wellbeing Index (International Wellbeing Group 2013). Using this technique, Western populations have a mean that lies within the range 70–80pp Cummins (1995). Non-Western means are generally somewhat lower (Cummins 1998) due to a combination of lower wealth and Cultural Response Bias (Lai et al. 2013; Lau et al. 2005).

Normative ranges have also been calculated for individual people using Australian data (Capic et al. 2017). Table A2.1 of this report shows that, based on the responses from 60,000 people, the population mean is 75pp and standard

deviation of 12.5. This provides a normative range for the SWB of individuals between 50 and 100pp. Having a positive view of life is normal.

Domain-based SWB Measurement

The conclusion, that SWB is normally stable and positive, applies to SWB as a single value indicator. This leaves open the relative performance of individual scale items. For the SWLS this is a minor issue since the reflective scale construction has determined a sense of uniformity between the items. This is not so, however, for the PWI where its formative construction has brought together items which refer to different aspects of life satisfaction, with the single unifying requirement that they each share unique variance with GLS.

However, when tested empirically using Australian data, the strength with which individual domains share unique variance with GLS splits into two groups (Cummins 2013; International Wellbeing Group 2013). The four domains of health, community connection, safety, and future security, have an inconsistent unique connection to GLS. This may be because their connection to GLS is mainly through a deficit. For example, if people feel unsafe, then this will create a negative connection to GLS. However if they feel 'safe', which is by far the general feeling of people in Australia, then this is simply neutral and does not add to homeostatic resilience.

The other three domains, on the other hand, have a far more consistent connection. The reason for this difference may be that the domains standard of living, achieving in life, and personal relationships have a dual role of both defending against homeostatic failure and also assisting homeostatic recovery (Cummins 2017). Each of these three domains will now be separately considered in this context.

The Golden Domain Triangle

It is proposed that each of the following domains have a dual role in relation to the maintenance of normal-level subjective wellbeing (SWB). Each domain has the capacity to both defend against homeostatic failure and also to assist recovery when homeostasis fails.

Standard of Living

There are serious misconceptions as to what money can and cannot do in relation to SWB. People who are rich experience rapid adaptation to high living standards, so living in a mansion with servants may feel luxurious in the short term, but over time

it will just feel 'normal'. Moreover, high wealth cannot shift the HPMood set point to create a perpetually happier person. So, in this sense, money cannot buy happiness. No matter how rich someone becomes, once their level of income saturates the wealth-dependent buffering capacity of their homeostatic system, additional wealth will not raise SWB further.

The real power of wealth is to protect wellbeing through its capacity as a flexible resource to assist homeostasis (Cummins 2000). It does this by allowing people to minimize the unwanted challenges they experience in their daily life. Wealthy people pay others to perform tasks they do not wish to do themselves. Thus, SWB rises, from low income to high income, as an asymptotic curve.

The power of money is particularly evident for people who are marginalized or disabled. Such people are more likely to encounter discrimination, to be unemployed, to have ill health and dependence on welfare. So, they are also more likely than is normal to experience homeostatic failure. For these people, the importance of money as a resource to regain homeostatic control is magnified.

Relationships

The second golden domain is an interpersonal relationship involving the mutual sharing of intimacies and support. Almost universally, the research literature attests to the power of such relationships to moderate the influence of stressors on SWB (Sarason et al. 1990), thereby facilitating homeostatic control.

The power of emotionally intimate relationships is especially evident when they are absent. When relationships are insufficient for people's needs they feel lonely and excluded. The predictable consequence is an enhanced probability of homeostatic failure and a high susceptibility to depression (Cummins and Nistico 2002).

Achieving in Life

The process of active engagement, providing purpose in life, is the third golden domain (Trope 1986). There are two main ways people engage in an activity that provides satisfaction with this domain. One is taking an active role in a family group and the other is through outside employment (Schaffer 1953). A voluminous literature attests to the fact that when people lose this homeostatic buffer through, for example, unemployment, their SWB is severely threatened (Clark et al. 2008). There is another, more insidious form of domain loss, which typically occurs when people move into congregate care, commonly towards the end of their lives.

When people live in an institution, the simplest and most cost-efficient method of care is to create predictable routines, and for the staff to conduct the necessary operational procedures. This, then, deprives the residents of the most available source of activity through which they could gain a continued sense of purpose and

responsibility, as by contributing to the collective. Organized activities are a weak substitute because they lack self-direction. The result of such institutional processes is to deny the residents access to an important golden domain.

In summary, the three PWI domains of standard, achieving, and relationships appear to be pre-eminent as representing the areas of life experience that contribute most consistently to measured subjective wellbeing. Notably, these three domains also represent the most difficult for governments to ensure a universal sufficiency.

Conclusions

Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) is surprisingly easy to measure in a valid and reliable way. It is less simple to understand in terms of its composition and interpretation of measurement. This is due, in part, to the layered composition of SWB. It comprises both an unchanging genetic component (Homeostatically Protected Mood: HPMood) representing each person's setpoint, upon which is superimposed a volatile experiential component in the form of emotion. The additional homeostatic management of emotion, to normally approximate the level of each HPMood setpoint, adds to a complex and intriguing system.

Measuring SWB by the domain-based, Personal Wellbeing Index, offers additional potential to increase the sophistication of our understanding. Even though the seven domains meet the psychometric specifications for a formative index, they do not represent equivalent slices of the SWB pie. Three domains, as money, relationships, and achieving, are more relevant than the other four in supporting homeostatic functioning. While our understanding of these intricacies is as yet fairly basic I trust, with positive confidence, that Ruut will experience many fulfilling years enjoying his 'Golden Domains' and the continued development of his World Database of Happiness.

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Chapter 8

Our Fearless Leader



Edward F. Diener



UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN



November 15, 2019

Dear Ruut,

You are our fearless leader—the Number One expert in the world on the science of happiness. You are the one who really got this field moving, and now the huge interest you have created around the world is apparent to all! You deserve so much gratitude from all of us, as well as our deepest respect and admiration for what you achieved! You should be extraordinarily satisfied with the field that you developed! In my mind you are the pre-eminent scholar and scientist in the world in the field of happiness studies!

Ruut, you are widely appreciated for the World Database of Happiness, but you also created many other impressive resources, as well as important empirical articles. You founded the *Journal of Happiness Studies*. Even though Alex and I were

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co-founding editors of the journal with you, it was you who initiated the journal and established it as a first-rate publication. It was primarily your creation. Thankfully, you made the journal what it is—broad and scholarly. Your accomplishments have been truly remarkable, and the science and scholarship on happiness are now flourishing because of you!

Besides your outstanding achievements, you are a very nice guy! It is rare in a person with such achievements to also find someone who is so friendly and warm. On the occasion of your Festschrift, I want to say THANK YOU and how very much I respect you!

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of the letters 'Ed' in a cursive, flowing style.

Ed Diener, Ph.D.

Chapter 9

Your Happiness Comrade-in-arms



Richard A. Easterlin

Dear Ruut,

It is such a pleasure to be in touch.

I want you to know that I consider your World Database of Happiness to have been a major impetus to establishing the scientific study of happiness. The careful classification and vetting of different questions and response options in more than 3500 happiness surveys has provided an invaluable resource for research on subjective well-being by scholars worldwide. I do not know how many of my students, piqued by a desire to do happiness research, have been directed by me to the World Database as the starting point.

True, we have had our differences, especially on the question whether economic growth increases people's happiness. But our give-and-take, I feel, has always been warm and mutually respectful. I like to think that their spirit has been well-expressed in a letter written some six centuries ago by Leonardo Bruni to one of his critics. You may recall that I published this over 15 years ago in a response to an article of yours, but I believe it is still apropos of our subsequent exchanges:

If your letter had praised everything of mine, I would not have been as pleased as I am by your attempt to disprove and reject certain points. I regard this as a mark of friendship and the other as one of adulation. But in return I ask you to listen with an open mind to my rebuttal. For what you say, if it were allowed to pass without any reply from me, would be too one-sided.

And so have we proceeded, back and forth, time and again.

Let me conclude on a happy note of agreement. A few years ago in a collaborative paper, I thought we had discovered some previously unknown facts on urban -rural

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differences in happiness. But when I researched the literature, I found that you had been there first, and by quite a few years. Well, it was not entirely to my surprise.

Fondly, from your happiness comrade-in-arms, Dick

December 1, 2019

Chapter 10

Il Maestro of Happiness



Richard J. Estes

March 30, 2020
Professor Dr. Ruut Veenhoven
Emeritus Professor of *Social Conditions for Human Happiness*
Extra-Ordinary Professor at North-West University (South Africa)
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Dear Ruut,

Italian scholars refer to their most distinguished members with the title of “maestro”. Well, you are a maestro among all nations and among the many scholars that you have not had the opportunity to meet directly but who closely monitor your multifaceted work.

Your work has inspired excellence in scholarship across at least four decades and has reached thousands of students and faculty members in the Netherlands, in Europe, and more broadly, in North and South America, as well as in selected regions and subregions of Asia and the Pacific. You have achieved this status through your steadily more sophisticated research on the dynamics and outcomes of quality of life and patterns of happiness of people living in more than 150 countries. You also have contributed to the intellectual development of others as well as that of quality life field through the creation of your highly innovative website—*The World Database of Happiness Research*—that contains nearly all of the world’s electronically accessible research on happiness. This is a remarkable website that can be configured by scholars for individual use.

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Ruut, among other contributions, you have provided critically needed professional leadership to the still young field of happiness research through the establishment of several international peer-reviewed journals on happiness, wellbeing and quality of life. You have delivered more scholarly lectures and organized more scholarly workshops on the topic than can be counted (except perhaps by you). And, of course, the list of your exemplary publications on all aspects of quality of life and happiness is a long and varied one.

I, in particular, have enjoyed the rich contributions that you have made to the formation of the *International Society for Quality of Life Studies* (ISQOLS), including electronically hosting the organization's 2020 international conference in Rotterdam. This *festschrift*, prepared in your honor largely by senior members of ISQOLS, is a further testament of the level of respect that your colleagues feel toward you as a maestro in furthering a deepened understanding of all aspects of the forces that influence the different levels of happiness and a subjective sense of quality of life found across the world.

Maestro, all of your colleagues around the world, and I, wish you well and much happiness on the special occasion of your formal retirement and look forward to reading and participating in your future contributions to our rich fields of mutual interest.

Sincerely,

Richard J. Estes

Professor Emeritus

President Emeritus, International Society for Quality of Life Studies (ISQOLS)

Chapter 11

On the Scientific Study of Happiness



Carol Graham

January 26, 2020

Professor Alex Michalos
Editor
Festschrift in honor of
Ruut Veenhoven
By email

Dear Alex,

I am honored to have a chance to write a few words about Ruut Veenhoven's fundamental contributions to the scientific study of happiness. Ruut was one of the pioneers in this field, and also stood out in coming from the perspective of sociology. He defines happiness as something that depends on life ability and life choice. While I would attribute a bit more to the inherited or genetic side of the equation, I share in his view that having the ability to make choices in life is a key determinant of life satisfaction.

Ruut began to study well before there was the expansive data that we have today, and, as such, began his early research with profound observation of human experience. He went on, though, to make major contributions to the measurement of happiness and well-being more generally, as well as to the development of new data sets. His latest effort in this area has been to develop the world database of happiness, which is a monumental collection which summarizes the existing research across many dimensions of happiness and well-being. He has written a n

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impressive list of fundamental articles—and several books—on the topic, and has inspired a huge number of students, including several of the rising stars in the field today.

I have been reading and benefiting from Ruut’s work since my own foray into the field over two decades ago. Of particular relevance to my work was his research showing that many of the relative qualities that are attributed to happiness had more to do with contentment than with long-term life satisfaction. This is a critical distinction that we are much more certain about today than we were when he wrote about it. It is also of fundamental importance when we think about the utility of the metrics in informing policy. Hedonic or temporary states that are weakly linked to objective conditions, while important to understanding human psychology and daily experiences, are less relevant in the context of using well-being metrics to inform policy decisions which aim to better welfare and quality of life over the life course. Ruut highlighted this early on in the debates about happiness in the policy domain.

Another fundamental contribution of Ruut’s that has influenced my thinking was that of happy life years, a concept that mirrors that of QALY’s in the health field, but brings a well-being lens to bear on assessments of human welfare. The concept of happy life years provides a good frame for thinking about the contribution that well-being metrics can make to our existing measures and assessments of human progress.

Ruut has contributed to this field of study for over 50 years. He remains active and innovative well-into his retirement years. I feel lucky to have benefited from his presence, his ideas, his extensive publications, and his approach to having a happy life, which is largely based in remaining active in the research that he loves and engaged with his family and community. It is an honor to contribute in a modest way to this celebration of his career.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Carol Graham', written in a cursive style.

Carol Graham

Chapter 12

The Social Democratic Agenda: The Impact of Scandinavian Social Democratic Regimes on Income Equality, Economic Security, Gender Equality, Levels and Inequality of Life Satisfaction



Bruce Headey and Ruud Muffels

Introduction

This paper is in honour of Ruut Veenhoven, who was 30 years ahead of his time in recognising the potential of ‘big data’ for happiness research. For many of us, his splendidly annotated data collections—*Conditions of Happiness* (1984, first edition) and *World Database of Happiness* (2019, latest edition)—are indispensable, automatic first points of reference when we start new projects. They summarise previous findings, sometimes point you in new directions, and sometimes, sadly, tell you that what seemed a really good idea is just ‘old hat’...and you had better do something else.

When Ruut started assembling data, there was only fragmentary research on happiness outside the Western world. Nevertheless, he strove for world-wide coverage and, from the start, made a key distinction whose importance is being recognised now that datasets from middle and low income countries are widely available. He pointed out that in Western countries happiness seems to depend mainly on the capabilities (or what he called the ‘*life-ability*’) of individuals. In

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lower income countries, by contrast, it was likely that political, social and economic ‘liveability’ would prove to be more important (Veenhoven 1991).

In this paper, we perversely sidestep Ruut’s advice by focussing on ‘liveability’ in the West. The aim is to provide an up-to-date assessment of the impact of Western political regimes on key aspects of welfare: income equality, economic security, gender equality, life satisfaction, and satisfaction with ‘work-life balance’.

In assessing regime performance, we use a revised version of Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) classification of *welfare-capitalist regimes*. Esping-Andersen observed that, although Western countries all have mainly private enterprise market economies, they also all collect between 25% and 50% of GDP in taxes and spend at least half the money on the ‘welfare state’; that is, on health, education and welfare. He initially classified countries into three groups: the Scandinavian ‘social democratic’ regimes, the ‘liberal regimes’ of the Anglo-Saxon countries and Japan, and the ‘conservative-corporatist regimes’ in European countries, where historically the Catholic church had substantial influence (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany). Subsequently, Esping-Andersen and other welfare state researchers have expanded the classification to include Southern European or Mediterranean ‘familial (family and patronage based) welfare regimes’ and also the ‘post-communist regimes’ of Eastern Europe (Esping-Andersen 1999; Arts and Gelissen 2010; Blossfeld et al. 2008; Samuel and Hadjar 2016).

The Social Democratic Agenda: Reduce Income Inequality, Economic Insecurity and Gender Inequality

In this paper our initial focus is on the ‘social democratic agenda’ of reducing the effects of a capitalist economy on income inequality, on economic (job) insecurity, and on gender inequality. Esping-Andersen had nothing to say about the potential effects of regime differences on life satisfaction, but later researchers (Radcliff 2001, 2013; Patek and Radcliff 2008; Deeming and Hayes 2012; Samuel and Hadjar 2016) have explored this topic and we do so too.

It needs to be stressed at the outset that Western regimes have differing welfare priorities. In liberal regimes top priority is given to promoting economic efficiency and economic growth (Esping-Andersen 1990; Goodin et al. 1999). In conservative-corporatist regimes, the highest priority is maintaining social stability. This is done partly via occupationally stratified social insurance schemes, which provide substantial but stratified income support, and so provide for household income stability in periods when a family’s normal market income—primarily the ‘male breadwinner’ income—is temporarily or permanently cut off. It is accepted that, in this paper, we are limiting ourselves to assessing regime performance mainly in terms of social democratic priorities (although perhaps life satisfaction is a priority more widely endorsed) and that proponents of alternative objectives could reasonably say that their concerns have been downgraded.

The key institutional features of the social democratic regimes of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are an alliance between a well supported social democratic party, an agrarian party or parties, and a centralised trade union movement with extensive coverage of the workforce.¹ For most of the time since World War II the social democratic party in Sweden, Norway and Denmark has been the largest single party. However, the Nordic countries are what political scientists term ‘consensus democracies’, rather than ‘majoritarian democracies’ (Ringen 2007; Lijphart 2012).² In consensus democracies, with proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, the main political parties and major interest groups usually prefer to work together, to forge more or less consensual policy decisions. This is what happened in the immediate post-War decades, when the Social Democrats in Denmark, Norway and Sweden were often strong enough to govern alone, and it has continued to happen in more recent times, when the social democratic hegemony has been broken and formal coalition governments (which do not always include social democrats) have become more common. In consensus democracies, unlike majoritarian democracies, it is unusual for an incoming government to repeal programs introduced by the previous government. In particular, coalition governments in the Nordic countries have maintained the social democratic welfare state more or less intact, with some cutbacks to benefits but little attempt to repeal universal, individual-based entitlements (Pierson 1994; Arts and Gelissen 2010).

It should be mentioned that basing welfare benefits on an individual’s entitlement to a decent standard of living, rather than on work history or family entitlements, as in other welfare-capitalist regimes, is viewed as crucial to achieving the social democratic aim of reducing the effects of social stratification and, particularly, to reducing gender inequality (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999). Clearly, women, who in many cases have short or interrupted work histories, stand to gain particularly from individual-based entitlements.

Previous Research on the Effects of Welfare-Capitalist Regimes

Esping-Andersen and subsequent researchers have reported on the effects of differing welfare-capitalist regimes on income equality and gender inequality (Goodin et al. 1999; Scruggs and Allan 2006; Blossfeld et al. 2008; Castles 2009; Castles et al. 2010; Schmitt and Starke 2011). Regular updates are also provided by

¹Union coverage has been declining in most Western countries. However, it remains at a high level in Scandinavia (OECD 2020b).

²In majoritarian democracies (e.g. Britain, Australia), a political party which achieves a legislative majority declines to form a coalition and normally seeks to impose its policy priorities, more or less regardless of the views of minority parties and their supporters (Lijphart 2012).

international agencies, including the World Bank, OECD, Freedom House, the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Social Progress Imperative.

The first researcher to report that levels of life satisfaction are, on average, higher in the Nordic countries than elsewhere in the West was Benjamin Radcliff (2001, 2013). Later researchers have produced similar findings, based on larger samples of countries (Pacek and Radcliff 2008; Deeming and Hayes 2012; Samuel and Hadjar 2016). It has been suggested that lower levels of income inequality contribute to higher national average ratings of life satisfaction (Alesina et al. 2004; Pickett and Wilkinson 2010). However, this claim has always been contentious, appearing to depend on which countries were included in the analysis (Veenhoven 2000). It was undermined in a comprehensive assessment of the international evidence, which indicated that in developing countries there appears to be a small negative relationship between income inequality and life satisfaction, while in developed countries there is no statistically significant relationship at all (Kelley and Evans 2017; see also Zagorski et al. 2014).

There has been little research on the distribution of life satisfaction within countries. However, in 2016 the UN's *World Happiness Report* published initial estimates, finding that the Scandinavian countries were among the most equal (see also Veenhoven 2019). The UN report also indicated a positive relationship between equality of incomes and equality of life satisfaction.

Assumptions, Model and Hypotheses

A core assumption, underlying the paper, is that most people (but not everybody) have two strong economic preferences/motives (Katona et al. 1971; Esping-Andersen 1990). They would prefer both more economic resources (more wealth, more income) and also a considerable degree of economic security. For most people economic security means job security, and for older people it means a secure retirement income.

The model and hypotheses on which this paper is based are set out in Fig. 12.1.

The welfare outcomes that we seek to account for are shown in the box on the far right of the figure. The key explanatory variables are the five types of welfare-capitalist regime, included in our statistical models as dummy variables. Additional explanatory variable, which we expect to be implicated in accounting for welfare outcomes (see hypotheses below) are: gender, relative household income (measured in deciles), socio-economic status and unemployment status. The remaining variables are included in equations as more or less standard 'controls'. A particularly important 'control' is GDP per capita (natural logarithm). All the welfare outcomes in our model are positively related to GDP, so results would heavily be biased towards favourable outcomes for the relatively wealthy Scandinavian countries if this 'control' were omitted.




Fig. 12.1 Effects of welfare-capitalist regimes on income equality, economic security, gender equality, levels and inequality of life satisfaction (LS)

Hypotheses Directly Linked to Social Democratic Policy Objectives

Most of the hypotheses that we test are straightforwardly derived from previous research. The first three are directly linked to explicit social democratic policy objectives.

Hypothesis 1:

Income Inequality

Income inequality is lower in social democratic regimes than under the other types of welfare—capitalist regimes.

Hypothesis 2.1 and 2.2:

Economic Security (Job Security)

2.1 Employees living under social democratic regimes are at less fear of losing their job than employees in other welfare-capitalist regimes.

2.2 Employees living under social democratic regime have greater confidence than employees in other regimes that, if they lose their job, they will be able to find an equally good one.

These two hypotheses perhaps require some explanation. One of the aims of a social democratic welfare state is to reduce fear of job loss—and consequent fear of economic insecurity—by legislating against unfair dismissal. The relative strictness of unfair dismissal rules in Scandinavia is documented in annual OECD reports on ‘job protection’ (OECD 2019). It should also be mentioned that the Scandinavian countries deploy what are termed ‘active labour market programs’, intended to ensure that employees who become redundant are guaranteed retraining linked to a potential replacement job (Easterlin and Switek 2014; OECD 2019). Further, these countries all have large public sectors in which employees have job security and favourable working conditions, including generous provisions for maternity, paternity and sick leave (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999). A majority of public sector employees are women.

Hypothesis 3:

Gender Equality/Inequality

Gender inequality is expected to be lower in social democratic regimes than in other welfare-capitalist regimes. Two specific hypotheses are:

Hypothesis 3.1 Under social democratic regimes women are more equally represented in positions of political power than in other regimes.

Hypothesis 3.2 Under social democratic regimes the gender pay gap between women and men is lower than under other regimes.

Hypotheses Relating to Life Satisfaction

Hypothesis 4:

Life satisfaction levels are higher, on average, in social democratic regimes than in other welfare-capitalist regimes.

Hypothesis 5:

Life satisfaction is less unequal under social democratic regimes than other regimes.

Hypothesis 6:

Lower inequality of life satisfaction in social democratic regimes is partly due to lower inequality of household incomes.

Destratification Hypotheses: Potentially Benign Consequences of High Life Satisfaction Combined with Reduced Inequality

Our final three hypotheses relate to potentially benign consequences—‘destratification’ consequences—of high life satisfaction combined with relatively low levels of income and gender inequality.

Hypothesis 7.1:

Under social democratic regimes the gap in life satisfaction between people of low socio-economic status and high socio-economic status is smaller than under other welfare-capitalist regimes.

Hypothesis 7.2:

Under social democratic regimes the gap in life satisfaction between people with relatively low and relatively high household incomes is smaller than under other regimes.

Hypothesis 7.3:

Under social democratic regimes women’s life satisfaction is higher, relative to men’s, than under other regimes.

Hypothesis 7.4:

Satisfaction with the balance between work and family life (‘work-life balance’) is higher in social democratic than other regimes.

Testing hypothesis 7.1 will just involve replicating the work of Samuel and Hadjar (2016), who reported relatively small gaps in the Nordic countries between the life satisfaction of high and low status people. Their results suggested to us some additional benign consequences that might flow from high satisfaction and low inequality (hypotheses 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4).

Methods

Data Sources

We analyse both individual-level survey data and national-level (aggregate) data covering the five ‘types’ of welfare-capitalist regime (31 countries):³

³Several countries sometimes included in welfare-capitalist classifications were omitted from our analyses. Iceland (social democratic?) and Luxembourg (conservative?) are countries with less than a million population and are, in any case, hard to fit into Esping-Andersen’s categories. Ireland is a particularly difficult country to classify (Arts and Gelissen 2010). Among post-communist countries Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia have considerably lower GDPs than any of the

- Social democratic regimes: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden.
- Liberal regimes: Australia, Britain, Japan, Switzerland and the US.
- Conservative-corporatist regimes: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands.
- Southern European familial regimes: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain
- Post-communist regimes: Bulgaria, Estonia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia.

Survey Data: The European Social Survey and National Panel Surveys

The European Social Survey (ESS) for which interviews have been conducted every two years since 2002 is our main data source. The biennial surveys are cross-sectional; there is no panel element. Not all European countries have participated in each wave, so we pool the data for 2002–2018 in regression analyses. On average, there are now about 10,000 respondents per country (all waves combined).

A limitation of the ESS from the standpoint of this project is that only two liberal welfare-capitalist regimes—Britain and Switzerland—are included. To remedy this we have added panel survey data for three liberal regimes: Australia, Japan and the US. The panels are: The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics Australia Survey (HILDA), the Japanese Household Panel Survey (JHPS), and the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The Australian panel has been running since 2001 and is based on annual interviews with about 15,000 respondents (Watson and Wooden 2010). Questions on life satisfaction and other topics covered in this paper have been included from the outset. The Japanese panel has been running since 2009, conducting annual interviews with about 4000 respondents (CNEF 2019). The US PSID (CNEF 2019) is the longest-running of all national socio-economic panel studies, starting in 1968. However, a question on life satisfaction has only been included since 2009, so we only use data from that year onwards. There are approximately 9000 respondents per wave.

Sample Weights

The number of respondents available per country varies between about 2000 for several of the smaller European countries to about 17,000 for France. The logic of our analysis is that each country is treated as a ‘case’ of one type of welfare-capitalist regime, so each country should be weighted equally in equations. To achieve this, we constructed sample weights for each country, based on a notional sample size of

countries that we have included. Since GDP per capita is a strong predictor of welfare provision, it may not be appropriate to compare them with their wealthier European neighbours.

10,000. So, for example, if the real sample size for a country is 2000, the country weight is 5 (10,000/2000). If the real sample is 15,000, the weight is 0.67 (10,000/15,000).

National-Level (Aggregate) Data

Four outcome variables in this paper—two relating to gender inequality (‘women’s political power’ and ‘gender pay gap’), one relating to income inequality (Gini coefficient), and one to inequality of life satisfaction—are only measured at the national level. Our data sources for the first three of these variables⁴ are international agencies that specialise in trying to make valid international comparisons: the World Bank, the OECD, and the Social Progress Imperative. These agencies all report annual data, so our ‘cases’ in aggregated data analyses should be thought of as ‘country-years’.⁵

Measures

Esping-Andersen’s classification of regimes is widely used by social scientists but has also been repeatedly critiqued (Castles 2009; Castles et al. 2010; Scruggs and Allan 2006; Arts and Gelissen 2010). Esping-Andersen thought in terms of ‘ideal types’. He acknowledged that, while some countries come close to his ‘ideal type’ (social democratic Sweden; liberal USA; corporatist Germany), others are borderline. The most borderline countries in his initial classification were probably Finland and the Netherlands, which had both social democratic and conservative-corporatist features.⁶ He classified Finland as social democratic and the Netherlands as conservative-corporatist. We have retained these classifications, but will later report checks on whether changing them makes a difference to results.

Another potential issue relating to the classification is that, as previously mentioned, social democratic political parties are now nothing like as dominant in the Scandinavian countries as they were in the post-War decades. Esping-Andersen and many other social scientists have speculated about regime ‘convergence’, perhaps mainly towards a liberal model (Esping-Andersen 1999; Pierson 1994; Arts and Gelissen 2010). Two countervailing points may be made. First, it is clear that welfare

⁴Inequality of life satisfaction is calculated from the ESS survey data.

⁵i.e. each country is treated as a separate ‘case’ for each year in which data are available. To match up with the ESS we use data for 2002–2018.

⁶The original classification relied heavily on a measure of ‘decommodification’; the extent to which individuals were entitled to an adequate standard of living regardless of labour force participation. The social democratic countries rated highest on decommodification, with the corporatist regimes next. Finland and the Netherlands were borderline (Esping-Andersen 1990).

state programs develop over decades, rather than being launched or abolished in a short span of years. So the historical record matters, and it is clear that in Scandinavia social democratic parties and trade unions have long been, and still remain considerably stronger than in the rest of Europe (or North America or Australasia). Detailed evidence on party representation in government and on trade union coverage of the labour force confirms these points (Mackie and Rose 1991; *European Journal of Political Research* 1991–; Lansford 2019; OECD 2020b). There is also continuing evidence, notably in the work of Pierson (1994) and Radcliff (2001, 2013), that Western welfare state development continues to be characterised more by ‘path dependence’ than by convergence (for a review of these issues, see Arts and Gelissen 2010). The results in this paper tend to confirm that viewpoint.

Outcome Variables

- *Income inequality* As mentioned, inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient (World Bank, annual). The Gini is the most widely used measure of economic inequality. However, it is more sensitive to income changes in the middle of the distribution than at the top or bottom, which are probably zones of greater interest to most social scientists.
- *Economic (job) insecurity* is measured by two survey questions in the ESS asking respondents (i) ‘How likely is it that you will be unemployed and looking for work in the next 12 months?’ (1–4 scale: ‘not at all likely’ to ‘very likely’), and (ii) If you did lose your job, ‘How likely is it that you would get a similar or a better job with another employer?’ (0–10 scale: ‘extremely difficult’ to ‘extremely easy’). Clearly, these questions measure perceptions of job insecurity, rather than actual probabilities of job loss.
- *Gender inequality* is measured by (i) the Social Progress Imperative (2014–2019) indicator of ‘women’s political power’ (0=unequal power 4=equal power) and (ii) the OECD measure of ‘gender pay gap’, defined as the percentage by which average female employee earnings are below average male employee earnings (OECD 2020a).
- *Life satisfaction levels*: Life satisfaction is measured in the ESS and the Australian panel by a single item asking respondents how satisfied they are with their lives (0=‘very dissatisfied’, 10=‘very satisfied’). In the Japanese and American panels a 1–5 scale is used. For present purposes both the 0–10 and 1–5 measures have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100. This rescaling does no violence to the data, and means that regression coefficients can be conveniently compared and interpreted as ‘quasi-percentages’.
- *Life satisfaction inequality* Inequality of life satisfaction is measured at the national level and is given by the standard deviation of LS (0–100). This is the indicator of inequality used in recent United Nations’ *World Happiness Reports* (2016–2019). Clearly, however, it is a measure of questionable validity. A 0–10 life satisfaction scale is an ordinal scale, not a ratio scale. In effect, this means that international comparisons of both levels and standard deviations require an

assumption that, when people in country x report a rating of, say, 9 on the scale, they are (at least on average) ‘genuinely’ more satisfied with life than people in country y who give a rating of, say, 7. This is a fairly brave assumption, although one routinely made by researchers. Clearly, it is a further stretch to assume that differences in standard deviations between countries can be validly compared (Frey and Stutzer 2002; Clark et al. 2018).

- *Satisfaction with work-life balance* Satisfaction with ‘work-life’ balance is measured in the ESS and the Australian panel on the same 0–10 scale as life satisfaction. Again, the scale has been transformed to run from 0 to 100. Data are not available for Japan or the US.

Data Analysis

The main pooled OLS fixed effects regression equation (2002–2018) used for individual level analysis, with (for example) life satisfaction (LS) as the outcome variable is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{LS} = & b_0 + B1[\text{regime type}] + b_2\text{female} + b_3\text{hhincome decile} \\ & + B4[\text{controls}] + b_5\ln\text{GDP per capita} + \text{year} \end{aligned} \quad (12.1)$$

In this equation life satisfaction is viewed as a function of ‘regime type’, gender, relative household income (measured in deciles), a set of standard ‘controls’, the logarithm of national GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity), and a time indicator (year of survey). The main explanatory variable is ‘regime type’. It enters into the equation as a set of dummy variables, with ‘social democratic’ as the reference group (comparison group). This set-up means that if, for example, we find statistically significant *negative coefficients* for the liberal, conservative, familial and post-communist regimes, we can infer that, on average, people living under these regimes are less satisfied with life than people in social democratic regimes.

The inclusion of a fixed time effect (year of survey) is fairly common in longitudinal analysis, but is somewhat questionable. The aim is to net out the effects of temporal fluctuations in life satisfaction that could be due to such things as the Football World Cup, or a beautiful summer. Clearly, such fluctuations have nothing to do with welfare-capitalist regimes. However, there is a danger of fixed time effects also accounting for some variance in life satisfaction which might be due to regime differences; for example, differences in responses to economic crisis.⁷ Fortunately, despite small variations, all our main results proved to be substantively unchanged, regardless of whether fixed year effects were included or not.

⁷In these circumstances, ‘controlling’ for fixed time effects would be the same as controlling for ‘mediating’ variables, linking regime type to life satisfaction. This could seriously bias results.

Table 12.1 Income inequality under welfare-capitalist regimes: (1) pooled OLS regression^a; (2) regime means, standard deviations, minima and maxima

| <i>Regimes</i> | Gini b | Gini Beta | Gini mean | Gini Standard deviation | Gini Minimum | Gini Maximum |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Social democratic | Reference | Reference | 0.272 | 0.003 | 0.267 | 0.276 |
| Liberal | 0.08*** (0.01) | 0.79 | 0.348 | 0.031 | 0.321 | 0.408 |
| Conservative- corporatist | 0.03*** (0.00) | 0.29 | 0.300 | 0.014 | 0.284 | 0.321 |
| Southern European familial | 0.07*** (0.00) | 0.72 | 0.351 | 0.010 | 0.344 | 0.368 |
| East European post- communist | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.36 | 0.313 | 0.040 | 0.250 | 0.368 |
| GDP per cap (ln) | -0.01* (0.01) | -0.13 | | | | |
| R ² | 0.56 | | | | | |
| N ^b | 225 | | | | | |

*** significant at 0.001, ** significant at 0.01, *significant at 0.05, ns = not significant

^aThe equation also includes fixed year effects (results not shown)

^bN = ‘country-years’

The equation used for national-level analysis, taking the national standard deviations of life satisfaction (LS) as an example, is:

$$LSsd = b_0 + B1[\text{regime type}] + b_2\ln\text{GDP per capita} + \text{year} \tag{12.2}$$

Here the only ‘controls’ are for GDP per capita plus, again, fixed year effects. Recall that in this equation the cases/observations are ‘country-years’; for example, Belgium 2002–2018 counts as 17 ‘country-years’.

Results

Income Inequality

Our first hypothesis is that income inequality is lower under social democratic regimes than under other Western regimes. Table 12.1 reports results of a pooled OLS regression (2002–2018) in which the outcome variables are national-level Gini coefficients of household net income (i.e. disposable income after taxes and transfers). Gini can range from 0 (perfect equality) to 1.00 (one household receives all income). Countries with Ginis under 0.30 are generally regarded as comparatively equal.

The *reference group* in Table 12.1 (and all subsequent tables) is social democratic regimes. This means that the regression coefficients should be interpreted as

showing degrees of inequality under other regimes, relative to inequality in social democratic regimes. The second column in the table reports metric coefficients (bs with robust standard errors in parentheses) and the third column gives standardized coefficients (Betas).

At first sight these results indicate that income inequality is substantially lower under social democratic regimes than other regimes. Consider the standardized coefficients. In liberal regimes Ginis are 0.79 ($p < 0.001$) standard deviation units higher than in social democratic regimes, in conservative-corporatist regimes the Ginis are, on average, 0.29 ($p < 0.001$) standard deviations higher, in Southern European ‘familial’ regimes 0.72 ($p < 0.001$) deviations higher, and in post-communist regimes 0.36 ($p < 0.001$) deviations higher.

Before accepting these results, some checks are needed. Aggregate-data results can be misleading, especially with small or moderate sample sizes. Here our ‘sample’ consists of 225 ‘country-years’ in which national Ginis were measured. With a sample of that size, it would be possible for a few national inclusions or exclusions to change results quite dramatically. With this in mind, we have provided some details about regime Ginis in Table 12.1. It can be seen that not only is the mean level of Ginis lowest in social democratic regimes, so too, by a considerable margin, is the standard deviation. This last result probably reflects the fact that one stated policy objective in social democratic regimes is to reduce economic inequality. Under other regimes, that is not an explicit objective, so a wide range of outcomes may be expected. That said, it should be noticed that a few non-social democratic regimes have lower levels of income inequality than the social democratic average. Two conservative-corporatist regimes, Belgium and the Netherlands, have Ginis under 0.30, as do three post-communist regimes, namely Czechia, Slovakia and Slovenia. The liberal regimes are the most unequal, although there is still great variation. The US Gini is consistently over 0.40, while Japan and Switzerland are relatively low at around 0.32.

Economic Insecurity (Job Insecurity)

Social democratic regimes aim to reduce economic (job) insecurity by such means as regulations against unfair dismissal, and provision of individual-based benefits that are available when not in paid work. Our two measures of economic insecurity—or really of perceived job insecurity—are survey questions relating to ‘fear of unemployment in the next 12 months’ and ‘likelihood of getting a similar job’ if one’s current job is lost. Table 12.2 reports pooled OLS regressions in which these two items are the outcome variables.

It is clear that, compared to people living under social democratic regimes, those living under East European post-communist and Southern European ‘familial’ regimes are at much greater fear of losing their job and becoming unemployed in the next 12 months. The margins of difference between social democracy the other

Table 12.2 Economic (job) insecurity under welfare-capitalist regimes: pooled OLS regressions^{a,b}

| <i>Regimes</i> | Fear of losing job in next 12 months b | Fear of losing job in next 12 months Beta | Likely get similar job (if job lost) b | Likely get similar job (if job lost) Beta |
|------------------------------|---|--|---|--|
| Social democratic | Reference | Reference | Reference | Reference |
| Liberal | 0.11*** (0.01) | 0.03 | -0.36 (0.06)*** | -0.04 |
| Conservative-corporatist | 0.11*** (0.01) | 0.04 | -1.07 (0.05)*** | -0.15 |
| Southern European familial | 0.24*** (0.01) | 0.09 | -1.48 (0.06)*** | -0.18 |
| East European post-communist | 0.38*** (0.02) | 0.19 | -0.86 (0.07)*** | -0.13 |
| GDP per cap (ln) | -0.08*** (0.01) | -0.04 | 0.34 (0.03)*** | 0.07 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.197 | | 0.089 | |

*** significant at 0.001, ** significant at 0.01, *significant at 0.05, ns = not significant

^aThe data are weighted so that each country has a notional sample size of 10,000, which approximates the mean sample size per country

^bThe equation includes ‘controls’ for gender, age, age-squared, marital/partner status (1-0), years of education, net household income decile, unemployed (1-0) and disability status (1-0). Also included are fixed year effects

two regime types—liberal and conservative—are considerably less but are still significant at the 0.001 level.

Results for our second indicator, likelihood of getting a similar job, if one’s current job is lost, are similar. The negative and statistically significant coefficients ($p < 0.001$) for all types of regime except social democracy tell a consistent story. People in the Southern European regimes view themselves as least likely to get as good a job as they had before, while those living in liberal regimes are ‘second best’ behind people in the social democratic regimes. These results are net of the effects of national income (GDP per capita) which is quite strongly and positively related to the prospects of getting a satisfactory job.

Gender Inequality

Our two measures of gender inequality are ‘women’s political power’ (0–4 scale) and ‘gender pay gap’ (percentage difference between male and female employees’ pay). Given that these are aggregate measures, we again supplement regression results with detailed evidence about distributions under different regimes (Table 12.3).

Table 12.3 Gender inequality under welfare-capitalist regimes: women's political power (0–4 scale): (1) pooled OLS regression^a; (2) regime means, standard deviations, minima and maxima

| <i>Regimes</i> | Women's political power b | Women's political power Beta | Women's political power mean | Women's political power Standard deviation | Women's political power Minimum | Women's political power Maximum |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Social democratic | Reference | Reference | 3.29 | 0.13 | 3.13 | 3.49 |
| Liberal | −0.76*** (0.06) | −0.60 | 2.57 | 0.29 | 2.05 | 2.92 |
| Conservative-corporatist | −0.35*** (0.06) | −0.32 | 2.92 | 0.30 | 2.40 | 3.30 |
| Southern European familial | −0.60*** (0.08) | −0.47 | 2.53 | 0.27 | 2.10 | 2.80 |
| East European post-communist | −0.60*** (0.10) | −0.62 | 2.40 | 0.41 | 1.42 | 2.70 |
| GDP per cap (ln) | 0.42** (0.16) | 0.34 | | | | |
| R^2 | 0.56 | | | | | |
| N^b | 141 | | | | | |

*** significant at 0.001, ** significant at 0.01, *significant at 0.05, ns = not significant

^aThe equation also includes fixed year effects (results not shown)

^b N = 'country-years'

The regression results indicate considerably less inequality of political power in social democratic regimes than in the other four regimes. In both post-communist Eastern Europe (Beta = -0.62 , $p < 0.001$) and in the liberal regimes (Beta = -0.60 , $p < 0.001$), political inequality is much higher than in social democratic regimes. Detailed distributional evidence confirms these findings. The mean of 'women's political power' is highest under social democracy and the standard deviation is lowest. All of the post-communist, Southern European and liberal regimes are rated as having lower levels of women's power than any of the social democratic ones. However, two conservative-corporatist regimes—France and Germany—have levels of equality which put them within the social democratic range.

Table 12.4 shows a quite different set of results for the gender pay gap.

The hypothesis that the gender pay would be lowest in the Scandinavian social democratic regimes is decisively falsified. The pay gap is significantly lower in the Southern European familial regimes (Beta = -0.19 , $p < 0.05$), and is not significantly different from the social democratic gap in the conservative or post-communist regimes. Only in liberal regimes (Beta = 0.48 , $p < 0.001$) is the gap clearly greater. The detailed distributional evidence in Table 12.4 confirms these findings.

Table 12.4 Gender inequality under welfare-capitalist regimes: gender pay gap: (1) pooled OLS regression^a; (2) regime means, standard deviations, minima and maxima

| <i>Regimes</i> | Gender pay gap (%) b | Gender pay gap (%) Beta | Gender pay gap (%) Mean | Gender pay gap (%) Standard deviation | Gender pay gap (%) Minimum | Gender pay gap (%) Maximum |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|--|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Social democratic | Reference | Reference | 9.38 | 4.95 | 5.30 | 17.72 |
| Liberal | 6.44*** (1.01) | 0.48 | 17.63 | 3.87 | 11.54 | 24.52 |
| Conservative-corporatist | 1.40 ^{ns} (1.19) | 0.10 | 11.85 | 4.67 | 3.70 | 16.19 |
| Southern European familial | -2.73* (1.36) | -0.19 | 9.09 | 4.30 | 4.49 | 14.77 |
| East European post-communist | -1.06 ^{ns} (1.88) | -0.09 | 12.07 | 5.13 | 5.00 | 21.12 |
| GDP per cap (ln) | -4.68** (1.56) | -0.37 | | | | |
| R^2 | 0.40 | | | | | |
| N^b | 222 | | | | | |

*** significant at 0.001, ** significant at 0.01, *significant at 0.05, ns = not significant

^aThe equation also includes fixed year effects (results not shown)

^b N = 'country-years'

Levels of Life Satisfaction: Regime Differences

In Table 12.5 we report the net effects of regime type on life satisfaction. Recall that life satisfaction is measured on a 0–100 scale, so regression coefficients may be interpreted as 'quasi-percentiles'. Both national GDP per capita and 'household income decile' are included in the regression as 'controls', so results can be viewed as assessing regime effects on life satisfaction, making full allowance for income differences.

The evidence indicates that people living under the generous/supportive Scandinavian welfare regimes have considerably higher average life satisfaction than people living in the other regimes. Net of 'controls' for national and household income, Scandinavians are 6.51 'quasi-percentage points' more satisfied than their counterparts in liberal regimes, 7.70 'quasi-percentiles' more satisfied than in conservative regimes, 11.67 points more satisfied than in Southern European 'familial' regimes, and 13.71 points more satisfied than in post-communist Eastern Europe (Inglehart et al. 2008). Results were similar for men and women, and for age groups under 35, 35–54 and 55 plus. All these groups reported higher life satisfaction in the social democratic regimes than elsewhere.

More detailed analysis confirms that all four social democratic regimes have mean life satisfaction ratings above the level predicted by their GDP per capita.

Table 12.5 Life satisfaction (levels) under welfare-capitalist regimes: pooled OLS regression^{a,b}

| <i>Regimes</i> | Life satisfaction (0–100) b | Life satisfaction (0–100) Beta |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Social democratic | Reference | Reference |
| Liberal | –6.51*** (0.13) | –0.10 |
| Conservative-corporatist | –7.70*** (0.11) | –0.12 |
| Southern European familial | –11.67*** (0.14) | –0.19 |
| East European post-communist | –13.71*** (0.16) | –0.29 |
| GDP per cap (ln) | 3.64*** (0.11) | 0.09 |
| R^2 | 0.14 | |

*** significant at 0.001, ** significant at 0.01, *significant at 0.05, ns = not significant

^aThe data are weighted so that each country has a notional sample size of 10,000, which approximates the mean sample size per country

^bThe equation includes ‘controls’ for gender, age, age-squared, marital/partner status (1-0), years of education, net household income decile, unemployed (1-0) and disability status (1-0). Also included are fixed year effects

By contrast, nearly all of the post-communist regimes have ratings below the level predicted by their national income. Poland and Slovenia are narrow exceptions, with mean life satisfaction ratings just above the level predicted by their GDP.

Mean life satisfaction levels in liberal regimes are closest to social democratic levels. So a demanding sensitivity test is to see if results remain substantively unchanged if we exclude the social democratic regime with the highest life satisfaction level, and also the liberal regime with the lowest level. The countries in question are Denmark with a mean life satisfaction level that is 13 quasi-percentiles above what is predicted by its national income, and Japan which is 10 points below its predicted level. With these exclusions the gap between the social democratic and liberal regimes narrows from 6.51 to 2.58 quasi-percentiles; a gap that is still significant at the 0.001 level.

Another useful sensitivity test involves checking whether results change if ‘borderline’ regimes are reclassified. As mentioned, the most borderline social democratic welfare state is Finland (borderline with ‘corporate’), and the most borderline corporate regime is the Netherlands (borderline with ‘social democratic’). The difference in life satisfaction of 7.70 quasi-percentiles only changes slightly if the classification of these two countries is swapped, or if one or both of them is omitted.

Inequality of Life Satisfaction: Regime Differences

Our next hypothesis is that inequality of life satisfaction is lower under social democratic than other regimes. Given previous evidence on income inequality and perhaps gender inequality, we would expect this hypothesis to be confirmed. Our measures of inequality, in line with recent UN *World Happiness Reports* (2016–2019), are national (aggregate-level) standard deviations of life satisfaction.

The evidence in Table 12.6 indicates that inequality of life satisfaction is significantly greater ($p < 0.001$) in the other four types of regime than under social democracy. Inequality is highest in post-communist Eastern Europe, where the standard deviation is 6.76 quasi-percentage points higher than in Scandinavia. The liberal regimes are closest to the social democratic regimes, but even there inequality of life satisfaction is 2.84 points higher. The more detailed distributional evidence in the right-hand columns of the table shows that both the mean and standard deviation (i.e. the standard deviation of life satisfaction standard deviations) are lower in the Scandinavian countries than in other regimes. There are exceptions to the overall picture. Australia, a liberal regime, actually has a lower degree of life satisfaction inequality than the Scandinavian countries, and the Netherlands, a conservative-corporatist regime, has a standard deviation of life satisfaction comparable to the Scandinavians.

A further, rather obvious hypothesis is that life satisfaction inequality is partly due to income inequality. The *World Happiness Report* (2016) shows a positive relationship between the two variables for a ‘sample’ of over 150 countries. Here we

Table 12.6 Inequality of life satisfaction (LS s.d.) under welfare-capitalist regimes: (1) pooled OLS regression^a; (2) regime means, standard deviations, minima and maxima

| <i>Regimes</i> | LS (s.d.) b | LS (s.d.) Beta | LS (s.d.) Mean | LS (s.d.) Standard deviation | LS (s.d.) Minimum | LS (s.d.) Maximum |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Social democratic | Reference | Reference | 16.16 | 0.87 | 15.23 | 17.19 |
| Liberal | 2.84*** (0.47) | 0.32 | 18.98 | 2.79 | 14.51 | 21.48 |
| Conservative-corporatist | 3.72*** (0.49) | 0.42 | 19.89 | 3.03 | 15.61 | 24.18 |
| Southern European familial | 5.35*** (0.32) | 0.60 | 21.49 | 1.24 | 19.90 | 23.18 |
| East European post-communist | 6.76*** (0.48) | 1.01 | 23.16 | 2.26 | 17.22 | 26.26 |
| GDP per cap (ln) | -0.13 ^{ns} (0.39) | -0.02 | | | | |
| R^2 | 0.55 | | | | | |
| N^b | 279 | | | | | |

*** significant at 0.001, ** significant at 0.01, *significant at 0.05, ns = not significant

^aThe equation also includes fixed year effects (results not shown)

^b N = ‘country-years’

restrict analysis to the 31 countries classified by type of regime. The Pearson correlation between national Ginis and national standard deviations of life satisfaction in this restricted sample is 0.48 ($p < 0.001$). Our measure of ‘women’s political power’ correlates negatively (as expected) with inequality of life satisfaction; $r = -0.33$ ($p < 0.001$).⁸ However, in a pooled regression analysis in which the outcome variable is ‘the national standard deviation of life satisfaction’, and measures of income and gender inequality are the predictor variables (controlling for GDP per capita), only income inequality (Gini) is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). It remains so even if, at risk of multicollinearity, regime type is also included in the equation.

‘Destratification’: Beneficial Consequences in Social Democratic Regimes of High Levels of Life Satisfaction Combined with Comparatively Low Income and Gender Inequality

Differences in Life Satisfaction between People of High and Low Socio-economic Status, and between People with High and Low Incomes

In this last part of the Results section, we consider some potentially benign ‘destratification’ consequences of the combination of high life satisfaction and comparatively low levels of income and gender inequality found in social democratic regimes. It is hypothesised that differences in life satisfaction between people of higher and lower socio-economic status will be smaller under social democratic than other welfare-capitalist regimes (Samuel and Hadjar 2016). Similarly, we hypothesise that the life satisfaction gap between high and low income people will be smaller in the social democratic regimes.

Technically, one way to test these hypotheses is to add interaction terms to equations we have already run. To test the hypothesis about socio-economic status, we constructed five interaction terms between regime type and the ISEI scale (International Socio-Economic Status). To test the hypothesis about reduced differences in life satisfaction between income groups, we interacted regime type with household income decile; that is, with a measure of *relative* household income.

Results are in Tables 12.7 and 12.8. Social democratic regimes are the reference group both for testing the *main effects* of regime on life satisfaction (in the top half of the tables) and also for testing *interaction effects* (the lower half of the tables).

The positive and statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) interaction terms in Table 12.7 show that there is a stronger relationship between socio-economic status and life satisfaction in the other four types of regime than in social democratic

⁸Somewhat surprisingly, the correlation between ‘gender pay gap’ instead of being positive is significant and negative ($r = -0.24$, $p < 0.001$).

Table 12.7 Life satisfaction is less dependent on socio-economic status in social democratic regimes than other welfare-capitalist regimes: pooled OLS regression^{a,b}

| <i>Regimes</i> | Life satisfaction (0–100) b | Life satisfaction(0–100) Beta |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <i>Main effects</i> | | |
| Social democratic | Reference | Reference |
| Liberal | –6.90 (0.49)*** | –0.08 |
| Conservative-corporatist | –13.48 (0.42)*** | –0.21 |
| Southern European familial | –18.00 (0.48)*** | –0.29 |
| East European post-communist | –22.93 (0.45)*** | –0.48 |
| GDP per cap (ln) | 2.31 (0.13)*** | 0.06 |
| Socio-economic status (ISEI) | –0.01 (0.01) ^{ns} | –0.01 |
| <i>Interaction terms</i> | | |
| Social democratic*ISEI | Reference | Reference |
| Liberal*ISEI | 0.07 (0.01)*** | 0.04 |
| Conservative*ISEI | 0.12 (0.01)*** | 0.09 |
| Southern European familial*ISEI | 0.12 (0.01)*** | 0.08 |
| East European post-communist*ISEI | 0.17 (0.01)*** | 0.17 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.16 | |

*** significant at 0.001, ** significant at 0.01, *significant at 0.05, ns = not significant

^aThe data are weighted so that each country has a notional sample size of 10,000, which approximates the mean sample size per country

^bThe equation includes ‘controls’ for gender, age, age-squared, marital/partner status (1-0), years of education, net household income decile, unemployed (1-0) and disability status (1-0). Also included are fixed year effects

welfare states. Similarly, the positive, significant interaction terms in Table 12.8 tell us that income matters more to life satisfaction in other regimes than under social democracy. Or, to put these results the other round, the gap between high and low status individuals, and between high and low income individuals is reduced in social democratic regimes.

Regime Differences in Life Satisfaction between Men and Women, and in Satisfaction with ‘Work-Life Balance’

Gender inequality is lower in Scandinavia than in other Western regimes, so it is reasonable to hypothesise that Scandinavian women may be more satisfied with life, relative to their menfolk, than women in other countries. As before, we include interaction terms—this time between regime and gender—to test our prediction (Table 12.9).

The evidence clearly refutes this hypothesis. The interaction terms indicate that, compared to men, women are no more satisfied with life in social democratic welfare states than in liberal or conservative regimes (differences not significant at the 0.05 level). However, in these three types of regime, women’s life satisfaction is higher,

Table 12.8 Life satisfaction is less dependent on household income in social democratic regimes than other welfare-capitalist regimes: pooled OLS regression^{a,b}

| <i>Regimes</i> | Life satisfaction (0–100) b | Life satisfaction (0–100) Beta |
|--|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <i>Main effects</i> | | |
| Social democratic | Reference | Reference |
| Liberal | –16.30 (0.32)*** | –0.30 |
| Conservative-corporatist | –17.00 (0.37)*** | –0.26 |
| Southern European familial | –17.25 (0.49)*** | –0.24 |
| East European post-communist | –25.80 (0.41)*** | –0.55 |
| GDP per cap (ln) | 3.03 (0.16)*** | 0.07 |
| Household income decile | 0.16 (0.04)*** | 0.02 |
| <i>Interaction terms</i> | | |
| Social democratic*Income decile | Reference | Reference |
| Liberal*Income decile | 1.82 (0.05)*** | 0.20 |
| Conservative*Income decile | 1.57 (0.05)*** | 0.15 |
| Southern European familial*Income decile | 1.10 (0.08)*** | 0.08 |
| East European post-communist*Income decile | 1.93 (0.05)*** | 0.26 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.18 | |

*** significant at 0.001, ** significant at 0.01, *significant at 0.05, ns = not significant

^aThe data are weighted so that each country has a notional sample size of 10,000, which approximates the mean sample size per country

^bThe equation includes ‘controls’ for gender, age, age-squared, marital/partner status (1-0), years of education, net household income decile, unemployed (1-0) and disability status (1-0). Also included are fixed year effects

relative to men’s, than in Southern European ‘familial’ regimes or in post-communist Eastern Europe.

Our last hypothesis concerns satisfaction with ‘work-life balance’. It was expected that relatively generous maternity, paternity and sick leave arrangements in Scandinavia would result in higher satisfaction, perhaps particularly for women. Table 12.10 gives regression results for the whole population, then for men and women separately.

The evidence shows that, on average, Scandinavians are more satisfied with their ‘work-life balance’ than people in other regimes. However, contrary to expectation, it is only Scandinavian men—and not women—who are exceptionally satisfied.

Discussion

Plainly, the overall picture appears to be that welfare outcomes relating to income and gender equality, economic security and life satisfaction, are more favourable in the social democratic regimes than elsewhere. In presenting results, we have

Table 12.9 Women are **not** more satisfied with life, relative to men, in social democratic welfare-capitalist regimes than in other regimes: pooled OLS regression^{a,b}

| <i>Regimes</i> | Life satisfaction (0–100) b | Life satisfaction (0–100) Beta |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <i>Main effects</i> | | |
| Social democratic | Reference | Reference |
| Liberal | –7.59 (0.18)*** | –0.12 |
| Conservative-corporatist | –7.69 (0.15)*** | –0.12 |
| Southern European familial | –10.84 (0.19)*** | –0.17 |
| East European post-communist | –13.96 (0.20)*** | –0.30 |
| GDP per cap (ln) | 3.47 (0.10)*** | 0.08 |
| Female (1-0) | 0.76 (0.15)*** | 0.02 |
| <i>Interaction terms</i> | | |
| Social democratic*Female | Reference | Reference |
| Liberal*Female | –0.02 (0.25) ^{ns} | –0.00 |
| Conservative*Female | 0.11 (0.21) ^{ns} | 0.00 |
| Southern European familial*Female | –2.15 (0.26)*** | –0.03 |
| East European post-communist*Female | –0.88 (0.22)*** | –0.02 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.14 | |

*** significant at 0.001, ** significant at 0.01, *significant at 0.05, ns = not significant

^aThe data are weighted so that each country has a notional sample size of 10,000, which approximates the mean sample size per country

^bThe equation includes ‘controls’ for age, age-squared, marital/partner status (1-0), years of education, net household income decile, unemployed (1-0) and disability status (1-0). Also included are fixed year effects

mentioned exceptions, and also summarised sensitivity analyses which indicate that reclassification of borderline regimes, or omitting countries with outlying results, make little difference to our substantive conclusions. However, there is an underlying problem that is common in international comparative studies. It is a problem of ‘over-determination’. However cautiously results are interpreted, we cannot escape the fact that we are dealing with a small number of countries, classified into five regime types. Further, none of these countries has clearly changed ‘type/regime’ during the period under study, so we cannot check whether a change of regime leads to a change in welfare outcomes. There is no available evidence, for example, on whether life satisfaction was higher or lower in the Scandinavian countries before they became social democratic welfare states after World War II. This being the case, we cannot decisively rule out the possibility that benign welfare outcomes are due to factors not considered in the paper. It might be, for example, that high levels of life satisfaction are partly due to the fact that the Scandinavian countries are ethnically homogeneous, have enjoyed a long period of peace, and have been relatively prosperous for the last 50 years.

Political scientists who have studied the Scandinavian countries in comparative perspective tend to attribute benign outcomes to a tradition of consensual policy making and to the development of a “kinder, gentler democracy” than is found

Table 12.10 Satisfaction with ‘work-life balance’ in differing welfare-capitalist regimes: pooled OLS regressions^{a,b}

| <i>Regimes</i> | <i>All</i> Satis with ‘work-life balance’ (0–100) b | <i>All</i> Satis with ‘work-life balance’ (0–100) Beta | <i>Men</i> Satis with ‘work-life balance’ (0–100) b | <i>Men</i> Satis with ‘work-life balance’ (0–100) Beta | <i>Women</i> Satis with ‘work-life balance’ (0–100) b | <i>Women</i> Satis with ‘work-life balance’ (0–100) Beta |
|------------------------------|--|---|--|---|--|---|
| Social democratic | Reference | Reference | Reference | Reference | Reference | Reference |
| Liberal | –1.64*** (0.35) | –0.02 | –2.74*** (0.48) | –0.03 | –0.40 ^{ns} (0.51) | –0.00 |
| Conservative-corporatist | –1.71*** (0.29) | –0.03 | –2.83*** (0.40) | –0.05 | –0.51 ^{ns} (0.42) | –0.01 |
| Southern European familial | –1.39*** (0.38) | –0.02 | –1.52** (0.52) | –0.03 | –1.17* (0.56) | –0.02 |
| East European post-communist | –3.99*** (0.41) | –0.09 | –4.54*** (0.57) | –0.10 | –3.17*** (0.60) | –0.07 |
| GDP per cap (ln) | 1.59*** (0.28) | 0.04 | 1.16** (0.38) | 0.03 | 2.20*** (0.43) | 0.05 |
| <i>R</i> ² | 0.04 | | 0.05 | | 0.04 | |

*** significant at 0.001, ** significant at 0.01, *significant at 0.05, ns = not significant

^aThe data are weighted so that each country has a notional sample size of 10,000, which approximates the mean sample size per country

^bThe equation includes ‘controls’ age, age-squared, marital/partner status (1-0), years of education, net household income decile, unemployed (1-0) and disability status (1-0). Also included are fixed year effects

elsewhere in Europe or North America (Ringen 2007; Lijphart 2012). The empirical results in this paper could be said to make it fairly obvious why lower status and lower income people in Scandinavia report relatively high levels of life satisfaction. Economic inequality has been reduced and lower income people have greater economic security than elsewhere.

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Chapter 13

Organizations with Virtuous Leaders Flourish More



Martijn Hendriks

This chapter is dedicated to Ruut Veenhoven, a virtuous leader himself.

Introduction

Virtuous leaders can be regarded as leaders whose character and voluntary behavior consistently exhibited in context-relevant situations align with some core virtues important to leaders (Hackett and Wang 2012). On the one hand, a long list of corporate leadership scandals and the often marginal role of leader character in the hiring, training, and evaluation of leaders illustrate that virtuous leadership is often considered of negligible importance or detrimental to oneself or the organization (Callahan 2004; Seijts et al. 2019). On the other hand, there is a longstanding belief that a leader’s character is a fundamental building block for effective and sustainable leadership because it shapes his or her goals and behavior, and it can therefore have a profound impact on the organization, individuals within the organization, and the leader him or herself (Peterson and Seligman 2004). In this regard, the belief that you can “do well by doing good” has revived in the last decade (Wright and Goodstein 2007; Flynn 2008). One inspirational example in this regard is Greystone Bakery, which Bernard Glassman founded to help an underprivileged local community in New York by giving the hard-to-employ an opportunity for work via its open hiring policy and by giving profits back to the local community. The approach of this

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successful social enterprise is nicely summarized in the firm's credo "we don't hire people to bake brownies, we bake brownies to hire people".

A major reason that practitioners differ in their willingness to be *virtuous* leaders is their dissimilar beliefs regarding its consequences. This raises a fundamental question: What is the association between virtuous leadership and flourishing in organizations? This chapter explores this question by reviewing the current literature and thereby aims to promote an understanding of how virtuous leadership relates to flourishing in organizations. Flourishing individuals and organizations are here considered as well-functioning in the sense that they achieve their goals in a sustainable way. The focus on flourishing in organizations highlights that as virtuousness centers on pursuing and enhancing the good, it may warrant attention as a way to not only avoid damaging situations but also exert positive influence in organizations. This chapter continues with an overview of recent advances in the conceptualization and measurement of virtuous leadership, followed by a discussion of theoretical insights and empirical evidence on the relationship between virtuous leadership and the flourishing of subordinates, leaders, and organizations.

What is Virtuous Leadership?

Character is inextricably linked with virtue because good character is built through the practice and habituation of virtues (Newstead et al. 2020). In turn, character strongly guides behavior and is understood through one's behavior (Hannah and Avolio 2011a, b). Hence, virtuous leadership denotes character-based leadership and is demonstrated through voluntary (intrinsically motivated and intentional) virtuous behaviors in context-relevant situations (Hackett and Wang 2012). This definition is based on the virtue ethics perspective that virtuous leadership does not require an instrumental outcome to be of worth (a teleological focus) and should not be motivated by rules or moral duties (a deontological focus), but requires leaders to engage in virtuous behaviors exactly because those behaviors are inherently moral.

The list of cardinal leader virtues as well as their interpretations and relative levels of importance vary somewhat between major traditions globally (Hursthouse 1999). Figure 13.1 depicts four main endeavors to develop a parsimonious and coherent conceptual framework of virtuous leadership. These conceptualizations somewhat differ in their philosophical and cultural underpinnings.

Riggio et al. (2010) define virtuous leaders in Western societies as leaders who adhere to four core virtues: prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude (courage). This set of four cardinal virtues are explicitly listed as cardinal virtues in Ancient Greek philosophy (Aristotle and Plato) and Christianity (St. Thomas Aquinas) and can thus from a historical perspective be regarded the four cardinal virtues in Western societies. However, Peterson and Seligman (2004) and Hackett and Wang (2012) illustrate that these virtues are also pre-eminent virtues in most other cultures globally and therefore consider these four virtues as globally applicable cardinal leader virtues. Crossan et al. (2017) demonstrate that these four cardinal virtues are also deemed crucial by contemporary practitioners. Hence, there is cross-cultural

| | Peterson and Seligman (2004) | Riggio et al. (2010) | Wang/ Hackett (2012, 2016) | Crossan et al. (2017) |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|--|--------------------------------------|
| Core virtues | | | | |
| Prudence/Wisdom/Judgement | x | x | x | X |
| Temperance | x | x | x | X |
| Justice | x | x | x | X |
| Courage/Fortitude | x | x | x | X |
| Humanity | x | | x | X |
| Transcendence | x | | | X |
| Truthfulness | | | x | |
| Accountability | | | | X |
| Integrity | | | | X |
| Drive | | | | X |
| Humility | | | | X |
| Collaboration | | | | X |
| Philosophical basis | | | | |
| Ancient Greek philosophy | x | x | x | x |
| Judeo-Christianity | x | x | x | x |
| Confucius & Taoism (East-Asia) | x | | x | x |
| Buddhism & Hinduism (South Asia) | x | | | x |
| Islam | | | | x |
| Beliefs of practitioners | | | | |
| Scope | Worldwide | Western societies | Western and East-Asian societies | North and Latin America |
| Operationalization | Values in Action -Inventory of Strengths | Leadership Virtues Questionnaire (LVQ) | Virtuous Leadership Questionnaire (VLQ) | - |

Fig. 13.1 Four conceptualizations of virtuous leadership

agreement that a virtuous leader should at least have a disposition to make the right judgments for achieving virtuous goals using appropriate means in a given situation (i.e., prudence, practical wisdom, or good judgement), control one’s emotional reactions and desires for self-gratification (i.e., temperance), give others what they deserve (i.e., justice), and persevere in doing what they believe is ‘right’ despite the risk of unpleasant consequences (i.e., courage or fortitude).

Drawing on philosophical and spiritual traditions across the globe, Peterson and Seligman (2004) added humanity and transcendence as globally applicable cardinal leader virtues. Focusing more specifically on Confucian and Aristotelian perspectives, Hackett and Wang (2012) added two virtues considered pre-eminent by Confucius (humanity and truthfulness) to the four Aristotelian virtues, thereby forming a list of six cardinal leader virtues that apply to Western and Eastern societies. Although humanity is not explicitly listed as a cardinal virtue in ancient Greek philosophy, both Peterson and Seligman (2004) and Hackett and Wang (2012) argue that it can be considered a cardinal virtue of leaders as it is implicitly valued as an essential virtue in Western cultural traditions, considered cardinal by most contemporary ethics scholars, and explicitly listed as a cardinal virtue in most other dominant traditions across the globe. A similar reasoning applies to for instance courage, which is in non-Western societies not always explicitly listed as a cardinal virtue but often implicitly regarded an essential virtue. The importance of other leader virtues is more context-dependent: for instance, truthfulness is a cardinal virtue for Confucius but not in Aristotelian thinking, Buddhism, Islam, and Judeo-Christianity. Similarly, transcendence is the pre-eminent virtue in Buddhism but only implicitly valued as a core virtue in most other traditions. Crossan et al. (2017) highlight that practitioners in North and Latin America require virtuous leaders to additionally adhere to some other pre-eminent virtues, particularly accountability, integrity, drive, humility, and collaboration. Adewale (2020) documented that the four core virtues in African cultures are truthfulness, courage, humility and humanity.

Crossan et al. (2017) also highlight that good judgment is considered the most important virtue by practitioners in North and Latin America, which corresponds to Aristotelian thinking that prudence is the “mother of all virtues” (Flynn 2008; Riggio et al. 2010). Notwithstanding, many contemporary ethics scholars concur with Aristotle’s belief that the cardinal virtues form a unified whole, meaning that people rarely possess some moral virtues but not others and that they are interdependent in creating positive outcomes (e.g., MacIntyre 1984). For example, a prudent but cowardly leader will not be very effective in fostering employee well-being, and just actions of an inhumane leader will not be fully appreciated by employees. Initial empirical evidence confirms that subordinate perceptions of leader virtues are strongly correlated (Riggio et al. 2010; Thun and Kelloway 2011; Wang and Hackett 2016; Hendriks et al. 2020a). However, the consideration of individual leader virtues in specific situations remains essential as the importance and the specific role of virtues are context-dependent.

Overall, a comparison of these four conceptualizations reveals that there is consensus about the broad conceptual framework of virtuous leadership but that context-dependent nuances are important. An important caveat is that other virtues are sometimes emphasized in positive organizational scholarship. For instance, the organizational virtuousness framework of Cameron et al. (2004) is focused on forgiveness, trust, integrity, optimism, and compassion as core virtues.

To assess leader character, Peterson and Seligman (2004) developed the Values in Action (VIA) Inventory of Strengths, which does not measure virtues directly because they believed virtues—and by extension virtuous leadership—are “too

abstract and general” to be measured (Peterson and Seligman 2004, p. 31). Instead, VIA measures 24 character strengths, which can be considered “the psychological ingredients—processes or mechanisms—that define the virtues” (Peterson and Seligman 2004, p. 13). For instance, bravery, persistence, and integrity are considered character strengths belonging to the virtue courage. This belief that virtuous leadership cannot be measured is convincingly dispelled by the development of sound and direct measures of virtuous leadership empirically distinct from other leadership concepts by Riggio et al. (2010) and Wang and Hackett (2016).

Leader virtues also play a role in various prominent leadership styles that are typically taught to and pursued by leaders, such as transformational leadership, ethical leadership, and servant leadership. However, these leadership styles do not center on leader virtues and other defining characteristics of virtuousness, particularly its focus on virtue ethics and character (for an in-depth review of differences with other leadership styles, see Hackett and Wang 2012). In sum, the recent advances in the conceptualization and measurement of virtuous leadership and differences with other leadership styles enable and highlight the relevance of deeper explorations into the link between virtuous leadership and human flourishing.

How Does Virtuous Leadership Relate to the Flourishing of Subordinates?

Virtuous leadership can promote the flourishing of subordinates in three major ways.

First, virtuous leader behaviors can influence the *objective* job characteristics and outcomes of subordinates. For instance, giving subordinates credit where credit is due can enhance their career progress and job security, the fair and considerate allocation of work tasks can positively influence subordinates’ job content, and caring about subordinates can result in more suitable work hours. On the other hand, virtuous behavior can harm the objective situations of subordinates (e.g., job security) if competitors manage to get ahead by doing wrong.

Second, virtuous leaders can also enhance the flourishing of followers through a *subjective* process. Trust is a central mechanism in this regard (Hendriks et al. 2020a). Leader character is considered a primary source of trust in one’s leader because trust is particularly built when virtuous behavior is intrinsically motivated, intentional, and consistently displayed in context-relevant situations (Dirks and Ferrin 2002). This perspective suggests that the character-based concept of virtuous leadership may enhance trust even more so than related leadership styles traditionally associated with trust, such as ethical leadership and transformational leadership, because those leadership styles do not fully center on character but also focus on behaviors that may generate less trust, such as conforming to rules or moral duties (a deontological focus) and goal-oriented behavior (a teleological focus). In turn, trust is the catalyst of various follower attitudes and behaviors that contribute to flourishing, including those directly related to the leader such as satisfaction with the leader and leader-member exchange, organization-related attitudes and behaviors

such as organizational identification (Schaubroeck et al. 2013), and broader psychological aspects such as reduced work stress (Liu et al. 2010). Together, these processes make trusting one's leader essential for the flourishing of employees (Dirks and Ferrin 2002; Hendriks et al. 2020a).

Third, by exemplifying virtuousness, leaders can influence, through internalization, the virtuous behavior of others in the organization, thereby stimulating a more virtuous organizational climate (Cameron and Winn 2012). Positive organizational scholarship (POS) posits that virtuousness in organizations, or employees' perceptions thereof, in turn has amplifying qualities by creating self-reinforcing spirals of positive practices such as prosocial behavior and organizational commitment, and positive feelings such as work engagement, affective well-being, and job satisfaction (Cameron et al. 2004). In addition, organizational virtuousness is suggested to have buffering qualities, meaning that it enables resiliency in organizations to cope with difficult times due to for instance greater solidarity and trust (Cameron et al. 2004; Nikandrou and Tsachouridi 2015). The concept of organizational virtuousness featuring in POS does not align well with the concept of virtuous leadership because it focuses on six virtues (integrity, empathy, warmth, courage, conscientiousness and zeal) that are mostly different from those considered in the virtuous leadership concept and is not grounded in virtue ethics. Notwithstanding, the insights on the consequences of organizational virtuousness correspond with causal evidence from studies on related concepts.

Few studies have employed coherent measures of virtuous leadership because of their recent development. However, the available studies consistently suggest that subordinates with virtuous leaders flourish more. Riggio et al. (2010) and Hendriks et al. (2020a) show that employees who perceive their supervisor to be more virtuous score better on various dimensions of work-related well-being across a wide range of contexts, including employees' psychological empowerment, moral identity, organizational identification, work engagement, job affect, and job satisfaction. Correspondingly, Wang and Hackett (2016) demonstrated that subordinates with more virtuous leaders had higher general well-being (happiness and life satisfaction) as well as in-role and extra-role performance, even after accounting for the supervisor's charismatic leadership.

These correlational findings are in line with the generally positive associations of subordinates' performance and well-being with single virtues. For instance, Thun and Kelloway (2011) revealed positive relationships between leader wisdom and subordinates' affective commitment, leader temperance and trust in the leader, and leader humanity and subordinates' organizational citizenship behavior, psychological well-being, and leader trust. Similarly, Protas (2013) revealed that behavioral integrity was positively related to employee well-being, while Mackey et al. (2017) show that abusive supervision is negatively related to the performance and wellbeing of employees. These findings are in line with causal evidence on the impact of specific leader virtues and vices on employee flourishing. For instance, Hendriks et al. (2020b) show that CEO compensation, which reflects leader vices such as greed and hubris, can reduce employee satisfaction and employee engagement under specific conditions. Organizational virtuousness is also related to better performance

and well-being of employees (e.g., Chun 2009). Despite the abundant correlational evidence that subordinates with virtuous leaders flourish more, further research using coherent measures of virtuous leadership is needed to better identify the causal relationships.

How Does Virtuous Leadership Relate to the Flourishing of Leaders?

A major reason that leaders engage in non-virtuous or vicious behaviors is that they believe it will have positive consequences for themselves. Positive consequences of vicious behaviors may occur in some situations, particularly in the short term. For example, many cases of fraudulent behavior have objective (e.g., monetary) short term benefits. However, the current empirical evidence consistently demonstrates that virtuous leaders tend to flourish more, at least in certain respects. Wang and Hackett (2016) provide empirical evidence that virtuous leaders have higher hedonic well-being and are more effective leaders in organizations. The literature on character strengths, which particularly features in positive psychology, also suggests that using one's character strengths and working on character weaknesses can increase subjective well-being (e.g., Seligman et al. 2005), meaning at work (Littman-Ovadia and Steger 2010), and in-role and extra-role performance (Lavy and Littman-Ovadia 2017), amongst other dimensions of flourishing. Positive associations are also commonly found in studies on specific virtues. For instance, Sosik et al. (2012) showed that the bravery, social intelligence and particularly integrity of executives were positively related to bosses' and board members' ratings of executive performance. Robinson et al. (2013) demonstrate that others are more willing to do future business with CEOs that they know to be compassionate, which is conducive to the leader's personal performance. More related to the leader's well-being, Krause and Hayward (2015) showed that greater practical wisdom is associated with stronger feelings of self-worth and greater hope. The current literature thus suggests that, if anything, demonstrating more virtuous leadership will lead leaders to flourish more themselves, not less. These findings confirm that good character is fundamental for effective leadership and there is generally no trade-off between being a virtuous leader and a leader's self-interest.

Theoretically, there are several mechanisms for a positive influence of virtuous leadership on leader performance. First, a significant part of leader performance depends on employee performance, and as discussed in this article, virtuous leadership tends to be positively associated with the in-role and extra-role performance of subordinates. Second, as clarified by Robinson et al. (2013), investors, clients, and suppliers are more willing to do business with virtuous leaders, thereby improving both the performance and well-being (e.g., self-esteem) of the leader. Relatedly, as virtuous leaders tend to have greater referent power because they are respected and trusted more, they can more effectively implement their vision and ideas in the

organization (Yukl 2010). Third, virtuous leaders tend to have higher work engagement, for instance because they perceive to have more meaningful work (Bass and Riggio 2006), which aids in achieving personally valued goals (Arjoon 2000). Fourth, good character helps leaders in the ethical decision making process (Crossan et al. 2013), thereby promoting effective decisions making. Fifth, doing well is inherently rewarding; for instance, an abundant literature shows that prosocial behavior makes a person happier (Dunn et al. 2008).

How Does Virtuous Leadership Relate to the Flourishing of Organizations?

The earlier discussion show that two major contributors to organizational performance, leaders and subordinates, perform better when leaders have virtuous character. There are various other stakeholders that influence organizational performance, such as investors, clients, customers, and suppliers. A lack of virtuous leadership among organizational leaders can lead to reputational damage (Shanahan and Seele 2015), and thereby make the company less attractive for investors, clients, customers, and suppliers. Virtuous leaders are also considered better at managing risks (Campbell 2015) and thereby tend to attract responsible investors because their greater engagement in virtue ethics-based CSR activities mitigates micro-finance portfolio risks more than deontological and consequentialist-based CSR activities (Chakrabarty and Bass 2015). On the other hand, virtuous behavior, such as compensating potentially negative consequences for local communities or ecological environments, can be costly.

The literature on organizational virtuousness has tried to understand how these effects add up. This literature generally finds that organizational virtuousness is associated with positive organizational performance, including better financial performance such as higher firm profitability as well as better operational performance such as higher customer retention and lower employee turnover (see Meyer 2018 for a review). Similarly, at the team-level, Palanski et al. (2011) shows that, if anything, behavioral integrity leads to better performance due to greater transparency and trust in the team. Moreover, the global financial crisis in the late 2000s and various highly publicized corporate leadership scandals, such as at Enron, WorldCom, Hewlett-Packard, Siemens, and more recently, at Barclays, Volkswagen and Samsung, illustrate that a disregard for virtuous leadership can cause serious damage to organizations and the economy.

Conclusion

The main conclusion of this literature review is that the initial evidence consistently demonstrates that subordinates, organizations, and the leaders themselves tend to flourish more when the leader has a virtuous character and demonstrates virtuous leadership. This general pattern suggests that the concern of many leaders that demonstrating virtuous leadership has detrimental effects for themselves or their organizations, and that others will get ahead by “doing wrong”, is frequently mistaken. Conversely, it provides support for the revived belief that virtuousness is pertinent for effective and sustainable leadership and may thereby contribute to creating thriving organizations with flourishing employees. Although more empirical research is needed to more thoroughly explore this research question, the findings of this review provide initial support for the proposition of Hannah and Jennings (2013) that “leaders must have both character and competence and that either by itself is deficient” (p. 8). In addition, we want to emphasize that virtuousness is its own reward and does not require this positive instrumental outcome to be of worth. Organizations may thus strongly benefit from stimulating virtuous leadership.

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Chapter 14

Moving Beyond GDP: Emerging Measures and Findings



Mohsen Joshanloo

I feel lucky, as well as honored, to contribute to this Festschrift for Professor Veenhoven. I greatly admire Professor Veenhoven's work, particularly his country-level analyses of subjective well-being (for a review, see Veenhoven 2018). He has made amazing contributions to a wide range of disciplines, and has addressed important questions in well-being research with his usual enthusiasm, persistence, and clarity. Anyone familiar with his vast amount of scholarly writing on subjective well-being will be aware of his lasting and immense influence on the field. I personally would like to express my gratitude to Professor Veenhoven for pioneering the research field that I am working in and for being a constant source of inspiration.

I had the honor of winning the Ruut Veenhoven Award in 2019, which is one of my greatest and meaningful achievements. Below, I provide an overview of two of our recent articles, one of which (Joshanloo 2018) brought me the Veenhoven Award. I connect the emerging insights from the two studies and provide new geomaps and tables to facilitate an integrative understanding of the findings across the two studies. I also highlight some of the consistencies of the ideas presented here with Professor Veenhoven's findings.

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Beyond GDP

Economic indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita have been traditionally used to measure societal well-being and progress. However, in recent years the inadequacy of economic indicators as proxies of well-being has been widely recognized and discussed (for an overview, see Joshanloo et al. 2019). Critics have suggested non-economic measures to replace or complement economic indices (Estes 1996; Land and Michalos 2018). For example, Veenhoven (2002) argues for the necessity of measuring subjective well-being to inform policymaking. He provides ample evidence to support the following statements:

1. Social policy is not limited to solely financial matters.
2. Subjective measurement is more effective than objective measurement in measuring economic progress.
3. Inclusive and comprehensive measurement is not feasible with objective measures.
4. Policymakers need subjective in addition to objective indicators for more effective policymaking.
5. Need satisfaction can be effectively measured by looking at the length of people's lives and their perceived happiness, with the latter component measurable only by means of subjective well-being scales.

An additional insight is that the levels of subjective well-being depend partly on governments' performance, as some factors that determine these levels are well under the control of governments (Veenhoven 2018).

The field has now reached a consensus regarding the importance of supplementing economic indicators with subjective and social indicators (e.g., Michalos 2017; Sirgy et al. 2006; Veenhoven 1996; Veenhoven 2007). In an effort to broaden the scope of research on societal well-being and prosperity, researchers have started to routinely measure subjective aspects of well-being. Governments and policymakers also have joined researchers in considering subjective well-being indices. However, to date, life satisfaction has received much of the research and policy attention. For example, life satisfaction measures have been included in many large-scale national and international surveys (such as the World Values Survey and Gallup World Poll), and the world happiness report, annually published, provides new findings on the status of national life satisfaction across the globe. Regrettably, however, other aspects of subjective well-being (such as eudaimonic well-being, positive and negative affect) have received much less attention. In two recent studies, we sought to examine dimensions of subjective well-being other than life satisfaction, the results of which are summarized next.

Study 1: The New Index of Eudaimonic Well-Being

To contribute to the diversification of the field of subjective well-being and social indicators, I developed the first global index of eudaimonic well-being across 166 nations (Joshanloo 2018). Eudaimonic well-being is different from life satisfaction, in that life satisfaction measures assess cognitive evaluations of one's life as a whole, whereas eudaimonic well-being measures an individual's perceptions of his or her psychological and social skills (such as meaning in life, social contribution, and autonomy). Eudaimonic well-being scores were calculated using seven items from the Gallup World Poll, measuring learning experience, social support, respect, efficacy beliefs, sense of freedom, and prosociality. Joshanloo's (2018) article provides evidence of discriminant and convergent validity for the new global index alongside life satisfaction as a comparison variable. Like life satisfaction (Veenhoven 2018), eudaimonic well-being also showed a positive global trend over time. Table 14.1 presents the main components of the concepts of eudaimonic well-being and life satisfaction. Table 14.2 presents the top and bottom 10 countries for each variable. Figures 14.1–14.2 show the global status of these variables. Finally, some insights from this study are summarized in Table 14.3.

The new eudaimonic well-being measure is being increasingly used in research on the quality of life. For example, in a sample of 264,123 individuals across 133 countries, Joshanloo et al. (2018) found that out of five societal moderators, only national levels of eudaimonic well-being robustly moderated the relationship between age and life satisfaction. The relationship between age and life satisfaction was negative in countries with low and moderate levels of eudaimonic well-being, and non-significant in countries with high levels of eudaimonic well-being. Based on the results of these initial studies, it can be concluded that eudaimonic well-being is a valid and distinct measure of well-being and should be used alongside life satisfaction for a more comprehensive assessment of subjective well-being and quality of life at the national level. As mentioned in Table 14.3, ignoring eudaimonic well-being may lead to distorted and inadequate accounts of the status of national well-being in some countries.

Table 14.1 Dimensions of well-being summarized in this article

| Dimensions | Components |
|---------------------------|--|
| Eudaimonic well-being | Psycho-social skills |
| Life satisfaction | Cognitive evaluation of one's life |
| Socio-economic progress | Economic, political, and institutional functioning + life satisfaction |
| Psycho-social functioning | Eudaimonic well-being + positive affect |
| Negative affectivity | Negative affect |

Table 14.2 Top and low ranking nations

| Dimension | N | Top ten | Bottom ten |
|---------------------------|-----|--|--|
| Eudaimonic well-being | 166 | Canada (1) Norway Australia United States New Zealand Ireland Philippines United Arab Emirates Kuwait Switzerland | Pakistan Ukraine Bulgaria Croatia Georgia Armenia Bosnia Herzegovina Lithuania Burundi Serbia (166) |
| Life satisfaction | 166 | Denmark (1) Norway Switzerland Finland Canada Netherlands Iceland Australia New Zealand Sweden | Rwanda Afghanistan Guinea Tanzania Benin Comoros Central African Republic South Sudan Burundi Togo (166) |
| Socio-economic progress | 149 | Switzerland (1) Finland Norway New Zealand Sweden Netherlands Denmark Canada Germany Australia | Burundi Mauritania Angola Chad Iraq Congo Kinshasa Yemen Afghanistan Sudan Central African Republic (149) |
| Psycho-social functioning | 152 | Uzbekistan (1) Indonesia Norway United Arab Emirates Denmark Canada Netherlands New Zealand Costa Rica Ireland | Belarus South Sudan Serbia Yemen Bosnia Herzegovina Ukraine Afghanistan Armenia Haiti Syria (152) |
| Negative affectivity | 152 | Iraq (1) Syria Iran South Sudan Central African Republic Sierra Leone Liberia Cambodia Bolivia Palestine | Belarus Singapore Azerbaijan Mongolia Kyrgyzstan Somalia Kazakhstan Russia Taiwan Uzbekistan (152) |




Fig. 14.1 Eudaimonic well-being




Fig. 14.2 Life satisfaction

Table 14.3 Some insights from Joshanloo (2018)

| No. | Insight |
|-----|---|
| 1 | The correlation between eudaimonic well-being and life satisfaction is .55, suggesting a fair amount of non-shared variance |
| 2 | Although African countries score relatively low on life satisfaction, there is considerable variability in the eudaimonic well-being scores in Africa. Thus eudaimonic well-being seems to be more effective than life satisfaction in distinguishing between African countries |
| 3 | The correlations between life satisfaction and other societal indicators of well-being (such as GDP per capita) was over .82, suggesting a large amount of overlap |
| 4 | The correlations between eudaimonic well-being and other societal indicators of well-being (such as GDP per capita) was smaller than .48, suggesting that eudaimonic well-being is more distinct than life satisfaction from existing societal and economic indicators |
| 5 | There are also some differences in the nomological networks of life satisfaction and eudaimonic well-being at the individual level. For example, being a female is a largely negative predictor of eudaimonic well-being, but mostly a positive or non-significant predictor of life satisfaction |
| 6 | There has been a slight upward global trend for eudaimonic well-being between 2011 and 2016 |

Study 2: Factor Structure of Indicators of Societal Well-Being

In another analysis (Joshanloo et al. 2019), my colleagues and I examined the factor structure of over 20 societal well-being variables. Life satisfaction and eudaimonic well-being were included alongside over 20 other variables of prosperity and well-being for a comprehensive assessment of quality of life. This was among the first (if not the first) large-scale factor analysis of societal well-being indicators. Based on the results of factor analysis, we identified three distinct factors that showed both overlap and complementarity. The first factor, ‘socio-economic progress’, was dominated by socio-political and economic indicators as well as life satisfaction, reflecting objective living conditions. The second factor, ‘psycho-social functioning’, consisted of subjective indicators, such as eudaimonic well-being, and positive affect. The third factor, ‘negative affectivity’, consisted of negative affective states. The three macro-factors of societal well-being exhibited moderate correlations and differential associations with cultural and ecological variables, supporting their discriminant validity. Table 14.1 presents the components of the three concepts emerging from this factor analysis. Table 14.2 presents the top and bottom 10 countries for each dimension. Figures 14.3–14.5 show the global status of these variables. Finally, some insights from the study are summarized in Table 14.4.

The second and third factors entirely consisted of subjective indicators. Life satisfaction was the only entirely subjective variable that loaded on socio-economic progress, showing its tight alignment with economic indicators. These results again suggest that in order to measure the well-being and quality of life of nations, one needs to consider affective well-being and eudaimonic well-being alongside life satisfaction. The three-dimensional structure of well-being emerging in this study contributes to future theory-building in this field of research. What is clear from




Fig. 14.3 Socio-economic progress




Fig. 14.5 Negative affectivity

these findings is that life satisfaction cannot be used as a proxy variable for all subjective variables such as eudaimonic well-being, positive affect, and negative affect. Thus, we cannot afford to ignore the myriad of subjective indicators currently available to us, if a comprehensive assessment of well-being is targeted.

Table 14.4 Some insights from Joshanloo et al. (2019)

| No. | Insight |
|-----|---|
| 1 | Life satisfaction loaded on socio-economic progress (measuring mostly objective conditions of life), whereas other entirely survey-based variables (such as affect and eudaimonic well-being) loaded on the other two factors |
| 2 | Life satisfaction is closely associated with classic indicators of economic progress and political development. Veenhoven (2018) points out that the relationship between life satisfaction and economic indicators stays significant even after controlling for other societal characteristics (such as freedom and rule of law). Thus, life satisfaction may be used as a short and quick measure of socio-economic progress at the group level in the absence of objective political and economic indicators |
| 3 | Whereas at the individual level, affect and life satisfaction form a single factor separately from eudaimonic well-being, at the societal level, positive and negative affect and life satisfaction load on three distinct factors. A good illustration of the fact that findings from one level of analysis cannot be automatically generalized to other levels. |
| 4 | Future life satisfaction functions differently from present life satisfaction. It loaded on the second factor, showing that it is less strongly associated with socio-economic progress and more with positive affect. Thus, people answer the present and future life satisfaction questions on different bases, and when aggregated to the national level, these two indicators do not seem to reflect the same underlying construct. |
| 5 | Socio-economic progress is strongly associated with urbanity, national age, individualism, self-expressive and secular values, as well as low religiosity and power distance, whereas the other two factors have weaker or no associations with these variables. |
| 6 | Socio-economic progress is more prevalent in colder countries and less prevalent in hotter countries. Negative affectivity is more prevalent in hotter countries and less prevalent in colder countries. Psychosocial functioning is mostly independent of temperature. |
| 7 | The strongest predictor of psychosocial functioning is self-expressive values |
| 8 | Suicide rates were almost unrelated to any of the three factors of societal well-being. Anxiety and depression (based on the DALYs as measured by the global burden of disease study) had a positive association with socio-economic progress. Income inequality was weakly but positively associated with psychosocial functioning. These four variables had unexpected and surprising factor loadings in the factor analyses as well. In other words, anxiety, depression, suicide rate, and income inequality did not have a clear and consistent association with the three factors of well-being, and thus they are not unambiguous indicators of national well-being. Of course, they can serve as valuable measures of quality of life in affected populations. In sum, whatever we know about these variables at the individual level, does not apply straightforwardly at the national level (at least the way they are currently measured). |

Concluding Remarks

The findings presented here highlight the importance of considering the subjective aspects of well-being in addition to economic indicators. They also show the importance of considering a diverse array of subjective indicators alongside life satisfaction. Given its close association with socio-economic progress at the national level, a ranking of national well-being based on life satisfaction can largely mirror socio-economic-based rankings. One side effect is that life satisfaction is not very efficient in distinguishing among some developing nations (such as African ones). Other subjective indicators introduced in the present study can be applied to gain a




Fig. 14.4 Psycho-social functioning

richer and more comprehensive understanding of national well-being that allows certain poorer and traditional countries to show relatively satisfactory levels of well-being.

Resources and Data

The two articles are freely available from the journals' websites (click on the doi links in the reference list). Interactive geomaps and data for the 5 variables introduced in Table 14.1 are available from the author's website: <https://mohsenjoshanloo.weebly.com/geomaps-and-data.html>.

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Chapter 15

Zest and Adventures in Happiness Research



Anna Lau

Dear Ruut,

It has been an honour and pleasure to come to know Emeritus-Professor Ruut Veenhoven through the International Society for Quality of Life Studies (ISQOLS). Thinking back over the many encounters we had at various scientific conferences, meetings and events and also, progressive stages of development in my academic journey on happiness research and promotion, three occasions always feature most strongly in my memory.

The first was during my induction into ISQOLS, at the dinner banquet of the ISQOLS' conference held in Washington DC (2001). Here, I had the privilege of hearing your speech at the time you received the prestigious *Distinguished QOL Researcher Award*. I was captivated by your entertaining depiction of your lifetime story and thoughtful insights on “happiness”, all delivered with gracious humility and gentility. I had thought to myself what a positive role model you are in the way you had conducted yourself, despite the accomplishments you have made in the field of *Happiness*.

The second was at the International Sociological Association's (ISA) world congress held in Australia in the following year, where I also presented a paper on my post-doctoral research work concerning *Cross-cultural equivalence and response bias*. Your genuine interest sparked stimulating discussions at the session. The positive manner in which you had engaged with me “as an equal” and also, considered my research worthy, meant the world to me. It fuelled my flames of passion for my continuing discovery and growing endeavours on *Happiness*.

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The third was during a more matured stage of my academic journey, when our paths crossed at a later ISQOLS conference in Florence, Italy, to find ourselves engaging in exchanges about the intricacies of our personal lives intertwined with our own academic journeys. It was amazing to have you walk me through yours to arriving at your desired destination in life. Listening to your personal life story helped to affirm normality for me of my share of roller coaster ride in life and reinforced hope!

More generally, the field has been greatly blessed in having your dedicated and committed presence. It has been so much more enriched by your various trailblazing contributions, laid during an era when many were still grappling with the uncertainty and means of employing “happiness” as a reliable measure to inform how well populations and nations are doing. Time has revealed that the seeds you have sown, such as with your founded *Journal of Happiness Studies* and *World database of Happiness*, have become highly regarded hubs and a valuable global resource for all who seek knowledge and adopt “happiness” as an important notion for informing life quality.

Ruut, you have been a wonderful role model and inspiration to all your colleagues engaged in happiness research. Your endeavours as well as gentle facilitating manner have open doors and encouraged the blossoming of future researchers in our shared quest to advance the field of “happiness”. Thank you for the positive influencing presence you have marked in my own journey of discovery and growth.

My very best wishes for your continuing zest and adventures in the realm of *Happiness*,

Anna

(Dr Anna Lau)

Chapter 16

Ruut Veenhoven: A Very Wise Man



Kai Ludwigs

In the beginning of 2013 I was a young psychology and economics student searching for a purpose in my research. I understood research as a way to create knowledge to find information to increase the chance for right decisions. So far so good, but the main question that was puzzling me was what “right decisions” are. After some discussions with my classmates, friends and family I realized, that decisions that lead to more happiness, well-being and quality of life might be the closest thing to “right decisions”. Therefore, I started to read about happiness research, which I have enjoyed ever since. After some reading time I realized that I found a lot of papers which described happiness differences from person to person but did not find a whole lot of papers that focused on happiness differences from moment to moment. Soon I started to realize that this is what I was mainly interested in: To understand which interventions have which effect on citizens’, employees’ or clients’ happiness. The main challenge I encountered was how to capture people’s happiness at different moments with methods such as the Experience Sampling Method or the Day Reconstruction Method without high efforts for the participants and the researchers and thus without high funding requirements. In order to solve this issue I teamed up with my best friend, the computer scientist Stephan Erdtmann, to develop the app “Happiness Analyzer”.

Half a year later in mid 2013 we shared our idea with different scholars I had read papers from. One of them was of course, Ruut, whose papers and contributions fascinated me from the beginning on. Thankfully, Ruut responded to my e-mail and invited me for a meeting in Rotterdam in August 2013. I remember that day still in full detail: I was very excited but also very nervous to meet the famous Ruut Veenhoven. I drove early in the morning from Dusseldorf, Germany, to Rotterdam,

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searched for his office, went for a walk until our meeting time and then explained him our idea, a first version of the app and thoughts on a first experiment with students in Dusseldorf to collect first data with the app and investigate if using the app had an own effect on the students' happiness. Ruut listened very calmly to all my (partially wild) ideas and after four hours he told me that he would like to supervise the experiment and also further experiments in case I want to do my Phd in Rotterdam. I was very excited and agreed to the cooperation right away and called Stephan on my way back home.

Over the next few months Stephan and I worked on the app and I met a few more times with Ruut to prepare the start of the experiment in October 2013. Two months after, in December 2013, the experiment was finished successfully and we had a first dataset collected with the Happiness Analyzer. In January 2014, we met again to discuss the first results and realized that the dataset had a lot of potential for academic studies but also for applied studies with corporates. At the end of this meeting Ruut asked me if I would be willing to start an own independent research institute with Stephan to be able to pursue the applied studies parallel to my academic studies for my PhD. I was first a bit unsure but after some discussions with Stephan, my friends and family we decided to try to collect funding and start our institute in the summer of 2014.

A couple months after, in July 2014, we were able to start our institute, the Happiness Research Organisation (HRO), and moved into our office in Dusseldorf in September 2014. From here on I met with Ruut and other scholars from the Erasmus Happiness Economics Research Organisation (EHERO) in Rotterdam at least once a month to pursue my PhD and discuss project ideas. Ruut was always on time, listened calmly and gave me wise advice on which projects to continue with and how to continue with them. Additionally, he linked me to scholars worldwide so that I could present the Happiness Analyzer at many different universities in 2015. At my wedding in July 2015 I got to know Ruut in a more private setting and also had the pleasure to meet his wonderful wife, Kiki.

From the end of 2015 we started to work on updating the World Data Base of Happiness (WDOH) and to make sure that Ruut's work in the synthesis of happiness research will be continued in the far future. In the process of the project I realized more how much work Ruut put into this project and into the field of happiness research in general.

In March 2018, I finished my PhD thesis about the Happiness Analyzer in Rotterdam with Ruut being one of the defense committee members. Since then we have kept in touch per e-mail and have seen each other a few more times in Rotterdam with him continuing to give me wise advice on all our activities.

I hope this letter expressed my thankfulness for Ruut and is for others another wonderful example of Ruut trying to support happiness research by advising young scholars like me. I have tremendous respect for him as a researcher and even more as a person. He is a true master of happiness research and I hope that his impact on the field will be remembered also in the far future!

Chapter 17

Unhappiness, Life-dissatisfaction and Economic Deprivation in the Philippines: Three Decades of Survey History



Mahar Mangahas

This paper is for a Festschrift organized by the International Society for Quality-of-Life Studies (ISQOLS) in honor of Ruut Veenhoven, sociologist, world pioneer in the study of happiness, director of the World Database of Happiness at Erasmus University Rotterdam, colleague at ISQOLS, and a dear friend for many years.

For over three decades, Social Weather Stations (www.sws.org.ph) has conducted social surveys, called Social Weather Surveys, to measure the Quality-of-Life (QOL) of Filipinos, and published these in what are called Social Weather Reports (Mangahas and Guerrero 2008). One of its sources of inspiration is the lifework of Ruut Veenhoven. The Social Weather Surveys are multi-dimensional—social, economic, psychological, political, and so forth—and rely heavily on subjective indicators.

Being an economist, my own focus in QOL studies has been on economic well-being, and, as an adherent of Rawlsian philosophy, on economic deprivation in particular. This explains why SWS constantly includes the topics of poverty and hunger among families (not individuals). After many years, SWS has accumulated a fairly large database on deprivation, and a modest database on happiness. These databases can be directly analyzed together, using the many instances when the survey items on deprivation and happiness have the same respondents.

The SWS surveys on family poverty, using the Self-Rated Poverty (SRP) approach (Mangahas 1995) started in 1986, and have been quarterly since 1992; the database has 112 quarterly data points as of now (Fig. 17.1). The incidence of SRP is much higher than that of official poverty, which is restrained by a severely understated official poverty line. SRP can be volatile; for instance, it rose by 12 percentage points between the third and fourth quarters of 2019. Official poverty, on the other hand, is inherently incapable of manifesting volatility, since it is only

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


Fig. 17.1 Self-Rated Poverty and official poverty of families, Philippines, 1983–2019




Fig. 17.2 Hunger in families, Philippines, 1983–2019

measured once every 3 years. Yet, fortunately, both self-rated and official poverty have trended downward in the long term.

The SWS surveys on family hunger have been quarterly since 1998, thus generating 88 quarterly data points as of now (Fig. 17.2). The surveys register two degrees of hunger: ‘moderate hunger’, which means it was experienced only once or a few times, in the past 3 months; and ‘severe hunger’, which means it happened often or always. The SWS surveys of economic deprivation are done quarterly, as a




Fig. 17.3 Happiness of adults, Philippines, 1991–2019

deliberate strategy for competing with the government’s quarterly statistics on Gross National Product for public attention.

Unlike the poverty incidence, the hunger incidence has not trended downward. It went through a bad hump in 2006–14, and in recent years fell back to where it was in the early 2000s. At any one point in time, hunger is always proportionally greater among the poor than the non-poor, as would be expected. But hunger proportions are not fixed in time, either among the poor or the non-poor, which implies that the severity of poverty tends to change. This has been discovered by the process of surveying poverty and hunger together.

The Social Weather Surveys have also included personal happiness and satisfaction with life, though not as often as poverty and hunger deprivation. It is important to clarify that the respondent of the questions on personal happiness and life satisfaction is an adult (randomly drawn from the sampled household) whereas the respondent of the questions on poverty and hunger is the household head, speaking in behalf of the whole family; at times, of course, the random adult is also the household head him/herself. Incidentally, the items on poverty and hunger are asked at the beginning of the survey interview, while the items on happiness and life-satisfaction are asked relatively close to its end.

There have been 38 SWS surveys on happiness since 1991 (Fig. 17.3), and 39 SWS surveys on life-satisfaction since 2002 (Fig. 17.4). Both types of surveys have been using simple four-point scales (VH = very happy, FH = fairly happy, NVH = not very happy, NAAH = not at all happy; and VS = very satisfied with life, FS = fairly satisfied with life, NVS = not very satisfied with life, NAAS = not at all satisfied with life), following the practice of some European surveys. For example,




Fig. 17.4 Life-Satisfaction of adults, Philippines, 2002–2019

| | Very happy | Fairly happy | Not very happy | Not at all happy |
|------------------|------------|--------------|----------------|------------------|
| C. AQUINO | | | | |
| Jul 91 | 24% | 60% | 13% | 2% |
| RAMOS | | | | |
| Jun 96 | 40 | 52 | 7 | 1 |
| ESTRADA | | | | |
| Nov 98 | 26 | 55 | 15 | 4 |
| ARROYO | | | | |
| Mar 01 | 28 | 51 | 16 | 5 |
| Jul 01 | 38 | 49 | 12 | 1 |
| Sep 01 | 30 | 53 | 12 | 4 |
| Nov 01 | 35 | 50 | 12 | 3 |
| Mar 02 | 33 | 51 | 13 | 3 |
| Jun 03 | 35 | 46 | 16 | 3 |
| Jun 04 | 28 | 51 | 18 | 3 |
| May 05 | 19 | 57 | 19 | 5 |
| Aug 05 | 26 | 50 | 18 | 5 |
| Sep 06 | 37 | 46 | 14 | 3 |
| Nov 06 | 39 | 45 | 14 | 3 |
| Dec 07 | 32 | 48 | 16 | 3 |
| Mar 08 | 34 | 46 | 16 | 4 |
| Sep 08 | 32 | 47 | 17 | 4 |
| Dec 08 | 29 | 48 | 19 | 4 |
| B. AQUINO | | | | |
| Sep 10 | 37% | 49% | 12% | 2% |
| Nov 10 | 34 | 49 | 14 | 3 |
| Jun 11 | 42 | 42 | 13 | 3 |
| Dec 12 | 35 | 48 | 13 | 3 |
| Dec 13 | 43 | 43 | 13 | 2 |
| Sep 14 | 30 | 50 | 17 | 4 |
| Dec 14 | 36 | 49 | 13 | 2 |
| Mar 15 | 37 | 53 | 9 | 1 |
| Sep 15 | 39 | 49 | 10 | 2 |
| Apr 16 | 31 | 56 | 11 | 2 |
| Jun 16 | 35 | 54 | 9 | 2 |
| DUTERTE | | | | |
| Dec 16 | 46 | 45 | 7 | 2 |
| Sep 17 | 40 | 50 | 9 | 2 |
| Dec 17 | 57 | 37 | 5 | 1 |
| Jun 18 | 41 | 50 | 8 | 1 |
| Dec 18 | 39 | 48 | 11 | 2 |
| Mar 19 | 44 | 49 | 7 | 1 |
| Jun 19 | 48 | 45 | 5 | 1 |
| Sep 19 | 48 | 42 | 8 | 2 |
| Dec 19 | 47 | 44 | 8 | 1 |

Fig. 17.5 Happiness of adults, Philippines, 1991–2019

Germany had VH .231, FH .609, NVH .134 and NAAH .015 in the 2012 World Values Survey, and had VS .33, FS .60, NVS .06 and NAAS .01 in the 2019 Eurobarometer (source: <https://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl>).

The time-series of the SWS survey proportions are appended in Figs. 17.5 and 17.6. With such answer-scales, the typical modal answer is the second one: ‘fairly’

| | Very satisfied | Fairly satisfied | Not very satisfied | Not at all satisfied | | Very satisfied | Fairly satisfied | Not very satisfied | Not at all satisfied |
|------------------|----------------|------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|----------------|------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| ARROYO | | | | | B. AQUINO (cont'd) | | | | |
| May 02 | 22% | 41% | 28% | 9% | Mar 14 | 27% | 49% | 17% | 8% |
| Sep 02 | 16 | 45 | 32 | 7 | Jun 14 | 27 | 49 | 16 | 9 |
| Nov 02 | 19 | 47 | 26 | 8 | Sep 14 | 29 | 50 | 17 | 4 |
| Jun 03 | 34 | 42 | 19 | 5 | Dec 14 | 37 | 48 | 12 | 3 |
| Sep 03 | 20 | 46 | 26 | 8 | Mar 15 | 33 | 52 | 13 | 3 |
| Nov 03 | 19 | 42 | 31 | 9 | Sep 15 | 41 | 47 | 10 | 2 |
| Feb 04 | 27 | 42 | 24 | 6 | Apr 16 | 30 | 55 | 11 | 3 |
| Jun 04 | 28 | 49 | 19 | 5 | Jun 16 | 35 | 51 | 11 | 3 |
| Aug 04 | 25 | 49 | 20 | 6 | DUTERTE | | | | |
| May 05 | 15 | 51 | 24 | 10 | Sep 16 | 47 | 43 | 8 | 2 |
| Aug 05 | 24 | 44 | 22 | 9 | Dec 16 | 41 | 46 | 9 | 4 |
| Mar 06 | 19 | 47 | 22 | 12 | Jun 17 | 48 | 41 | 8 | 2 |
| Dec 08 | 24 | 44 | 23 | 9 | Sep 17 | 39 | 49 | 9 | 3 |
| B. AQUINO | | | | | Dec 17 | 56 | 37 | 6 | 1 |
| Sep 10 | 37 | 48 | 12 | 4 | Jun 18 | 38 | 49 | 9 | 3 |
| Nov 10 | 26 | 51 | 18 | 6 | Dec 18 | 34 | 48 | 14 | 3 |
| Jun 11 | 40 | 41 | 15 | 5 | Mar 19 | 37 | 53 | 8 | 2 |
| Dec 11 | 41 | 45 | 10 | 5 | Jun 19 | 44 | 47 | 8 | 1 |
| Mar 12 | 31 | 45 | 18 | 7 | Sep 19 | 48 | 42 | 8 | 2 |
| Dec 12 | 33 | 48 | 14 | 5 | Dec 19 | 37 | 51 | 9 | 2 |
| Dec 13 | 39 | 43 | 12 | 5 | | | | | |

Fig. 17.6 Life-satisfaction of adults, Philippines, 2002–2019




Fig. 17.7 Unhappiness of adults, Philippines 1991–2019

happy/satisfied is a relatively easy default-response. This is also seen in the German example. The first answer of ‘very’ happy/satisfied is definitely favorable, while the third and fourth answers of ‘not very’ and ‘not at all’ happy/satisfied are definitely unfavorable.

It is the third and fourth answers, segregated in Figs. 17.7 and 17.8 respectively, that may be characterized as ‘unhappy’ and ‘dissatisfied with life’—representing ‘ill-




Fig. 17.8 Life-dissatisfaction of adults, Philippines, 2002–2019

being’, which is on the opposite side of the spectrum from ‘well-being’. From the charts, one can see that the incidences of unhappiness, as well as of dissatisfaction with life: (a) fluctuate up/down every 1 or 2 years, and (b) have a rough, bumpy downward trend, similar to the trend in poverty, over time. Ten to 15 years ago, the number of adult Filipinos that felt unhappy or dissatisfied with life was two or more of every ten; but by the end of the last decade, it was down to only one of every ten.

The SWS economic indicators focus on the proportion of families that feel deprived rather than on average family well-being. It is logical to expect such feelings of deprivation to have a direct relation to the feelings of ill-being among (adult) family members. This is indeed the case in Fig. 17.9, which differentiates unhappiness in poor families from that in non-poor families; in Fig. 17.10, which differentiates unhappiness according to the degree of hunger suffered by the family; in Fig. 17.11, which differentiates life-dissatisfaction between poor and non-poor families; and in Fig. 17.12, which differentiates life-dissatisfaction by the degree of family hunger.

The charts show that the proportions of adults saying they are unhappy or dissatisfied with life are clearly higher among families that suffer from poverty or hunger. There are no cases when the time lines cross in Figs. 17.7 and 17.9; there are only a few cases in Figs. 17.8 and 17.10. With the present adult population at 60 million, the percentage-differences are not only statistical, but also substantive.

Note that the elimination of economic deprivation—as targeted by the UN Sustainable Development Goals, in particular—does not eliminate all ill-being. However, on the premise that economic deprivation is undeserved, eliminating it




Fig. 17.9 Unhappiness* of adults in poor and non-poor families, Philippines, 1991–2019




Fig. 17.10 Unhappiness* of adults in severely hungry, moderately hungry, and non-hungry families, Philippines, 2001–2019

would lessen undeserved ill-being. Joint surveys of economic deprivation and ill-being enable very interesting examination of their interaction, of which Ruut Veenhoven would surely approve.




Fig. 17.11 Life-dissatisfaction* of adults in poor and non-poor families, Philippines, 2002–2019




Fig. 17.12 Life-dissatisfaction* of adults in severely hungry, moderately hungry, and non-hungry families, Philippines, 2002–2019

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Chapter 18

Good Societies, Financial Inequality and Secrecy, and a Good Life: From Aristotle to Piketty



Alex C. Michalos and P. Maurine Hatch

Introduction

In this paper we show that salient quality of life/well-being indexes have good convergent validity, that a plausible measure of institutionalized financial secrecy is statistically significantly and negatively associated with those indexes, and we rank order 105 countries using 21 indexes crafted from the original five revealing a considerable variety of resulting distributions. Quality of life/well-being indexes are supposed to be the essential dependent variables in general or overall quality of life studies, but because there are indexes based only on objective indicators or subjective indicators or combinations of both, it is possible to use some of these indexes as independent/predictor variables of others.

Regarding comparison standards, Hagerty et al. (2001) reported results of a committee of the International Society for Quality of Life Studies (ISQOLS) that produced a set of 14 “criteria that are important in QOL indexes for use in public policy” and assessed 22 indexes that had been used at least once by someone up to 2001. Not all members of the ISQOLS committee were entirely happy with the stipulated criteria, but each one had majority support. We have not tested the indexes reviewed here against the 14 criteria in any rigorous way, although we believe most of them would satisfy most of our indexes. Early versions of three of our indexes

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were included in the ISQOLS review, Happy Life Years (HLY), Weighted Index of Social Progress (WISP) and the Human Development Index (HDI). We introduce one test suggested by Foster and Sen (1997). Michalos et al. (2011, p. 9), claimed that such criteria are “not usually specified with great precision, but they provide useful guidelines for discussions and negotiations over particular indicators and indexes”. That is the spirit in which we have used them. Depending on producers’ and consumers’ interests, resources, political circumstances, and other things, different criteria will be more or less important. We recommend the committee report to anyone who has not seen it. (See also IISD 2009.)

Although the focus of this paper involves incomes and wealth as predictors and components of overall quality of life, Michalos has spent much of the past few decades showing the relative weakness of incomes in particular compared to indicators expressing human wants, needs, expectations, hopes, experiences, choices, and the like as such predictors. His view is that the quality of our lives is a function of the objective circumstances in which we live and what we, as subjects or human agents, make of them, the latter consisting of our perceptions, attitudes, evaluations, choices, beliefs, knowledge, actions and all their consequences. To tell the story of our lives and to live our lives most fully, objective and subjective indicators are each necessary and jointly sufficient as informational/evidential bases (Michalos 2014a; Land and Michalos 2017; Michalos and Land 2017).

The historical roots of these views on the importance of objective and subjective features of our lives as equally important may be traced as far back as Plato and Aristotle in the fourth and fifth centuries BCE. Both of these philosophers held somewhat revisionist as well as conventional views of a good life. Aristotle was generally clearer in his insistence that a good life required goods of the mind (e.g., wisdom, moral virtue), goods of the body (e.g., health, attractiveness) and external goods (e.g., congenial/just communities, wealth, friends). Regarding Plato’s view, which applies equally to Aristotle’s, Michalos (2015, p. 53) wrote “Such is the interdependent relationship between an ideal city and an ideal individual that it is impossible for the latter to exist apart from the former. This is about as much of a reconciliation between the interests of any individual and the public interest, self and other, as one could hope to have”. To a considerable extent, this ancient idea that there is an essential connection between a good society, a good person and a good life has driven his devotion to research on the quality of life.

While Aristotle realized that wealth is a significant external component of a good life, compared to income, wealth has been relatively neglected as a predictor and component by social indicators/quality of life researchers, as many writers have noticed, e.g., Mullis 1992; Orr 2003; Headey et al. 2008; Hochman and Skopek 2013; Guillen-Royo et al. 2013; Hamilton and Hepburn 2014. However, thanks to the brilliant treatise by Piketty (2014), wealth is beginning to get the attention it deserves as an important determinant of the quality of people’s lives. (For critiques of Piketty’s book, see Boushey et al. 2017; Delsol et al. 2017, and Land 2017.)

Following Piketty, we use the terms ‘wealth’ and ‘capital’ “interchangeably, as if they were perfectly synonymous”, allowing that alternative views are also workable. For our purposes, the following sketch of certain aspects of his research will suffice.

“National wealth” may be defined as “the total market value of everything owned by the residents and government of a given country at a given point in time, provided it can be traded on some market. It consists of the sum total of nonfinancial . . . and financial assets”. Within the class of national wealth, we may distinguish private from public assets and liabilities, i.e., private and public wealth. In all countries, public wealth is always very small compared to private wealth, e.g., “private wealth in 2010 accounts for . . . more than 99 percent in Britain and roughly 95 percent in France”. Within the class of private wealth, there is again generally a huge difference between what is owned by the top 10 percent of wealth-holders and what is owned by everyone else, e.g., “in the early 2010s, the richest 10 percent own around 60 percent of the national wealth in most European countries . . . In the United States, . . . the top decile own 72 percent of America’s wealth, while the bottom half claim just 2 percent” (Piketty 2014, pp. 48, 125, 257–8).

Piketty’s primary message is boldly stated. “The central thesis of this book is precisely that an apparently small gap between the return on capital and the rate of growth can in the long run have powerful and destabilizing effects on the structure and dynamics of social inequality” (Piketty 2014, p. 77). What’s more, as DeLong et al. (2017, p. 14) wrote: “An unequal economy is one that is lousy at turning productive potential into societal well-being”. Although the historical record is, to say the least, extremely rough, on Piketty’s reckoning, from 1000 to 2012 “the rate of return to capital (pretax) has always been higher than the world growth rate”. In fact, he claims that “the annual growth rate from antiquity to the seventeenth century never exceeded 0.1–0.2 percent for long” and the average per capita output growth rate from 1700 to 2012 was 0.8%, while “there appears never to have been a society in which the rate of return on capital fell naturally and persistently to less than 2–3 percent, and the mean return we generally see (averaging over all types of investments) is generally closer to 4–5 percent (before taxes)” (Piketty 2014, pp. 352–358). The result of these different historical rates of change is that “the distribution of capital ownership (and of income from capital) is always more concentrated than the distribution of income from labor . . . in all countries in all periods for which data are available, without exception . . . [and] . . . the upper 10 percent of the labor income distribution generally receives 25–30 percent of total labor income, whereas the top 10 percent of capital income distribution always owns more than 50 percent of all wealth (and in some societies as much as 90 percent)” (Piketty 2014, p. 244).

The persistent inequality just sketched partly explains the failure of the French revolution, reminds us that in Irving Fisher’s 1919 presidential address to the American Economic Association he expressed the view that “the increasing concentration of wealth was the nation’s foremost economic problem”, and suggests that Emile Durkheim’s 1893 prediction that in time inheritance taxes would ensure “that ownership of property ended at death” is still unconfirmed (Piketty 2014, pp. 365, 422, 506). Piketty spends two chapters (of 16) making the case for a “progressive global tax on capital, coupled with a very high level of international financial transparency . . . [as] . . . a way to avoid an endless inegalitarian spiral and to control the worrisome dynamics of global capital concentration”, allowing that

such a tax is for now, at least, “a utopian idea” (Piketty 2014, p. 515). He is not the only scholar to look beyond the immediately impossible to the maybe sometime possible (Michalos 1988; Atkinson 2015; Zucman 2015; Krugman 2017; Boushey 2017).

Although he spends more time on issues related to global wealth taxation than on anything else as a means of arresting the growth of wealth and income inequalities, throughout his book he recognizes the multi-dimensional nature of wealth and income, and their variety of determinants offering additional opportunities for remedial intervention. A good summary of his views appears in Piketty (2017, pp. 545–547), partly drawn from Piketty (2014).

One should be wary of any economic determinism in regard to inequalities of wealth and income. The history of the distribution of wealth has always been deeply political, and it cannot be reduced to purely economic mechanisms. . . . The history of inequality is shaped by the way economic, social, and political actors view what is just and what is not, as well as by the relative powers of those actors and the collective choices that result. . . . A large number of other public and sociopolitical institutions also play an important role. These include: the development of the social state in the broad sense; monetary regimes, central banks, and inflation; labor legislation, the minimum wage, and collective bargaining; nationalization, expropriation, and privatization; slavery and forced labor; corporate governance and the rights of salaried workers; the regulation of rent and other forms of control over prices and usurious interest rates; financial deregulation and the flow of capital; commercial and migratory policies; inheritance regulations and property regimes; demographic and familial policies; and so on.

Other authors in the Boushey et al. volume provide more suggestions. For example, Naidu (2017) recommends “robust antitrust commitment, eliminating barriers to entry and mobility . . . public sources of investment (such as housing) . . . [and] a financial transactions tax” (See also Michalos 1997a, b); Solow (2017) suggests “a more steeply progressive income tax”; Nielsen (2017) suggests “Investing in the human capital of young children . . . early home environments, and even prenatal health and nutrition”; Tyson and Spence (2017) suggest “increasing the marginal income tax rate for top earners”, although they are short on what to do about the inequality effects brought on by the computer/digital revolution, “imperfect competition, first-mover advantages, market power in networked systems, and the wages and livelihoods of workers who perform tasks and have jobs that can be better performed by machines at lower cost”; Milanovic (2017) suggests making greater use of Employee Stock Ownership; Lakner (2017) suggests raising tax rates on capital incomes up to those of labor incomes, raising relatively low property taxes, challenging tax havens, redistribution through cash transfers, improvements in educational opportunities, sharing benefits of automation with workers; Boushey (2017) suggests giving greater support for “women’s economic independence” by “ensuring equal access to and economic and political rights for men and women—and for those with and without caregiving responsibilities”; Steinbaum (2017) suggests that “the decline and fall of an ideology is what precipitated the egalitarian era of the mid-twentieth century”, rather than the wars and depression, and therefore remediation of current inequalities will require the election of a “working-class, left-wing coalition” with a suitably powerful ideology; Grewal

(2017) suggests reforming judicial systems “that offer special protections to asset-holders; Derenoncourt (2017) suggests improvements in the collection and analysis of administrative statistics, and the provision of reparations for subjects of formally colonized countries; Jacobs (2017) suggests facilitating change through greater attention to and use of institutions like legal structures, informal rules, common knowledge, history and culture, and reminds us that “The aim is to build countervailing political power such that political equity in turn makes possible reforms to unravel the pernicious economic inequality detailed by Piketty in *Capital*.”

As if all this were not enough of an agenda for future research and political action, there is still the pressing question for social indicators researchers of the impact of financial inequalities and institutionalized financial secrecy on the quality of life. Years of poverty research have demonstrated that the life chances of the poor are significantly more negative than they are for the non-poor. What is less clear is the impact of wealth and income inequalities, and financial secrecy on our most salient overall quality of life indexes, as well as on what they measure. These particular issues will be addressed in this paper.

The general structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we give a sketch of each of the variables used here. Following that, ‘Objective and Subjective Bivariate Relations’ examines associations among four indexes based on only objective indicators and two based only on subjective indicators. The section entitled ‘Happiness-Weighted Indexes’ examines associations among five *overall* quality of life indexes, Gini-wealth and Gini-income indexes, financial secrecy scores and a measure of offshore wealth as a fraction of GDP. In ‘Gini-weighted (G_w and G_i) indexes, offshore wealth and financial secrecy’ we examine results of weighting overall quality of life indexes with distribution equality measures based on wealth and income. In our penultimate section, ‘Rank Ordering of 105 Countries Using 21 Indexes’, we discuss specific country rank-orderings based on tables in the Appendix to show in detail how altering features of our original objective indexes alters countries’ rank-order positions. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks.

Good Societies Measured by Their Effects

The defining characteristic of any sort of pragmatic philosophy is its emphasis on evaluating things on the basis of their consequences, effects, outputs or outcomes. Whether the things are works of art or science, events, actions or beliefs, pragmatists look to their consequences to assess their value. Other philosophers have recognized that human intentions/motives, the actual content of the things in question (a sculpture, society, scientific theory or heroic act), among many other things, are also vitally important for a comprehensive evaluation of anything. Neglect of things besides consequences has led critics to complain that “the trouble with pragmatists is that they will get in bed with anyone”. There is, after all, no rule book to apply to decide exactly what consequences should be examined, over what period of time,

with what measuring devices, by whom, and so on (Michalos 1978, 1995; Michalos et al. 2011). Nevertheless, in this section we briefly sketch measuring instruments largely based on the pragmatic assumption focused on consequences of one kind or another, some using only objective indicators, some using only subjective indicators and some using both kinds (Michalos 2014b).

As usual, we assume that the quality of life of individuals and societies is a function of their living conditions and what they make of them. Objective indicators designate publicly observable phenomena as seen from the perspective of any independent, unbiased and well-informed person e.g., numbers of births, deaths, marriages, secondary school graduates. Subjective indicators designate privately observable phenomena as seen from the perspective of some particular person, e.g., pains, pleasures, loves, hopes, fears, desires, attitudes, perceived equity, satisfaction and happiness. From these assumptions, it follows that a comprehensive (overall) measure of the quality of life must contain objective and subjective indicators.

Human Development Index (HDI)

Initiated by the United Nations Development Program, HDI was first published in the *Human Development Report* 1990 (UNDP 1990). Mathematically it is the geometric mean of three objective standardized indexes, a Life Expectancy Index, an Education Index and an Income Index. (The geometric mean of n positive numbers is the n th root of their product, e.g., the geometric mean of 2 and 8 is the square root of 16, or 4) For any country, life expectancy at birth provides the raw data for the first index, expected years and mean years of schooling provide the data for the arithmetic mean of two equally weighted sub-indexes making the second index, and the natural logarithm of the per capita gross national income provides the raw data for the third. HDI scores run from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating greater development. The HDI is the parent of a family of indexes including an Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), A Gender Development Index, Gender Inequality Index and a Multidimensional Poverty Index. The offspring have generated considerable reflections, e.g., Dijkstra (2002), Permanyer (2013) and Ferrant (2014). IHDI is built by independently calculating the inequality of each of its three dimensions and taking the geometric mean of those three. This paper uses HDI and IHDI data from (UNDP 2016).

Weighted Index of Social Progress (WISP)

WISP was introduced six years before HDI by Estes (1984) to describe trends in the social, political and economic development of countries. The index is composed of 41 objective social indicators assembled in 10 subindexes including education

(4 indicators), health status (7), women status (5), defense effort (1), economic (5), demographic (3), environmental (3), social chaos (5), cultural diversity (3) and welfare effort (5). The indicators are all drawn from annual reports of well-known agencies like the UN Development Programme, World Bank and Amnesty International. Factor analysis was applied to each indicator within its subindex and then applied again to each of the 10 subindexes, and the factor loadings of each of the 10 subindexes were used as weights for each of the latter to construct the WISP. Finally, setting each subindex score of 10 times its weighting score and summing the lot for the ten subindexes, each country is assigned a WISP score theoretically running from 0 to 100.0. Higher scores mean greater progress. The sixteenth iteration of the index was presented in Estes (2015) using data from 2011. Because the figures are generally earlier than the 2015 target year established for this article, strict comparisons with results for other indexes are not possible. In fact, given the variety of data compromises that all researchers in the field of international studies routinely make, our comparisons are not extra-ordinary, although some of our analyses produce remarkably high levels of association.

Social Progress Index (SPI)

SPI is a product of the Social Progress Imperative, which is a “non-profit nongovernmental organization incorporated in late 2012 . . . in the United States” (www.socialprogressimperative.org). The organization includes a large network of partners involving regional, country, state and city-level agents, and a large number of funders (Porter et al. 2016). The working definition for the project says that “Social progress is the capacity of a society to meet the basic human needs of its citizens, establish the building blocks that allow citizens and communities to enhance and sustain the quality of their lives, and create the conditions for all individuals to reach their full potential” (Porter et al. 2016, p. 12). Based on this definition, the SPI was built on three dimensions of needs, building blocks and opportunities containing four components each with three to five unequally weighted objective indicators totalling 56 altogether. Like WISP, indicators are standardized to range from 0 to 100.0, with higher scores indicating greater progress. Uniquely, “The Social Progress Index is the first comprehensive framework for measuring social progress that is independent of GDP, but complementary to it.” The authors’ “vision is a world in which social progress sits alongside GDP as a core benchmark for national performance”. When the authors correlated SPI scores with GDP per capita levels, they found something similar to what many other authors found by correlating such levels with life satisfaction scores, namely, that “countries achieve widely divergent levels of social progress at similar levels of GDP per capita” (Porter et al. 2016, pp. 11, 19; cf. Diener et al. 2010).

Sustainable Society Index (SSI)

SSI is a product of the Sustainable Society Foundation, which was founded in 2006 by Geurt van de Kerk and Arthur Manuel (www.ssfindex.com). The foundation and index are connected to an international network of agents representing regions, countries and cities. The index is published every two years and the 2016 version covers 154 countries using data mostly from 2014. There are three basic dimensions covering economic, environmental and human well-being. The dimension of human well-being has three categories (basic needs, personal development and health, well-balanced society), environmental well-being has two (natural resources, and climate and energy), and economic well-being has two (transition and economy). Within each category there are from 2 to 4 equally weighted objective indicators, altogether 9 for human well-being, 7 for environmental well-being and 5 for economic well-being (www.ssfindex.com). The indicators are standardized to range from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating “no sustainability” and 10 “full sustainability” (van de Kerk 2014, p. 6520). Indicators are aggregated within each dimension using a geometric mean, which implies that the index is not compensative in the sense that low scores on one indicator can be compensated by high scores on another. While the authors do not calculate a single composite score for the three dimensions, we have aggregated the three using a geometric mean.

Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index (GWB)

GWB is produced by Healthways, Inc., a company founded in 1981, with a revenue of \$771 million in 2014, over 2500 employees and a wide variety of subsidiaries and partnerships including 16,000 fitness and wellness facilities, over 80 health plan clients, and “68 million covered lives actively managed”. “Our business,” the website informs us, “is improving well-being . . . Healthier people cost less and perform better, which is the value proposition we offer our clients” (<http://www.well-beingindex.com/2014-global-report>). Their report is based on an index built on subjective indicators from responses to 10 questions from 146,000 individuals in the Gallup World Poll (Gallup <http://www.gallup.com/178667/gallup-world-poll-work.aspx>) covering 145 countries throughout 2014. Likert-type questions with response categories running from “strongly disagree (1)” to “strongly agree (5)” provide information on respondents’ views about five “elements of well-being”. The elements cover how much people like where they live and what they do every day, whether they have supportive relationships, face financial stress, and have good health. Responses are “categorized as thriving, struggling or suffering” and countries are ranked in the GWB “on the percentage of the population [sample] that is thriving in three or more elements of well-being”. Higher percentages indicate superior well-being.

World Happiness Survey (WHS)

WHS is based on another set of questions drawn from the 2014 Gallup World Poll (<https://s3.amazonaws.com/happiness-report/2016/StatisticalAppendixWHR2016.pdf>). The central subjective indicator captures the general sense of happiness, life satisfaction or subjective well-being. It is a version of the familiar Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale (Glatzer and Gulyas 2014), here called the “Cantril life ladder” expressed as follows. “Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?” Helliwell and Wang (2012, p. 14) reported that comparing country rankings for life satisfaction and the life ladder “asked of the same respondents, and in the same survey, the correlation is very high ($r = 0.94$). Analysis of the resulting data show that while there were significant differences in average scores, with the mean life satisfaction being higher by about 0.5 on the 11 point scale, the two variables are explained by the same factors, including the same effects of income.”

Happiness Combined with Objective Measures

In several publications, Veenhoven (e.g., 1996, 2014) has explained his combined measure called Happy Life Years (HLY), which is simply the product of life expectancy at birth times 0–1 happiness. His usage of the word ‘happiness’ covers practically any of the family of measures (Michalos 2015) capturing the ideas of enjoyment of life, subjective well-being or life satisfaction. In his latest summary of *Happy Life Years in 158 Nations 2005–2014: How long and happy people live*, his evaluative term is ‘satisfaction with life’ (scale 0–10, converted to 0–1) (https://Worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/findingreports/RankReport_HappyLifeYears.php). It is worth reminding readers (as he does) that HLY “scored highest in a scholarly review of indicators” in Hagerty et al. (2001). Since we have sketched four indexes using only objective indicators and two using only subjective indicators, we could apply Veenhoven’s strategy to create eight more combinations, i.e., Happy HDI, HWISP, HSPI, HSSI using WHS and then GWB as the evaluative measure of happiness. Given the dominance (Michalos 1970) of WHS over GWB shown below, we will only consider applications of WHS as we proceed.

Quality of Life/Well-Being Combined with Measures of Financial Inequality

None of the indexes sketched above address Piketty's problems with the growth of financial inequalities in incomes and net wealth. Kovacevic's (2010) comprehensive review of issues related to measures crafted to address those problems involves more sophisticated measures than we have here. However, we would like to offer some information and suggestions. In particular, we have some ideas about the use of Gini indexes of incomes and wealth, and measures of institutionalized financial secrecy that may be useful to others.

Gini-Weighted Indexes

The Gini index made its appearance in a 1912 paper by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini. It measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of a set of objects of any sort but is usually associated with income or wealth distributions. The scale runs from 0 meaning all recipients have an equal share to 1, meaning one person has everything to be distributed and everyone else has nothing. It has some well-known strengths and weaknesses. Piketty is skeptical about the use of "synthetic indices, such as the Gini coefficient, which mix very different things, such as inequality with respect to labor and capital, so that it is impossible to distinguish clearly among the multiple dimensions of inequality and the various mechanisms at work". In his view, which seems correct to us, "normative and moral reasons" for the justification of inequalities from labour and inherited wealth must be different because "the economic, social, and political mechanisms capable of explaining the observed evolutions are totally distinct" (Piketty 2014, p. 243). Besides, data from different countries or periods may not be comparable (Piketty 2014, pp. 267–268). While these problems do call for analysts to be cautious, they should not prevent us from addressing the problems just as Piketty has. In particular, he insists on greater use of historical records, such as they are or may be polished, increased attention to obtaining more thorough and accurate data on the top 0.01% and 0.1% of income earners from capital, and on the hidden wealth in tax havens.

Using data from 2007 for 141 countries, Kovacevic showed that correlations of the income Gini index for the HDI and each of its three components were all negative. Notwithstanding Piketty's cautionary comments, it is certainly useful to have even modest evidence that "increased income inequality . . . [is] an obstacle to human development . . . [and that] a redistribution of income towards more equality would be associated with an increase in the average level of health and the average level of education index" (Kovacevic 2010, pp. 15–16). Following up Kovacevic's (2010, pp. 17–19) discussion of what he calls "the Sen welfare standard" (from Sen 1973 and 1992, and Foster and Sen 1997), we have calculated interaction scores for each of our five happiness (WHS)-weighted indexes and one-minus-Gini wealth

index scores, and one-minus-Gini income index scores to obtain rough wealth- and income-equality-weighted overall quality of life scores. To simplify our notation, we use Gw and Gi as abbreviations for ‘one-minus-Gini wealth’ and ‘one-minus-Gini income’, respectively. Gw and Gi refer simply to ‘Gini wealth index’ and ‘Gini income index’ measures, respectively. These measures are certainly more primitive than those produced by Foster and Sen (1997) or Atkinson (1983), but they are useful for present purposes.

Financial Secrecy Scores (FSS)

FSS are probably unfamiliar to most quality of life researchers. They make up half of the Financial Secrecy Index (FSI), which is an initiative of the Tax Justice Network (2016a). The other half of the FSI provides a rough estimate of the global scope of each jurisdiction’s financial services activity, but it is unnecessary for our purposes. FSS is based on a biennial survey of secrecy jurisdictions. ‘Secrecy jurisdictions’ is the Tax Justice Network’s preferred name for what are more familiarly referred to as tax havens. They are an assortment of countries (e.g., Belgium, Greece), protected territories (e.g., British Virgin Islands), special administrative regions (e.g., Hong Kong) or crown dependencies (e.g., Guernsey). These areas of the globe are defined roughly by two characteristics, namely, (1) they have regulations, rules and/or laws offering special benefits or advantages to non-resident commercial entities and (2) most especially they offer a “veil of secrecy” prohibiting exposure of the identities of the ultimate owners of those commercial entities from laws, rules and regulations of their countries of residence (Cobham et al. 2015). Secrecy jurisdictions offer non-residents (mainly banks, other financial institutions and corporate entities) the opportunity to take a free ride on their governments, competitors, customers and neighbours at home and abroad, notoriously a tax-free ride, but perhaps as often as not, a free ride on laws against environmental pollution and worker rights (Shaxson 2011; Deneault 2015; Zucman 2015; Jones 2017). Shorter and cruder still, secrecy jurisdictions are areas of the globe in which theft from one’s competitors, customers, neighbours and government is officially institutionalized and legalized. In a persuasively argued historical essay Fichtner (2014) claimed that some of today’s relatively high level secrecy jurisdictions in general and hedge funds in particular have their roots in and share many of the same features of the thirteenth to nineteenth century privateers and their home bases, except for the current absence of physical violence.

The FSI is an attempt to provide a means of rank-ordering jurisdictions according to the intensity of their secrecy tactics and the extension of their impact on the world. Instead of creating always controversial dichotomous lists of tax havens versus non-tax havens, the FSI allows one to construct a mix of subjective and objective indicators of secrecy of various sorts that apply to all jurisdictions. Prior to each biennial survey, proposed survey instruments are crafted and updated from more or less expert responses to survey items involving 15 Key Financial Secrecy Indicators

(KFSI). The KFSI are subjective indicators in the broad sense that people with different training, experiences, values and purposes may reasonably have different views about various aspects of secrecy and, in particular, differences between illegitimate secrecy and legitimate privacy. As well, KFSI have features of objective indicators insofar as they may designate not only specific but even distinct numbers of laws and other objectively identifiable secrecy-related attributes.

KFSI cover things like each jurisdiction's level of banking secrecy in the form of effective access to existing banking data, whether there is a central register of trusts and foundations, and whether beneficial ownership of all companies must be registered and updated with a governmental authority, whether there is publicly accessible worldwide financial reporting of all companies on a country-by-country basis, whether "protected cell companies" and trusts with "flee clauses" may be created in each jurisdiction, the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering tactics of each jurisdiction, on participation in multilateral automatic information exchange or "upon request" bilateral treaties on the exchange of tax data, on the extent of participation in five international conventions on financial transparency and international judicial cooperation on criminal issues (Tax Justice Network 2016b, pp. 24–27).

Data finally used to provide numerical assessments for each of the 15 KFSI in each biennial report come from "public reports by the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], the associated Global Forum [on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes], the FATF [Financial Action Task Force], IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the US State Department ... specialist tax databases and websites such as by the IBFD [International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation], PwC [PriceWaterhouseCoopers], [Lowtax.net](#) ... Ministries of Finance and the Financial Intelligence Units of all 102 reviewed jurisdictions" (Tax Justice Network 2016a, pp. 6–7). The Global Forum (2016) report describes their peer review system and the data obtained from it. For the FSI report of 2015, there were 102 jurisdictions participating and 92 had sufficient data to be included in the final ranking.

The total secrecy score for any jurisdiction is obtained by adding "the values of each of the assessed KFSIs and [dividing] the sum by the number of assessed KFSIs, expressing the resulting value (between 0 and 1) as a percentage score (0% to 100%) ... For example, if a jurisdiction was given a transparency credit for all 15 indicators, the resulting secrecy score would be 0%. No indicator being rated as transparent, in contrast, would result in a 100% secrecy score" (Tax Justice Network 2016a, p. 9).

Offshore Wealth as a Fraction of GDP

Shaxson (2011, p. 23), showed that "... the offshore world is not a bunch of independent states exercising their sovereign rights to set their laws and tax systems as they see fit. It is a set of networks of influence controlled by the world's major

powers, notably Britain, the United States, and some jurisdictions in Europe”. Regarding Britain, he wrote:

When Britain’s formal empire collapsed, it did not entirely disappear. Fourteen small island states decided not to become independent and became instead Britain’s Overseas Territories, with Britain’s Queen as their head of state. It is a status that has been preserved until today. Exactly half of them—Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands—are tax havens, actively supported and managed from Britain and intimately linked to the City of London. Accompanying these were the Crown Dependencies near the British mainland—Jersey and Guernsey, in the English Channel off the French coast; the Isle of Man, near the Irish republic; as well as a scattering of other territories—Hong Kong as a gateway to China . . . and a variety of ex-colonial oddities in the Pacific and elsewhere. (Shaxson 2011, pp. 87–88)

Other jurisdictions in the British Commonwealth Realm include St. Kitts and Nevis, the Bahamas, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, St. Vincent and Grenadines. While other countries have diverse connections to other territories, “jurisdictions that are formally or informally dependent on Britain clearly play in their own league” (Fichtner 2014, p. 48).

Examining “global corporate ownership networks”, Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2017) distinguished “sink” jurisdictions “that attract and retain foreign capital” from “conduit” jurisdictions that mainly facilitate “the transfer of capital to other countries”. Five countries serve mainly as “conduits”, the Netherlands (by a wide margin), United Kingdom, Switzerland, Singapore and Ireland, and 24 jurisdictions serve mainly as “sinks”. The top five “sinks” are the British Virgin Islands (by a wide margin), Taiwan, Jersey, Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. Using their network analyses, these authors are able to reveal geographical and sectoral specializations among secrecy jurisdictions that cannot be revealed by “offshore-intensity ratios” or “ratios of foreign investment to GDP” but, to our knowledge, they have not produced a world-wide assessment of the sort we require. Still, the analyses of these authors remind us of the difficulties of sorting out which jurisdiction has exactly what financial wealth. In fact, all the writers we have consulted have emphasized that their findings most likely represent an underestimate of actual holdings and transfers. The following comment by Zucman (2015, p. 35) precisely illustrates the sort of problems faced by researchers in this field. “Remember . . . that the distinction between Switzerland and other tax havens doesn’t really make much sense: a large part of the assets registered in Singapore or Hong Kong are in reality managed by Swiss banks, sometimes directly from Zurich and Geneva”. Zucman estimated that Switzerland has “close to a third” of the world’s offshore wealth.

Making matters even worse for our investigations, most of the most successfully secretive jurisdictions are not included in any of our quality of life/human well-being indexes. While this is unfortunate for us, it presents an excellent opportunity for young researchers to help close some important information gaps. Most significantly, the Cayman Islands do not appear in any of these indexes although “the foreign assets booked in the Cayman Islands are over 1,566 times larger than GDP”. This ratio is far above its next rival, the Marshall Islands (a territory with special

association with the United States), which has an offshore-intensity ratio of 228, as well as the other 28 jurisdictions in the top 30 in 2011 (Fichtner 2014, p. 49).

Notwithstanding the issues presented in the previous three paragraphs, we are going to take advantage of some recent work to try to shed a little light on this somewhat dark area. We know it is a bit of a stretch to search for some measurable impact of the usually small percentages of most countries' offshore wealth, but we think it is important for scholars to become familiar with this ground-breaking work related to inequality research.

According to Zucman (2015, p. 45), "It is one of the great rules of capitalism that the higher one rises on the ladder of wealth, the greater the share of financial securities in one's portfolio". Financial securities include bank deposits, stocks, bonds, shares of mutual funds and insurance contracts. Net household wealth is the sum of such securities plus non-financial wealth in the form of material goods like real estate, art, jewelry and gold, minus any debt. Zucman (2013) estimated that 8% of the world's household financial wealth (10% of world GDP) is held in offshore tax havens. Using 2007 as the "benchmark" year for their assessments, Alstadsæter et al. (2017) offered, for the first time ever, country-by-country estimates of this wealth (\$5.6 trillion). Extremely briefly, they estimated "how much each country owns in Switzerland, then . . . how much each country owns in tax havens other than Switzerland, and last combine the two distributions". Besides having about 45% to 50% of the globe's offshore wealth in 2006–2007, Switzerland also has relatively good official banking and financial institutions data. Using these data as uniquely exploited in Alstadsæter et al. (2017), we made a modest exploration of the impact of countries' fraction of GDP held as offshore wealth (FOW) on their quality of life measured in our objective, subjective and mixed indexes.

Objective and Subjective Bivariate Relations

In order to have our results strictly comparable across all our analyses, we used a dataset containing the same array of 105 countries. This had the disadvantage of removing all the non-country jurisdictions that play such a huge role in offshore financial transactions. Twenty-one of the 24 jurisdictions identified as sinks by Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2017, p. 6) are not countries. The only countries are Mauritius, Cyprus and Liberia. Results of running our analyses with no missing countries were similar to results with some missing countries, but we prefer the set with superior comparability. While all of our raw data are drawn from publicly available sources identified in this article, EXCEL tables are available on request for our total set of raw data and for the smaller working set of 105 countries.

Table 18.1 gives the descriptive statistics for our four indexes with only objective indicators, two with only subjective indexes, Gini wealth index coefficients (Gw), Gini income index coefficients (Gi), Financial Secrecy Scores (FSS) and fraction of GDP held as offshore financial wealth (FOW). The diversity of index metrics makes comparisons of mean and standard deviation values unclear, but what is clear is that

Table 18.1 Descriptive statistics for 4 objective and 2 subjective indexes, Gw, Gi, FSS and FOW

| | Mean | Std. deviation | N |
|------|--------|----------------|-----|
| HDI | .715 | .162 | 105 |
| WISP | 51.21 | 11.868 | 105 |
| SPI | 67.188 | 14.658 | 105 |
| SSI | 5.232 | .694 | 105 |
| WHS | 5.408 | 1.191 | 105 |
| GWB | 19.011 | 10.219 | 102 |
| Gw | 76.138 | 7.499 | 105 |
| Gi | 37.770 | 8.359 | 105 |
| FSS | 50.39 | 13.380 | 44 |
| FOW | 11.574 | 13.398 | 97 |

Sources: UNDP (2016), Estes (2017), Porter et al. (2016), Van de Kerk and Manuel (2017), Helliwell et al. (2016), Gallup-Healthways (2014), Credit Suisse (2016), Tax Justice Network (2016a), Alstadsæter et al. (2017)

the N for FSS (44) is considerably lower than 105 and that of FOW (97) is a bit lower than 105. The Gini wealth mean (76.138) is considerably higher than the Gini income mean (37.770), indicating that on average for the 105 countries, financial wealth is more unevenly distributed than income.

Table 18.2 lists Pearson correlation coefficients, significance levels (2-tailed) and Ns among objective and subjective indexes, Gw, Gi, FSS and FOW. (We also ran Spearman's rho correlations which turned out to be very similar to Pearson scores, and Z-score transformations of the four objective indexes and found exactly matching coefficients with our originals.) The very high correlations of HDI with WISP ($r = .927$), SPI ($r = .956$) and WHS ($r = .828$), and relatively low correlation with SSI ($r = .498$) stand out immediately. Their coefficients of determination make the differences between SSI and the others more stark, i.e., HDI with WISP ($r^2 = .859$), SPI ($r^2 = .914$), WHS ($r^2 = .686$) and SSI ($r^2 = .248$). If we calculated correlation coefficients using the total Ns available for each of these pairs instead of using only the 105 cases in which every country had a score on every index then the correlation of HDI with WISP would be $r = .903$ ($N = 159$); HDI with SPI, $r = .950$ ($N = 133$); HDI with WHS, $r = .833$; and HDI with SSI, $r = .440$ ($N = 152$). The correlation of SPI and WISP would be $r = .941$ ($N = 129$).

The relatively high correlations among three of the four indexes apparently provides some convergent validation for each of them. Reflecting on the frequency with which writers have mentioned the vagueness or opaqueness of the idea of overall quality of life, it is remarkable that these three popular indexes have such high levels of association. Researchers scrambling to find a plausible set of components and/or determinants of a life with a good quality came up with very similar constructions. HDI clearly has the virtue and advantage of relative simplicity, but WISP and SPI have superior content validity. SSI shares high content validity but its correlations are lower because it includes more environmental and natural resource measures.

Table 18.2 Correlations among objective and subjective indexes, Gw, Gi, FSS and FOW^a

| Index | HDI | WISP | SPI | SSI | WHS | GWB | Gw | Gi | FSS |
|-------|--------------------|----------|----------|--------------------|--------------------|----------|---------|---------|----------|
| HDI | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| WISP | .927 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| SPI | N = 105 | | | | | | | | |
| | .956 | .946 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 | | | | | | | |
| SSI | .498 | .563 | .535 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | | | | | | |
| WHS | .828 | .803 | .841 | .501 | – | – | – | – | – |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | | | | | |
| GWB | .528 | .493 | .549 | .381 | .769 | – | – | – | – |
| | N = 102 | N = 102 | N = 102 | N = 102 | N = 102 | | | | |
| Gw | –.246 [^] | –.311 | –.271 | –.186 ns | –.144 ns | .035 ns | – | – | – |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 102 | | | |
| Gi | –.315 | –.429 | –.291 | –.285 | –.231 [^] | .040 ns | .438 | – | – |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 102 | N = 105 | | |
| FSS | –.524 | –.550 | –.508 | –.191 ns | –.295 ns | .031 ns | .183 ns | .193 ns | – |
| | N = 44 | N = 44 | N = 44 | N = 44 | N = 44 | N = 43 | N = 44 | N = 44 | |
| FOW | –.092 ns | –.140 ns | –.114 ns | –.217 [^] | .020 ns | –.027 ns | .128 ns | .339 | –.019 ns |
| | N = 97 | N = 97 | N = 97 | N = 97 | N = 97 | N = 94 | N = 97 | N = 97 | N = 38 |

^aAll correlations significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) except those at 0.05 indicated by [^] and not significant by ns

Because the idea of a sustainable good life is, on the face of it, broader than that of a good life in itself, one might complain that introducing SSI to our discussion is a bit unfair, like bringing a duck to a dog show. However, the idea of quality of life can be conceptualized with sustainability built into the construct or not. While good health is generally regarded as good in itself (intrinsically good), it is also known to be instrumentally good insofar as it facilitates many other good activities, e.g., routine daily activities that define healthiness. As good health is a component and determinant of a good life, sustainable good health has the same dual nature. Because a life with a good quality is surely at least one of the things one wants to achieve and sustain, somehow the components necessary and sufficient for reaching these goals must be brought together. SSI is one way to bring them together. We cannot explore these issues in detail here, but some light can be shed on our views from Michalos (2011) and Michalos et al. (2015). The dual nature of health and the need for some attention to sustaining this and other virtues across one's whole life were considered long ago by Aristotle in his eudaimonic account of happiness (Michalos 2015).

There are interesting similarities of inclusion and exclusion with respect to the individual components of each index which we will not explore at length. By definition, indexes made up of only objective indicators exclude all the powerful subjective/personal determinants of subjective as well as objective well-being. The main difference between SSI and the other three objective indexes is in the percentage of environmental and resource indicators. HDI has none, WISP has 3 (7% of 41), SPI has 9 (16% of 56) and SSI has 8 (38% of 21). Leisure activities in any form are totally absent from all the indexes. Arts in any form (literature, painting, sculpture, theatre, film, dance, architecture) and sports (soccer, football, basketball, golf, baseball, swimming) are not mentioned. There are no indicators concerning religion in HDI and SSI, one in WISP and two in SPI. Sexual activity, of course, is totally neglected in these indexes. Maybe these areas of concern are excluded because people do not think about these fields as central for public policy making and maybe they occur to us because we tend to think of overall quality of life spreading beyond the borders of public policy making. In any case, they are important features of a good life and merit some attention by quality of life researchers.

The correlation between WHS and GWB, which are supposed to measure subjective well-being in some global sense, is good at $r = .769$. Still, in every case, WHS scores are more highly correlated than GWB scores with objective index scores. For HDI, the correlation with WHS is $r = .828$, compared to $r = .528$ for GWB; for WISP, the figures are $r = .803$ and $r = .493$; for SPI $r = .841$ and $r = .549$; and for SSI, $r = .501$ and $r = .381$, respectively. On average, WHS scores correlate to objective index scores at $r = .743$, compared to $r = .488$ for GWB scores. Accordingly, if one had to choose only one of these subjective indexes to work with, WHS would be the one. While the high average correlation of the four objective indexes with WHS represents good predictive validity for all four, omitting SSI from the average increases it to the very high $r = .824$. Interestingly, if one's preferred objective index were WISP or SPI following the analysis in the previous paragraph, one could happily choose WHS as one's preferred subjective index as its complement. If one's preferred subjective measure were WHS, one's preferred

Table 18.3 Correlations among objective indexes compared to average of remaining three

| Index name | HDI | WISP | SPI | SSI |
|--------------|------|------|------|------|
| HDI | – | .927 | .956 | .498 |
| WISP | .927 | – | .946 | .563 |
| SPI | .956 | .946 | – | .535 |
| SSI | .498 | .563 | .535 | – |
| Average of 3 | .794 | .812 | .812 | .532 |

objective index could happily be SPI, although few, if any, of the components of SPI could be determined by subjective well-being. Going with WISP would mean a decrease from $r = .841$ to $r = .803$ in the correlation between one's objective and subjective measures of the quality of life.

The correlation coefficients reported in the rows for Gw, Gi and FSS provide some confirmation of our expectations for our four objective indexes and one subjective index. It is broadly assumed and there is some evidence showing that substantial inequality in countries' distributions of wealth and income significantly reduce citizens' life chances and overall quality of life. So, one would expect measures of at least substantial aspects of the quality of life to be negatively associated with measures of inequality. On average, Gw scores are significantly correlated with the three objective indexes (HDI, WISP and SPI) at $r = -.276$, with WISP leading the four at $r = -.311$. SSI scores are not significantly correlated with Gw scores. The average correlation between Gi scores and the four objective index scores is $r = -.330$ ($p = 0.01$), with WISP again leading at $r = -.429$. The correlation of Gw with WHS is not significant, but for Gi it is ($r = -.231$, $p = 0.05$). The absence of a significant correlation between WHS and Gw scores is contrary to our expectations but we have no explanation for it. The correlation between Gw and Gi scores was lower than we expected at $r = .438$.

Because financial secrecy facilitates financial inequalities, one would expect FSS also to be negatively correlated with our objective and subjective indexes. This expectation is mostly confirmed in Table 18.2. On average, FSS is significantly and negatively correlated with our three objective indexes at $r = -.527$, with WISP leading the group at $r = -.550$. The correlation of FSS and WHS is not significant.

Our measure of offshore wealth as a fraction of GDP (FOW) had only one significant association with our four objective and one subjective index. FOW correlated with SSI at $r = -.217$ ($p = 0.05$). Although FOW did not have a significant correlation with Gw, it did have a positive correlation with Gi at $r = .339$ ($p = 0.01$). It is unclear why the two measures involving wealth should not have a significant correlation while the correlation between a wealth and an income measure is significant.

Table 18.3 shows that when the correlations of each of the four objective indexes with the averages of the other three are compared, one finds that WISP and SPI have the highest average correlation ($r = .812$) with the other three and SSI has the lowest average correlation ($r = .532$) with the other three. The identical WISP and SPI values are surprising because SPI is the only index without any financial data. (The idea of selecting a particular index on the basis of comparisons of the average of

several measures to that particular one was suggested by Foster and Sen (1997) in their discussion of alternative poverty measures. The suggestion has a somewhat conservative bias built into it insofar as highly correlated (convergently validated) indexes might have constructed similarities appropriate to the contemporary status of science or society although a low correlating index might contain components that are more significant for future developments.)

Happiness-Weighted Indexes

Table 18.4 gives the basic descriptive statistics for five happiness (WHS) weighted indexes following up Veenhoven's suggestion explained above, plus Gw, Gi, FSS and FOW. By combining objective and subjective indicators of the quality of life, these indexes qualify as *overall* quality of life indexes according to the two variable theory as explained in Michalos (2014a). In every case the introduction of WHS to the four objective indexes (Table 18.1) decreased the sizes of the means and increased the sizes of the standard deviations of the four objective indexes.

Table 18.5 lists Pearson correlation coefficients, significance levels (2-tailed) and Ns among the five overall quality of life indexes, Gw, Gi, FSS and FOW. HLY does not have an unweighted index for comparison, but for all 6 of the 6 correlations among the other four indexes, the correlations among unweighted indexes are all lower than the correlations among their happiness (WHS) weighted counterparts. The most dramatic increases occur with SSI. The correlation between SSI and HDI is $r = .498$, while the correlation between HSSI and HHDI is $r = .898$; the correlation between SSI and WISP is $r = .563$, while the correlation between HSSI and HWISP is $r = .908$; between SSI and SPI it is $r = .535$, but for HSSI and HSPI it is $r = .907$.

The correlations between Gw and HWISP and HSPI were smaller than those between Gw and WISP and SPI, but that between Gw and HHDI and HSSI were both not significant while that between Gw and HDI is significant but between Gw and SSI is not. Of the five overall quality of life indexes, HWISP had the greatest

Table 18.4 Descriptive statistics for five happiness (WHS)-weighted indexes, Gw, Gi, FSS and FOW

| Index | Mean | Std. dev. | N |
|-------|--------|-----------|-----|
| HLY | 39.687 | 12.495 | 105 |
| HHDI | .402 | .164 | 105 |
| HWISP | 28.817 | 11.990 | 105 |
| HSPI | 37.789 | 15.438 | 105 |
| HSSI | 2.871 | .883 | 105 |
| Gw | 76.138 | 7.499 | 105 |
| Gi | 37.770 | 8.359 | 105 |
| FSS | 50.39 | 13.380 | 44 |
| FOW | 11.574 | 13.398 | 97 |

Sources: Authors' calculations following Veenhoven (2014) using same sources as Table 18.1

Table 18.5 Correlations among five overall quality of life indexes, Gw, Gi, FSS and FOW^a

| Index | HLY | HHDI | HWISP | HSPI | HSSI | Gw | Gi | FSS |
|-------|--------------------|----------|--------------------|--------------------|----------|---------|---------|----------|
| HLY | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| HHDI | .983 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | N = 105 | | | | | | | |
| HWIS | .973 | .982 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| P | N = 105 | N = 105 | | | | | | |
| HSPI | .982 | .989 | .986 | - | - | - | - | - |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | | | | | |
| HSSI | .916 | .898 | .908 | .907 | - | - | - | - |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | | | | |
| Gw | -.199 [^] | -.191 ns | -.225 [^] | -.202 [^] | -.172 ns | - | - | - |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | | | |
| Gi | -.282 | -.302 | -.365 | -.288 | -.289 | .438 | - | - |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | | |
| FSS | -.348 [^] | -.400 | -.430 | -.390 | -.266 ns | .183 ns | .193 ns | - |
| | N = 44 | N = 44 | N = 44 | N = 44 | N = 44 | N = 44 | N = 44 | |
| FOW | -.040 ns | -.057 ns | -.082 ns | -.073 ns | -.108 ns | .128 ns | .339 | -.019 ns |
| | N = 97 | N = 97 | N = 97 | N = 97 | N = 97 | N = 97 | N = 97 | N = 38 |

^aAll correlations significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) except those at 0.05 indicated by [^] and not significant by ns

Table 18.6 Correlations among overall quality of life indexes compared to average of remaining four

| Index name | HLY | HHDI | HWISP | HSPI | HSSI |
|--------------|------|------|-------|------|------|
| HLY | – | .983 | .973 | .982 | .916 |
| HHDI | .983 | – | .982 | .989 | .898 |
| HWISP | .973 | .982 | – | .986 | .908 |
| HSPI | .982 | .989 | .986 | – | .907 |
| HSSI | .916 | .898 | .908 | .907 | – |
| Average of 4 | .964 | .963 | .962 | .966 | .907 |

association with Gw at $r = -.225$ and HLY had the lowest at $r = -.199$. Three of the five associations with Gw were statistically significant and negative (with HLY, HWISP and HSPI), giving us some confirmation of the assumption about the relationship between inequality and the overall quality of life. The remaining two are inconsistent with that assumption.

The correlations between Gi and HHDI, HWISP and HSPI were smaller than those between Gi and HDI, WISP and SPI, but that between Gi and HSSI was larger than that between Gi and SSI. Of the five happiness-weighted indexes, HWISP had the greatest association with Gi at $r = -.365$ and HLY had the lowest at $r = -.282$. All of the five associations with Gi were statistically significant and negative, completely confirming our assumption about the relationship between inequality and the overall quality of life. On average, Gw's three significant correlations with the five indexes was $r = -.209$ and Gi's average correlation with all five was $r = -.305$. This might indicate that income inequality is on average more devastating than wealth inequality for the quality of peoples' lives, or perhaps only that our income measures are more accurate than our wealth measures.

On average, FSS correlated negatively and significantly with four of the five overall quality of life indexes at $r = -.392$, with HWISP having the strongest association at $r = -.430$. HSSI was not significantly associated with FSS. Again, at least for four of the five indexes these results confirm our expectations concerning associations between the indexes and FSS.

Our measure of offshore wealth as a fraction of GDP (FOW) had no significant association with our five happiness weighted indexes. As we saw earlier, FOW correlated with Gi at $r = .339$ ($p = 0.01$).

Table 18.6 shows that among the five overall quality of life indexes, HSPI has the highest average correlation ($r = .966$) with the other four and HSSI has the lowest average correlation ($r = .907$) with the other four, which is still very high.

Gini-weighted (Gw and Gi) Indexes, Offshore Wealth and Financial Secrecy

Table 18.7 gives descriptive statistics for results of multiplying one-minus-Gini coefficients of wealth scores (Gw) times each of the five overall quality of life indexes, Financial Secrecy Scores (FSS) and Offshore Wealth as a Fraction of

Table 18.7 Descriptive statistics for five one-minus-Gini wealth (Gw) scores times overall quality of life indexes, plus Financial Secrecy Scores (FSS) and Offshore Wealth as a Fraction of GDP scores (FOW)

| Index | Mean | Std. dev. | N |
|----------------|--------|-----------|-----|
| <u>GwHLY</u> | 9.655 | 4.615 | 105 |
| <u>GwHHDI</u> | .098 | .055 | 105 |
| <u>GwHWISP</u> | 7.077 | 4.033 | 105 |
| <u>GwHSPI</u> | 9.249 | 5.176 | 105 |
| <u>GwHSSI</u> | .696 | .329 | 105 |
| FSS | 50.39 | 13.380 | 44 |
| FOW | 11.574 | 13.398 | 97 |

Sources: Same as Table 18.2 plus authors' calculations using Gini wealth scores (Gw) from Credit Suisse (2016); FSS scores from Tax Justice Network (2016) and FOW scores from Alstadsæter et al. (2017)

Table 18.8 Correlations among five wealth-equality-adjusted overall quality of life index scores, plus Financial Secrecy Scores (FSS)^a

| Index | <u>GwHLY</u> | <u>GwHHDI</u> | <u>GwHWISP</u> | <u>GwHSPI</u> | <u>GwHSSI</u> |
|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------|---------------|
| <u>GwHLY</u> | – | – | – | – | – |
| <u>GwHHDI</u> | .988 | – | – | – | – |
| | N = 105 | | | | |
| <u>GwHWISP</u> | .985 | .992 | – | – | – |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 | | | |
| <u>GwHSPI</u> | .987 | .995 | .992 | – | – |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | | |
| <u>GwHSSI</u> | .958 | .945 | .948 | .946 | – |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | |
| FSS | –.315 [^] | –.360 [^] | –.378 [^] | –.347 | –.245 ns |
| | N = 44 | N = 44 | N = 44 | N = 44 | N = 44 |

^aAll correlations significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) except those at 0.05 indicated by [^] and not significant by ns

GDP scores (FOW). In every case the introduction of Gw scores to the five overall quality of life indexes (Table 18.4) decreased the sizes of the means and standard deviations of the indexes. The interaction of Gw and each of the five overall quality of life indexes produces wealth-equality-adjusted overall quality of life indexes.

Table 18.8 lists Pearson correlation coefficients, significance levels (2-tailed) and Ns among the five wealth-equality-adjusted overall quality of life indexes and Financial Secrecy Scores (FSS). The measure of Offshore Wealth as a Fraction of GDP scores (FOW) had no significant correlations with any of the other measures. So it was removed from further consideration.

For 10 of the 10 correlations among the five wealth-equality-adjusted indexes, the coefficients are higher than the coefficients among their unadjusted counterparts. The most dramatic increases occur with SSI, on average increasing .061 percentage points with each of the other indexes. For example, the correlation between HSSI and HHDI is $r = .898$, while the correlation between GwHSSI and GwHHDI is $r = .945$.

Table 18.9 Correlations among five wealth-equality-adjusted quality of life indexes compared to average of remaining four

| Index name | GwHLY | GwHHDI | GwHWISP | GwHSPI | GwHSSI |
|--------------|-------|--------|---------|--------|--------|
| GwHLY | – | .988 | .985 | .987 | .958 |
| GwHHDI | .988 | – | .992 | .995 | .945 |
| GwHWISP | .985 | .992 | – | .992 | .948 |
| GwHSPI | .987 | .995 | .992 | – | .946 |
| GwHSSI | .958 | .945 | .948 | .946 | – |
| Average of 4 | .980 | .980 | .979 | .980 | .949 |

Table 18.10 Descriptive statistics for five one-minus-Gini income (Gi) scores times overall quality of life indexes, plus Financial Secrecy Scores (FSS), Offshore Wealth as a Fraction of GDP scores (FOW) and Happiness-Inequality-adjusted Human Development scores (HIHDI)

| Index | Mean | Std. dev. | N |
|---------|--------|-----------|-----|
| GiHLY | 24.989 | 9.346 | 105 |
| GiHHDI | .255 | .119 | 105 |
| GiHWISP | 18.295 | 8.900 | 105 |
| GiHSPI | 23.883 | 11.288 | 105 |
| GiHSSI | 1.807 | .674 | 105 |
| FSS | 50.39 | 13.380 | 44 |
| FOW | 11.574 | 13.398 | 97 |
| HIHDI | .338 | .166 | 105 |

Sources: Same as Table 18.2 plus authors’ calculations using Gini income scores (Gi) and IHDI scores from UNDP (2016); FSS scores from Tax Justice Network (2016); FOW scores from Alstadsæter et al. (2017)

In four of the five cases, Financial Secrecy Scores (FSS) are significantly and negatively correlated with the five wealth-equality-adjusted quality of life indexes. GwHSSI is not significantly associated with FSS. The average association for the four significant correlations is $r = -.350$, with GwHWISP leading at $r = -.378$. There is, of course, a large drop in the sample sizes for every correlation with FSS and the correlation coefficients are on average lower than they were for FSS and the overall quality of life indexes.

Table 18.9 shows that among the five wealth-equality-adjusted overall quality of life indexes, GwHLY, GwHHDI and GwHSPI have the same highest average correlation ($r = .980$) with the other four and GwHSSI has the lowest average correlation ($r = .949$) with the other four, which is still very high. GwHWISP’s average correlation with the other four is $r = .979$. Still, all of the coefficients are very high and the first four are very close to each other.

Table 18.10 gives descriptive statistics for results of multiplying one-minus-Gini coefficients of income scores (Gi) times each of the five overall quality of life indexes, Financial Secrecy Scores (FSS), Offshore Wealth as a Fraction of GDP scores (FOW) and Happiness-Inequality-adjusted HDI scores (HIHDI). As we have just seen for Gw, in every case the introduction of Gi scores to the five overall quality of life indexes (Table 18.4) decreased the sizes of the means and standard deviations of the indexes. However, in every case the introduction of Gi produced a greater

Table 18.11 Correlations among five income-equality-adjusted quality of life index scores, plus Financial Secrecy Scores (FSS), Offshore Wealth as a Fraction of GDP scores (FOW) and Happiness-Inequality-adjusted Human Development scores (HIHDI)^a

| Index | <u>Gi</u> HLY | <u>Gi</u> HHDI | <u>Gi</u> HWISP | <u>Gi</u> HSPI | <u>Gi</u> HSSI | FSS | FOW |
|-----------------|---------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------------|----------|----------|
| <u>Gi</u> HLY | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| <u>Gi</u> HHDI | .987 | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| | N = 105 | | | | | | |
| <u>Gi</u> HWISP | .985 | .987 | – | – | – | – | – |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 | | | | | |
| <u>Gi</u> HSPI | .987 | .992 | .990 | – | – | – | – |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | | | | |
| <u>Gi</u> HSSI | .937 | .924 | .935 | .928 | – | – | – |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | | | |
| FSS | –.390 | –.420 | –.436 | –.412 | –.318 [^] | – | – |
| | N = 44 | N = 44 | N = 44 | N = 44 | N = 44 | | |
| FOW | –.151 ns | –.142 ns | –.158 ns | –.152 ns | –.209 [^] | –.019 ns | – |
| | N = 97 | N = 97 | N = 97 | N = 97 | N = 97 | N = 38 | |
| HIHDI | .960 | .982 | .959 | .973 | .885 | –.420 | –.090 ns |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 105 | N = 44 | N = 97 |

^aAll correlations significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) except those at 0.05 indicated by [^] and not significant by ns

result than the introduction of Gw. The interaction of Gi and each of the five overall quality of life indexes produces income-equality-adjusted overall quality of life indexes. IHDI only needed the addition of happiness scores to become an overall measure of quality of life adjusted by inequality scores (HIHDI).

Table 18.11 lists Pearson correlation coefficients, significance levels (2-tailed) and Ns among the five income-equality-adjusted overall quality of life indexes, Financial Secrecy Scores (FSS), Offshore Wealth as a Fraction of GDP scores (FOW) and Happiness-Inequality-adjusted Human Development scores (HIHDI). The measure of Offshore Wealth as a Fraction of GDP scores (FOW) had only one significant correlation with any of the other measures. GiHSSI correlated with FOW at $r = -.209$ ($p = 0.05$).

For 8 of the 10 correlations among the five income-equality-adjusted indexes, the correlations are lower than the correlations among their wealth-equality-adjusted counterparts. For example, the correlation between GwHSSI and GwHHDI is $r = .945$, while the correlation between GiHSSI and GiHHDI is $r = .924$.

In every case, Financial Secrecy Scores (FSS) are significantly and negatively correlated with the five overall quality of life indexes. The average association is $r = -.395$, with GiHWISP leading at $r = -.436$. The average association rises to $r = -.399$ if we include HIHDI, because the latter's correlation with FSS is $r = -.420$. So, in summary, FSS has an average correlation with three of the original four objective indexes at $r = -.527$; with happiness scores there is no significant correlation; with four of the five overall quality of life indexes, $r = -.392$; with four of the five wealth-equality-adjusted indexes, $r = -.350$; with all of the five

Table 18.12 Correlations among five income-equality-adjusted quality of life indexes and HIHDI compared to average of remaining four or five

| Index name | <u>GiHLY</u> | <u>GiHHDI</u> | <u>GiHWISP</u> | <u>GiHSPI</u> | <u>GiHSSI</u> | HIHDI |
|----------------|--------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|-------|
| <u>GiHLY</u> | – | .987 | .985 | .987 | .937 | .960 |
| <u>GiHHDI</u> | .987 | – | .987 | .992 | .924 | .982 |
| <u>GiHWISP</u> | .985 | .987 | – | .990 | .935 | .959 |
| <u>GiHSPI</u> | .987 | .992 | .990 | – | .928 | .973 |
| <u>GiHSSI</u> | .937 | .924 | .935 | .928 | – | .885 |
| Average of 4 | .974 | .973 | .974 | .974 | .931 | – |
| HIHDI | .960 | .982 | .959 | .973 | .885 | – |
| Average of 5 | .971 | .974 | .971 | .974 | .922 | .952 |

income-equality-adjusted indexes, $r = -.395$; and adding HIHDI to this last figure, the average is $r = -.399$. Thus, seventeen of the 21 negative correlations (81%) are statistically significant. On average for these 17 cases, the coefficients were $r = -.409$. Clearly, then, considerably more often than not, the less secrecy a country's financial system has, the higher its overall quality of life is, and vice versa. (On top of this, we may add that in 16 of 21 cases there is a significant and negative correlation between Gw or Gi and our quality of life indexes (Tables 18.2 and 18.5)). Hopefully, as FSS is improved and applied to more jurisdictions, these correlation coefficients will increase, governments will strengthen their laws, secrecy and inequalities will decrease and people's overall quality of life will improve. A more comprehensive assessment of these associations would require comprehensive quality of life/well-being evaluations of non-country jurisdictions.

Table 18.12 shows that among the five income-equality-adjusted overall quality of life indexes, GiHLY, GiHWISP and GiHSPI have the same highest average correlation ($r = .974$) with the other four and GiHSSI has the lowest average correlation ($r = .931$) with the other four. Among the five indexes plus HIHDI, GiHHDI and GiHSPI have the highest average correlation ($r = .974$) with the other five and GiHSSI has the lowest average correlation ($r = .922$).

Rank Ordering of Countries Using 21 Indexes

In Appendix A of this paper we rank order our 105 countries from best to worst quality of life using all 21 indexes assembled in 5 groups. Each individual index is placed in one of 4 sets and each country is rank ordered in each index. Set 1 contains the four indexes based on only objective indicators and the one based only on a subjective indicator, i.e., HDI, WISP, SPI, SSI, WHS. Set 2 contains 5 happiness-weighted indexes, which we regard as indexes of the *overall* quality of life or *overall* well-being, i.e., HLY, HHDI, HWISP, HSPI, HSSI. Set 3 contains 5 wealth-equality-weighted quality of life indexes, i.e., GwHLY, GwHHDI, GwHWISP,

GwHSPI, GwHSSI. Set 4 contains 5 income-equality-weighted quality of life indexes, i.e., GiHLY, GiHHDI, GiHWISP, GiHSPI, GiHSSI and HIHDI.

The first column of each of the 4 sets of indexes contains a rank ordering of the sums of the results for each index in the set. In the first section of the Appendix we list the rank orderings of the set summaries, and the first column of this section contains a rank ordering of the rank ordered set summaries. This column is, therefore, an aggregated view (sum) of the results of 21 indexes. Appendix B lists the countries by name for the first 35 of 105 countries assessed. This way of looking at some of our results seems more complicated than looking at rank-order numbers, but we include it for anyone particularly interested in seeing the country names ranked.

Although the indexes are largely very highly correlated, there are very few direct matches between countries rank-order numbers in the overall ranking and in individual indexes. For example, we compared each of the 105 countries' rank scores for the overall column with the rank scores for the five indexes in Sets 1 and 4 and found the following few matches: For WISP and SSI there were 4 matches to each index; for HIHDI there were 5; for SPI, WHS, GiHLY and GiHSSI there were 6; for HDI, 7; GiHHDI and GiHWISP, 8; and GiHSPI, 14. When we examined matching countries for the indexes with the highest correlations, we found more matches but still fairly modest. The two indexes with the highest correlation among all 21 were GwHHDI and GwHSPI, with a correlation of $r = .995$. The pair had 26 direct matches out of 105 (25%). The second highest pair were GiHHDI and GiHSPI, with $r = .992$ and only 14 (13%) direct matches.

On the assumption that some researchers may want to pick only one individual quality of life index to work with, Table 18.13 lists the correlation coefficients for the overall-ranking score with each of the 21 individual quality of life index scores. All the scores were transformed into Z-scores and measures were taken using both Pearson and Spearman procedures. Using Pearson's procedure, the indexes with the highest correlations with the overall composite are HWISP at $r = .973$, HIHDI at $r = .971$ and GiHSPI at $r = .967$. Using Spearman's procedure, the indexes with the highest correlations with the overall composite are GiHSPI at $r = .980$, HWISP at $r = .977$ and HIHDI at $r = .973$. Considering only these three indexes and both procedures, HWISP is the top performer.

Because we wanted to find and had found evidence of a statistically significant and negative association between institutionalized financial secrecy (FSS) and quality of life scores, we were surprised and disappointed to find Switzerland with such a commanding presence in our quality of life measures in spite of its relatively low FSS score. Comparing the country rankings for the overall scores with the rankings for the FSS scores, one finds that Switzerland ranks first in the former list (as well as in Set 1 and Set 2) and 42nd in the latter. Of the 44 country FSS scores, Liberia ranks last with 44, Ukraine is second last with 43 and Switzerland is third last. In fact, according to the Tax Justice Network (2016a, p. 75), Switzerland had the worst Financial Secrecy Index score of the 92 jurisdictions evaluated in 2015. Of our 44 cases, the three top ranked countries for FSS scores were Denmark, Slovenia

Table 18.13 Correlations of Z-scored 21 variables with the overall composite Z-score

| Index name | Pearson correlation with overall composite | Spearman's Rho with overall composite |
|----------------|--|---------------------------------------|
| HDI | .915 | .932 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| WISP | .933 | .942 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| SPI | .937 | .942 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| SSI | .622 | .612 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| WHS | .916 | .918 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| HLY | .952 | .956 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| HHDI | .961 | .961 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| HWISP | .973 | .977 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| HSPI | .964 | .971 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| HSSI | .913 | .925 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| <u>GwHLY</u> | .854 | .871 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| <u>GwHHDI</u> | .895 | .913 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| <u>GwHWISP</u> | .893 | .914 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| <u>GwHSPI</u> | .895 | .916 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| <u>GwHSSI</u> | .829 | .855 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| <u>GiHLY</u> | .959 | .958 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| <u>GiHHDI</u> | .965 | .967 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| <u>GiHWISP</u> | .958 | .964 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| <u>GiHSPI</u> | .967 | .980 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| <u>GiHSSI</u> | .917 | .934 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |
| HIHDI | .971 | .973 |
| | N = 105 | N = 105 |

All correlations significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 18.14 Illustration of rank-order variety based on Canada and the United States

| Overall | Set 1 | Set 2 | Set 3 | Set 4 | FSS | |
|-----------|-------|--------|---------|--------|--------|-------|
| Canada 12 | 22 | 11 | 9 | 13 | 21 | – |
| USA 30 | 30 | 17 | 59 | 20 | 34 | – |
| | – | HDI | WISP | SPI | SSI | WHS |
| Canada | – | 9 | 20 | 2 | 92 | 6 |
| USA | – | 9 | 28 | 18 | 96 | 12 |
| | HLY | HHDI | HWISP | HSPI | HSSI | – |
| Canada | 4 | 6 | 11 | 6 | 37 | – |
| USA | 14 | 10 | 17 | 13 | 45 | – |
| | GwHLY | GwHHDI | GwHWISP | GwHSPI | GwHSSI | – |
| Canada | 9 | 8 | 10 | 8 | 31 | – |
| USA | 63 | 51 | 54 | 55 | 80 | – |
| | GiHLY | GiHHDI | GiHWISP | GiHSPI | GiHSSI | HIHDI |
| Canada | 10 | 9 | 13 | 8 | 28 | 8 |
| USA | 22 | 17 | 22 | 19 | 48 | 14 |

and Spain, in that order. Their overall quality of life ranks were 10, 15 and 18, respectively.

Table 18.14 illustrates the sort of variety of rank-order positions one finds for the 105 countries across the 21 indexes for Canada and the United States. Combining the overall and 4 set rank scores with the 21 index rank scores, plus FSS, there are 27 cells. Canada's mean rank score for the 27 cells is 16, running from 2 to 92, while the mean rank score for the United States is 33, running from 9 to 96. Canada has a higher rank score in 26 of the 27 (96%). There is only one matching score in the table, with both countries ranked in 9th place on HDI. Considering the 21 index rank scores, Canada has a higher score in 20 (95%). These results are generally consistent with those revealed in *North American Social Report* over 30 years ago (Michalos 1980a, 1980b, 1981a, 1981b, 1982), which is briefly summarized in Michalos (2017).

Reading down each column, one can see the impact of introducing a subjective indicator to the indexes of objective indicators, then introducing a wealth-equality or an income-equality indicator. For example, adding a measure of subjective well-being to HDI, Canada's one matching score with the United States advances to 4 ranks above it, i.e., from 9 each to 6 and 10, respectively. Introducing a measure of wealth-equality to the overall quality of life measure HHDI drops the rank scores of both countries, from 6 to 8 for Canada and from 10 to 51 for the United States. Replacing wealth-equality with income-equality combined with HHDI decreases Canada's rank score from 8 to 9 and increases the United States score from 51 to 17.

Conclusion

According to the semantic theory of the structure of scientific theories (Michalos 2006), all of our indexes may be regarded as proposed theoretical definitions of the quality of life or human well-being. They are proposed logical identities that may or may not match the real world. Users suppose that the components assembled in the definiens on the left side are substantively the same as the definiendum on the right side, i.e., they suppose that the technical term on the right can be acceptably or adequately decomposed into the components on the left side.

We have shown that four candidate objective indexes (HDI, WISP, SPI, SSI) and one subjective index (WHS) of at least aspects of the quality of life or human well-being have good convergent validity among themselves and provide modest confirmation of our expectations concerning their association with a measure of political jurisdictions' institutionalized financial secrecy (FSS). Our measure of offshore wealth as a fraction of GDP (FOW) showed only a couple significant correlations with one objective index (SSI) and one overall quality of life index (GiSSI). When we combined the four objective indexes to the subjective index to create overall measures of the quality of life (HHDI, HWISP, HSPI, HSSI) and added HLY, the correlations among the indexes increased. Of these five overall quality of life indexes, HLY is by far the simplest and some would say has the greatest face validity. The content validity of each of the other four is greater than that of HLY and certainly provides many more potential points of entry for public policy and program interventions. Most of the correlations increased again when we created wealth- and income-equality-adjusted overall quality of life measures (GwHLY-GwSSI and GiHLY-GiSSI), and the content validity increased again for both sets of indexes compared to the five overall quality of life indexes. When IHDI was added to the five wealth- and income-equality-adjusted overall quality of life indexes, GiHHDI had the highest average correlation with the other five and it was higher than that of GwHHDI, which had the highest average correlation with the other wealth-equality-adjusted overall quality of life indexes.

We showed that one can get a considerable impact (revealing predictive validity) on the subjective measure WHS from the objective measures in HDI, WISP, SPI and somewhat smaller impact from those in SSI. Although we could not demonstrate a causal connection from our Pearson correlations and it is likely that there are some causal arrows going in both directions, given the content of our objective measures, it does appear likely that there are more causal arrows running from the objective measures to the subjective measures than the reverse. We have not explored the causal connections among the array of components in our objective measures to see what, if anything, might be redundant or what alternative sets of measures might be more productive of subjective well-being or happiness. Still, it is obvious that from the point of view of having available and plausible points of intervention leading to desired changes in one's conditions of life, the more generous the supply of predictive components, the better. As demonstrated in studies with multiple discrepancies theory (Michalos 1985, 1986, 1991a, 1991b, 1993a, 1993b), there are many

powerful subjective/personal determinants of subjective well-being, happiness, life satisfaction and satisfaction in diverse domains (e.g., marriage, jobs, friendships, religion) that are not captured by objective measures. So, we are still a long way from a general, comprehensive theory of overall quality of life.

When the social indicators/quality of life research movement began fifty years ago, we didn't have any of the indexes examined here. This is the first time anyone has built the array of index options crafted here. In Land and Michalos (2017) and Michalos and Land (2017), we sketched the international path of development from those early years until now and, with the help of several colleagues, we made recommendations for work in the future. This paper is offered as another potential starting point for the next generation of researchers.

Appendix A: Overall Rankings

| Overall rank | Country | Set1 ranking | Set2 ranking | Set3 ranking | Set4 ranking | V25: FSS | V25r: rank |
|--------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|----------|------------|
| 1 | Switzerland | 1 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 73 | 42 |
| 2 | Norway | 3 | 3 | 23 | 1 | 38 | 9 |
| 3 | Iceland | 8 | 5 | 6 | 3 | 46 | 21 |
| 4 | Australia | 10 | 8 | 4 | 10 | 43 | 16 |
| 5 | Finland | 5 | 6 | 20 | 6 | – | – |
| 6 | Netherlands | 9 | 7 | 10 | 7 | 48 | 23 |
| 7 | Slovakia | 16 | 28 | 1 | 16 | 50 | 24 |
| 8 | Belgium | 19 | 16 | 2 | 11 | 41 | 13 |
| 9 | Sweden | 4 | 4 | 43 | 5 | – | – |
| 10 | Denmark | 2 | 2 | 63 | 2 | 31 | 1 |
| 11 | Austria | 6 | 9 | 25 | 8 | 54 | 28 |
| 12 | Canada | 22 | 11 | 9 | 13 | 46 | 21 |
| 13 | Germany | 7 | 10 | 29 | 9 | 56 | 32 |
| 14 | United Kingdom | 11 | 15 | 16 | 15 | 41 | 13 |
| 15 | Slovenia | 18 | 30 | 3 | 18 | 34 | 3 |
| 16 | Czech Republic | 12 | 18 | 24 | 12 | 35 | 4 |
| 17 | France | 14 | 19 | 17 | 17 | 43 | 16 |
| 18 | Spain | 23 | 22 | 8 | 19 | 33 | 2 |
| 19 | Ireland | 15 | 14 | 39 | 14 | 40 | 12 |
| 20 | Uruguay | 13 | 21 | 11 | 26 | 71 | 40 |
| 21 | Japan | 29 | 29 | 7 | 22 | 58 | 33 |
| 22 | Costa Rica | 17 | 13 | 18 | 32 | 55 | 31 |
| 23 | Italy | 21 | 27 | 13 | 23 | 35 | 4 |
| 24 | Israel | 27 | 12 | 27 | 21 | 53 | 27 |
| 25 | Lithuania | 25 | 33 | 14 | 29 | – | – |
| 26 | Poland | 20 | 31 | 28 | 24 | 36 | 6 |
| 27 | Croatia | 34 | 37 | 15 | 33 | – | – |

(continued)

| Overall rank | Country | Set1 ranking | Set2 ranking | Set3 ranking | Set4 ranking | V25: FSS | V25r: rank |
|--------------|-----------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|----------|------------|
| 28 | Estonia | 36 | 40 | 19 | 34 | 44 | 18 |
| 29 | Latvia | 31 | 36 | 21 | 38 | 45 | 19 |
| 30 | United States | 30 | 17 | 59 | 20 | 60 | 34 |
| 31 | Argentina | 32 | 23 | 42 | 31 | – | – |
| 32 | Romania | 24 | 35 | 33 | 25 | – | – |
| 33 | Belarus | 47 | 44 | 12 | 27 | – | – |
| 34 | Chile | 26 | 20 | 46 | 39 | 54 | 28 |
| 35 | Panama | 35 | 24 | 35 | 43 | – | – |
| 36 | Moldova (Republic of) | 43 | 43 | 22 | 28 | – | – |
| 37 | Hungary | 28 | 49 | 30 | 37 | 36 | 6 |
| 38 | Mexico | 37 | 25 | 41 | 42 | 45 | 19 |
| 39 | Portugal | 33 | 46 | 31 | 40 | 39 | 10 |
| 40 | Mauritius | 44 | 47 | 34 | 41 | 72 | 41 |
| 41 | Greece | 41 | 52 | 26 | 45 | 36 | 8 |
| 42 | Brazil | 42 | 26 | 53 | 46 | 52 | 26 |
| 43 | El Salvador | 48 | 41 | 37 | 47 | – | – |
| 44 | Thailand | 40 | 32 | 67 | 35 | – | – |
| 45 | Cyprus | 38 | 38 | 64 | 36 | 50 | 24 |
| 46 | Ecuador | 46 | 39 | 45 | 50 | – | – |
| 47 | Colombia | 49 | 34 | 44 | 59 | – | – |
| 48 | Azerbaijan | 53 | 56 | 32 | 44 | – | – |
| 49 | Peru | 45 | 45 | 56 | 54 | – | – |
| 50 | Nicaragua | 55 | 48 | 47 | 60 | – | – |
| 51 | Bulgaria | 39 | 64 | 40 | 63 | – | – |
| 52 | Albania | 63 | 63 | 36 | 51 | – | – |
| 53 | Macedonia | 60 | 59 | 38 | 64 | 66 | 37 |
| 54 | Venezuela | 52 | 42 | 66 | 53 | – | – |
| 55 | Kazakhstan | 59 | 50 | 88 | 30 | – | – |
| 56 | Tunisia | 61 | 60 | 49 | 56 | – | – |
| 57 | Turkey | 50 | 54 | 68 | 52 | 64 | 36 |
| 58 | Paraguay | 54 | 53 | 52 | 73 | – | – |
| 59 | Kyrgyzstan | 70 | 62 | 48 | 49 | – | – |
| 60 | Philippines | 51 | 57 | 72 | 62 | 63 | 35 |
| 61 | Bolivia | 65 | 55 | 54 | 71 | – | – |
| 62 | Indonesia | 58 | 58 | 75 | 57 | – | – |
| 63 | Russian Federation | 56 | 51 | 100 | 48 | 54 | 28 |
| 64 | Mongolia | 71 | 66 | 51 | 58 | – | – |
| 65 | Tajikistan | 73 | 68 | 50 | 61 | – | – |
| 66 | Morocco | 66 | 61 | 62 | 69 | – | – |
| 67 | Georgia | 62 | 70 | 57 | 74 | – | – |
| 68 | Sri Lanka | 57 | 67 | 71 | 70 | – | – |

(continued)

| Overall rank | Country | Set1 ranking | Set2 ranking | Set3 ranking | Set4 ranking | V25: FSS | V25r: rank |
|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|----------|------------|
| 69 | Armenia | 67 | 74 | 58 | 65 | – | – |
| 70 | Iran | 69 | 65 | 65 | 68 | – | – |
| 71 | Nepal | 68 | 69 | 73 | 66 | – | – |
| 72 | Pakistan | 80 | 72 | 55 | 67 | – | – |
| 73 | Bangladesh | 72 | 73 | 70 | 72 | – | – |
| 74 | Ukraine | 64 | 71 | 102 | 55 | 77 | 43 |
| 75 | Lao P.D. Rep. | 79 | 75 | 61 | 75 | – | – |
| 76 | Ethiopia | 89 | 82 | 60 | 78 | – | – |
| 77 | India | 74 | 77 | 99 | 76 | 39 | 10 |
| 78 | Ghana | 81 | 80 | 69 | 80 | 67 | 38 |
| 79 | Cambodia | 78 | 86 | 81 | 77 | – | – |
| 80 | Senegal | 84 | 83 | 76 | 81 | – | – |
| 81 | South Africa | 76 | 78 | 85 | 99 | 42 | 15 |
| 82 | Nigeria | 83 | 79 | 90 | 79 | – | – |
| 83 | Cameroon | 88 | 85 | 80 | 86 | – | – |
| 84 | Tanzania | 85 | 92 | 74 | 85 | – | – |
| 85 | Kenya | 87 | 84 | 93 | 88 | – | – |
| 86 | Mali | 96 | 91 | 77 | 83 | – | – |
| 87 | Namibia | 77 | 76 | 104 | 95 | – | – |
| 88 | Zimbabwe | 93 | 89 | 83 | 87 | – | – |
| 89 | Malawi | 90 | 87 | 92 | 90 | – | – |
| 90 | Sierra Leone | 98 | 90 | 78 | 84 | 69 | 39 |
| 91 | Botswana | 75 | 81 | 105 | 102 | – | – |
| 92 | Congo | 97 | 88 | 82 | 92 | – | – |
| 93 | Uganda | 86 | 94 | 95 | 91 | – | – |
| 94 | Madagascar | 92 | 96 | 84 | 94 | – | – |
| 95 | Mauritania | 99 | 93 | 79 | 82 | – | – |
| 96 | Burkina Faso | 94 | 98 | 96 | 89 | – | – |
| 97 | Cote d'Ivoire | 95 | 97 | 94 | 96 | – | – |
| 98 | Benin | 91 | 99 | 89 | 98 | – | – |
| 99 | Rwanda | 82 | 95 | 103 | 103 | – | – |
| 100 | Niger | 102 | 100 | 87 | 93 | – | – |
| 101 | Guinea | 103 | 102 | 86 | 97 | – | – |
| 102 | Liberia | 104 | 103 | 91 | 100 | 83 | 44 |
| 103 | Angola | 101 | 101 | 101 | 101 | – | – |
| 104 | Togo | 100 | 104 | 98 | 105 | – | – |
| 105 | Chad | 105 | 105 | 97 | 104 | – | – |

Appendix A: Set 1 Rankings

| Set1 ranking | Country | V1: HDI | V1r: rank | V2: WISP | V2r: rank | V3: SPI | V3r: rank | V4: SSI | V4r: rank | V5: WHS | V5r: rank |
|--------------|----------------|---------|-----------|----------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|
| 1 | Switzerland | .939 | 2 | 68 | 6 | 88.87 | 5 | 7.2 | 1 | 7.509 | 2 |
| 2 | Denmark | .925 | 5 | 72 | 1 | 89.39 | 3 | 6.7 | 2 | 7.526 | 1 |
| 3 | Norway | .949 | 1 | 72 | 1 | 88.70 | 7 | 6.5 | 4 | 7.498 | 4 |
| 4 | Sweden | .913 | 11 | 71 | 3 | 88.80 | 6 | 6.4 | 5 | 7.291 | 9 |
| 5 | Finland | .895 | 17 | 66 | 13 | 90.09 | 1 | 5.9 | 20 | 7.413 | 5 |
| 6 | Austria | .893 | 18 | 70 | 5 | 86.60 | 12 | 6.0 | 16 | 7.119 | 11 |
| 7 | Germany | .926 | 4 | 71 | 3 | 86.42 | 14 | 5.8 | 23 | 6.994 | 14 |
| 8 | Iceland | .921 | 8 | 68 | 6 | 88.45 | 10 | 5.5 | 34 | 7.501 | 3 |
| 9 | Netherlands | .924 | 6 | 67 | 10 | 88.65 | 8 | 5.5 | 34 | 7.339 | 7 |
| 10 | Australia | .939 | 2 | 68 | 6 | 89.13 | 4 | 5.3 | 46 | 7.313 | 8 |
| 11 | United Kingdom | .909 | 12 | 65 | 15 | 88.58 | 9 | 5.6 | 28 | 6.725 | 19 |
| 12 | Czech Republic | .878 | 22 | 66 | 13 | 82.80 | 21 | 6.0 | 16 | 6.596 | 23 |
| 13 | Uruguay | .795 | 38 | 63 | 24 | 80.12 | 26 | 6.2 | 7 | 6.545 | 24 |
| 14 | France | .897 | 15 | 67 | 10 | 84.79 | 17 | 5.3 | 46 | 6.478 | 26 |
| 15 | Ireland | .923 | 7 | 65 | 15 | 87.94 | 11 | 4.9 | 65 | 6.907 | 17 |
| 16 | Slovakia | .845 | 29 | 64 | 20 | 78.96 | 29 | 6.2 | 7 | 6.078 | 30 |
| 17 | Costa Rica | .776 | 43 | 58 | 35 | 80.12 | 27 | 6.2 | 7 | 7.087 | 13 |
| 18 | Slovenia | .890 | 19 | 60 | 29 | 84.27 | 19 | 6.1 | 11 | 5.768 | 43 |
| 19 | Belgium | .896 | 16 | 68 | 6 | 86.19 | 15 | 4.8 | 73 | 6.929 | 16 |
| 20 | Poland | .855 | 26 | 63 | 24 | 79.76 | 28 | 6.2 | 7 | 5.835 | 39 |
| 21 | Italy | .887 | 20 | 67 | 10 | 82.49 | 23 | 5.6 | 28 | 5.977 | 33 |
| 22 | Canada | .920 | 9 | 64 | 20 | 89.49 | 2 | 4.4 | 92 | 7.404 | 6 |
| 23 | Spain | .884 | 21 | 65 | 15 | 85.88 | 16 | 5.2 | 52 | 6.361 | 28 |
| 24 | Romania | .802 | 36 | 59 | 31 | 72.23 | 39 | 6.7 | 2 | 5.528 | 49 |
| 25 | Lithuania | .848 | 27 | 59 | 31 | 76.94 | 32 | 6.1 | 11 | 5.813 | 41 |
| 26 | Chile | .847 | 28 | 57 | 37 | 82.12 | 24 | 5.4 | 40 | 6.705 | 20 |
| 27 | Israel | .899 | 14 | 58 | 35 | 75.32 | 35 | 5.1 | 56 | 7.267 | 10 |
| 28 | Hungary | .836 | 31 | 64 | 20 | 76.88 | 33 | 6.1 | 11 | 5.145 | 58 |
| 29 | Japan | .903 | 13 | 65 | 15 | 86.54 | 13 | 4.8 | 73 | 5.921 | 35 |
| 30 | United States | .920 | 9 | 61 | 28 | 84.62 | 18 | 4.3 | 96 | 7.104 | 12 |
| 31 | Latvia | .830 | 32 | 55 | 40 | 76.19 | 34 | 6.3 | 6 | 5.560 | 46 |
| 32 | Argentina | .827 | 33 | 59 | 31 | 75.20 | 36 | 5.4 | 40 | 6.650 | 22 |
| 33 | Portugal | .843 | 30 | 64 | 20 | 83.88 | 20 | 5.5 | 34 | 5.123 | 60 |
| 34 | Croatia | .827 | 33 | 62 | 26 | 77.68 | 31 | 5.6 | 28 | 5.488 | 51 |
| 35 | Panama | .788 | 41 | 52 | 47 | 73.02 | 38 | 5.7 | 26 | 6.701 | 21 |
| 36 | Estonia | .865 | 24 | 57 | 37 | 82.62 | 22 | 5.3 | 46 | 5.517 | 50 |
| 37 | Mexico | .762 | 50 | 51 | 51 | 70.02 | 44 | 5.8 | 23 | 6.778 | 18 |
| 38 | Cyprus | .856 | 25 | 59 | 31 | 80.75 | 25 | 5.0 | 61 | 5.546 | 47 |
| 39 | Bulgaria | .794 | 39 | 62 | 26 | 72.14 | 40 | 6.0 | 16 | 4.217 | 86 |
| 40 | Thailand | .740 | 56 | 49 | 57 | 67.43 | 53 | 5.8 | 23 | 6.474 | 27 |

(continued)

| Set1 ranking | Country | V1: HDI | V1r: rank | V2: WISP | V2r: rank | V3: SPI | V3r: rank | V4: SSI | V4r: rank | V5: WHS | V5r: rank |
|--------------|--------------------|---------|-----------|----------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|
| 41 | Greece | .866 | 23 | 65 | 15 | 78.27 | 30 | 4.6 | 83 | 5.033 | 63 |
| 42 | Brazil | .754 | 52 | 54 | 41 | 71.70 | 41 | 4.9 | 65 | 6.952 | 15 |
| 43 | Moldova | .699 | 62 | 53 | 42 | 64.73 | 60 | 6.0 | 16 | 5.897 | 37 |
| 44 | Mauritius | .781 | 42 | 52 | 47 | 73.24 | 37 | 5.4 | 40 | 5.648 | 45 |
| 45 | Peru | .740 | 56 | 50 | 54 | 70.09 | 43 | 5.6 | 28 | 5.743 | 44 |
| 46 | Ecuador | .739 | 58 | 51 | 51 | 69.56 | 46 | 5.4 | 40 | 5.976 | 34 |
| 47 | Belarus | .796 | 37 | 60 | 29 | 66.18 | 57 | 4.8 | 73 | 5.802 | 42 |
| 48 | El Salvador | .680 | 67 | 50 | 54 | 66.36 | 56 | 5.7 | 26 | 6.068 | 31 |
| 49 | Colombia | .727 | 60 | 46 | 69 | 70.84 | 42 | 5.2 | 52 | 6.481 | 25 |
| 50 | Turkey | .767 | 46 | 47 | 64 | 67.82 | 50 | 5.6 | 28 | 5.389 | 52 |
| 51 | Philippines | .682 | 66 | 47 | 64 | 65.92 | 59 | 6.1 | 11 | 5.279 | 55 |
| 52 | Venezuela | .767 | 46 | 52 | 47 | 62.60 | 68 | 5.1 | 56 | 6.084 | 29 |
| 53 | Azerbaijan | .759 | 51 | 52 | 47 | 63.75 | 64 | 5.5 | 34 | 5.291 | 54 |
| 54 | Paraguay | .693 | 64 | 49 | 57 | 67.44 | 52 | 5.5 | 34 | 5.538 | 48 |
| 55 | Nicaragua | .645 | 72 | 50 | 54 | 63.03 | 65 | 5.5 | 34 | 5.992 | 32 |
| 56 | Russian Federation | .804 | 35 | 53 | 42 | 64.19 | 62 | 4.6 | 83 | 5.856 | 38 |
| 57 | Sri Lanka | .766 | 48 | 46 | 69 | 62.21 | 70 | 6.1 | 11 | 4.415 | 77 |
| 58 | Indonesia | .689 | 65 | 46 | 69 | 62.27 | 69 | 5.9 | 20 | 5.314 | 53 |
| 59 | Kazakhstan | .794 | 39 | 49 | 57 | 63.86 | 63 | 4.8 | 73 | 5.919 | 36 |
| 60 | Macedonia | .748 | 53 | 47 | 64 | 67.88 | 49 | 5.3 | 46 | 5.121 | 61 |
| 61 | Tunisia | .725 | 61 | 53 | 42 | 68.00 | 48 | 5.0 | 61 | 5.045 | 62 |
| 62 | Georgia | .769 | 45 | 51 | 51 | 69.17 | 47 | 5.3 | 46 | 4.252 | 83 |
| 63 | Albania | .764 | 49 | 53 | 42 | 69.78 | 45 | 4.9 | 65 | 4.655 | 70 |
| 64 | Ukraine | .743 | 54 | 57 | 37 | 66.43 | 55 | 4.8 | 73 | 4.324 | 81 |
| 65 | Bolivia | .674 | 68 | 46 | 69 | 64.73 | 61 | 4.5 | 90 | 5.822 | 40 |
| 66 | Morocco | .647 | 71 | 49 | 57 | 61.92 | 72 | 4.9 | 65 | 5.151 | 57 |
| 67 | Armenia | .743 | 54 | 49 | 57 | 66.05 | 58 | 4.6 | 83 | 4.360 | 79 |
| 68 | Nepal | .558 | 81 | 43 | 76 | 57.40 | 76 | 5.9 | 20 | 4.793 | 69 |
| 69 | Iran | .774 | 44 | 47 | 64 | 59.45 | 74 | 4.5 | 90 | 4.813 | 68 |
| 70 | Kyrgyzstan | .664 | 70 | 53 | 42 | 62.91 | 66 | 4.2 | 100 | 5.185 | 56 |
| 71 | Mongolia | .735 | 59 | 48 | 62 | 62.80 | 67 | 4.3 | 96 | 4.907 | 65 |
| 72 | Bangladesh | .579 | 78 | 48 | 62 | 52.73 | 82 | 5.3 | 46 | 4.643 | 71 |
| 73 | Tajikistan | .627 | 74 | 44 | 74 | 58.78 | 75 | 4.8 | 73 | 4.996 | 64 |
| 74 | India | .624 | 75 | 45 | 73 | 53.92 | 79 | 5.2 | 52 | 4.404 | 78 |
| 75 | Botswana | .698 | 63 | 42 | 79 | 67.03 | 54 | 4.6 | 83 | 3.974 | 91 |
| 76 | South Africa | .666 | 69 | 47 | 64 | 67.60 | 51 | 4.1 | 101 | 4.459 | 76 |
| 77 | Namibia | .640 | 73 | 40 | 83 | 62.01 | 71 | 4.6 | 83 | 4.574 | 73 |
| 78 | Cambodia | .563 | 80 | 40 | 83 | 54.28 | 78 | 5.6 | 28 | 3.907 | 93 |
| 79 | Lao P.D. Rep. | .586 | 77 | 42 | 79 | 52.54 | 83 | 4.8 | 73 | 4.876 | 66 |
| 80 | Pakistan | .550 | 83 | 39 | 86 | 49.13 | 90 | 5.0 | 61 | 5.132 | 59 |
| 81 | Ghana | .579 | 78 | 43 | 76 | 60.37 | 73 | 4.6 | 83 | 4.276 | 82 |
| 82 | Rwanda | .498 | 91 | 44 | 74 | 51.91 | 84 | 5.4 | 40 | 3.515 | 103 |
| 83 | Nigeria | .527 | 86 | 37 | 92 | 46.49 | 95 | 5.0 | 61 | 4.875 | 67 |
| 84 | Senegal | .494 | 92 | 39 | 86 | 55.64 | 77 | 4.9 | 65 | 4.219 | 85 |

(continued)

| Set1 ranking | Country | V1: HDI | V1r: rank | V2: WISP | V2r: rank | V3: SPI | V3r: rank | V4: SSI | V4r: rank | V5: WHS | V5r: rank |
|--------------|---------------|---------|-----------|----------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|
| 85 | Tanzania | .531 | 85 | 42 | 79 | 49.99 | 87 | 5.1 | 56 | 3.666 | 100 |
| 86 | Uganda | .493 | 93 | 37 | 92 | 50.69 | 85 | 5.4 | 40 | 3.739 | 97 |
| 87 | Kenya | .555 | 82 | 35 | 97 | 53.72 | 80 | 4.7 | 81 | 4.356 | 80 |
| 88 | Cameroon | .518 | 87 | 36 | 95 | 47.22 | 94 | 4.9 | 65 | 4.513 | 74 |
| 89 | Ethiopia | .448 | 98 | 38 | 90 | 43.50 | 101 | 5.2 | 52 | 4.508 | 75 |
| 90 | Malawi | .476 | 96 | 43 | 76 | 53.44 | 81 | 4.4 | 92 | 4.156 | 89 |
| 91 | Benin | .485 | 95 | 39 | 86 | 50.03 | 86 | 5.1 | 56 | 3.484 | 104 |
| 92 | Madagascar | .512 | 90 | 41 | 82 | 45.91 | 98 | 4.9 | 65 | 3.695 | 99 |
| 93 | Zimbabwe | .516 | 88 | 37 | 92 | 49.11 | 91 | 4.6 | 83 | 4.193 | 88 |
| 94 | Burkina Faso | .402 | 103 | 40 | 83 | 49.34 | 89 | 5.1 | 56 | 3.739 | 98 |
| 95 | Cote d'Ivoire | .474 | 97 | 35 | 97 | 48.97 | 93 | 4.9 | 65 | 3.916 | 92 |
| 96 | Mali | .442 | 99 | 39 | 86 | 46.24 | 96 | 4.8 | 73 | 4.073 | 90 |
| 97 | Congo | .592 | 76 | 36 | 95 | 49.74 | 88 | 3.8 | 104 | 4.236 | 84 |
| 98 | Sierra Leone | .420 | 101 | 25 | 104 | 44.22 | 100 | 4.7 | 81 | 4.635 | 72 |
| 99 | Mauritania | .513 | 89 | 38 | 90 | 46.08 | 97 | 3.4 | 105 | 4.201 | 87 |
| 100 | Togo | .487 | 94 | 34 | 100 | 49.03 | 92 | 4.1 | 101 | 3.303 | 105 |
| 101 | Angola | .533 | 84 | 26 | 102 | 39.70 | 104 | 4.3 | 96 | 3.866 | 94 |
| 102 | Niger | .353 | 105 | 35 | 97 | 41.63 | 103 | 4.4 | 92 | 3.856 | 95 |
| 103 | Guinea | .414 | 102 | 32 | 101 | 41.66 | 102 | 4.4 | 92 | 3.607 | 102 |
| 104 | Liberia | .427 | 100 | 24 | 105 | 45.07 | 99 | 4.1 | 101 | 3.622 | 101 |
| 105 | Chad | .396 | 104 | 26 | 102 | 36.38 | 105 | 4.3 | 96 | 3.763 | 96 |

Appendix A: Set 2 Rankings

| Set2 rank | Country | V7: HLY | V7r: rank | V8: HHDI | V8r: rank | V9: HWISP | V9r: rank | V10: HSPI | V10r: rank | V11: HSSI | V11r: rank |
|-----------|-------------|---------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|------------|
| 1 | Switzerland | 62.400 | 1 | .705 | 2 | 51.061 | 4 | 66.732 | 3 | 5.406 | 1 |
| 2 | Denmark | 60.509 | 5 | .696 | 3 | 54.187 | 1 | 67.275 | 1 | 5.042 | 2 |
| 3 | Norway | 61.259 | 3 | .712 | 1 | 53.986 | 2 | 66.507 | 4 | 4.874 | 3 |
| 4 | Sweden | 60.005 | 9 | .666 | 8 | 51.766 | 3 | 64.744 | 9 | 4.666 | 4 |
| 5 | Iceland | 62.033 | 2 | .691 | 4 | 51.007 | 5 | 66.346 | 5 | 4.126 | 8 |
| 6 | Finland | 60.045 | 7 | .663 | 9 | 48.926 | 10 | 66.784 | 2 | 4.374 | 6 |
| 7 | Netherlands | 59.960 | 10 | .678 | 7 | 49.171 | 9 | 65.060 | 8 | 4.036 | 11 |
| 8 | Australia | 60.332 | 6 | .687 | 5 | 49.728 | 7 | 65.181 | 7 | 3.876 | 14 |
| 9 | Austria | 58.091 | 11 | .636 | 14 | 49.833 | 6 | 61.651 | 10 | 4.271 | 7 |
| 10 | Germany | 56.721 | 12 | .648 | 12 | 49.657 | 8 | 60.442 | 12 | 4.057 | 10 |
| 11 | Canada | 60.861 | 4 | .681 | 6 | 47.386 | 11 | 66.258 | 6 | 3.258 | 37 |
| 12 | Israel | 60.025 | 8 | .653 | 11 | 42.149 | 18 | 54.735 | 19 | 3.706 | 19 |
| 13 | Costa Rica | 56.413 | 13 | .550 | 21 | 41.105 | 21 | 56.781 | 16 | 4.394 | 5 |
| 14 | Ireland | 56.016 | 16 | .638 | 13 | 44.896 | 13 | 60.740 | 11 | 3.384 | 31 |

(continued)

| Set2 rank | Country | V7: HLY | V7r: rank | V8: HHDI | V8r: rank | V9: HWISP | V9r: rank | V10: HSPI | V10r: rank | V11: HSSI | V11r: rank |
|-----------|--------------------|---------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|------------|
| 15 | United Kingdom | 54.338 | 18 | .611 | 16 | 43.713 | 14 | 59.570 | 15 | 3.766 | 17 |
| 16 | Belgium | 56.125 | 15 | .621 | 15 | 47.117 | 12 | 59.721 | 14 | 3.326 | 34 |
| 17 | United States | 56.264 | 14 | .654 | 10 | 43.334 | 17 | 60.114 | 13 | 3.055 | 45 |
| 18 | Czech Republic | 51.976 | 23 | .579 | 18 | 43.534 | 15 | 54.615 | 21 | 3.958 | 12 |
| 19 | France | 53.379 | 19 | .581 | 17 | 43.403 | 16 | 54.927 | 18 | 3.433 | 29 |
| 20 | Chile | 54.981 | 17 | .568 | 19 | 38.219 | 26 | 55.061 | 17 | 3.621 | 21 |
| 21 | Uruguay | 50.658 | 26 | .520 | 27 | 41.234 | 20 | 52.439 | 22 | 4.058 | 9 |
| 22 | Spain | 52.669 | 20 | .562 | 20 | 41.347 | 19 | 54.628 | 20 | 3.308 | 35 |
| 23 | Argentina | 50.873 | 25 | .550 | 21 | 39.235 | 23 | 50.008 | 24 | 3.591 | 23 |
| 24 | Panama | 52.134 | 22 | .528 | 25 | 34.845 | 29 | 48.931 | 27 | 3.820 | 15 |
| 25 | Mexico | 52.191 | 21 | .516 | 28 | 34.568 | 32 | 47.460 | 30 | 3.931 | 13 |
| 26 | Brazil | 51.931 | 24 | .524 | 26 | 37.541 | 27 | 49.846 | 25 | 3.406 | 30 |
| 27 | Italy | 49.788 | 27 | .530 | 24 | 40.046 | 22 | 49.304 | 26 | 3.347 | 33 |
| 28 | Slovakia | 46.436 | 32 | .514 | 29 | 38.899 | 24 | 47.992 | 29 | 3.768 | 16 |
| 29 | Japan | 49.559 | 28 | .535 | 23 | 38.487 | 25 | 51.240 | 23 | 2.842 | 51 |
| 30 | Slovenia | 46.490 | 31 | .513 | 30 | 34.608 | 31 | 48.607 | 28 | 3.518 | 26 |
| 31 | Poland | 45.280 | 34 | .499 | 31 | 36.761 | 28 | 46.540 | 31 | 3.618 | 22 |
| 32 | Thailand | 48.296 | 29 | .479 | 33 | 31.723 | 40 | 43.654 | 36 | 3.755 | 18 |
| 33 | Lithuania | 42.726 | 40 | .493 | 32 | 34.297 | 33 | 44.725 | 35 | 3.546 | 24 |
| 34 | Colombia | 48.089 | 30 | .471 | 36 | 29.813 | 49 | 45.911 | 32 | 3.370 | 32 |
| 35 | Romania | 41.349 | 47 | .443 | 43 | 32.615 | 39 | 39.929 | 44 | 3.704 | 20 |
| 36 | Latvia | 41.311 | 48 | .461 | 41 | 30.580 | 45 | 42.362 | 39 | 3.503 | 27 |
| 37 | Croatia | 42.532 | 41 | .454 | 42 | 34.026 | 34 | 42.631 | 38 | 3.073 | 44 |
| 38 | Cyprus | 44.534 | 37 | .475 | 35 | 32.721 | 37 | 44.784 | 34 | 2.773 | 56 |
| 39 | Ecuador | 45.477 | 33 | .442 | 44 | 30.478 | 46 | 41.569 | 40 | 3.227 | 38 |
| 40 | Estonia | 42.481 | 42 | .477 | 34 | 31.447 | 42 | 45.581 | 33 | 2.924 | 49 |
| 41 | El Salvador | 44.478 | 38 | .413 | 50 | 30.340 | 47 | 40.267 | 42 | 3.459 | 28 |
| 42 | Venezuela | 45.265 | 35 | .467 | 39 | 31.637 | 41 | 38.086 | 49 | 3.103 | 43 |
| 43 | Moldova | 42.281 | 43 | .412 | 52 | 31.254 | 43 | 38.171 | 48 | 3.538 | 25 |
| 44 | Belarus | 41.484 | 46 | .462 | 40 | 34.812 | 30 | 38.398 | 47 | 2.785 | 55 |
| 45 | Peru | 42.958 | 39 | .425 | 49 | 28.715 | 52 | 40.253 | 43 | 3.216 | 40 |
| 46 | Portugal | 41.599 | 45 | .432 | 47 | 32.787 | 36 | 42.972 | 37 | 2.818 | 54 |
| 47 | Mauritius | 42.134 | 44 | .441 | 45 | 29.370 | 50 | 41.366 | 41 | 3.050 | 46 |
| 48 | Nicaragua | 45.060 | 36 | .386 | 55 | 29.960 | 48 | 37.768 | 51 | 3.296 | 36 |
| 49 | Hungary | 38.742 | 55 | .430 | 48 | 32.928 | 35 | 39.555 | 45 | 3.138 | 41 |
| 50 | Kazakhstan | 41.196 | 49 | .470 | 38 | 29.003 | 51 | 37.799 | 50 | 2.841 | 52 |
| 51 | Russian Federation | 41.168 | 50 | .471 | 36 | 31.037 | 44 | 37.590 | 53 | 2.694 | 58 |
| 52 | Greece | 40.818 | 51 | .436 | 46 | 32.715 | 38 | 39.393 | 46 | 2.315 | 70 |
| 53 | Paraguay | 40.427 | 53 | .384 | 56 | 27.136 | 55 | 37.348 | 54 | 3.046 | 47 |
| 54 | Turkey | 40.687 | 52 | .413 | 50 | 25.328 | 59 | 36.548 | 55 | 3.018 | 48 |
| 55 | Bolivia | 39.997 | 54 | .392 | 54 | 26.781 | 56 | 37.686 | 52 | 2.620 | 60 |
| 56 | Azerbaijan | 37.513 | 59 | .402 | 53 | 27.513 | 53 | 33.730 | 59 | 2.910 | 50 |

(continued)

| Set2 rank | Country | V7: HLY | V7r: rank | V8: HHDI | V8r: rank | V9: HWISP | V9r: rank | V10: HSPI | V10r: rank | V11: HSSI | V11r: rank |
|--------------|------------------|------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|
| 57 | Philippines | 36.056 | 64 | .360 | 62 | 24.811 | 61 | 34.799 | 56 | 3.220 | 39 |
| 58 | Indonesia | 36.720 | 60 | .366 | 59 | 24.444 | 64 | 33.090 | 60 | 3.135 | 42 |
| 59 | Macedonia | 38.664 | 56 | .383 | 57 | 24.069 | 65 | 34.761 | 57 | 2.714 | 57 |
| 60 | Tunisia | 37.838 | 58 | .366 | 59 | 26.739 | 57 | 34.306 | 58 | 2.523 | 64 |
| 61 | Morocco | 38.272 | 57 | .333 | 67 | 25.240 | 60 | 31.895 | 63 | 2.524 | 63 |
| 62 | Kyrgyzstan | 36.710 | 61 | .344 | 64 | 27.481 | 54 | 32.619 | 61 | 2.178 | 76 |
| 63 | Albania | 36.309 | 63 | .356 | 63 | 24.672 | 62 | 32.483 | 62 | 2.281 | 72 |
| 64 | Bulgaria | 31.332 | 74 | .335 | 66 | 26.145 | 58 | 30.421 | 65 | 2.530 | 62 |
| 65 | Iran | 36.386 | 62 | .373 | 58 | 22.621 | 67 | 28.613 | 71 | 2.166 | 78 |
| 66 | Mongolia | 34.251 | 66 | .361 | 61 | 23.554 | 66 | 30.816 | 64 | 2.110 | 79 |
| 67 | Sri Lanka | 33.113 | 70 | .338 | 65 | 20.309 | 75 | 27.466 | 74 | 2.693 | 59 |
| 68 | Tajikistan | 34.772 | 65 | .313 | 71 | 21.982 | 69 | 29.366 | 68 | 2.398 | 67 |
| 69 | Nepal | 33.551 | 68 | .267 | 79 | 20.610 | 73 | 27.512 | 73 | 2.828 | 53 |
| 70 | Georgia | 31.890 | 73 | .327 | 68 | 21.685 | 70 | 29.411 | 67 | 2.254 | 73 |
| 71 | Ukraine | 30.744 | 75 | .321 | 70 | 24.647 | 63 | 28.724 | 70 | 2.076 | 81 |
| 72 | Pakistan | 34.076 | 67 | .282 | 75 | 20.015 | 76 | 25.214 | 78 | 2.566 | 61 |
| 73 | Bangladesh | 33.430 | 69 | .269 | 78 | 22.286 | 68 | 24.483 | 79 | 2.461 | 65 |
| 74 | Armenia | 32.656 | 71 | .324 | 69 | 21.364 | 71 | 28.798 | 69 | 2.006 | 85 |
| 75 | Lao P.D. Rep. | 32.474 | 72 | .286 | 74 | 20.479 | 74 | 25.619 | 77 | 2.340 | 69 |
| 76 | Namibia | 29.783 | 77 | .293 | 73 | 18.296 | 79 | 28.363 | 72 | 2.104 | 80 |
| 77 | India | 30.079 | 76 | .275 | 77 | 19.818 | 77 | 23.746 | 80 | 2.290 | 71 |
| 78 | South Africa | 25.728 | 87 | .297 | 72 | 20.957 | 72 | 30.143 | 66 | 1.828 | 94 |
| 79 | Nigeria | 25.886 | 86 | .257 | 80 | 18.038 | 80 | 22.664 | 83 | 2.438 | 66 |
| 80 | Ghana | 26.297 | 85 | .248 | 82 | 18.387 | 78 | 25.814 | 76 | 1.967 | 86 |
| 81 | Botswana | 25.632 | 88 | .277 | 76 | 16.691 | 83 | 26.638 | 75 | 1.828 | 94 |
| 82 | Ethiopia | 29.122 | 78 | .202 | 90 | 17.130 | 82 | 19.610 | 90 | 2.344 | 68 |
| 83 | Senegal | 28.225 | 79 | .208 | 88 | 16.454 | 84 | 23.475 | 81 | 2.067 | 82 |
| 84 | Kenya | 27.094 | 80 | .242 | 83 | 15.246 | 93 | 23.400 | 82 | 2.047 | 83 |
| 85 | Cameroon | 25.273 | 89 | .234 | 84 | 16.247 | 85 | 21.310 | 85 | 2.211 | 74 |
| 86 | Cambodia | 26.802 | 81 | .220 | 85 | 15.628 | 88 | 21.207 | 86 | 2.188 | 75 |
| 87 | Malawi | 26.557 | 83 | .198 | 91 | 17.871 | 81 | 22.210 | 84 | 1.829 | 93 |
| 88 | Congo | 26.644 | 82 | .251 | 81 | 15.250 | 92 | 21.070 | 87 | 1.610 | 101 |
| 89 | Zimbabwe | 24.823 | 90 | .216 | 86 | 15.514 | 89 | 20.592 | 88 | 1.929 | 88 |
| 90 | Sierra Leone | 23.778 | 95 | .195 | 92 | 11.588 | 100 | 20.496 | 89 | 2.178 | 76 |
| 91 | Mali | 23.827 | 94 | .180 | 97 | 15.885 | 87 | 18.834 | 94 | 1.955 | 87 |
| 92 | Tanzania | 24.012 | 92 | .195 | 92 | 15.397 | 91 | 18.326 | 96 | 1.870 | 92 |
| 93 | Mauritania | 26.550 | 84 | .216 | 86 | 15.964 | 86 | 19.358 | 91 | 1.428 | 104 |
| 94 | Uganda | 22.135 | 98 | .184 | 96 | 13.834 | 96 | 18.953 | 93 | 2.019 | 84 |
| 95 | Rwanda | 22.742 | 96 | .175 | 98 | 15.466 | 90 | 18.246 | 97 | 1.898 | 91 |
| 96 | Madagascar | 24.202 | 91 | .189 | 94 | 15.150 | 94 | 16.964 | 99 | 1.811 | 96 |
| 97 | Cote d'Ivoire | 20.324 | 103 | .186 | 95 | 13.706 | 97 | 19.177 | 92 | 1.919 | 89 |
| 98 | Burkina Faso | 22.060 | 99 | .150 | 102 | 14.956 | 95 | 18.448 | 95 | 1.907 | 90 |
| 99 | Benin | 20.834 | 101 | .169 | 99 | 13.588 | 98 | 17.430 | 98 | 1.777 | 97 |

(continued)

| Set2 rank | Country | V7: HLY | V7r: rank | V8: HHDI | V8r: rank | V9: HWISP | V9r: rank | V10: HSPI | V10r: rank | V11: HSSI | V11r: rank |
|-----------|---------|---------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|------------|
| 100 | Niger | 23.869 | 93 | .136 | 105 | 13.496 | 99 | 16.053 | 102 | 1.697 | 98 |
| 101 | Angola | 20.374 | 102 | .206 | 89 | 10.052 | 103 | 15.348 | 103 | 1.662 | 99 |
| 102 | Guinea | 21.353 | 100 | .149 | 103 | 11.542 | 101 | 15.027 | 104 | 1.587 | 102 |
| 103 | Liberia | 22.167 | 97 | .155 | 101 | 8.693 | 105 | 16.324 | 100 | 1.485 | 103 |
| 104 | Togo | 19.884 | 104 | .161 | 100 | 11.230 | 102 | 16.195 | 101 | 1.354 | 105 |
| 105 | Chad | 19.530 | 105 | .149 | 103 | 9.784 | 104 | 13.690 | 105 | 1.618 | 100 |

Appendix A: Set 3 Rankings

| Set3 rank | Country | V13: GwHLY | V13r: rank | V14: GwHHDI | V14r: rank | V15: GwHWISP | V15r: rank | V16: GwHSPI | V16r: rank | V17: GwHSSI | V17r: rank |
|-----------|----------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|--------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|
| 1 | Slovakia | 23.682 | 1 | .262 | 1 | 19.839 | 1 | 24.476 | 1 | 1.922 | 1 |
| 2 | Belgium | 20.149 | 2 | .223 | 2 | 16.915 | 2 | 21.440 | 2 | 1.194 | 6 |
| 3 | Slovenia | 19.293 | 3 | .213 | 4 | 14.362 | 4 | 20.172 | 4 | 1.460 | 3 |
| 4 | Australia | 19.186 | 4 | .218 | 3 | 15.814 | 3 | 20.727 | 3 | 1.233 | 4 |
| 5 | Switzerland | 17.410 | 6 | .197 | 5 | 14.246 | 6 | 18.618 | 6 | 1.508 | 2 |
| 6 | Iceland | 17.369 | 7 | .193 | 7 | 14.282 | 5 | 18.577 | 7 | 1.155 | 10 |
| 7 | Japan | 18.287 | 5 | .197 | 5 | 14.202 | 7 | 18.908 | 5 | 1.049 | 15 |
| 8 | Spain | 16.854 | 8 | .180 | 9 | 13.231 | 8 | 17.481 | 9 | 1.058 | 13 |
| 9 | Canada | 16.311 | 9 | .183 | 8 | 12.699 | 10 | 17.757 | 8 | .873 | 31 |
| 10 | Netherlands | 15.410 | 12 | .174 | 11 | 12.637 | 11 | 16.720 | 10 | 1.037 | 17 |
| 11 | Uruguay | 15.248 | 13 | .157 | 18 | 12.411 | 13 | 15.784 | 12 | 1.221 | 5 |
| 12 | Belarus | 15.681 | 10 | .175 | 10 | 13.159 | 9 | 14.514 | 20 | 1.053 | 14 |
| 13 | Italy | 15.584 | 11 | .166 | 12 | 12.534 | 12 | 15.432 | 15 | 1.048 | 16 |
| 14 | Lithuania | 14.313 | 19 | .165 | 13 | 11.489 | 17 | 14.983 | 19 | 1.188 | 7 |
| 15 | Croatia | 15.099 | 14 | .161 | 17 | 12.079 | 15 | 15.134 | 17 | 1.091 | 12 |
| 16 | United Kingdom | 14.563 | 18 | .164 | 14 | 11.715 | 16 | 15.965 | 11 | 1.009 | 19 |
| 17 | France | 14.946 | 16 | .163 | 16 | 12.153 | 14 | 15.380 | 16 | .961 | 24 |
| 18 | Costa Rica | 15.006 | 15 | .146 | 22 | 10.934 | 19 | 15.104 | 18 | 1.169 | 8 |
| 19 | Estonia | 14.613 | 17 | .164 | 14 | 10.818 | 21 | 15.680 | 13 | 1.006 | 20 |
| 20 | Finland | 14.051 | 20 | .155 | 19 | 11.449 | 18 | 15.627 | 14 | 1.023 | 18 |
| 21 | Latvia | 13.633 | 22 | .152 | 20 | 10.091 | 26 | 13.979 | 21 | 1.156 | 9 |
| 22 | Moldova | 13.530 | 23 | .132 | 29 | 10.001 | 28 | 12.215 | 30 | 1.132 | 11 |
| 23 | Norway | 12.374 | 28 | .144 | 23 | 10.905 | 20 | 13.434 | 22 | .984 | 22 |
| 24 | Czech Republic | 12.474 | 27 | .139 | 25 | 10.448 | 25 | 13.108 | 24 | .950 | 26 |
| 25 | Austria | 12.490 | 26 | .137 | 26 | 10.714 | 23 | 13.255 | 23 | .918 | 29 |
| 26 | Greece | 13.470 | 24 | .144 | 23 | 10.796 | 22 | 13.000 | 25 | .764 | 45 |
| 27 | Israel | 13.686 | 21 | .149 | 21 | 9.610 | 30 | 12.480 | 28 | .845 | 37 |
| 28 | Poland | 12.225 | 30 | .135 | 28 | 9.925 | 29 | 12.566 | 27 | .977 | 23 |
| 29 | Germany | 11.968 | 33 | .137 | 26 | 10.478 | 24 | 12.753 | 26 | .856 | 36 |
| 30 | Hungary | 11.816 | 37 | .131 | 30 | 10.043 | 27 | 12.064 | 32 | .957 | 25 |

(continued)

| Set3 rank | Country | V13: GwHLY | V13r: rank | V14: GwHHDI | V14r: rank | V15: GwHWISP | V15r: rank | V16: GwHSPI | V16r: rank | V17: GwHSSI | V17r: rank |
|-----------|---------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|--------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|
| 31 | Portugal | 11.939 | 35 | .124 | 34 | 9.410 | 31 | 12.333 | 29 | .809 | 38 |
| 32 | Azerbaijan | 11.892 | 36 | .127 | 32 | 8.722 | 35 | 10.692 | 42 | .922 | 28 |
| 33 | Romania | 11.164 | 41 | .120 | 38 | 8.806 | 34 | 10.781 | 40 | 1.000 | 21 |
| 34 | Mauritius | 11.966 | 34 | .125 | 33 | 8.341 | 39 | 11.748 | 33 | .866 | 33 |
| 35 | Panama | 12.199 | 31 | .124 | 34 | 8.154 | 41 | 11.450 | 34 | .894 | 30 |
| 36 | Albania | 12.708 | 25 | .124 | 34 | 8.635 | 37 | 11.369 | 35 | .798 | 40 |
| 37 | El Salvador | 12.187 | 32 | .113 | 42 | 8.313 | 40 | 11.033 | 37 | .948 | 27 |
| 38 | Macedonia | 12.295 | 29 | .122 | 37 | 7.654 | 43 | 11.054 | 36 | .863 | 35 |
| 39 | Ireland | 11.203 | 40 | .128 | 31 | 8.979 | 32 | 12.148 | 31 | .677 | 52 |
| 40 | Bulgaria | 10.716 | 45 | .115 | 40 | 8.942 | 33 | 10.404 | 45 | .865 | 34 |
| 41 | Mexico | 11.534 | 38 | .114 | 41 | 7.639 | 44 | 10.489 | 44 | .869 | 32 |
| 42 | Argentina | 10.836 | 43 | .117 | 39 | 8.357 | 38 | 10.652 | 43 | .765 | 44 |
| 43 | Sweden | 10.081 | 50 | .112 | 43 | 8.697 | 36 | 10.877 | 39 | .784 | 42 |
| 44 | Colombia | 11.445 | 39 | .112 | 43 | 7.095 | 48 | 10.927 | 38 | .802 | 39 |
| 45 | Ecuador | 11.096 | 42 | .108 | 46 | 7.437 | 46 | 10.143 | 46 | .787 | 41 |
| 46 | Chile | 10.721 | 44 | .111 | 45 | 7.453 | 45 | 10.737 | 41 | .706 | 47 |
| 47 | Nicaragua | 10.499 | 46 | .090 | 51 | 6.981 | 49 | 8.800 | 49 | .768 | 43 |
| 48 | Kyrgyzstan | 10.426 | 47 | .098 | 48 | 7.804 | 42 | 9.264 | 47 | .618 | 54 |
| 49 | Tunisia | 10.178 | 48 | .098 | 48 | 7.193 | 47 | 9.228 | 48 | .679 | 51 |
| 50 | Tajikistan | 10.084 | 49 | .091 | 50 | 6.375 | 52 | 8.516 | 52 | .695 | 49 |
| 51 | Mongolia | 9.761 | 51 | .103 | 47 | 6.713 | 50 | 8.783 | 50 | .601 | 55 |
| 52 | Paraguay | 9.137 | 53 | .087 | 54 | 6.133 | 53 | 8.441 | 53 | .688 | 50 |
| 53 | Brazil | 8.880 | 54 | .090 | 51 | 6.419 | 51 | 8.524 | 51 | .583 | 56 |
| 54 | Bolivia | 8.839 | 55 | .087 | 54 | 5.919 | 55 | 8.329 | 54 | .579 | 58 |
| 55 | Pakistan | 9.303 | 52 | .077 | 61 | 5.464 | 59 | 6.883 | 61 | .701 | 48 |
| 56 | Peru | 8.291 | 58 | .082 | 57 | 5.542 | 57 | 7.769 | 56 | .621 | 53 |
| 57 | Georgia | 7.973 | 62 | .082 | 57 | 5.421 | 60 | 7.353 | 59 | .563 | 59 |
| 58 | Armenia | 8.393 | 57 | .083 | 56 | 5.491 | 58 | 7.401 | 57 | .515 | 68 |
| 59 | United States | 7.764 | 63 | .090 | 51 | 5.980 | 54 | 8.296 | 55 | .422 | 80 |
| 60 | Ethiopia | 8.795 | 56 | .061 | 70 | 5.173 | 63 | 5.922 | 69 | .708 | 46 |
| 61 | Lao P.D. Rep. | 8.054 | 59 | .071 | 64 | 5.079 | 65 | 6.353 | 64 | .580 | 57 |
| 62 | Morocco | 8.037 | 61 | .070 | 65 | 5.300 | 62 | 6.698 | 62 | .530 | 64 |
| 63 | Denmark | 6.474 | 73 | .074 | 63 | 5.798 | 56 | 7.198 | 60 | .540 | 62 |
| 64 | Cyprus | 7.348 | 65 | .078 | 60 | 5.399 | 61 | 7.389 | 58 | .458 | 78 |
| 65 | Iran | 8.041 | 60 | .082 | 57 | 4.999 | 66 | 6.324 | 65 | .479 | 77 |
| 66 | Venezuela | 7.378 | 64 | .076 | 62 | 5.157 | 64 | 6.208 | 66 | .506 | 71 |
| 67 | Thailand | 6.810 | 68 | .068 | 67 | 4.473 | 69 | 6.155 | 67 | .529 | 65 |
| 68 | Turkey | 6.835 | 67 | .069 | 66 | 4.255 | 70 | 6.140 | 68 | .507 | 70 |
| 69 | Ghana | 6.574 | 72 | .062 | 69 | 4.597 | 68 | 6.454 | 63 | .492 | 74 |
| 70 | Bangladesh | 7.154 | 66 | .058 | 73 | 4.769 | 67 | 5.239 | 75 | .527 | 66 |
| 71 | Sri Lanka | 6.391 | 75 | .065 | 68 | 3.920 | 76 | 5.301 | 73 | .520 | 67 |
| 72 | Philippines | 5.985 | 77 | .060 | 71 | 4.119 | 73 | 5.777 | 70 | .535 | 63 |
| 73 | Nepal | 6.576 | 71 | .052 | 76 | 4.040 | 74 | 5.392 | 72 | .554 | 60 |
| 74 | Tanzania | 6.459 | 74 | .052 | 76 | 4.142 | 71 | 4.930 | 78 | .503 | 72 |
| 75 | Indonesia | 5.875 | 79 | .059 | 72 | 3.911 | 77 | 5.294 | 74 | .502 | 73 |

(continued)

| Set3 rank | Country | V13: GwHLY | V13r: rank | V14: GwHHDl | V14r: rank | V15: GwHWISP | V15r: rank | V16: GwHSPI | V16r: rank | V17: GwHSSI | V17r: rank |
|-----------|--------------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|--------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|
| 76 | Senegal | 6.661 | 70 | .049 | 81 | 3.883 | 78 | 5.540 | 71 | .488 | 75 |
| 77 | Mali | 6.195 | 76 | .047 | 83 | 4.130 | 72 | 4.897 | 79 | .508 | 69 |
| 78 | Sierra Leone | 5.921 | 78 | .048 | 82 | 2.885 | 91 | 5.103 | 77 | .542 | 61 |
| 79 | Mauritania | 6.691 | 69 | .054 | 74 | 4.023 | 75 | 4.878 | 80 | .360 | 92 |
| 80 | Cameroon | 5.560 | 82 | .051 | 78 | 3.574 | 79 | 4.688 | 81 | .487 | 76 |
| 81 | Cambodia | 5.494 | 85 | .045 | 84 | 3.204 | 84 | 4.347 | 83 | .449 | 79 |
| 82 | Congo | 5.729 | 80 | .054 | 74 | 3.279 | 82 | 4.530 | 82 | .346 | 94 |
| 83 | Zimbabwe | 5.113 | 87 | .045 | 84 | 3.196 | 85 | 4.242 | 84 | .397 | 84 |
| 84 | Madagascar | 5.373 | 86 | .042 | 86 | 3.363 | 81 | 3.766 | 93 | .402 | 82 |
| 85 | South Africa | 4.374 | 93 | .050 | 80 | 3.563 | 80 | 5.124 | 76 | .311 | 96 |
| 86 | Guinea | 5.531 | 83 | .039 | 89 | 2.989 | 89 | 3.892 | 90 | .411 | 81 |
| 87 | Niger | 5.609 | 81 | .032 | 99 | 3.172 | 86 | 3.772 | 92 | .399 | 83 |
| 88 | Kazakhstan | 4.449 | 91 | .051 | 78 | 3.132 | 87 | 4.082 | 85 | .307 | 97 |
| 89 | Benin | 4.604 | 90 | .037 | 92 | 3.003 | 88 | 3.852 | 91 | .393 | 87 |
| 90 | Nigeria | 4.219 | 94 | .042 | 86 | 2.940 | 90 | 3.694 | 94 | .397 | 85 |
| 91 | Liberia | 5.497 | 84 | .038 | 90 | 2.156 | 100 | 4.048 | 87 | .368 | 89 |
| 92 | Malawi | 4.860 | 88 | .036 | 93 | 3.270 | 83 | 4.064 | 86 | .335 | 95 |
| 93 | Kenya | 4.687 | 89 | .042 | 86 | 2.638 | 94 | 4.048 | 88 | .354 | 93 |
| 94 | Cote d'Ivoire | 4.207 | 96 | .038 | 90 | 2.837 | 93 | 3.970 | 89 | .397 | 86 |
| 95 | Uganda | 4.117 | 98 | .034 | 95 | 2.573 | 95 | 3.525 | 95 | .376 | 88 |
| 96 | Burkina Faso | 4.191 | 97 | .029 | 101 | 2.842 | 92 | 3.505 | 96 | .362 | 91 |
| 97 | Chad | 4.414 | 92 | .034 | 95 | 2.211 | 99 | 3.094 | 98 | .366 | 90 |
| 98 | Togo | 4.215 | 95 | .034 | 95 | 2.381 | 98 | 3.433 | 97 | .287 | 98 |
| 99 | India | 3.730 | 99 | .034 | 95 | 2.457 | 96 | 2.945 | 99 | .284 | 99 |
| 100 | Russian Federation | 3.170 | 101 | .036 | 93 | 2.390 | 97 | 2.894 | 100 | .207 | 101 |
| 101 | Angola | 3.178 | 100 | .032 | 99 | 1.568 | 103 | 2.394 | 101 | .259 | 100 |
| 102 | Ukraine | 2.552 | 102 | .027 | 102 | 2.046 | 101 | 2.384 | 102 | .172 | 103 |
| 103 | Rwanda | 2.411 | 103 | .019 | 104 | 1.639 | 102 | 1.934 | 104 | .201 | 102 |
| 104 | Namibia | 2.234 | 104 | .022 | 103 | 1.372 | 104 | 2.127 | 103 | .158 | 104 |
| 105 | Botswana | 1.794 | 105 | .019 | 104 | 1.168 | 105 | 1.865 | 105 | .128 | 105 |

Appendix A: Set 4 Rankings

| Set4 rank | Country | V19: GiHLY | V19r: rank | V20: GiHHDl | V20r: rank | V21: GiHWISP | V21r: rank | V22: GiHSPI | V22r: rank | V23: GiHSSI | V23r: rank | V27: HiHHDl | V27r: rank |
|-----------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|--------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|
| 1 | Norway | 45.393 | 1 | .527 | 1 | 40.003 | 1 | 49.282 | 1 | 3.611 | 2 | .673 | 1 |
| 2 | Denmark | 42.901 | 6 | .494 | 3 | 38.419 | 2 | 47.698 | 4 | 3.575 | 3 | .646 | 3 |
| 3 | Iceland | 45.346 | 2 | .505 | 2 | 37.286 | 4 | 48.499 | 3 | 3.016 | 6 | .651 | 2 |
| 4 | Switzerland | 42.681 | 7 | .482 | 7 | 34.926 | 7 | 45.645 | 7 | 3.698 | 1 | .645 | 4 |
| 5 | Sweden | 43.624 | 4 | .484 | 5 | 37.634 | 3 | 47.069 | 5 | 3.392 | 4 | .620 | 9 |
| 6 | Finland | 43.773 | 3 | .484 | 5 | 35.667 | 5 | 48.685 | 2 | 3.188 | 5 | .625 | 7 |

(continued)

| Set4 rank | Country | V19: GiHLY | V19r: rank | V20: GiHHDl | V20r: rank | V21: GiHWISp | V21r: rank | V22: GiHSPI | V22r: rank | V23: GiHSSI | V23r: rank | V27: HIHDI | V27r: rank |
|-----------|----------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|--------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 7 | Netherlands | 43.171 | 5 | .488 | 4 | 35.403 | 6 | 46.843 | 6 | 2.906 | 9 | .632 | 5 |
| 8 | Austria | 40.373 | 9 | .442 | 12 | 34.634 | 9 | 42.847 | 10 | 2.969 | 7 | .580 | 12 |
| 9 | Germany | 39.648 | 11 | .453 | 8 | 34.711 | 8 | 42.249 | 12 | 2.836 | 10 | .601 | 10 |
| 10 | Australia | 39.276 | 12 | .447 | 11 | 32.373 | 11 | 42.433 | 11 | 2.523 | 16 | .630 | 6 |
| 11 | Belgium | 40.634 | 8 | .449 | 10 | 34.113 | 10 | 43.238 | 9 | 2.408 | 18 | .569 | 13 |
| 12 | Czech Republic | 38.411 | 13 | .428 | 14 | 32.171 | 12 | 40.360 | 14 | 2.925 | 8 | .547 | 17 |
| 13 | Canada | 40.351 | 10 | .452 | 9 | 31.417 | 13 | 43.929 | 8 | 2.160 | 28 | .621 | 8 |
| 14 | Ireland | 37.811 | 14 | .430 | 13 | 30.304 | 14 | 41.000 | 13 | 2.284 | 23 | .587 | 11 |
| 15 | United Kingdom | 36.624 | 15 | .412 | 15 | 29.462 | 15 | 40.150 | 15 | 2.538 | 15 | .562 | 16 |
| 16 | Slovakia | 34.316 | 19 | .380 | 19 | 28.747 | 17 | 35.466 | 18 | 2.785 | 11 | .482 | 21 |
| 17 | France | 35.710 | 16 | .389 | 16 | 29.036 | 16 | 36.746 | 16 | 2.297 | 22 | .527 | 18 |
| 18 | Slovenia | 34.589 | 17 | .382 | 18 | 25.748 | 21 | 36.164 | 17 | 2.618 | 13 | .483 | 20 |
| 19 | Spain | 33.761 | 20 | .360 | 22 | 26.503 | 18 | 35.017 | 20 | 2.120 | 29 | .503 | 19 |
| 20 | United States | 33.139 | 22 | .385 | 17 | 25.524 | 22 | 35.407 | 19 | 1.799 | 48 | .565 | 14 |
| 21 | Israel | 34.335 | 18 | .374 | 20 | 24.109 | 25 | 31.308 | 24 | 2.120 | 29 | .565 | 14 |
| 22 | Japan | 33.650 | 21 | .363 | 21 | 26.132 | 19 | 34.792 | 21 | 1.930 | 40 | .468 | 23 |
| 23 | Italy | 32.263 | 23 | .344 | 24 | 25.950 | 20 | 31.949 | 22 | 2.169 | 27 | .469 | 22 |
| 24 | Poland | 30.745 | 25 | .339 | 25 | 24.960 | 24 | 31.601 | 23 | 2.456 | 17 | .452 | 26 |
| 25 | Romania | 29.978 | 29 | .321 | 27 | 23.646 | 27 | 28.948 | 30 | 2.685 | 12 | .395 | 40 |
| 26 | Uruguay | 29.584 | 30 | .304 | 33 | 24.080 | 26 | 30.624 | 25 | 2.370 | 19 | .439 | 29 |
| 27 | Belarus | 30.201 | 27 | .336 | 26 | 25.343 | 23 | 27.953 | 33 | 2.027 | 35 | .432 | 31 |
| 28 | Moldova | 30.950 | 24 | .302 | 34 | 22.878 | 29 | 27.941 | 34 | 2.590 | 14 | .370 | 47 |
| 29 | Lithuania | 27.686 | 36 | .319 | 28 | 22.224 | 32 | 28.982 | 29 | 2.298 | 21 | .441 | 28 |
| 30 | Kazakhstan | 30.362 | 26 | .346 | 23 | 21.375 | 34 | 27.858 | 35 | 2.094 | 31 | .423 | 33 |
| 31 | Argentina | 29.150 | 32 | .315 | 30 | 22.482 | 31 | 28.655 | 32 | 2.058 | 33 | .464 | 24 |
| 32 | Costa Rica | 29.052 | 33 | .283 | 38 | 21.169 | 35 | 29.242 | 28 | 2.263 | 24 | .445 | 27 |
| 33 | Croatia | 28.709 | 34 | .306 | 32 | 22.967 | 28 | 28.776 | 31 | 2.074 | 32 | .413 | 35 |
| 34 | Estonia | 28.377 | 35 | .319 | 28 | 21.007 | 36 | 30.448 | 26 | 1.953 | 39 | .435 | 30 |
| 35 | Thailand | 29.992 | 28 | .298 | 36 | 19.700 | 41 | 27.109 | 40 | 2.332 | 20 | .379 | 44 |
| 36 | Cyprus | 29.259 | 31 | .312 | 31 | 21.498 | 33 | 29.423 | 27 | 1.822 | 45 | .423 | 33 |
| 37 | Hungary | 26.887 | 40 | .299 | 35 | 22.852 | 30 | 27.451 | 37 | 2.178 | 26 | .397 | 39 |
| 38 | Latvia | 26.645 | 42 | .298 | 36 | 19.724 | 40 | 27.323 | 38 | 2.259 | 25 | .413 | 35 |
| 39 | Chile | 27.216 | 37 | .281 | 40 | 18.918 | 42 | 27.255 | 39 | 1.792 | 50 | .464 | 24 |
| 40 | Portugal | 26.623 | 43 | .276 | 41 | 20.984 | 37 | 27.502 | 36 | 1.803 | 47 | .387 | 42 |
| 41 | Mauritius | 27.050 | 38 | .283 | 38 | 18.855 | 43 | 26.557 | 41 | 1.958 | 38 | .378 | 45 |
| 42 | Mexico | 27.035 | 39 | .268 | 45 | 17.906 | 48 | 24.584 | 43 | 2.036 | 34 | .398 | 38 |
| 43 | Panama | 25.702 | 47 | .260 | 46 | 17.179 | 51 | 24.123 | 45 | 1.883 | 43 | .411 | 37 |
| 44 | Azerbaijan | 25.584 | 48 | .274 | 44 | 18.764 | 44 | 23.004 | 49 | 1.985 | 37 | .349 | 50 |
| 45 | Greece | 25.838 | 45 | .276 | 41 | 20.708 | 38 | 24.936 | 42 | 1.466 | 72 | .382 | 43 |
| 46 | Brazil | 25.187 | 49 | .254 | 47 | 18.207 | 46 | 24.175 | 44 | 1.652 | 56 | .390 | 41 |
| 47 | El Salvador | 25.886 | 44 | .240 | 55 | 17.658 | 49 | 23.436 | 47 | 2.013 | 36 | .321 | 53 |
| 48 | Russian Fed. | 24.042 | 54 | .275 | 43 | 18.125 | 47 | 21.952 | 53 | 1.573 | 64 | .425 | 32 |
| 49 | Kyrgyzstan | 26.872 | 41 | .252 | 49 | 20.116 | 39 | 23.877 | 46 | 1.594 | 62 | .302 | 57 |
| 50 | Ecuador | 24.831 | 50 | .241 | 54 | 16.641 | 55 | 22.697 | 50 | 1.762 | 52 | .351 | 49 |

(continued)

| Set4 rank | Country | V19: GiHLY | V19r: rank | V20: GiHHDl | V20r: rank | V21: GiHWISp | V21r: rank | V22: GiHSPI | V22r: rank | V23: GiHSSI | V23r: rank | V27: HHHDl | V27r: rank |
|--------------|------------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| 51 | Albania | 25.779 | 46 | .253 | 48 | 17.517 | 50 | 23.063 | 48 | 1.619 | 59 | .308 | 56 |
| 52 | Turkey | 24.331 | 51 | .247 | 51 | 15.146 | 60 | 21.856 | 54 | 1.805 | 46 | .348 | 51 |
| 53 | Venezuela | 24.036 | 55 | .248 | 50 | 16.799 | 53 | 20.224 | 59 | 1.648 | 57 | .376 | 46 |
| 54 | Peru | 24.013 | 56 | .238 | 56 | 16.052 | 56 | 22.501 | 51 | 1.798 | 49 | .333 | 52 |
| 55 | Ukraine | 23.334 | 59 | .244 | 53 | 18.707 | 45 | 21.802 | 55 | 1.575 | 63 | .298 | 61 |
| 56 | Tunisia | 24.292 | 52 | .235 | 57 | 17.166 | 52 | 22.024 | 52 | 1.619 | 59 | .284 | 67 |
| 57 | Indonesia | 22.215 | 67 | .222 | 59 | 14.789 | 63 | 20.020 | 60 | 1.897 | 42 | .299 | 58 |
| 58 | Mongolia | 23.291 | 60 | .245 | 52 | 16.016 | 57 | 20.955 | 57 | 1.435 | 75 | .314 | 55 |
| 59 | Colombia | 22.361 | 66 | .219 | 61 | 13.863 | 68 | 21.349 | 56 | 1.567 | 65 | .355 | 48 |
| 60 | Nicaragua | 23.837 | 57 | .204 | 67 | 15.849 | 58 | 19.979 | 61 | 1.743 | 53 | .287 | 65 |
| 61 | Tajikistan | 24.062 | 53 | .217 | 62 | 15.212 | 59 | 20.322 | 58 | 1.659 | 55 | .266 | 69 |
| 62 | Philippines | 20.552 | 70 | .205 | 66 | 14.142 | 66 | 19.836 | 62 | 1.836 | 44 | .294 | 62 |
| 63 | Bulgaria | 20.053 | 73 | .214 | 63 | 16.733 | 54 | 19.470 | 64 | 1.619 | 59 | .299 | 58 |
| 64 | Macedonia | 21.613 | 68 | .214 | 63 | 13.454 | 71 | 19.432 | 66 | 1.517 | 67 | .319 | 54 |
| 65 | Armenia | 22.370 | 65 | .222 | 59 | 14.634 | 64 | 19.726 | 63 | 1.374 | 77 | .294 | 62 |
| 66 | Nepal | 22.546 | 64 | .180 | 74 | 13.850 | 69 | 18.488 | 68 | 1.900 | 41 | .195 | 74 |
| 67 | Pakistan | 23.615 | 58 | .196 | 70 | 13.870 | 67 | 17.473 | 72 | 1.778 | 51 | .195 | 74 |
| 68 | Iran | 22.778 | 61 | .233 | 58 | 14.161 | 65 | 17.912 | 70 | 1.356 | 78 | .249 | 70 |
| 69 | Morocco | 22.695 | 63 | .198 | 69 | 14.967 | 62 | 18.914 | 67 | 1.497 | 69 | .235 | 71 |
| 70 | Sri Lanka | 20.132 | 72 | .206 | 65 | 12.348 | 76 | 16.699 | 73 | 1.637 | 58 | .299 | 58 |
| 71 | Bolivia | 20.639 | 69 | .202 | 68 | 13.819 | 70 | 19.446 | 65 | 1.352 | 79 | .278 | 68 |
| 72 | Bangladesh | 22.699 | 62 | .183 | 73 | 15.132 | 61 | 16.624 | 74 | 1.671 | 54 | .191 | 77 |
| 73 | Paraguay | 19.526 | 74 | .185 | 72 | 13.107 | 72 | 18.039 | 69 | 1.471 | 71 | .290 | 64 |
| 74 | Georgia | 19.102 | 77 | .196 | 70 | 12.989 | 73 | 17.617 | 71 | 1.350 | 80 | .286 | 66 |
| 75 | Lao P.D. Rep. | 20.166 | 71 | .177 | 76 | 12.718 | 75 | 15.909 | 75 | 1.453 | 73 | .208 | 72 |
| 76 | India | 19.491 | 75 | .178 | 75 | 12.842 | 74 | 15.388 | 76 | 1.484 | 70 | .200 | 73 |
| 77 | Cambodia | 18.547 | 78 | .152 | 77 | 10.815 | 78 | 14.675 | 78 | 1.514 | 68 | .170 | 81 |
| 78 | Ethiopia | 19.453 | 76 | .135 | 81 | 11.443 | 77 | 13.099 | 81 | 1.566 | 66 | .149 | 87 |
| 79 | Nigeria | 14.755 | 86 | .146 | 78 | 10.281 | 82 | 12.918 | 83 | 1.389 | 76 | .160 | 84 |
| 80 | Ghana | 15.042 | 84 | .142 | 80 | 10.517 | 81 | 14.766 | 77 | 1.125 | 87 | .167 | 83 |
| 81 | Senegal | 16.850 | 80 | .124 | 86 | 9.823 | 83 | 14.014 | 79 | 1.234 | 82 | .140 | 90 |
| 82 | Mauritania | 17.948 | 79 | .146 | 78 | 10.792 | 79 | 13.086 | 82 | .966 | 96 | .146 | 88 |
| 83 | Mali | 15.964 | 81 | .121 | 88 | 10.643 | 80 | 12.618 | 84 | 1.310 | 81 | .119 | 96 |
| 84 | Sierra Leone | 15.693 | 83 | .128 | 82 | 7.648 | 99 | 13.527 | 80 | 1.438 | 74 | .121 | 95 |
| 85 | Tanzania | 14.936 | 85 | .121 | 88 | 9.577 | 86 | 11.399 | 90 | 1.163 | 86 | .145 | 89 |
| 86 | Cameroon | 13.521 | 95 | .125 | 84 | 8.692 | 89 | 11.401 | 89 | 1.183 | 85 | .157 | 85 |
| 87 | Zimbabwe | 14.099 | 90 | .123 | 87 | 8.812 | 88 | 11.696 | 88 | 1.096 | 89 | .155 | 86 |
| 88 | Kenya | 13.954 | 92 | .125 | 84 | 7.852 | 92 | 12.051 | 85 | 1.054 | 91 | .170 | 81 |
| 89 | Burkina Faso | 14.273 | 88 | .097 | 100 | 9.677 | 84 | 11.936 | 87 | 1.234 | 82 | .100 | 102 |
| 90 | Malawi | 14.314 | 87 | .107 | 96 | 9.632 | 85 | 11.971 | 86 | .986 | 95 | .136 | 92 |
| 91 | Uganda | 13.060 | 96 | .109 | 93 | 8.162 | 91 | 11.182 | 91 | 1.191 | 84 | .127 | 94 |
| 92 | Congo | 13.615 | 94 | .128 | 82 | 7.793 | 93 | 10.767 | 95 | .823 | 101 | .189 | 79 |
| 93 | Niger | 15.753 | 82 | .090 | 102 | 8.907 | 87 | 10.595 | 96 | 1.120 | 88 | .098 | 103 |
| 94 | Madagascar | 13.868 | 93 | .108 | 95 | 8.681 | 90 | 9.720 | 101 | 1.037 | 93 | .138 | 91 |
| 95 | Namibia | 11.615 | 99 | .114 | 91 | 7.135 | 100 | 11.062 | 92 | .821 | 102 | .190 | 78 |

(continued)

| Set4 rank | Country | V19: GiHLY | V19r: rank | V20: GiHHDl | V20r: rank | V21: GiHWISp | V21r: rank | V22: GiHSPI | V22r: rank | V23: GiHSSI | V23r: rank | V27: HHHDl | V27r: rank |
|-----------|---------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|--------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 96 | Cote d'Ivoire | 11.544 | 100 | .105 | 97 | 7.785 | 94 | 10.892 | 94 | 1.090 | 90 | .115 | 98 |
| 97 | Guinea | 14.157 | 89 | .099 | 98 | 7.653 | 98 | 9.963 | 99 | 1.052 | 92 | .097 | 104 |
| 98 | Benin | 11.792 | 97 | .096 | 101 | 7.691 | 95 | 9.866 | 100 | 1.006 | 94 | .106 | 100 |
| 99 | South Africa | 9.417 | 105 | .109 | 93 | 7.670 | 97 | 11.032 | 93 | .669 | 105 | .194 | 76 |
| 100 | Liberia | 14.076 | 91 | .098 | 99 | 5.520 | 105 | 10.366 | 98 | .943 | 98 | .103 | 101 |
| 101 | Angola | 11.674 | 98 | .118 | 90 | 5.760 | 103 | 8.794 | 103 | .953 | 97 | .130 | 93 |
| 102 | Botswana | 10.125 | 104 | .110 | 92 | 6.593 | 101 | 10.522 | 97 | .722 | 104 | .172 | 80 |
| 103 | Rwanda | 11.280 | 101 | .087 | 103 | 7.671 | 96 | 9.050 | 102 | .941 | 99 | .119 | 96 |
| 104 | Chad | 11.073 | 102 | .084 | 105 | 5.547 | 104 | 7.762 | 105 | .917 | 100 | .090 | 105 |
| 105 | Togo | 10.737 | 103 | .087 | 103 | 6.064 | 102 | 8.745 | 104 | .731 | 103 | .110 | 99 |

Appendix B: Top 35 Countries Rank Ordered from Best Overall and 4 Sets, Plus FSS (N = 105)

| Overall rank | Set 1 rank | Set 2 rank | Set 3 rank | Set 4 rank | FSS rank |
|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|---------------------------|
| Switzerland | Switzerland | Switzerland | Slovakia | Norway | Denmark |
| Norway | Denmark | Denmark | Belgium | Denmark | Spain |
| Iceland | Norway | Norway | Slovenia | Iceland | Slovenia |
| Australia | Sweden | Sweden | Australia | Switzerland | Czech R. ^{4/5} |
| Finland | Finland | Iceland | Switzerland | Sweden | Italy ^{4/5} |
| Netherlands | Austria | Finland | Iceland | Finland | Hungary ^{6/7} |
| Slovakia | Germany | Netherlands | Japan | Netherlands | Poland ^{6/7} |
| Belgium | Iceland | Australia | Spain | Austria | Greece |
| Sweden | Netherlands | Austria | Canada | Germany | Norway |
| Denmark | Australia | Germany | Netherlands | Australia | Portugal ^{10/11} |
| Austria | United King. | Canada | Uruguay | Belgium | India ^{10/11} |
| Canada | Czech Rep. | Israel | Belarus | Czech Rep. | Ireland |
| Germany | Uruguay | Costa Rica | Italy | Canada | Belgium ^{13/14} |
| United King. | France | Ireland | Lithuania | Ireland | UK ^{13/14} |
| Slovenia | Ireland | United King. | Croatia | United King. | South Africa |
| Czech Rep. | Slovakia | Belgium | United King. | Slovakia | Austral. ^{16/17} |
| France | Costa Rica | United States | France | France | France ^{16/17} |
| Spain | Slovenia | Czech Rep. | Costa Rica | Slovenia | Estonia |
| Ireland | Belgium | France | Estonia | Spain | Latvia |
| Uruguay | Poland | Chile | Finland | United States | Iceland ^{20/21} |
| Japan | Italy | Uruguay | Latvia | Israel | Canada ^{20/21} |
| Costa Rica | Canada | Spain | Moldova | Japan | Netherlands |
| Italy | Spain | Argentina | Norway | Italy | Slovakia ^{23/24} |
| Israel | Romania | Panama | Czech Rep. | Poland | Cyprus ^{23/24} |
| Lithuania | Lithuania | Mexico | Austria | Romania | Brazil |
| Poland | Chile | Brazil | Greece | Uruguay | Israel |

(continued)

| Overall rank | Set 1 rank | Set 2 rank | Set 3 rank | Set 4 rank | FSS rank |
|---------------|---------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------------------|
| Croatia | Israel | Italy | Israel | Belarus | Austria ^{28/30} |
| Estonia | Hungary | Slovakia | Poland | Moldova | Chile ^{28/30} |
| Latvia | Japan | Japan | Germany | Lithuania | Russia ^{28/30} |
| United States | United States | Slovenia | Hungary | Kazakhstan | Costa R. |
| Argentina | Latvia | Poland | Portugal | Argentina | Germany |
| Romania | Argentina | Thailand | Azerbaijan | Costa Rica | Japan |
| Belarus | Portugal | Lithuania | Romania | Croatia | United States |
| Chile | Croatia | Colombia | Mauritius | Estonia | Philippines |
| Panama | Panama | Romania | Panama | Thailand | Turkey |

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Chapter 19

Hamba Kahle, ‘Go Well’, from Africa



Valerie Møller

Dear Ruut

To many of us veteran quality-of-life researchers you go by the name of Mr. Happiness. The appellation is accurate: Your life’s work has been dedicated to studying happiness, to arguing the importance of happiness as a driver of progress in society, and to sharing happiness with all your students and the people with whom you have come into contact. Moreover, as photographs of you attest, you have the demeanour of a happy person, making you a walking advertisement for happiness studies.

I have always associated you and your life’s work with the 1984 *Data-Book of Happiness* and *Conditions of Happiness* and the *World Database on Happiness* a decade later, a continuous register of research on the subjective appreciation of life, which recorded thousands of *Correlates on Happiness* by 1994. These well-thumbed thick green volumes have been on my bookshelf and companions to my own research for as long as I can remember. It is possible that your collection of happiness data from around the world was driving what is now called the ‘new politics of happiness’, long before the 2008 Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission and the Beyond GDP movement recommended collecting data on subjective well-being in addition to ones on objective living conditions to measure social progress. It is also likely that your database, which provided insights on the global variations in happiness, may have served as precursor to the annual *World Happiness Report* that was first published in 2012.

You once shared a document with me in which you endorsed Bhutan’s idea of pursuing a new policy of promoting happiness rather than economic wealth for its citizens. The pursuit of Gross National Happiness was a ground-breaking policy

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shift at the time. Approbation for Bhutan's GNH policy from an expert in the field will surely have provided the small mountain kingdom in the Himalayas the support it needed to break with traditional political goals of achieving purely economic prosperity.

Interestingly, your collection of happiness data is not restricted to a single metric. It caters for a range of evaluations of life, including both the more rational 'life satisfaction' measure and the more emotional 'happiness' one. The collection also considers nuanced variations in expressing happiness that reflect cultural differences around the world. One of your most ambitious and worthwhile research projects, in my view, examines the meaning of the end anchors and calibration of the scales with which we measure human well-being around the globe. Such differences and deviations from standard, usually Western, definitions, is what makes the study of happiness one of the most challenging and fascinating. I share your view that we cannot assume that everyone uses our tools of measurement in similar fashion. One of your more recent endeavours has been to showcase the many cultural nuances in people's understanding of happiness, which in turn will affect the manner in which they use conventional scales of measurement of personal well-being. From a scientific point of view, such differences are important not only for global comparison purposes, but also to add to our knowledge of what makes people happy in the new age of individual identities (e.g. see Francis Fukuyama's 2018 book on *Identity*).

In 2006, you gave a keynote lecture for the only International Society for Quality of Life Studies (ISQOLS) conference to have been held in Africa to date. In appreciation, we presented you with a bottle of South African 'happiness wine' and a year's supply of 'happiness sugar' in the form of sachets of sugar inscribed with aphorisms on happiness. This gesture just seemed to be the most appropriate thank you to a speaker known to us as 'Mr. Happiness' (Fig. 19.1).

Your lecture at the 2006 Rhodes University conference in Grahamstown was on the subject of health and happiness—how good health can have benefits for happiness. As hosts, my colleague Denis Huschka and I were very proud that Brandan Reynolds, one of South Africa's leading political cartoonists, chose to broadcast the key message of your lecture to the South African public the following day. To our knowledge, ISQOLS conferences had never been reported in the print media, let alone in pictorial form. Since that time, you have continued to share your knowledge of happiness studies with emerging South African scholars in your role as extraordinary professor at North-West University's Optentia research programme in Vanderbijlpark (Fig. 19.2).

In the course of your career, you will have tutored many young students, who have gone on to contribute to our knowledge of happiness studies. The *Journal of Happiness Studies*, launched in 2000, bears your imprint as co-founder with Ed Diener and Alex Michalos and as editor-in-chief. Its cover is green and the choice of title will most certainly have been your idea. Your chapter in the first issue serves both as inspiration and as systematic introduction to the study of happiness. Many of the emerging scholars you have mentored are today notable scholars in their own right.



Fig. 19.1 Ruut, a keynote speaker at the 2006 ISQOLS conference at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, receiving South African 'happiness' wine and 'happiness' sugar in appreciation

You have also have played an important role in bringing together both veteran and emerging happiness scholars from around the world to share their research experience. The Erasmus University in Rotterdam in the Netherlands is a fitting place to be your home base. Rotterdam has always been an important gateway to Europe and the world and Erasmus of Rotterdam was one of the most celebrated and known scholars of his time. As the university's internationally recognised professor of social conditions for human happiness, you might be said to be following in his footsteps. In September 2013, I was honoured and privileged to be invited to tell the South African story of long-term trends in happiness at the International Sociological Association's (ISA) Research Committee 55 Social Indicators meeting that you and your colleagues hosted at The Netherlands Institute for Social Research in The Hague. This year, you will again be hosting a meeting of happiness scholars from




Fig. 19.2 Political cartoonist Brandon draws on Ruut’s message on health and happiness to advise South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki on policy!

around the world: ISQOLS will be holding its 18th annual conference at your Erasmus University in September 2020.¹

In a nutshell, you have more than earned ISQOLS’ most prestigious 2001 lifetime award for your many achievements in the pursuit of the scientific measurement of happiness. At the same time, you have shared your knowledge of both the concept and the reality of happiness with so many others around the world. We all look forward to celebrating with you when we meet again in Rotterdam this year. Until then, we wish you both ‘health and happiness’—*Hamba kahle*, ‘go well’, as we like to say in Africa.

Valerie Møller

¹Owing to the Covid-19 the conference was held virtually.

Chapter 20

The Good Life under Attack: Reflections on the Future of the Quality of Life Concept



Heinz-Herbert Noll

According to *Ruut Veenhoven*, who is being honored and whose impressive scientific oeuvre is appreciated by this Festschrift, “quality of life research tries to define what a good life is and how well reality meets these standards” (*Veenhoven 1997*).¹ Today, this definition of *quality of life* research is as true as it was in the end of the 1990s. It seems to be less certain however, that the sense of “a *good life*” today and tomorrow is and will be still the same as it was by then and over the last couple of decades. Of course, it is currently unknown how the *good life* will be defined and recognized in the future, but there is a substantial likelihood that it’s sense will change dramatically. This short essay starts from the observation that the notion of a *good life*, which we became acquainted with, is increasingly coming under attack—not least as a byproduct of the global anti-climate-change movement—and thus reflects on the future of the *quality of life* concept and research.

Historically, the concept of *quality of life* was born in the late 1960s as an alternative to the concept of material prosperity that by then became more and more questionable in affluent societies. Thus *quality of life* was considered the new, multidimensional and much more complex yardstick of the *good life* as well as goal of societal development (*Noll 2004*: 153). Depending on respective approaches and notions, *quality of life* was regarded to be different from material wealth and standard of living in two ways basically:

- either in the sense of going beyond material wealth in terms of command over goods and services by including also immaterial components like health, freedom, safety, equity, social relations, self-actualization, happiness etc.

¹The wording in the article originally published in French language reads: “La recherche sur la qualité de vie tente de définir ce qu’est une «bonne vie» et comment la réalité correspond aux critères ou standards adoptés.” (*Veenhoven 1997*: 30)

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- or in the sense of a contradiction to material wealth by emphasizing post-materialist, critical views of the affluent society (limits to growth, ecological concerns etc.).

The evolving debate about the *quality of life* concept in research as well as policy making thus encompassed the notion of *quality of life* as including the amenities of life, but at the same time being more than just material prosperity as well as the view of something being fundamentally different and contrasting (Noll 2010: 35). During the following years and decades, the first notion clearly prevailed, whilst the second turned out to become a minority view at best. As a matter of fact, almost all measurement approaches developed over the years covered—amongst others—life domains strongly related to issues of material well-being, like e.g. income, consumption, standard of living and housing.² Erik Allard's (1993) early approach of *quality of life* measurement, distinguishing 'having', 'loving' and 'being' as the three major components of a *good life*, clearly documents the importance assigned to material well-being symbolized by the 'having' category. Ruut Veenhoven, who eyed the *good life* predominantly through the lens of subjective well-being or happiness, always emphasized the "enjoyment of life" (Veenhoven 2009) as a constitutive element of human well-being, which certainly does not seem to be restricted to the joy and benefits provided by material prosperity, but clearly doesn't exclude them either.

The *quality of life* concept was severely challenged for the first time, when the debate about sustainable development came up at the end of the 1980s. Famously, the so-called *Brundtland Commission*, led by the former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, defined sustainable development as a development that "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." (United Nations 1987). According to the report, "sustainable global development requires that those who are more affluent adopt lifestyles within the planet's ecological means". More generally, the sustainability debate posed the question, whether the sumptuous way of living characteristic for western affluent societies and resulting in high levels of wealth and life quality could be considered sustainable for future development and moreover serve as good practice for less developed, poorer societies.

As early as in the beginning of the 1990s, Wolfgang Zapf, the German pioneer in social indicators and *quality of life* research, expressed doubts and concerns about the possibility to extend the unprecedented high level of material well-being on a global scale: "Could the modern society characterized by mass consumption and welfare state spread out globally? Could we imagine to see some day 600 millions of cars driving around in China, or at least proportionally as many as in the former German Democratic Republic, 250 millions. . . Or can we imagine, that in the future

²See for example the *German* (Noll 2014a), and *European System of Social Indicators* (Noll 2014b), the *OECD Better Life Index—Project* (www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org) or *Eurostat's Quality of Life Indicators* (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Quality_of_life_indicators)

China will pay thirty times the amount of the current per capita income for welfare state benefits only?” His answer to these questions was: “No, this is not imaginable ...”³ (Zapf 1993: 171; translation HHN)

As the concepts of quality of life or well-being and sustainability obviously were in conflict to some extent at least, ideas and suggestions have been developed with a view to reconcile the two, e.g. by defining sustainability as to sustain the *quality of life* for future generations, which did not necessarily have the implication of changing the notion of a *good life* or to reduce the *quality of life* of current generations. To this effect, Eckersley (1998: 6) suggested that “sustainable development has become a widely accepted term to describe the goal of achieving a high, equitable and sustainable *quality of life*” and the UK Government’s Sustainable Development Strategy (2005: 15) came to the conclusion that sustainable development means “a better *quality of life* for everyone, now and for generations to come”.

From the perspective of those promoting the sustainability concept and policies, the resolution of the conflict did not seem to be equally simple, but initially their prospect of finding a solution to reconcile the preservation of a high level of life quality with a sustainable development was rather optimistic too. Whilst both a “*sufficiency revolution*” as well as an “*efficiency revolution*” were discussed as strategies towards a more sustainable development,⁴ initially the latter was clearly preferred and given priority to the former. According to Merriam-Webster sufficiency basically means “a modest but adequate scale of living”.⁵ Thus the advocates of a “*sufficiency revolution*” criticize and disapprove the “overconsumption” and sumptuous life styles typical for western affluent societies, demanding less material production and consumption as well as a reduced and limited level of material well-being. To “establish sufficiency means relinquishment” (translation HHN) as the German social scientist Joseph Huber (1995) put it once. As it still needs to be demonstrated that high levels of *quality of life* and well-being can be achieved at lower levels of material wealth and consumption, it does not come as a surprise that proposing sufficiency and related measures, e.g. taxes, regulations and bans, did not find much acceptance in populations as yet.

As an alternative a much less demanding “*efficiency revolution*”—being more and better compatible with the prevailing life styles and traditional societal development goals— was proposed and adopted in order to solve the apparent sustainability issues. Policies as well as economic activities aiming at making better and more efficient use of all sorts of natural resources and not least energies were not

³As a matter of fact almost thirty years later the number of cars in China amounted to 260 million (2019). See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_vehicles_per_capita

⁴It would go beyond the scope of this short essay to also have a look at a less known third strategy, which in the German discussion is called “consistency” (e.g. Huber 1995) and has a certain similarity to the so-called “cradle to cradle”-approach (McDonough and Braungart 2002). Rather than aiming at improved effectiveness (e.g. of traditional power plants), the focus is at a qualitative transformation of the industrial metabolism (e.g. renewable energies).

⁵For a detailed discussion of the “sufficiency concept” and “sufficiency research” see e.g. Linz (2004).

only agreeable, but even seemed to be attractive to everyone. Whilst this strategy turned out to be quite successful, e.g. in terms of more efficient heating devices, cars consuming less fuel and emitting less pollution, more efficiently isolated buildings etc., overall the ambitious goals could not be achieved by relying on the efficiency approach only. The achieved savings of resources by means of increased efficiency were actually compensated to a considerable extent by increasing production and consumption levels, e.g. growing numbers of larger cars, but also growing segments of populations—particularly in rapidly developing and economically successful countries like *China*—enjoying higher incomes and prosperity.

Although sustainability experts had doubted that pure efficiency strategies could be successful without being accompanied by sufficiency strategies due to growth and rebound effects (Scherhorn 2008; Behrendt et al. 2016), the introduction of serious sufficiency policies was hardly suggested or asked for at the political level until recently. Yet, the situation has changed dramatically during the last couple of years. It was mainly in the course of the global climate change debate—not least driven or sped up by the “Fridays for Future” movement—that increasingly calls have been made for “*sufficiency*” not only in the public debate, but also by policy makers and politicians. Proponents of the sufficiency movement even call for a non-voluntary reduction of consumption levels (Linz 2004: 30).

With a view to stop climate change and to reduce CO₂ emissions not only climate activists, but also politicians, political parties, governments and not least considerable parts of the media request for example

- to reduce short- and long-distance mobility, particularly in terms of individual mobility;
- to ban cars driven by combustion engines;
- to limit if not ban air and long distance travel;
- to ban the production of energies based on non-renewable sources, particularly the usage of fossil fuels;
- to strongly reduce if not ban the consumption of meat and many other goods and services, which make life pleasant, comfortable and enjoyable, e.g. the consumption and usage of butter and mineral water, Christmas trees or gift-wrap-paper, which all are considered to be climate killers.

Actually it is only a few years ago that inter- and supranational organizations, national governments and policy makers around the globe explicitly adopted *quality of life* and well-being as policy objectives and development goals.⁶ Obviously the former enthusiasm around the campaign of going beyond GDP and putting people’s well-being and *quality of life* at the centre of policy making and governing has cooled down a lot since then. However, not only politicians and policy

⁶See for example the *OECD* “Better Life” programme, the Programme for Measuring National Well-being in the *UK*, the work and report of the “Commission on the measurement of economic performance and social progress” established by the French President *Nicolas Sarkozy* as well as various *EU* activities and strategies of going “beyond GDP”.

makers changed their mind, but also the media have dropped these topics almost completely from their front pages recently and replaced them by topics related to climate change as well as behavioral changes in politics and everyday life considered to be necessary.

Rather than fostering the *good life*, abstinence and asceticism as forms of sufficiency are propagated as the appropriate life styles of the future: “off of consumption, towards a creative cooperation. Even renouncement can turn out to be beneficial then”.⁷

Although the notions of *quality of life* and well-being—including respective research activities—are currently obviously challenged, answers concerning their most likely future are necessarily speculative as yet. For now the following developments seem to be most likely though in my view:

- First of all, it seems to be quite likely, that voices promoting issues of well-being and *quality of life* in the political debate as well as the media, everyday life and not least research and research funding will increasingly being forced into the defensive. The booming attention, which issues of well-being and *quality of life* have attracted in the recent past will most likely ebb away rather soon, if it did not happen already.
- Along with changing priorities in societal development and policy making, we will probably also observe changes in life styles and value orientations. Materialistic and hedonistic value orientations and life styles will more and more become outlawed as climate compatibility is going to be the most decisive criterion to distinguish the “good” from the “evil”. On this account, we may also expect a widening gap between the generations. Following up on *Inglehart’s (1977)* theory of a major value shift in advanced industrial societies driven by a generational replacement and his observation that the shift to “post materialist” values was primarily advanced by the young generation, which grew up under prosperous living conditions, it is also very likely, that today’s young people will be those giving sufficiency a higher priority compared to materialistic values.
- Due to a growing significance of the sustainability of value orientations, patterns of behavior and life styles in the public debate, there is a high likelihood that the notion of the *good life* may also change considerably in the foreseeable future. One may expect a much stronger emphasis on the non-material constituents of a *good life* like social relations, marriage and family, participation, safety, art and culture, health and self-actualization to name just a few.
- However, such a redefinition of the *good life* seems to have its limits too. As a matter of fact, *quality of life* is currently still strongly associated with material well-being in multiple terms, such as high levels of income and consumption, comfortable housing conditions, ownership of cars and access to individual

⁷The statement by the head of the fundamental programme commission of the *German Social Democratic Party (SPD) Gesine Schwan*, reads in German: “weg vom Konsum, hin zu einem kreativeren Miteinander. Dann kann auch Verzicht Gewinn sein.” See FAZ.Net, March, 9, 2020. <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/grundwertekommission-mit-der-spd-die-welt-retten-16669409.html?premium>)

mobility, access to services making life comfortable, enjoyment in terms of travelling and costly leisure time activities. As numerous studies have approved, income and consumption continue to be strong drivers of subjective well-being (e.g. *Sacks et al. 2010*), at least in *Germany* showing no clear cut upper limit (*Noll and Weick 2015: 111*).⁸ Only in case of voluntary abstinence, low levels of consumption are not associated with low levels of life satisfaction: “the findings seem to suggest that even extremely low consumption levels must not necessarily result in pronounced reductions of SWB, if low consumption levels are the outcome of voluntary decisions” (*Noll and Weick 2015: 110*).

- Moreover, even though it seems to be inevitable that the notion of the *good life* will be redefined, there is a good chance that the transformation process will be rather slow. Among other reasons, this is due to the fact, that “*loss aversion*” (*Kahneman and Tversky 1979*) is a powerful psychological mechanism motivating people to defend their currently high level of material *quality of life* and well-being seriously. Although this may first of all apply to the middle aged and elderly people, the present young generation, which in affluent societies is used to exceedingly high levels of well-being too, seems to have a lot to lose as well.

Naturally as yet, we can’t know for sure what the future of the *quality of life* concept will look like. Some of the tendencies considered possible here—a growing request for “*sufficiency*” and limitation if not decline of material well-being as well as a redefinition of the *good life* emphasizing non-material constituents, seem to be rather likely, whilst at the same time mechanisms like loss aversion may set limits and slow down this transformation process. Unsurprisingly it is also uncertain as yet, what the future of *quality of life* and well-being research will look like. Unfortunately, we must fear however, that times will getting harder for this branch of research compared to the last two decades or so.

One thing seems to be assured though, the need for *enjoyment in life*, that *Ruut Veenhoven* always underlined as a crucial element of the *good life*, will survive!

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⁸A working group (including the author of this essay), which was established to explore the possibilities of maintaining high levels of subjective well-being under conditions of decreasing prosperity in Germany, came—based on survey data analyses—to the result, that life satisfaction was much more driven by material success variables than by immaterial factors like health, social relations or freedom. See the “Memorandum der Arbeitsgruppe ‘Zufriedenheit’ des Ameranger Disputs der Ernst Freiberger-Stiftung” (2010: 14).

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Chapter 21

Contentment and Affect in the Assessment of Life Satisfaction: More Empirical Findings and New Questions



Mariano Rojas

Introduction

During 2003 and 2004 I did spend my sabbatical year at Erasmus University in Rotterdam. Ruut Veenhoven hosted me at his World Database of Happiness Studies. That sabbatical year has had an important impact not only on my research but also on my family life: my wife got her PhD from Erasmus University and we discovered Efteling, a magical place which my daughters enjoy whenever we visit The Netherlands.

Ruut has been a source of knowledge and ideas since my sabbatical year; his friendship –and that of his wife Kiki- are always in our highest esteem. We had very interesting conversations during that sabbatical year and, of course, in the many gatherings we have had afterwards. Ruut and I agree on many issues and, particularly, on two fundamental ones: The importance of following a scientific approach in the study of happiness and the relevance of people’s happiness reports. This implies that theories and hypotheses need to be tested on the basis of people’s well-being reports.

By following a scientific approach we can also address and elucidate those issues where we may have disagreement on. It was during my sabbatical year at Erasmus that Ruut and I had an interesting conversation which led to an enduring interest on the role of the cognitive-oriented and affective-oriented substrates of information in explaining life satisfaction. Ruut has shown a preference to emphasize the role of affect in explaining overall assessments of life –such as life satisfaction-. In Ruut’s view –as I understand it- the affective substrate is closely related the process of human evolution, and this implies for affect to be universal across human beings

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and, in consequence, less sensitive to contextual factors. Hence, Ruut's view that life satisfaction is closely related to the affective substrate translates into life satisfaction being less sensitive to contextual and culturally-dependent factors. I have argued that the role of the cognitive-oriented substrate of information in explaining overall assessments of life –such as life satisfaction- should not be underestimated. In particular, I propose that people's understanding of what a good life is play an important role in overall assessments of life. In principle, the cognitive-oriented substrate depends on the purposes and values people have and, in consequence, it is more sensitive to cultural factors. This would imply for life satisfaction to be sensitive to these contextual and culturally-dependent factors. I would like to remark that there is no fundamental difference in how Ruut and I approach the formation of an overall life-satisfaction assessment; we both agree that affect and contentment play a role; however, we emphasize different aspects and we are both interested in understanding how the information substrates end up being transformed into an overall assessment of life.

Our common interest in this topic led to joint research and a co-authored paper which presented our views as well as some empirical findings (Rojas and Veenhoven 2013) At that moment we concluded that: "*Veenhoven's Need-theory holds that affective experience dominates the overall evaluation of life, while Rojas' Conceptual referent-theory predicts that cognitive evaluation will be more important. The data of this study support Rojas' view*" We also concluded that: "*So it seems that people's comparisons to standards —which may have a social or cultural substrate—, have considerable importance when assessing their satisfaction with life. Goals and evaluation norms may differ across cultures and even across persons, and they may be socially influenced.*" We added: "*Still this is not the last word*", and many caveats were mentioned.

The original theoretical discussion is presented in our 2013 paper. I don't think that at the theoretical level there is much more to add for the moment; however, I do think that new empirical research will provide further insight to sharpen and, perhaps, modify the theoretical framework that is guiding current research.

Further research on the contentment vs. affect issue has been pursued by Ruut and colleagues; this research aims at addressing some of our previously pointed caveats. It is stated in a paper Ruut co-authored that: "*People can distinguish between how well they feel most of the time and to what extent they are getting what they want from life. Their overall evaluation of life depends more on the affective appraisal than on cognitive judgment*" (Kainulainen et al. 2018), while in another paper co-authored by Ruut it is stated that: "*There are good reasons to believe that overall happiness is mainly extrapolated from affective experience. One reason for this is that 'life-as-a-whole is not a suitable object for calculative evaluation. Life has many facets and there is generally no straightforward ideal to compare it with. Another reason seems to be that cognitive appraisals are often instigated by affective cues. This corresponds with the theory that affective systems are evolutionarily older than cognition and that cognition works as an addition to the navigation system rather than as a replacement*" (Webb et al. 2019) As Ruut and I previously stated: "*Still this is not the last word*".

In this contribution I will present further empirical research on the contentment and affect issue. Like Ruut, I am convinced that empirical research will lead us to a better understanding of how people use their informational substrate to come up with a general assessment of how their life is going on.

The chapter relies on micro-level information to further explore the relationship between contentment, affect and life satisfaction. Previous studies have mostly relied on country-level data, but the experience of being well happen to concrete persons and not to countries. Micro-data allows for having deeper knowledge of the relationship between contentment, affect and life satisfaction at the level where these experiences take place: the person. There are not many previous studies dealing with the issue at hand and using micro-level data; the few studies available rely on uncommonly used variables to assess affect and contentment, which means that it becomes unclear whether differences in findings emerge as a consequence of using micro-level data or of using a different set of variables.

The present study does not aspire to reach theoretical level conclusions, it has more modest aspirations. The purpose of the study is to use empirical evidence in order to raise some questions which future research ought to address. The chapter shows that there are still many lagoons in our knowledge about the relationship between contentment, affect and life satisfaction.

Micro-level Information

The Gallup World Poll has information regarding contentment (Cantril or Best-Possible-Life question) and affective states (day-before question). During the years 2007 and 2008 -and in some countries also in 2009 and 2010- the survey incorporated the life-satisfaction question. Thus, there are approximately 135000 observations in about 125 countries which contain the relevant information to study the relationship between contentment, affect and life satisfaction.

The Variables:

Life Satisfaction (LS). The life-satisfaction variable is based on the answer to the following question: *'All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?'* The Gallup World Poll uses a 0 to 10 response scale, where 0 is dissatisfied and 10 is satisfied.

Contentment (BPL). The widely used 'Cantril Ladder' or 'Best-possible life' question is used to assess the evaluative informational substrate: *"Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to ten at the top. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you, and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time, assuming that the higher the step the better you feel about your life, and the lower the step the worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to the way you feel?"* The response scale is based on an imaginary 11-point ladder, with 0 designating one's worst possible life and 10 referring to the best possible life respondents can imagine for themselves.

Affective state (Aff). Positive and negative affect are measured on the basis of the well-known ‘day-before’ question. The question states: “*Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the day yesterday? How about . . .*” The response scale is dichotomous: Yes (1) or No (0). The feelings under consideration are: Smile or laugh yesterday, Learn something, Treated with respect, Experienced enjoyment, Feel well-rested, Worry, Sadness, Anger, Stress, and Depression. The first five feelings are associated to positive affect, and the last five are associated to negative affect. Positive and Negative affect are computed as simple averages of their corresponding feelings; and Affective Balance Scale is computed as the difference between Positive and Negative affect.

The Relationship Between Contentment and Affect

Table 21.1 presents the correlation coefficients between contentment and affect; these estimations are based on micro-level information from different regions of the world. It is interesting to observe that relatively high correlations are observed in Western countries and in East Europe (0.35), while relatively low correlations are observed in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (0.18 and 0.23, respectively).

In East Europe and Western countries it is more likely for a content person to have a higher affective balance. It could be that affect is used as a cue to assess contentment; it could also be that contentment is used as a cue to assess the affective situation; or –more likely- it could be that the sources of affect and contentment overlap and, in some cases, are very similar. If people derive affect from the same sources they derive contentment from then a higher correlation between contentment and affect would be expected. On the other hand, the relatively low correlation between affect and contentment in South Africa and Latin America indicates that it is possible to enjoy high affect while being discontent, and vice versa. Thus, it seems that in these regions affect is not used as information to assess contentment, or vice versa; but it could also be that the sources of affect and contentment are different and that their degree of overlapping is low. The argument points to further research on the degree of overlapping in the sources of affect and contentment as well as on how these sources vary by regions of the world. Furthermore, the regional differences in the correlation between affect and contentment make it more difficult to sustain –as a general or evolutionary-based trend- that ‘*cognitive appraisals are often instigated by affective cues*’.

Further exploration of the correlation between affect and contentment at the country level is done; the exercise distinguishes between positive and negative affect. Table 21.2 presents the situation for those countries with the highest and lowest correlations and high dispersion is observed. The correlation between contentment and positive affect is very high in countries like Bulgaria, United States, Slovenia, Romania and Sweden, and the correlation between contentment and negative affect is very high (in absolute terms) in United Kingdom, Sweden, Australia, Denmark and Estonia. On the other hand, the correlation between

Table 21.1 Contentment and Affect Correlations. Micro-level information World and world regions

| | Correlation coefficient |
|---|-------------------------|
| World | 0.27 |
| Latin America | 0.23 |
| East Europe | 0.35 |
| Western countries (West Europe, USA, NZ, Aust.) | 0.35 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 0.18 |
| Southeast Asia | 0.25 |
| South Asia | 0.24 |
| Central Asia | 0.25 |
| MENA | 0.30 |

Regions of the world

Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, Venezuela

MENA: Arab/Muslim: Iran, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab, Yemen, Somalia, Lebanon, Palestinian, Northern Cyprus.

Central Asia: Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

Eastern Europe: Turkey, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Poland

South Asia: Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan

Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam

Sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central Africa, Chad, Comoros, Congo-Kinshasa, Congo Brazzaville, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mauritius

Western countries: Western Europe and Anglo-Saxon: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

Source: Gallup World Poll 2007–2010

contentment and positive affect is negligible –and even negative- in countries like Tanzania, Congo Brazzaville, Saudi Arabia, Mali and Laos; and the correlation between contentment and negative affect is very low in countries like Laos, Tanzania, Congo Brazzaville, Central Africa and Philippines. It seems that geographical factors do play a role in the magnitude of the correlations; it could be associated to cultural differences in the relevant explanatory factors of contentment and affect.

The high variation across countries –and regions- in the correlation between contentment and affect shows that there are some context-dependent factors which play a role. Furthermore, the assumption that contentment is activated by affective information does not seem to sustain as a general (evolutionarily-based) rule. In many countries the likelihood for people to have high affect with low contentment

Table 21.2 Countries with Highest and Lowest Correlation Coefficients. Correlations between Contentment, Positive Affect, and Negative Affect Micro-level information

| Contentment-Positive Affect | | Contentment-Negative Affect | |
|-----------------------------|--------|-----------------------------|--------|
| TOP 5 | | TOP 5 | |
| Bulgaria | 0.408 | United Kingdom | -0.417 |
| United States | 0.357 | Sweden | -0.384 |
| Slovenia | 0.339 | Australia | -0.372 |
| Romania | 0.339 | Denmark | -0.350 |
| Sweden | 0.339 | Estonia | -0.350 |
| BOTTOM 5 | | BOTTOM 5 | |
| Tanzania | -0.043 | Philippines | 0.062 |
| Congo Brazzaville. | -0.011 | Central Africa | 0.058 |
| Saudi Arabia | -0.010 | Congo Brazzaville | 0.046 |
| Mali | 0.000 | Tanzania | 0.032 |
| Laos | 0.027 | Laos | -0.020 |

Source: Gallup World Poll 2007–2010

Table 21.3 Contentment and Affect, by categories. Percentage of People in each category

| CONTENTMENT | AFFECT | | | |
|-------------|--------|--------|------|-------|
| | Low | Medium | High | Total |
| Low | 12.0 | 7.4 | 8.8 | 28.2 |
| Medium | 10.1 | 10.6 | 15.2 | 35.9 |
| High | 6.7 | 11.2 | 18.0 | 35.9 |
| Total | 28.8 | 29.2 | 42.0 | 100 |

Contentment categories: Low (0–4), Medium (5–6), High (7–10)
 Affective categories: Low (-1 to 0.29), Medium (0.30 to 0.75), High (0.80 to 1)

Source: Gallup World Poll 2007–2010

and low affect with high contentment is high. Table 21.3 presents this likelihood for the whole sample; 6.7 percent of observations in the general sample have low affect and high contentment (with percentages above 15 percent in Cyprus, Israel, Italy, Malta, Singapore and France). On the other hand, 8.8 percent of observations in the general sample have high affect and low contentment (with percentages above 25 percent in Congo Brazzaville, Niger, Tanzania, Mali, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone and Kenya)

Contentment, Affect and Life Satisfaction

Table 21.4 presents information on the correlation between life satisfaction and contentment and affect; in specific, it presents information on the countries with the highest and lowest correlations. It is observed that the correlation between life satisfaction and contentment ranges from 0.83 in Vietnam to 0.11 in Mali, while the correlation between life satisfaction and positive affect goes from 0.45 in Bulgaria to

Table 21.4 Correlations Life Satisfaction and Contentment, Positive Affect, and Negative Affect. Countries with Highest and Lowest Correlation Coefficients Micro-level analyses

| LS-Contentment | | LS-Pos_Aff | | LS-Neg_Aff | |
|----------------|------|------------|------|----------------|-------|
| TOP 5 | | TOP 5 | | TOP 5 | |
| Vietnam | 0.83 | Bulgaria | 0.45 | Iceland | -0.47 |
| Ivory Coast | 0.80 | Czech Rep. | 0.40 | United Kingdom | -0.40 |
| Latvia | 0.76 | Lithuania | 0.40 | Canada | -0.40 |
| Bulgaria | 0.76 | Slovakia | 0.39 | Sweden | -0.39 |
| Ukraine | 0.76 | Slovenia | 0.37 | Australia | -0.39 |
| BOTTOM 5 | | BOTTOM 5 | | BOTTOM 5 | |
| Sierra Leone | 0.23 | Belize | 0.09 | Qatar | -0.07 |
| Benin | 0.21 | Benin | 0.09 | Saudi Arabia | -0.06 |
| Tanzania | 0.19 | Laos | 0.04 | Tanzania | -0.06 |
| Belize | 0.13 | Mali | 0.03 | Mali | -0.03 |
| Mali | 0.11 | Tanzania | 0.02 | Laos | -0.00 |

Source: Gallup World Poll 2007–2010

0.02 in Tanzania and, in the case of negative affect, it goes from -0.47 in Iceland to 0 in Laos.

The main purpose of the information presented in Table 21.4 is to show that correlations between life satisfaction and contentment, as well as between life satisfaction and positive and negative affect vary substantially across countries in the world. It was argued by Ruut and me in our previous paper that one of the possible reasons for a greater correlation between life satisfaction and contentment was the similarity in which the two variables were measured, with relatively similar response scales and phrasing. It is clear that the similarity exists and it could play a role in explaining the empirical findings; however, the argument stressing the similarity of questions and response scales would need to explain why the correlation between life satisfaction and contentment can be as low as 0.11 in Mali, even when the questions and the response scale are very similar. It seems that high correlation emerges from other factors which could be more important and not from questions and response scales being similar.

Explanatory Power of Contentment and Affect in Explaining Life Satisfaction

Table 21.5 presents the estimated goodness-of-fit coefficient (R^2) from ordinary least squares regressions which use different explanatory variables. In some cases Contentment and Affect are both incorporated as explanatory variables, while in other cases only one of these variables is incorporated. These regressions are run for the whole world sample as well as for different world regions, which implies that homogeneity across regions in the explanatory structure of life satisfaction is not

Table 21.5 Contentment and Affect in the Explanatory Structure of Life Satisfaction R2 Coefficients. Dependent Variable: Life Satisfaction Micro-level regressions, Ordinary Least Squares Regressions

| Region | Number of observations | Dependent variables | | | R2(Cont)/ R2(Cont, Aff) | R2(Aff)/ R2(Cont, Aff) |
|--------------------|------------------------|---------------------|------|------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | | Cont and Aff | Cont | Aff | | |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| World | 137618 | 0.41 | 0.40 | 0.08 | 0.97 | 0.18 |
| Latin America | 16811 | 0.24 | 0.19 | 0.10 | 0.80 | 0.40 |
| East Europe | 16863 | 0.51 | 0.49 | 0.13 | 0.96 | 0.24 |
| Western countries | 30502 | 0.44 | 0.43 | 0.13 | 0.97 | 0.29 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 27770 | 0.19 | 0.17 | 0.04 | 0.91 | 0.23 |
| Southeast Asia | 17437 | 0.38 | 0.37 | 0.07 | 0.95 | 0.18 |
| South Asia | 8514 | 0.28 | 0.26 | 0.06 | 0.95 | 0.22 |
| Central Asia | 5725 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0.10 | 0.98 | 0.20 |
| MENA | 13044 | 0.34 | 0.32 | 0.07 | 0.94 | 0.22 |

R2: Goodness-of-fit coefficient

Cont: Contentment

Aff: Affective balance scale

Micro-level information

Regions: see Table 21.1 for an explanation of the regions of the world

Source: Gallup World Poll 2007–2010

enforced. Due to limitations in the number of observations, analyses based on country-level averages are usually forced to assume that the same explanatory structure applies everywhere. The using of micro-level information allows studying differences across countries and regions.

The issue I want to address in this section is not which substrate of information contributes the most in explaining life satisfaction but whether the explanatory power of these substrates is similar across regions in the world. The joint explanatory power of affect and contentment is presented in column 3; the isolated explanatory power of contentment is presented in column 4, and the isolated explanatory power of affect in column 5.

Column 3 in Table 21.5 shows that the joint explanatory power of contentment and affect ranges from 0.51 in East Europe and Central Asia to 0.19 in Sub-Saharan Africa. Relatively low values are also observed in Latin America (0.24) and South Asia (0.28) while relatively high values are also observed in Western countries (0.45). Thus, regarding the explanation of life satisfaction, it seems that the contentment-and-affect framework fits better in some regions of the world than in others. This is a conclusion that, of course, raises new questions which require further research.

Columns 6 and 7 in Table 21.5 show how much of the total explanatory power of contentment and affect would be explained by each substrate of information in an

isolated way; this is an indication of the relative importance of affect and contentment as explanatory factors of life satisfaction. It is clear from Table 21.4 that contentment has greater marginal explanatory power than affect. However, my point here is that there is heterogeneity in the marginal importance of affect and contentment across regions and countries. It is observed in columns 6 and 7 that in Latin America –and to a lesser degree in Western countries- the isolated power of affect in explaining life satisfaction is relatively larger and the importance of contentment in explaining life satisfaction is relatively smaller –in comparison to other regions of the world-. Thus, it seems that affect has a relatively larger marginal contribution in explaining life satisfaction in Latin America.

Thus, there are two important questions that need to be addressed: First, why the joint explanatory power of affect and contentment varies so much across regions of the world? Second, why the isolated importance of affect and contentment in contributing to the explanation of life satisfaction varies across regions of the world? The first question points towards the existence of other substrates of information which are not fully captured by the contentment-and-affect framework, these other substrates could play a larger role in some regions than in others. It also points towards deficiencies in the way we measure affect and contentment; for example, important affective states such as love, care and appreciation are not incorporated in current measures of affect. The second question points towards cross-regional differences in affective regimes and in values and purposes in life, with some regions being relatively more materialistic and others more relational.

Final Comments

This contribution presents many empirical findings which raise many questions; this was its main purpose. Empirically-driven findings will contribute to reflect on our theoretical models and to revise them.

The correlation between affect and contentment substantially varies across countries and regions of the world. This empirical finding questions the belief that affect is universally used as a source of information to assess contentment; it makes it more difficult to sustain –as a general or evolutionary-based trend- that *'cognitive appraisals are often instigated by affective cues'*. A reasonable hypothesis for the large variation across regions and countries is that the explanatory factors of affect and contentment vary across regions and that some context and culture-dependent factors need to be incorporated in happiness research. Thus, further research is needed on the factors explaining contentment and affect and on their degree of overlapping.

The relatively high correlation between life satisfaction and contentment could be partially explained by the similarity of questions and response scales used to measure life satisfaction and contentment. However, empirical findings presented in this contribution show that the correlation substantially varies across countries and regions of the world, with values as low as 0.11; this suggests that the 'similar

questions and response scales' argument plays a minor role and that the explanation for the high correlation in many countries has to be found somewhere else –such as the contentment substrate being very important as a source of information when making overall assessments of life-.

The explanatory power of the contentment-and-affect framework varies across regions and countries; hence, it seems that the framework which is used to explain life satisfaction fits better in some regions of the world than in others. This is a finding that raises new questions which require further research: Why the joint explanatory power of affect and contentment varies so much across regions of the world? Why the isolated explanatory power of affect and contentment varies across regions of the world? This is not the place to provide potential answers to these questions; however, one could think of a case of missing substrates of information – which play a larger role in some regions than in others-. One could also think of better ways of measuring affect and contentment, including –for example- some emotions which are more important in some regions and which are currently missing from the way affect is measured. It would also be possible to think about differences across regions in values and evaluative and affective regimes.

As a general comment, I do also believe that a high sensitivity of life satisfaction to the contentment substrate is not a weakness. It should be considered as strength for life satisfaction to be sensitive to people's values; after all, people cannot be detached from their culture, and life satisfaction aims at measuring the happiness of concrete people, people who are in a specific social and historical context.

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Chapter 22

A Happiness Path Taken Together: A Letter to Ruut



Peggy Schyns

When Alex invited me to write something for Ruut, at first it seemed an easy task. Ruut and I go back for more than 25 years, and even though we don't see each other on a daily basis anymore, as we did from 1995 till 2000, I think in a way I know Ruut pretty well. . . but then of course little cracks appeared in my initial confidence. How well do I *really* know Ruut, and on a more philosophical note: how well can we really know a person at all? If I start to have these thoughts it usually means I am procrastinating. . . 😊 So let's stop that here and now and just sit still and write down what comes to mind.

So Here We Go. . . a Trip Down Memory Lane

Ruut and I met for the first time late 1994 or maybe beginning 1995. Jobs were scarce in those days in our country and I was already carefully preparing my whole family for the fact that they might end up with a graduated, yet unemployed daughter and sister. I applied for several PhD positions in the Netherlands, and was, among others, invited for a job interview at Ruut's Sociology department at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Unfortunately I caught a serious flu at the time. I phoned the secretary's office to ask whether the interview could be postponed, but that was not possible. In that split second I had to decide whether to go, sick and all, or just to stay home and miss a job opportunity. I decided to go, with a 'nothing to lose' attitude, high on Paracetamol, and I had a very pleasant and animated job interview with Ruut. Much to my surprise, I got the job, even though I had barely any expertise in the field of happiness research. Ruut told me afterwards that if you show that much

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determination to do a job interview, you must be someone who does not give up easily. In his perception, a perfect trait for a PhD candidate. And Ruut was right.

A Turning Point in Prince George

So I started on February 1st 1995. I was Ruut's first PhD student, and his PhD proposal on income and life satisfaction could be—euphemistically—categorized as 'ambitious'. Not only should it be a cross-national study, covering more than 40 countries, but also a longitudinal study using time series analysis, and moreover it should include a lengthy theoretical exercise on what happiness and life satisfaction meant, and if and how it could be measured. On top of that I had to find my way as a PhD student in a new, big city, and in dealing with an enthusiastic supervisor, whose passion in the subject I not necessarily yet mirrored. As you can imagine, in the beginning it has not always been a peachy rosy situation, as probably most PhD students and also supervisors can relate to. So after a first strugglesome year from my side, in 1996, Ruut mentioned this new interdisciplinary international conference on Quality of Life in Prince George, Canada, and he encouraged me to go. Upon arrival he introduced me to all the 'big' names in the research field, from which I started to build up my international research network, and from which also my first published article originated. It was a turning point in my (PhD) life: it helped me to plan my academic career in terms of research output and structure, it taught me that I can speak quite ok in public without actually dying, and it sparked my lifelong joy for travelling. Ruut was right again in pushing my boundaries internationally.

This Approach or That Approach, or Maybe. . . Do It All?

The years passed by and I remember that Ruut was very keen on persuading me to study happiness in nations, while using easy-to-grasp methods. Moreover, he had this crazy idea that instead of writing a monograph—which was still the norm at the time—I should write and publish several articles instead. It would get my name out there way faster than with a book no one would read in the end anyway (another PhD illusion prematurely shattered by Ruut. . .). I, however, was more interested in studying life satisfaction of individuals, in advanced quantitative methods such as structural equation and multilevel modelling, and in qualitative research (what do people actually mean when they talk about happiness or life satisfaction?). As in any type of relationship, also between Ruut and me it was a matter of give and take. Or maybe a better description would be: why not do it all! (p.s. NOT recommended)

- Yes, I did a cross-national study, but also three individual-level studies.
- Yes, I used straightforward methods, but also the advanced ones.

- Yes, I even managed to combine the individual level with the national level, a method that was about to take off in the mid 90s in social sciences. Ruut thought it was way too fancy and would not survive the test of time, but in that respect he was—*finally!!!* 😊—wrong: multilevel modelling has become quite the norm in social sciences.
- Yes, I published 5 different articles in the end, but I also wrote my beloved monograph.
- And yes, I have to reluctantly admit, the articles definitely caught more attention than the book. So Ruut was right again in this regard. (But still sometimes you need to hold on to your own ideas as a PhD student; I just love books)

Bullet-style Knowledge and How To Be Brainwashed Without Even Knowing

When I left the Erasmus University to work elsewhere, I kept in touch with Ruut. We met at conferences and when I needed some up-to-date answer concerning any kind of Quality of Life question, I always emailed Ruut as my epitome of knowledge and calm. Ruut would promptly reply in his typical, short and practical, bullet-style manner. Now that I look back in time, it hits me that whatever the topic, whether it be poverty struck Amsterdam citizens, political cynicism, volunteer work in public health care, sustainability, political consumerism, or public health, I have always tried to make some kind of connection with my happiness background. So in the end, Ruut has just brainwashed me from the very start by always making me look at research topics from a happiness perspective. I think it is also Ruut's enthusiasm and endurance, that has sparked so many researchers in studying happiness all over the world, and also governments in not taking happiness for granted when designing policy. Something you were downright ridiculed for in the 90s—"You study happiness?" [baffled look with an undertone of pity]; "Happiness as a policy goal? . . . hahaha"—now has become the norm. So I guess Ruut was right (again) in foreseeing the importance of this subject.

The Ongoing Happiness Path. . .

In recent years, Ruut meets up with a core group of happiness researchers in annual Study of Happiness board meetings. We discuss matters concerning among other things the World Database of Happiness. We all know that the Database is Ruut's scientific baby, and we want to make sure it remains accessible for all those interested in happiness research in the future. But even more than talking about happiness research, the Database, and the crappy canteen food (Kiki please save us

next time!), I always look forward to those meetings, simply because it is nice to be in Ruut's company and to listen to his dry sense of humor and no-nonsense attitude.

So Ruut, thank you for our 25+ year old companionship/friendship. Thank you for being right so many times (but not all the times). It has been—and still is—such a nice path to travel together: sometimes close next to each other, sometimes with a bit more temporal distance, but always connected!

Lieve groeten, Peggy

Rotterdam, The Netherlands, March 19, 2020

Peggy Schyns

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Chapter 23

What Makes Chinese People Happy? Insights from a Traditional Chinese Essay and a Hong Kong Cantopop



Daniel T. L. Shek

To many people, their life goal is to live a happy life. However, there are different views on what makes a happy life. For some people, they believe that a happy life is based on how much money one can earn. However, the relationship between income or GDP and happiness is not a linear one (Easterlin et al. 2010). For some people, they may equate achievement with happiness. While achievement may bring some happiness, it may also bring stress and burnout. Hence, the question of what makes people happy remains as a theoretical puzzle as well as a practical issue to be resolved.

With particular reference to the Chinese culture, the conception of happiness may be different from the Western conceptualizations (Joshanloo 2014; Zhang and Veenhoven 2008). In Confucianism, pursuit of happiness occupies a lower priority than self-cultivation of virtues. In fact, maintaining harmony with oneself and others takes precedence to individual happiness and there is a moral basis of individual happiness (Luo 2019). In Buddhism, happiness is deceptive and there is no essential difference between happiness and unhappiness (Dalai Lama 2014). In fact, there is a need to transcend personal feelings (i.e., not to indulge in experience). In Taoist thoughts, submission to nature and integration with Nature are important conditions for a fulfilled life.

Although happiness is conceived differently in different Chinese philosophies, not much research has been done to understand indigenous conceptions of the sources of happiness in Chinese people. Besides, there are two limitations of the related literature. First, the field is dominated by quantitative studies using happiness scales (Chen and Davey 2008; Huang et al. 2016; Ip 2011; Steele and Lynch 2013). Second, although there are some available qualitative studies (e.g., Lu 2001; Lu and

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Shih 1997) and studies on Chinese discourses on happiness (Wielander and Hird 2018), there are few studies investigating happiness with reference to available Chinese literature (such as traditional Chinese classic writings) and cultural products (such as songs).

In this chapter, we attempt to understand the question of “what makes Chinese people happy?” with reference to a traditional Chinese classic essay and a contemporary Hong Kong Cantopop. The traditional Chinese essay is entitled “Thirty-three Happy Moments in Life” written by Chin Sheng Tan. The essay was translated by Lin Yu Tang to English in 1937. In the second piece of work, we analysed the lyrics of a popular Cantopop entitled “Happiness” in contemporary Hong Kong. By doing this, snapshots of sources of happiness in the traditional Chinese cultural beliefs and contemporary Hong Kong ideologies can be taken.

Thirty-Three Happy Moments in Life

In the Chinese literature, there are some writings on happiness. One example is the poem entitled “Four Happy Occasions”. According to Nylan (2014), this poem was written by Wang Zhu (The Poems of Child Geniuses: Four Happy Occasions) or Hong Mai (Rong Zhai essays: Four Happy Occasions). These four happy occasions include: timely and sweet rain after a long period of drought, meeting an old friend in a foreign place, honey moon with colored candles on the wedding day, and one’s name is scribed on the golden plaque because of excellence in the civil examination. In contrast, there are four saddest things in life, including a widow raising up her child, a general captured by the enemy, a palace maid out of favor, and a candidate fails in an examination (Bao 2015).

Another popular essay on happiness is entitled “Thirty-three Happy Moments in Life”, which was written by Chin Sheng Tan. Chin was an influential Chinese scholar born near the end of the Ming Dynasty of China. An examination of the 33 happy moments shows that there are several themes related to the origin of happiness. The English translated version was based on Lin’s work (1937).

Ordinary Events Breed Happiness

Happy Moment 4 (Newly planted banana trees): “I have pulled out the old plants and planted ten or twenty green banana trees there. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 6 (Resolving an argument): “I see two rascals arguing with their faces flushed and their eyes staring with anger in the street. Yet they still pretend to be courteous to each other. Suddenly a big fellow appears, swinging his arms and coming up to them, and with a shout telling them to disperse. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 7 (Reciting the classics): “When children recite the classics fluently, it is like the sound of pouring water from a vase. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 8 (Buying something we like): “I discover a fancy thing in a shop. Originally, because of little price difference between myself and the seller, the seller refuses to sell it. I then add a little bit of money and the seller suddenly smiles and agrees to sell. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 11 (Death of a bad guy): “When I wake up in the morning, I realize that the meanest and most calculating person in the city has died. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 12 (Sawing bamboo to make water pipes): “I wake up early on a summer morning and see someone sawing a huge bamboo that will be used as a water pipe. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 17 (Cutting watermelon): “Cutting a green watermelon on a summer afternoon. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 23 (Finding a suitable living place): “I have not been able to find a suitable house to share with a friend for a long time. One day, someone brings the news that there is a house available with only a dozen rooms, facing a big river with trees around. After having the meal, we go over to look at the house with no idea how it looks like. Entering the gate, I see there is a large vacant lot with an acreage of six or seven acres. There is no need to worry about shortage of vegetables and melons anymore. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 27 (Writing Chinese calligraphy): “Watching someone writing big Chinese characters. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 30 (Kite with a broken line): “Seeing a kite with a broken line. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 33 (Reading a novel): “Reading the novel of Curly-Beard. Is this not happiness?”

Several observations can be highlighted from these “happy moments”. First, many things in life, such as cutting a watermelon and seeing others sawing bamboos to make water pipes can create happiness. Second, happiness is not brought forth by big and significant events. Instead, many “simple and small” things in life, such as reading a book, seeing others writing big characters, and planting banana trees can generate happiness. Third, surprise and unexpectedness create happiness, such as unexpected consent of the seller to sell a small fancy thing and unexpected opportunity to find a suitable place to live. Fourth, as happiness can be easily derived from simple and minute things in life, what one needs to do is to pay attention to such happy moments in life. In other words, learning to be happiness conscious by appreciating different small things in life is the recipe for happiness. Unfortunately, while it seems easy to get happiness, it is not easy to get it for several reasons. First, we tend to think that happiness is gained by having material possession. In a capitalistic city such as Hong Kong, people always believe that money and achievement can lead to happiness. For example, previous studies show that young people do believe that happiness is derived from material possession (Shek and Lin 2017; Shek and Ma 2017; Shek and Yu 2018).

Happiness Can Be Derived from Nature

Happy Moment 10 (Treading the water wheel): “On a summer day, I watch a young man treading the water wheel. The water then bubbles up like molten silver and melting snow. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 16 (Drinking on a cold night): “Drinking on an extremely cold winter’s night with heavy snow fall. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 31 (Watching wildfire): “Watching wildfire. Is this not happiness?”

Several comments can be highlighted from these happy moments. First, Nature is a good source for generating happiness. Because there are many different phenomena in Nature, it is not difficult to attain happy moments from Nature. Second, happy moments from Nature does not cost anything and one cannot buy it with money. Third, probably because of urbanization and industrialization, it is easy for people to forget how Nature can contribute to happiness. Fourth, to promote happiness in people, one useful way is to help them appreciate Nature and learn to be more conscious of different phenomena in Nature. Fifth, focus on health promotion and healing power of Nature is intrinsic to some intervention approaches such as adventure-based counseling and wilderness therapy. In these intervention approaches, it is argued that when one is placed in Nature and appreciates the “call of Nature”, therapeutic effects would take place.

Happiness Can Be Derived from Disappearance of Negative Feelings and Problem Solving

Happy Moment 1 (Rain on a hot summer day): “On a hot summer day in June, it is as hot as an oven. It is wet with flies around me. I do not have appetite. When I feel helpless, thunderstorms develop and it rains heavily. My sweating stops and the flies disappear. I can eat my meal. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 3 (A cat hunting a mouse): “I am getting annoyed by a mouse at the bedside of my room. I guess the rustling sound means my possession or my books are bitten. While I do not know what to do, a handsome cat appears as if it is looking at something. With a little moment, the mouse disappears like a whiff of wind. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 5 (Playing firecrackers when half-drunk): “I am drinking with some friends and I am half drunk, finding it difficult to stop drinking and equally difficult to go on. A caring boy servant at the side suddenly brings in a dozen of big fire-crackers, so I rise from the table and go to fire them off. The smell of sulfur passes through my nostrils and enters my brain so I feel comfortable all over my body. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 13 (Sunny day after a month of bad weather): “The cloudy days last for a month. I have been lying in bed like drunk or ill and I am not willing to

get up. Suddenly hearing a group of birds announces a clear day. I immediately pull away the drape and open the window. I see the lights shining and the forest looks like having a bath. Is this not happiness?"

Happy Moment 19 (Taking a hot bath): "I have several scabies in my private part. I then close the door to take a hot bath. Is this not happiness?"

Happy Moment 22 (Getting unintentional help): "Although there is wind, our small boat cannot benefit because there is no sail. Suddenly, a big lorcha appears running a high speed. I try to hook on the lorcha and it works. We then benefit from the wind. Is this not happiness?"

Several points can be made based on the above happy moments. First, there are moments which can make people feel uncomfortable, such as extremely hot weather, itchy feeling, and depressed weather. Second, relief from uncomfortable status is a happy moment. Third, some of the relief of uncomfortable situations is beyond human control such as rain in hot weather, which one can do nothing but to wait. Therefore, cultivation of forbearance is indispensable. Fourth, some relief of uncomfortable situations can be controlled such as taking a hot bath to release the itchy feeling arising from scabies in one's private part. In such situations, one can actively find solutions for the problem.

Happy Moment is Derived from Completion of Responsibilities and Tasks

Happy Moment 15 (Building a house): "I originally do not have the intention to build my own house. However, with a little sum of unexpected money, I do it eventually. However, there are many troublesome matters after the commencement of construction work. Despite these problems, the house is completed with whitewashed walls, clean floors, paper windows and scrolls of paintings. All the workmen left, and friends arrived, sitting on couches in order. Is this not happiness?"

Happy Moment 32 (Repaying debts): "I have repaid all debts. Is this not happiness?"

Happy Moment 29 (Beating the drum): "A magistrate declares the office work for a day is completed by beating the drum. Is this not happiness?"

Three comments can be made with reference to these happy moments. First, completion of a task means the burden related to the task is relieved. Second, completion of a task implies fulfilment of responsibility. Third, we should educate people to realize that completion of a task is not simply fulfilment of responsibility—it is in fact a happy moment.

Happiness is Derived from Helping Others

Happy Moment 9 (Burning all arrear documents): “I accidentally find hundreds of debit notes from those who have borrowed money from me. As some borrowers have died and others cannot repay the debts, I secretly burn all area documents with a fire. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 21 (Helping the needy): “When somebody is too shy to borrow money from me, I understand the awkwardness and uncomfortable experience involved. I then give him the money in private without causing embarrassment to him. I then ask whether he has time for a drink. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 28 (Release a bee): “To open a window to release a bee. Is this not happiness?”

Two comments can be made for this category of happy moments. First, helping is a recipe for happiness. This observation is in fact consistent with the research findings that helping others is positively related to happiness. As such, if one adopts a helping mentality, it is easy to establish a happy mentality. Second, these happy moments are consistent with the Chinese belief of “zhu ren wei kuai le zhi ben” (helping others is the origin of happiness). In short, helping others, including animals, is a good source for generating happiness.

Happiness is Derived from Friendship, Support from Significant-Others and Heritage

Happy Moment 2 (A hairpin for wine): “An old friend suddenly arrives after ten years. Without asking whether he came by boat or by land, and without asking him to sit down on the bed or the couch, I ask my wife whether she has wine. My wife gladly takes out her gold hairpin so that I can trade it and buy wine which can last for three days. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 14 (Visit a friend): “I go to visit an old friend. We then read a document and have a good time. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 20 (Letter from an old friend): “Accidentally, I find a handwritten letter from an old friend. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Movement 24 (Returning home): “A traveller returns home after a long journey. He sees the old city gate and hears people talking using the local dialect. Is this not happiness?”

Several observations can be highlighted from these happy moments. First, getting support from the significant-others is a happy moment as shown in the case where the wife gives the gold hairpin to her husband to buy wine. Second, friendship is a source of happiness. Third, one’s heritage is a source of happiness. These happy moments are consistent with the literature on social capital which highlights the importance of social networks and support in promoting one’s well-being. These

happy moments are also consistent with the Chinese emphasis on family and interpersonal relationships.

Transcendence and Wish-Fulfilment Lead to Happiness

Happy Moment 18 (A monk who eats meat): “I have long wanted to become a monk, but was worried about not being able to eat meat. If I could be permitted to become a monk and yet eat meat publicly, I would heat a basin of hot water and with the help of a sharp razor to shave my head clean in a summer month! Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 25 (Letting go a broken piece of porcelain): “It is impossible to repair a good piece of old porcelain. It is frustrated to look at the broken porcelain. I then ask my cook to use it as any other old vessels and I instruct him that I do not want to see it again. Is this not happiness?”

Happy Moment 26 (Repentance through disclosure): “As I am not a saint, I am not without sin. When I do something wrong, I find it difficult to be at ease. Based on the Buddhist teaching of “posatha”, I realize the importance of not covering my sin which is a sign of repentance. Hence, I begin to tell my sins to others when I make one, even they are strangers or my friends. Is this not happiness?”

Several comments can be highlighted from these happy moments. First, wish fulfilment is a happy moment. Even though a monk cannot eat meat, thinking about the possibility of a monk who can eat meat is a happy moment. This is in line with the saying that dreaming of something which cannot be attained is happy. Second, to let go some broken possession or experience is a key to happiness. In the happy moment of the broken porcelain, the owner asks the servant to use it as other old vessels. In other words, the broken porcelain can still be used but in another way. Also, the owner adopts the philosophy of “out of sight, out of mind” to deal with the negative feeling of seeing the broken piece of porcelain. Finally, disclosing hidden mistakes can help to bring happiness. Although this is based on the Buddhist teaching in the essay, this practice is in fact consistent with the contemporary clinical literature that “talking out” the problem and self-disclosure are in fact therapeutic in nature.

“Happiness” in Hong Kong Cantopop

The 33 Happy Moments can reveal the origin of happiness according to traditional Chinese literature. While the insights are interesting, it is important to ask how happiness is conceived in contemporary Hong Kong which is a melting pot of both Western influences and traditional Chinese cultural beliefs. As Cantopop is an important component of Hong Kong culture, we attempt to look at the ingredients

of happiness based on a Cantopop entitled “Happiness” originally composed and sung by Sam Hui. The English translated lyrics of the song is based on those in the YouTube (Lifeisgood181 2013):

Happiness, the morning sunshine
 Happiness, the melody of waterfall
 Happiness, here for you always
 If you know where to find
 Happiness, the stars in the afar sky
 Happiness, the memories of past
 Happiness is for everyone
 rich or poor
 Love of friends and parents
 warms my heart always
 Generosity and contentment
 Kindness and forgiveness
 Happiness is always with you.
 Happiness, days away from city life
 Happiness, a hot bath after work
 Happiness, a beautiful song
 reading an evening daily
 sipping a drink
 Happiness, support from my darling wife
 Happiness, kiss from my beloved son
 Happiness is always with me
 For I am a happy man.
 Happiness is for everyone
 rich or poor
 Love of friends and parents
 warms my heart always
 Generosity and contentment
 Kindness and forgiveness
 Happiness is always with you
 Happiness, one day away from city life
 Happiness, a hot bath after work
 Happiness, a beautiful song
 reading evening daily
 sipping a drink
 Happiness, support from my darling wife
 Happiness, kiss from my beloved son
 Happiness is always with me
 For I am a happy man.

Seven themes can be derived from the song. First, happiness is always available (i.e., “here for you always”). It is free and it does not cost anything, but it can be far away (i.e., “stars in the sky afar”) or very near (i.e., “memories of the past”). Second, whether one is rich or poor, one can have happiness. In other words, happiness transcends social class and it is accessible to everyone. Third, although happiness is readily available, whether one knows how to get it is another question. In fact, there are many ways to attain happiness. Fourth, happiness can be derived from ordinary things in life, such as “reading evening daily”, “sipping a drink”, “having a hot

bath”, and “singing a beautiful song”. Fifth, happiness can be derived from nature, including “morning sunshine”, “melody of waterfall”, and “stars in the afar sky”. Sixth, significant-others is an important source of happiness, including “support from my dear wife” and “kiss from my beloved son”. Finally, good deeds and virtues, including generosity, contentment, kindness, and forgiveness, breed happiness.

General Discussion

From the analyses of the traditional Chinese classic essay and contemporary Cantopop in this article, several observations can be highlighted. First, in these two pieces of work, happiness is not related to material possession and achievement, which are commonly regarded as yardsticks of success in the Hong Kong culture (Shek and Lin 2017; Shek and Ma 2017; Shek and Yu 2018). In fact, this observation is consistent with the available research suggesting that happiness is not linearly related to money and achievement. Second, both traditional and contemporary work suggest that happiness is free. Most importantly, it is available to everybody irrespective of social class; everybody is entitled to happiness and there is no “happiness inequality”. This point is empowering for everyone. Third, many things in life, including Nature, people, and animals, can contribute to happiness. Hence, it is important to appreciate things around us and be conscious of the origin of happiness. This observation is consistent with the research findings of Lu and Shih (1997) who found that respondents in Taiwan reported nine sources of happiness, including getting respect from others, harmony in social relationships, gratification of physical wants, occupational achievement, feeling ease with life, getting pleasure with payment from other people, sense of controlling and fulfilling life, and positive experience and health. Ip (2011) also reported that there are different types of happiness derived from different domains, including family, social life, and work and health. However, it is noteworthy that health, achievement, and controlling life are not covered in the 33 happy moments and the Cantopop reviewed in this study.

Fourth, there are some situations where we do not have much control over happiness, such as uncomfortable weather. In such situations, we have to develop patience and forbearance. In contrast, there are situations where we can proactively change our circumstances. In such cases, we have to develop problem solving skills and proactivity. Fifth, developing social capital such as gaining help from significant-others and friends would contribute to happiness. Sixth, helping others and doing good deeds are precursors to happiness. Seventh, transcendence such as “let go” and developing virtues such as forgiveness and kindness can help to develop happiness. In short, these conceptions of happiness are empowering and growth oriented in nature.

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Chapter 24

Calling for Social Support: Whose Support and What Types of Support Matter for Early Adolescents' Life Satisfaction?



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Psychology has traditionally focused on the study and treatment of psychopathological problems. However, recent shifts in the field have led to increased interest in the promotion of healthy functioning, including such characteristics as high overall life satisfaction (LS). LS refers to a person's cognitive evaluations of her or his quality of life overall or with specific domains (Diener et al. 2003). LS is one of the most commonly assessed components of subjective well-being in youth as it tends to be the more stable component (Suldo 2016) and is a robust predictor of adult and youth adaptive and maladaptive outcomes in terms of physical, psychosocial, and educational development (Huebner et al. 2014; Lyubomirsky et al. 2005; Suldo 2016; Veenhoven 1988).

Given the consequences of differences in LS, studies of its determinants are crucial to understanding its development and associated outcomes. Led by visionaries in the field such as Veenhoven (1984) and Diener (1984), studies of the antecedents and consequences of individual differences in the LS of adults have proliferated over the years, whereas studies of children and adolescents have lagged behind. Nevertheless, some studies of children and youth have addressed such factors as personal characteristics, demographic differences, and environmental experiences, resulting in some generalizable conclusions. For example, higher levels of LS in youth appear to be associated with extraverted temperament, active coping, and social support (see Huebner, Hills, Siddall, & Gilman, 2014 for a review). With respect to social support in particular, studies have shown strong connections between social support sources (parent, teacher, and peer) and LS in early adolescence (i.e., middle school age). For example, Stewart and Suldo (2011) conducted a study investigating the relations between social support sources (parent, classmate, teacher) and LS in middle school-aged youth, with findings revealing that parent,

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peer, and teacher support all significantly related to overall LS, with parent support most strongly correlated with LS. For another example, Siddall et al. (2013) found family and peer support for learning were significant contributors to early adolescent LS. Finally, Danielsen et al. (2009) also observed greater associations between parent and peer support and adolescent LS compared to teacher support. Taken together, extant studies suggest that social support is a key contributor to adolescents' LS, although the importance of the sources of support may vary across samples.

Similar to LS, social support is significantly linked to many positive outcomes in youth, such as mental health (Malecki and Demaray 2002). Multiple factors including age, sex and SES influence perceived social support in youth (Mahon et al. 1994). Younger children report greater frequency of support than older children. Elementary school-aged youth have reported greater social support from all sources (parent, teacher, peer) than both middle and high school-aged youth (Demaray and Malecki 2002). Gender differences in perceived support and attachment also emerge in middle school. Early adolescent females perceive greater support than males (Demaray and Malecki 2002; Mahon et al. 1994; Rueger et al. 2008), and they demonstrate differences in associations between attachment and global LS, as peer attachments partially mediate the relationship of parent attachment and LS in adolescent females, but not in adolescent males (Ma and Huebner 2008). Lastly, school-based social support is associated with positive outcomes in students of low socioeconomic standing compared with peers who do not experience poverty (DuBois et al. 1994; DuBois et al. 1992).

Several theories of the nature of social support have been developed. For example, Tardy (1985) conceptualizes five major components of social support: direction, disposition, description-evaluation, network, and content. Direction refers to whether one gives or receives support. Disposition refers to whether supportive behaviors are available versus actually performed. Description-evaluation describes how one evaluates or perceives the support received. The components of description-evaluation describe how one evaluates or perceives the support received. Network conveys the source of social support, including parents, friends, teachers, classmates, and school. Finally, content communicates the type of support behaviors present (i.e., emotional, appraisal, informational, instrumental).

Each source of social support (e.g., parents, friends, teachers, peers) can provide each type of support behaviors (i.e., emotional, appraisal, informational, instrumental). Emotional support includes caring behaviors from others. Appraisal support refers to feedback or evaluative information from others. Informational support refers to provision of needed information or advice. Lastly, instrumental support consists of resources provided by someone, such as time or money. The current study utilized Tardy's (1985) model in defining social support and conceptualized support as the perceived frequency of supportive behaviors experience by youth.

Studies to date have not examined the unique contributions of each type of support behavior (emotional, appraisal, informational, instrumental) within the sources of parent and peer support on youth global LS, but have done so for a

variety of adjustment variables (e.g., problem behaviors, clinical maladjustment, emotional symptoms, and school maladjustment). Malecki and Demaray (2003) found that collectively, the types of parent support significantly related to student adjustment, but no significant, unique individual predictors were identified. As for teachers, the type of support most related to adjustment (i.e., social skills and academic competence) was emotional support. Interestingly, no individual type of peer or classmate support was found to significantly predict adjustment. Overall, different types of support within sources seem to be more related to certain outcomes in adjustment.

One study was identified from the literature that explored the relation of support type within source and subjective well-being (SWB), a construct highly related to youth global LS. Suldo et al. (2009) conducted a mixed methods study on the influence of SWB on perceived teacher support behaviors. Their quantitative findings revealed that emotional support and informational support served as unique predictors of SWB. Analyses of their qualitative data showed that youth perceived teachers to be most supportive when they connected with students emotionally, demonstrated fairness, used a range of best-practice teaching strategies, acknowledged academic success, and encouraged questions. Furthermore, Guess and McCane-Bowling (2016) further found that teacher support correlated significantly with LS in middle school-aged youth, with informational support as the most statistically significant unique predictor of LS variance.

Rationale for Study

Studies have investigated the relations between social support source (parent, teacher, peer) and various indicators of ill-being and well-being in youth. However, few studies have addressed sources and types of support and LS in early adolescents. Specifically, studies indicate unique contributions of parent and peer support to youth LS (e.g., Danielsen et al. 2009). However, to the authors' knowledge, no research has examined the associations between specific social support types (emotional, appraisal, informational, instrumental) within each source, as conceptualized in Tardy's (1985) theory of social support. Our study thus sought to contribute novel findings to the literature by examining the contributions of unique variance for the four social support types within each support source to global LS in youth.

Research Questions

The purpose of our study was thus to examine the associations between early adolescents' global LS and the sources (parents, teachers, and peers) and types of social support (emotional, appraisal, informational, instrumental) within each source

of support. To accomplish this overarching goal, four specific research questions were identified.

1. What Are the Relative Contributions of Parent, Teacher, and Peer Social Support Sources to the Variance in LS in Early Adolescents?

The literature on youth social support indicates that the importance of different sources of social support varies as a function of age. Research indicates that perceived parent social support is lower in early and middle adolescence when compared to childhood and late adolescence, and that during this time other sources of support (i.e., friends, romantic partners) increase in importance (Furman and Buhrmester 1992). Furman and Buhrmester (1992) theorized that such findings suggest that early adolescents are less dependent on their parents, wish to be less dependent, or may demonstrate a tendency to invest greater importance in peer relations at this stage of development compared to childhood. They also theorized that early adolescents perceive teacher support as less important as the nature of education changes at this point in school where youth transition from having one or two teachers in primary school to multiple teachers in secondary school, which may impact the possibility of forming closer relationships. Furman and Buhrmester's theory as well as research conducted by Siddall et al. (2013) informed our hypothesis that parent social support would account for the greatest variance in early adolescents' LS. Based on research conducted by Stewart and Suldo (2011) that found teacher and peer support to be statistically significant contributors to adolescent psychological well-being and Furman and Buhrmester's theory, we further hypothesized that teacher and peer social support would also emerge as unique contributors of variance to LS at this point in development.

2. Does Gender Moderate the Associations Between Sources of Social Support (Parent, Teacher, Peer) and Early Adolescents' Global LS?

Gilligan's (1982) developmental theory of gender differences proposed that the sexes value or view relationships in different ways. Specifically, girls may invest greater time and effort into relationships than boys. Gilligan's theory also suggests that relationship development may be more salient to identity development in girls and may thus have a greater influence on well-being in girls than boys. Furthermore, findings by Demaray and Malecki (2002) revealed that boys and girls did not report differences in reports of parent support, but females reported greater support from teachers, classmates, and close friends. Thus, we hypothesized that a stronger association between teacher and peer support and LS would be demonstrated for girls than for boys, as girls may invest greater interest in these relationships than boys or that these relationships may be more influential to the development of LS in girls of this age.

3. What Are the Relative Contributions of the Four Identified Types of Social Support (Emotional, Appraisal, Informational, Instrumental) within each Source of Social Support (Parent, Teacher, Peer) to Variance in Early Adolescents' Global LS?

The literature was limited regarding the relation of global LS to social support type within each source of support. Three studies of support type were identified in the literature. Based on findings by studies examining teacher support and support type in relation to youth adjustment (Malecki and Demaray 2003), SWB (Suldo et al. 2009) and LS (Guess and McCane-Bowling 2016), it was hypothesized that emotional and informational support would each be indicated as unique predictors of LS. Findings related to support types within parent and peer support have been more limited. Malecki and Demaray (2003) found that all types of parent support predicted adjustment, but no significant individual predictors were identified, and no individual types of peer support were related to adjustment. Notably, studies relating social support type for parents or peers for either LS or associated constructs, such as SWB, have not been reported in the literature. Due to such limitations, we did not formulate specific hypotheses regarding support type within these sources.

4. Does Gender Moderate the Associations Between Early Adolescents’ LS and the Four Types of Social Support within each Source?

Due to the exploratory nature of this question, specific hypotheses were not formulated.

Method

Participants

Our study utilized an archival dataset collected by school personnel from four middle schools in a southeastern US state. This extant dataset has been used in previous research (e.g., Reckart et al. 2017), but these analyses are new. Data were collected as a part of a school-wide survey of school climate and student well-being. Demographic information was collected through self-report items included in the survey.

A total of 1710 sixth (28.1%), seventh (35.1%), and eighth (35.5%) grade students completed the survey (see Table 24.1). The mean sample age was 12.44

Table 24.1 Regression Analyses: Sources of Social Support

| Variable | Step 1 | | | Step 2 | | |
|--|----------|-----------|---------|-----------|-----------|---------|
| | <i>B</i> | <i>SE</i> | β | <i>B</i> | <i>SE</i> | β |
| Age | -.881 | .146 | -.142** | -.289 | .115 | -.047* |
| Lunch | -1.882 | .283 | -.157** | -1.246 | .221 | -.104** |
| Parent social support | | | | .187 | .009 | .434** |
| Teacher social support | | | | .059 | .010 | .138** |
| Peer social support | | | | .067 | .008 | .178** |
| <i>R</i> ² | .049 | | | .432 | | |
| <i>F</i> for change in <i>R</i> ² | 44.110** | | | 387.751** | | |

Note: * *p* < .05; ** *p* < .01

($SD = .98$), representing a range from 11 to 15 years old. Ethnic or racial composition of the sample was 54.3% Caucasian, 22.6% African American, 1.4% Asian American or Pacific Islander, 8.0% Hispanic or Latino, and 1.6% Native American, and 2.0% identified as “other”. Socioeconomic status (SES) was measured through self-report of receiving regular school lunch (higher SES) or free or reduced lunch (lower SES). Lower SES was reported by 38.2% of students.

Procedures

School personnel administered the questionnaires during the students' class time. Teachers read scripted directions to the students, which included instructions encouraging the students to complete the survey packet in its entirety. Students were informed of their right to withdraw at any point, and that all responses would be kept confidential. Approval from the University of South Carolina Institutional Review Board was obtained. Researchers were only allowed to access the data after school personnel removed identifying information.

Measures

Brief Multidimensional Students' Life Satisfaction Scale (BMSLSS; Seligson et al. 2003). The BMSLSS is a self-report measure of child and adolescent LS consisting of five items related to the areas of life most critical to youth development (Huebner 1994). This measure requires students to rate their satisfaction with family life, friendships, school experiences, self, and living environment (Seligson et al. 2003), to provide a comprehensive picture of student's overall LS. The BMSLSS requires participants to respond to statements that evaluate these areas of their lives using a 7-point scale, ranging from 1-*terrible* to 7-*delighted*. The BMSLSS was adapted to address the same dimensions of LS measured in the longer version of the Multidimensional Students' Life Satisfaction Scale (MSLSS; Huebner 1994), which is a widely accepted measure of child and adolescent LS (Proctor et al. 2009). The BMSLSS Total score has demonstrated significant correlations with other validated measures of LS, such as the MSLSS total score ($r = .66$) and the Students Life Satisfaction (SLSS; Huebner 1991) total score ($r = .62$) (Seligson et al. 2003). The BMSLSS scale is appropriate for use with third-12th grade youth (Seligson et al. 2003; Seligson et al. 2005). With this sample, the BMSLSS demonstrated an alpha coefficient of 0.86.

Children and Adolescent Social Support Scale (CASSS; Malecki et al. 1999). The CASSS is a 40-item multi-dimensional scale used to measure participant's perceived social support. The CASSS measures perceived social support from four sources: parents, teachers, classmates, and a close friend. The scale was modified for this study to include only the items assessing support from parents, teachers, and

classmates. This scale also separates items for each source of support into four aspects of social support: appraisal, emotional, informational, and instrumental. The Malecki, Demaray, Elliot, and Nolten format of the CASSS requires participants to respond to statements that refer to different types of support (appraisal, emotional, information, and instrumental), with participants rating the perceived frequency of support using a 6-point Likert scale, ranging from 1-*never* to 6-*always*. These ratings were used to create frequency scores for: Parent Support, Teacher Support, and Classmate Support subscales. This study used Level 2 of the CASSS as it is most appropriate for use with 6th–12th grade youth. The CASSS has shown acceptable convergent validity when compared to other measures of youth social support, such as the Social Support Scale for Children and the Social Skills Rating System (Malecki and Demaray 2002). Additionally, incremental fit indices for the CASSS demonstrated values greater than .90, which indicated support for its factor structure (Malecki and Demaray 2002). With this sample, the CASSS demonstrated an alpha coefficient of 0.97.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

The data were assessed for possible violations of model assumptions. This examination revealed that missingness ranged from .2% to 11%, which can influence standard errors and tests of significance (Cohen et al. 2003). Thus, missing data were handled through multiple imputation using IBM SPSS Statistics Version 24. Multiple imputation was used to predict and replace missing values using existing values within the dataset. Forty new datasets were generated and one dataset was chosen for analyses using a random number generator.

The dataset included data from four separate schools. Thus, data were examined for clustering within schools. The intraclass correlation (ICC) for global LS was 0.01, suggesting variance within schools was larger than variance between schools. Findings indicated that clustering within schools would not downwardly bias the standard errors in the present study, and therefore a multi-level model was not used in further analyses.

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics for variables were computed. The mean for global LS was 4.88 ($SD = 0.94$). The means for the Parent, Teacher, and Peer Social Support subscales were 4.70 ($SD = 1.15$), 4.65 ($SD = 1.16$), and 4.01 ($SD = 1.31$). These means suggested relatively high perceptions of support across all three sources of support. The means for the Emotional Support, Informational Support, Appraisal Support,

and Instrumental Support subscale were 4.54 ($SD = 1.03$), 4.62 ($SD = 1.02$), 4.32 ($SD = 1.09$), and 4.43 (1.08). These means indicated relatively high perceptions of support across all four types of social support.

Four one-way ANOVAs were conducted to test for differences in LS related to each demographic variable including: age, grade level, gender, and SES (based on lunch status; regular or reduced/free). Mean differences were found to be related to student age $F(3, 1727) = 14.32, p < 0.01$. Results indicated that 11-year-olds ($M = 30.53, SD = 5.07$) were significantly different from 13-year-olds ($M = 28.66, SD = 5.95$) and 14-year-olds ($M = 27.58, SD = 6.40$), but not significantly different from 12-year-olds ($M = 29.59, SD = 5.98$) or 14- and 15-year-olds ($M = 28.03, SD = 5.70$). Also, 12-year-olds were significantly different from 14- and 15-year-olds, but not the other age groups. All other comparisons were statistically non-significant, p -values > 0.05 . Mean differences were found for student grade level $F(2, 1728) = 7.74, p < 0.01$, such that sixth grade students ($M = 29.83, SD = 5.78$) were significantly different from eighth grade students ($M = 28.48, SD = 5.91$), $p < 0.01$. Comparisons between seventh grade students ($M = 29.36, SD = 6.01$) and all other students were non-significant, p -values > 0.05 . Gender did not demonstrate a significant relation with LS. Mean differences were also found for student SES, $F(1, 1729) = 50.78, p < 0.01$, such that students receiving free/reduced price lunch ($M = 28.00, SD = 6.53$) reported lower LS than students receiving regular lunch ($M = 30.03, SD = 5.30$). Due to the significant relations between LS and age/grade level and SES, age and SES were controlled for in further analyses.

Correlations

Pearson correlations were computed. The correlations were statistically significant for all variables ($p < 0.05$). According to Cohen's (1988) criteria, LS demonstrated a strong correlation with parent social support ($r = .60, p < .01$) and moderate correlations with peer social support ($r = .45, p < .01$), and teacher social support ($r = .46, p < .01$). LS also showed a strong correlation with emotional social support ($r = .63, p < .01$) and moderate correlations with informational support ($r = .58, p < .01$), appraisal social support ($r = .54, p < .01$), and instrumental social support ($r = .57, p < .01$).

Multiple Regression Analyses

Multiple regression analyses were performed to assess the unique variance contributed by each social support source (parent, teacher, peer) to LS. Analyses were run after controlling for statistically significant demographic variables (i.e., age and SES). Results indicated a significant positive relationship between social support

source and LS ($R^2 = .432$, $F(5, 1725) = 387.75$, $p < .001$). Each source of social support demonstrated a statistically significant unique relationship with LS (see Table 24.1), with parent social support demonstrating the highest unique relation.

Gender was then assessed as a moderator between sources of social support and LS. None of the interaction terms demonstrated a statistically significant, unique relationship with LS (see Table 24.2). Results indicated that gender did not moderate the effects of parent, teacher, or peer social support on youth LS. Parent, teacher, and peer social support associated with early adolescent LS regardless of gender.

Parent, Teacher, and Peer Social Support were centered at the mean.

Regression analyses assessing social support types within parent social support revealed that emotional ($\beta = .29$, $p < .01$), informational ($\beta = .12$, $p < .01$), and instrumental ($\beta = .20$, $p < .01$) support significantly contributed unique variance in LS. Appraisal support from parents was not statistically significant. Regression analyses assessing social support types within teacher social support indicated that emotional ($\beta = .21$, $p < .01$) and informational ($\beta = .13$, $p < .01$) support significantly contributed to unique variance in LS. Appraisal and instrumental support by teachers were not statistically significant. Regression analyses assessing social support types within peer social support demonstrated that emotional ($\beta = .27$, $p < .01$), instrumental ($\beta = .13$, $p < .01$), and informational ($\beta = .10$, $p < .05$) support significantly contributed to unique variance in LS. Appraisal support from peers was not statistically significant. See Table 24.3 for results.

Gender was also assessed as a moderator between LS and social support types within each source of social support. Twelve separate regressions were run. None of the interaction terms revealed a statistically significant interaction between gender and social support type within each source of social support.

Discussion

The literature on youth well-being has demonstrated that LS is a strong predictor of positive outcomes such as academic performance, classroom behavior, and mental health outcomes (see Huebner et al., 2014 for a review). Research has further indicated that social support is an important contributor to development of well-being in youth. Specifically, Tardy's (1985) theory conceptualizing the major components of social support has informed many studies that have examined social support and well-being, especially studies of the associations of well-being and different *sources* of support (i.e., parent, teacher, peer). However, scant research has examined the associations of social support and LS in youth, especially studies of the different types of social support provided by the major sources of support (e.g., emotional, appraisal, informational, instrumental). We thus examined the associations between early adolescents' reports of global LS and the unique contributions of sources (i.e., parent, teacher, peer) and types of social support (i.e., emotional, appraisal, informational, instrumental) within social support sources

Table 24.2 Hierarchical Regression Analyses: Gender and Sources of Social Support

| Model | Variable | Step 1 | | Step 2 | | Step 3 | | Step 4 | |
|--------------------|-----------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|
| | | SE | β | SE | β | SE | β | SE | β |
| 1. Parent support | | | | | | | | | |
| Step 1: | Age | .146 | -.142** | .146 | -.142** | .119 | -.067** | .120 | -.066** |
| | Lunch | .283 | -.157** | .283 | -.157** | .231 | -.087** | .231 | -.087** |
| Step 2: | Gender | | | .279 | -.010 | .226 | -.001 | .226 | -.001 |
| Step 3: | Parent support | | | | | .008 | .583** | .012 | .568** |
| Step 4: | Interaction | | | | | | | .016 | .021 |
| 2. Teacher support | | | | | | | | | |
| Step 1: | Age | .146 | -.142** | .146 | -.142** | .133 | -.063* | .133 | -.063* |
| | Lunch | .283 | -.157** | .283 | -.157** | .254 | -.158** | .254 | -.158** |
| Step 2: | Gender | | | .279 | -.010 | .250 | -.034 | .250 | -.034 |
| Step 3: | Teacher support | | | | | .009 | .441** | .013 | .430** |
| Step 4: | Interaction | | | | | | | .018 | .016 |
| 3. Peer support | | | | | | | | | |
| Step 1: | Age | .146 | -.142** | .146 | -.142** | .130 | -.106** | .131 | -.105** |
| | Lunch | .283 | -.157** | .283 | -.157** | .252 | -.150** | .252 | -.150** |
| Step 2: | Gender | | | .279 | -.010 | .248 | -.022 | .248 | -.022 |
| Step 3: | Peer support | | | | | .008 | .451 | .011 | .448** |
| Step 4: | Interaction | | | | | | | .016 | .005 |

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Table 24.3 Regression Analyses: Types of Social Support within Sources of Social Support

| Model | Variable | Step 1 | | Step 2 | |
|---------------------------|---------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|
| | | SE | β | SE | β |
| 1. Parent support | | | | | |
| Step 1: | Age | .146 | -.142** | .119 | -.071** |
| | Lunch | .283 | -.157** | .230 | -.088** |
| Step 2: | Emotional | | | .158 | .292** |
| | Informational | | | .146 | .121** |
| | Appraisal | | | .156 | .036 |
| | Instrumental | | | .146 | .201** |
| 2. Teacher support | | | | | |
| Step 1: | Age | .146 | -.142** | .133 | -.060* |
| | Lunch | .283 | -.157** | .254 | -.159** |
| Step 2: | Emotional | | | .148 | .215** |
| | Informational | | | .163 | .133** |
| | Appraisal | | | .151 | .081 |
| | Instrumental | | | .151 | .073 |
| 3. Peer support | | | | | |
| Step 1: | Age | .146 | -.142** | .129 | -.106** |
| | Lunch | .283 | -.157** | .250 | -.146** |
| Step 2: | Emotional | | | .148 | .272** |
| | Informational | | | .142 | .095* |
| | Appraisal | | | .134 | .013 |
| | Instrumental | | | .126 | .134** |

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

(i.e., parent, teacher, peer). Furthermore, we explored gender as a potential moderator of the links between LS and social support sources and types.

We first examined the relative contributions of social support sources (parent, teacher, peer) to the variance in LS in early adolescents. Results indicated that all three sources demonstrated statistically significant, unique associations with LS. Parent social support demonstrated the largest unique relation. This finding expands on previous research conducted by Siddall et al. (2013) that examined the effects of parental support for learning and indicated similar results for overall support in early adolescents. These findings also further elucidate the changes in relationships discussed in Furman and Buhrmester’s (1992) theory that sources of support beyond parental support (i.e., peer support) also demonstrate importance in early adolescent development, though parent support remains the most salient contributor. Furthermore, Furman and Buhrmester’s theory supports results that peers emerge as a more important source of social support than teachers at this point in development as the nature of student-teacher relations changes during the secondary education school years, with students experiencing multiple teachers and potentially fewer opportunities to form close bonds.

We also examined gender as a moderator of the effect of different sources and types of social support on levels of LS. Findings did not indicate gender as a moderator in the relations between LS and social support sources, nor types. Such results notably indicate that the positive associations between sources and types of social support and LS generalize across both genders in early adolescence.

Finally, we examined the relative contributions of the four types of social support (emotional, informational, appraisal, and instrumental) within each of the three sources of social support (parent, teacher, peer) to the variance in early adolescent LS scores. Our findings extend the results of Malecki and Demaray's (2003) study by demonstrating the contributions of parent support and types of support to the LS of early adolescents. Specifically, our results indicated that parent emotional, instrumental, and informational support each provided unique variance to early adolescent LS reports. Although parent appraisal (i.e., evaluative feedback) did *not* contribute unique variance to the LS of the early adolescents, the finding might be explained by Elkind's (1967) theory of egocentrism in adolescence, which is described as a failure of adolescents to differentiate between concerns of others versus concerns of the self. It is thought that egocentrism emerges in early adolescence and incorporates beliefs that the self is special and invulnerable to harm. Such beliefs might account for the decrease in importance of appraisal support in early adolescents, as they are less concerned with the concerns of others at this point in development.

Our findings regarding teacher social support indicated emotional and informational support as displaying unique contributions to early adolescent LS. However, teacher instrumental and appraisal support did not contribute unique variance to LS. Students may seek less instrumental support from teachers due to the nature of the personal advice they seek and context of their relationships within the school setting. Teachers may not be the most appropriate resource to provide access to materials that relate to concerns that are more personal in nature and less related to the schooling. Regarding appraisal support, it is reasonable to draw the aforementioned similar conclusion from Elkind's (1967) theory of adolescent egocentrism; that is, early adolescents are less concerned with others' evaluations of them.

Our findings regarding peer support revealed that emotional, instrumental, and informational support all demonstrated unique contributions to early adolescent LS. However, appraisal support from peers also did not demonstrate unique variance in LS scores. Notably, instrumental support was more important from peers and parents, but not from teachers. Again, this might be explained by the nature of the personal concerns that early adolescents demonstrate, and that parents and peers might be more appropriate sources of support for addressing such needs while teachers might be viewed as more appropriate sources for providing academic resources. Appraisal support from peers was also not reported as uniquely important for LS, which further supported the notion that early adolescents may be more concerned with self-evaluations than evaluations by others.

Our study was subject to several limitations. Although a reasonably large and diverse sample was used, the demographics of participants did not accurately reflect the greater U.S. population. Thus, the generalizability of results should be considered with caution. Longitudinal data would also be preferred over our cross-sectional

data, which would allow researchers to better explain the directionality of the relations between social support and global LS. Another limitation that should be considered is the self-report method of data collection in this study. Future studies might benefit from use of multiple methods of assessment (i.e., parent and teacher report of youth LS levels) to provide more confidence in the meaningfulness of the measures. Cross-national studies may also be of interest as the sources and types of social support may vary across nations.

Implications for Professionals and Future Research Directions

Our study contributed to the literature by demonstrating the differential importance of various types of social support, in addition to their sources, in understanding the development of differences in early adolescents' overall LS. Such research on perceptions of social support should help in understanding the determinants of LS in early adolescence as well as in identifying specific supportive behaviors most effective to address in the implementation of well-being interventions with early adolescents. Identification and improvement in the delivery of key social support behaviors within the school and home settings should likely foster better outcomes for youth. This study also supports the notion that positive youth outcomes can be bolstered by incorporating support from multiple sources, as all three sources of social support (parent, teacher, peer) contributed to the development of higher levels of youth LS. Furthermore, as this study did not demonstrate differences in support types within sources as being moderated by gender; similar identified behaviors can be beneficial for both male and female youths.

Emotional support was indicated as the most important supportive behavior across all sources; thus, specific emotional support behaviors appear essential to promote more positive outcomes in youth. Relationships within the school and home contexts should promote trust, empathy, and safety to successfully address youth emotional needs. Additionally, youth should be supported in building meaningful and healthy relationships. Such relationships should naturally foster youth access to informational and instrumental support. Youth who are heard or feel that their needs can be expressed should have greater opportunities for receiving helpful advice and appropriate resources when needed.

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Chapter 25

The Relationship between Happiness and Public Policy: The Opinion of University Students



Graciela Tonon

Introduction

It is a delight and a great honor to have been invited by Prof. Alex Michalos to take part in the Festfricht of Prof. Ruut Veenhoven, so I would like to start by thanking Prof. Michalos for having considered me for this task. Participating in such an important editorial work is a great responsibility, as Prof. Veenhoven is a pioneer in happiness studies and we have all read and studied his books and attended his lectures in different parts of the world.

Since 2018 I have organized and taught an online course at Universidad de Palermo, Argentina, on the study of quality of life and happiness for the building of better societies. The course includes a module on happiness, in which I propose that my students read and study the theoretical approach of Prof. Veenhoven, which they do with great delight. It is for this reason that I considered this a good opportunity to provide Prof. Veenhoven with a brief analysis of the opinions of the students that took the course in 2019—a total of 143 students.

Having reviewed the students' answers one by one, we focused on the relationship drawn and valued by them between public policy, happiness and the community/society. Hence, this chapter explores that pedagogic experience and its results.

I humbly expect this chapter to be of interest to Prof. Veenhoven, as it presents the views of students from Argentina and from another countries of South America.

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Overview of the Online Course

The online course entitled *Quality of Life and Happiness: Building Better Societies* is a pedagogic space that started in 2019 within the framework of the Online Education Program at Universidad de Palermo, Argentina. The Program is led by the Vice-rector of the University, and it is described in the chapter authored by him called: Popovsky, M. (2019) *Online Education and Quality of Life: Universidad de Palermo as a Model of Innovation in Latin America*, which is included in the book *Teaching Quality of Life in Different Domains*, by Graciela Tonon, 2020, Editor, SIR 94 Series, Springer.

This is an elective course offered to all the students of the University, becoming an interdisciplinary pedagogic space. Students from the six schools of the University—Social Sciences, Architecture, Economics, Law, Design and Engineering—enrolled in the course in the first and second term of 2019. In other words, the issue of happiness was studied by students taking the following degree courses: psychology, law, architecture, certified public accounting, business management, advertising, interior design, textile design and clothing, public relations, image and sound design, information technologies, human resources, music production, journalism, international trade, marketing and industrial design.

As noted above, a total of 143 students took the course in 2019. The course includes a module on happiness, with a knowledge integration exercise consisting of a forum where students debate about the need and importance of measuring happiness. In this chapter we analyze the students' opinions provided in that forum. The first significant result we identified is that, out of the 143 students, 42 (29.37% of the total) referred to the relationship between happiness and public policy.

We analyzed the students' opinions using the methodological strategy called thematic analysis, which allows identifying, organizing, analyzing in detail and reporting themes by carefully reading and re-reading the information collected and then obtaining results for a proper understanding and interpretation of the phenomenon under consideration (Braun and Clarke 2006). Thus, this methodological strategy of analysis provides an insight into individuals' experiences, meanings and realities and allows examining the circumstances in which events, realities, meanings and experiences are the effects of discourses operating within society. Braun and Clarke (2006) approach to thematic analysis is organized into the following six phases: familiarizing yourself with the data; generating initial codes; searching for themes; reviewing themes; defining and naming themes; and producing the final report.

We present below the thematic analysis of the students' answers, including some theoretical reflections about such analysis.

Thematic Analysis of the Forum “Measuring Happiness”

In 2019, a total of 143 students from over 20 different degree courses attended the course “Quality of Life and Happiness: Building Better Societies”.

From the students’ participation in the *Forum “Measuring Happiness”*, 42 answers were identified that were centered on the “happiness-public policy” relationship.

We start from Veenhoven’s (2009, p. 279) idea that “happiness is defined as subjective enjoyment of one’s life as a whole”. In addressing happiness, Veenhoven (2009) defines it as an umbrella term to refer to all that is good and, in this sense, the word is often used interchangeably with the terms “well-being” and “quality of life” (Veenhoven 2009, p. 281). However, these concepts are not strictly synonymous.

In order to carry out the thematic analysis of the students’ opinions, in Table 25.1 they are grouped and categorized into three themes

As to the importance of measuring happiness for deciding public policy, the following were the students’ most significant answers:

- *Measuring happiness is important as this allows including the issue in the design of public policies and giving it the importance it deserves.*
- *I didn’t know that there were different methods to measure happiness. I find this very interesting, as I think it can be useful for the implementation of public policies aimed at improving those issues individuals are less satisfied with, and also different tools can be developed for people to improve their subjective well-being.*
- *I hope these measurement systems can be extended to allow the implementation of policies and measures that help people be happier.*
- *It’s possible to measure the well-being of a group so that a given institution or even the state can decide what measures to adopt for the particular needs of the group and thus improve its members’ quality of life.*
- *It’s important to have quantified data to, for example, design better public policies, to have an objective measure of how the country fares in terms of happiness.*
- *It’s indeed possible to measure happiness at the social level; for this purpose, it’s necessary to adopt public policy aimed at freedom, equality and justice.*
- *At a social level, it’s very important to know and measure people’s quality of life, as this allows the design of public policies to improve their well-being.*

Table 25.1 Thematic analysis student’s opinions (Source: made by the author)

| |
|--|
| The importance of measuring happiness for deciding public policy. |
| The creation of public policy aimed at improving justice and citizens’ freedom to enhance happiness. |
| The relationship between happiness, public policy and the community/society. |

Table 25.2 Types of measures of happiness considering Veenhoven's proposal

| Measure of Happiness | Based on |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| Average Happiness | Policies that create greater happiness for a greater number of individuals. |
| Happy Life Years | Policies aimed at achieving enduring happiness; this measure is the most sensitive to the conditions that may be affected by social policy. |
| Inequality of Happiness | Policies aiming at fairness. |
| Inequality Adjusted Happiness (IAH) | Dual purpose policies: fairness and happiness. |

- *It's important to measure citizens' happiness in cities. I believe it's a valuable tool that not only gives people a voice, but it also helps the authorities to make better decisions to improve the quality of life of those living in a particular city.*
- *It's important for governments, as they can collect factual data of the population's level of happiness on the basis of certain public policies.*
- *If the society's opinions and these surveys are given due consideration, we can transform those spaces seen as negative into positive ones and improve citizens' quality of life.*
- *It's a fundamental tool for all societies to have results based on studies for the implementation of public policies aimed at freedom and justice. This helps to build better societies that promote policies conducive to greater happiness for all individuals.*
- *Attempting to assess an individual's subjective well-being is a necessary and valuable goal that contributes to public policy and the political system at large. This helps to enhance individuals' happiness and well-being and improve society's quality of life.*
- *It's important to implement public policy that has a direct impact on individuals' well-being and measure happiness along with other more tangible indicators.*

In this respect, Veenhoven (2009) identified four types of measures of happiness in connection with nations' policies (Table 25.2):

The students provided the following views on the creation of public policy aimed at improving justice and citizens' freedom to enhance happiness:

- *Individuals' happiness can be greatly enhanced by the implementation of policies designed to improve their quality of life, although happiness still depends on each individual and how they absorb their own life experiences, tastes, wishes and needs.*
- *I think that happiness can be improved by means of governmental public policies, which must be aimed at expanding and improving justice and citizens' freedom.*
- *It's possible to achieve happiness with the appropriate public policies, in relation to culture and the local administration of each of such policies.*
- *I think it's interesting that consideration is given to broad aspects such as public policies and to more personal ones such as the psychological aspects that play a*

critical role in an individual's quality of life. This is something that is not taken into account when public policies are designed, as is the case with the importance of mental health.

- *I agree with my classmates that it's important to create public policies for this issue to be properly developed.*
- *Happiness can be enhanced by means of public policies focused on freedom and justice.*
- *I think it's an interesting proposal and I agree that up to a point happiness is subjective, but I believe it's an extremely important factor in our lives that is not given due consideration in certain areas, including politics.*
- *It's necessary to design new public policies and even stop crises affecting people's lives.*

Veenhoven (2001, p. 11) argues that he found in his research a strong relationship between happiness and political freedom indicators, independent of economic affluence. In addition, Veenhoven noted that happy people are usually more interested in politics, their opinions tending to be moderate rather than extreme (Veenhoven 2001, p. 16). According to the author, in order to answer the question of what policies are the most conducive to happiness, it is first necessary to establish what are the determinants of happiness in each country (Veenhoven. 2009, p. 295).

With respect to the relationship between happiness, public policies and the community/society, the students provided the following views:

- *Happiness is also related to the social environment in which we live and develop. Public policies are very important for the development of a community as well as for personal development.*
- *Happiness has an impact on the quality of life of society. As noted by Veenhoven, happiness is feasible for most societies and it can be achieved by means of public policies centered on freedom and justice.*
- *The society in which we live and the people we share things with have a strong impact on our feelings of happiness or unhappiness.*
- *Happy societies are possible with public policies centered on freedom and justice.*
- *In addition, as discussed by one of my classmates, the collective feeling of the people around us or of the society in which we live also contributes to our sense of happiness or unhappiness.*
- *As to happiness in a community, I think that public policy can help to promote a certain degree of happiness as people can have a better quality of life and, consequently, greater happiness.*
- *Happiness is a feeling experienced by individuals after making a favorable judgment of their own life in terms of the quality of life they have, whether this has been achieved with their own resources or with those provided by the state through the implementation of public policies, intervening in society.*

Veenhoven (2001, pp. 12–14) identified a correlation between happiness and the social climate, finding that less prejudiced societies produce happier citizens and that

people are happier in a climate of social peacefulness. The author further identified the existence of links between happiness and social roots, and noted that the greater the social distance in terms of people's education, the less happy citizens are (Veenhoven 2001, p. 17). In addition, Veenhoven noted that happier individuals worry more about social issues (Veenhoven, 2001, p. 15).

Conclusions

Based on the analysis of the students' opinions provided in the forum on the measurement of happiness, which was organized within the framework of the online course on *Quality of Life and Happiness: Building Better Societies* delivered at Universidad de Palermo, Argentina, we can conclude that for 30% of the participants, the relationship between happiness and public policy is not only important but also necessary. This is in line with Veenhoven's (2009, p. 294) statement that "happiness is a realistic goal for public policy".

For this reason, we propose continuing on this path that countries and their governments take into account their citizens' opinions about their needs and problems when deciding public policy.

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Chapter 26

Prospective Well-being, Relative Income and Tolerance of Inequality in Japan



Ming-Chang Tsai

Introduction

Japan has been highly appraised as an ideal society, not solely because of its technological advancement, economic development, and massive wealth. It also has been envied for its social cohesiveness, safety and high quality of life when compared to other Asian or Western societies (Tsai and Iwai 2020). Yet against this background of remarkable socio-economic achievement, DeJonge et al. (2019) found that happiness of the whole Japanese population did not increase appreciably in the past decades. A lesser known fact is that in contemporary Japan, there has been a long trend of widening inequality, measured either in earnings, income, or wealth in the past three decades or so (Kitao and Yamada 2019). Indeed, Japan's income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient or other attitudinal indicators, has been increasing at a fast speed (Tachibanaki 2006; Shirahase 2014). Economic slowdown, inflating realty prices, changing household structure, and an ageing population all play a role in increasingly skewed distribution (Kitao and Yamada 2019; Kumakura and Kojima 2018; Oshio 2006; Tachibanaki 2006). The obstacles to social mobility have been particularly acute for less-educated young people about to enter the labor market (Brinton 2011), which necessarily aggravates inequality between generations, as well as between those who have secured a firm position in established corporations and others who at their best have only grabbed a temporary, precarious job and earned a meager income. Increasing fluidity of the employment relationship has emerged paralleling a conventional sector with a highly stable job market, generating a system of social stratification that not only reduces the size of the middle class but also makes Japan highly segmented (Sato 2010). Whether

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contemporary Japan is heading for a class-divided society is, however, still at issue (Chiavacci 2008; Chiavacci and Hommerich 2016; Asahina *forthcoming*).

Alongside this trend of increasing inequality is a deep culture of Japan in which the society has long been organized in a clearly defined rank order. Workers, companies, and government organizations are placed in a pecking order in which the status and material gains of each person are distributed according to the institutional rules of an age-based social hierarchy. This social order is dissimilar to what has been observed in Western countries, where, to take the US as an example, society is conceived of as a field of game players who compete for rewards, status, and prestige on equal footing; that is, ideally, all game players should not be disadvantaged in any way, and the rules of the game ensure fairness in competition and rewards giving (Caprio 1990; Ohbuchi 2011).

The Japanese pecking order, however, does not seem to justify the widening inequality in society. Indeed, Japanese have become intolerant of the lack of opportunities and inequality, and have demanded policy actions for redistribution (Tachibanaki 2006). Shirahase (2014) argues that what makes Japan a distinctive case is not its unequal distribution, but a high proportion of Japanese people that see themselves as belonging to a lower social stratum and perceive inequality as an acute social problem (cf. Sudo 2019). Yet, despite these general accounts of the level of inequality and societal responses thereto, there is a dearth of empirical evidence about how Japanese perceive inequality and how necessary they see redistribution to be for a fairer, better society. Moreover, unlike recent studies (Kim et al. 2018; Linos and West 2003), this chapter avoids regressing attitudes on attitudes in the research design. Specifically, I test two major hypotheses in explaining Japanese people's aversion to inequality and redistributive preference with objective indicators of the income gap along with important value positions. I argue that in light of tunnel effect theory (Hirschman 1973), perceived lack of prospective mobility in terms of wellbeing leads to intolerance of inequality, which activates a demand for redistribution. Furthermore, an income gap with peers (relative income) is considered a stimulant of a sense of relative deprivation that increases aversion to inequality and leads to demanding redistribution. My empirical analysis provides findings from a recent social survey to better understand the patterns of public opinions about perceived well-being, inequality and preference for redistribution.

Arguments

A basic proposition about social inequality is that a society's tolerance of increasing disparities can be substantial, even though differences in gains among different sectors, classes, or regions tend to become larger with economic growth. Hirschman (1973) proposes a tunnel effect model to explain this somewhat counterintuitive stance among the mass public. For Hirschman, how people see a widening inequality is analogous to two-lane traffic in a tunnel. If my car is stuck in a jam in one lane while cars in the other lane are moving (that is, inequality is emerging), I can feel

better than when both lanes are jammed and no car is moving (that is, equality due to lack of mobility). This is because others' moving cars incite an expectation that sooner or later my car will move. Prospective well-being, defined as expected contentment about one's living conditions in the future (catching up in terms of income, welfare, and so on) evolves so that inequality is acceptable.

Note that Hirschman's tunnel effect model refers to an initial stage of development in a society. Japan obviously passed this take-off stage a good while ago. As early as 1981, Japan's GDP per capita surpassed US\$10,000. It even joined the OECD, the club of the wealthiest countries, much earlier in 1964. However, although the strategy of 'growth along with inequality' may operate nicely for a while, initial gratification may wane when more and more people see themselves as lagging significantly behind peers. Hirschman (1973, p. 561) stated that a "development disaster" in developing societies may happen where a safety valve is lacking or fails, such that inequality escalates to an extent that frustration and alienation become widespread, leading to a surge in demand for fundamental change of the existing order of distribution.

Indeed, it has been suggested (Graham 2009) that tolerance of inequality varies greatly across societies. I thus expect that the tunnel effect has ended in Japan, as the time for initial tolerance has passed, and frustration and a feeling of relative deprivation have grown. Thus, the improved income of others generates aversion to, rather than tolerance of, inequality in contemporary Japan. That is, seeing peers fare better does not bring a wishful expectation, but instead is likely to generate a feeling of relative deprivation. In the early literature on social comparison, Stouffer (Stouffer et al. 1949; Pettigrew 2015) has noted such frustration in his study of the Air Corps of the US in a working environment with rapid promotion. Additionally, an argument is advanced by relative income theory that proposes an opposite hypothesis: information about differences in income of one's peers might incite a sentiment of envy, because the peers are faring better or catching up. The result is a reduced level of contentment with what one has achieved (Clark et al. 2008).

Perception of increasing inequality has substantial implications in policy making. Ohbuchi (2011) observes that in the wake of the collapse of the bubble economy in Japan in the beginning of the 2000s, fairness became a salient issue among the mass public. Distributive policies were increasingly favored, in contrast to a meritocracy that justifies status or achievement disparities by ability and performance. Shirahase (2014) showed a finding from the International Social Survey Program of 1999 that 50.3% of Japanese agreed to the question that it is the role of the government to reduce the extent of income inequality. In contrast, only 35.8% disagreed. From the perspective of the tunnel effect model, in a period of fast economic growth, people tend to "rationalize away" unfairness and inequality issues. Yet, as the Japanese economy appeared to have encountered substantial difficulties in maintaining its momentum in growth, perceived inequality necessarily leads to a greater concern for redistribution.

On the basis of previous discussions, this chapter develops three hypotheses as follows. Figure 26.1 gives a graphic presentation.




Fig. 26.1 Hypotheses and directions of correlation

Hypothesis 1:

Prospective well-being is positively correlated with tolerance of inequality, but is negatively correlated to redistributive preference.

Hypothesis 2:

Relative income is negatively correlated with tolerance of inequality, but is positively correlated with redistributive preference.

Hypothesis 3:

Tolerance of inequality is negatively correlated with redistributive preference.

Data and Measurement

The data are drawn from the International Comparative Survey on Lifestyle and Values in Asia. Overseen by the Center for Social Well-being Studies, Senshu University, Japan, this survey was conducted in 2015. A stratified sample of 11,786 adults (age range 20–69) registered respondents of Nikkei Research Inc. answered questions about their well-being, social capital, and risk and safety network online (International Consortium for Social Well-Being Studies 2020; Yazaki 2016). This dataset provides adequate information which this study needs to test the proposed hypotheses. The participants were stratified by gender, age, and population size of residential cities to match the demographic characteristics of the national census of Japan as of 2010. Only those who report currently having a job are included in the analysis. The subsample comprises 8201 men and women.

Prospective well-being refers to an individual's evaluation of life conditions in the future. It is measured by response to the question: "What do you expect your circumstance will be five years from now compared to your current circumstances?" On a 10-point semantic differential scale showing "will probably be worse" (=0) and "will probably improve" (=10), respondents placed themselves on a suitable

Table 26.1 Descriptive statistics

| | Mean/% | S.D. |
|---------------------------------------|--------|-------|
| Prospective well-being | 4.9 | 2.1 |
| Relative income (in 10,000 yen) | 168.0 | 379.8 |
| Tolerance of inequality | 3.6 | 2.5 |
| Redistributive preference | | |
| by abilities, effort and achievements | 78.9 | |
| by needs | 14.2 | |
| everyone receives the same | 6.9 | |
| Personal income (in 10,000 yen) | 412.8 | 328.5 |
| Sex | | |
| Female | 40.6 | |
| Male | 59.4 | |
| Age | | |
| 20–29 | 18.1 | |
| 30–39 | 25.7 | |
| 40–49 | 21.3 | |
| 50–59 | 21.5 | |
| 60–69 | 13.4 | |
| Education years | 14.9 | 2.1 |
| Occupational status | | |
| Temporary worker | 28.9 | |
| Self-employed/family worker | 12.7 | |
| Permanent worker | 53.8 | |
| Managerial | 4.5 | |
| Married | | |
| Single/Widowed/Divorced | 40.9 | |
| Married | 59.1 | |
| Breadwinner | | |
| No | 34.3 | |
| Yes | 47.2 | |
| Missing | 18.5 | |
| Urbanization | | |
| Town or village | 8.6 | |
| less than 200 thousand in population | 37.5 | |
| more than 200 thousand in population | 24.4 | |
| Ordinance-designated city | 29.3 | |
| Missing | 0.2 | |

point. Higher scores indicate expectation of a better future condition (see Table 26.1 for descriptive statistics).

Relative income is calculated by the estimated yearly income of “those graduated from the last school [the respondent] attended” minus the income of the respondent. This figure ranges widely, ranging between –21,500 and 49,750 thousand yen

(mean=1,680,000). To reduce the influence of the scale, I decided to use the standard scores of this variable in estimation.

In tapping tolerance of inequality, I used the question “the income gap is currently too big”. Its measurement is the same as prospective well-being, with “strongly agree” = 0, while “strongly disagree” = 10. Higher scores show more tolerance.

To measure the attitudinal preference for redistribution, I regrouped responses to the following statement about the “opinions on who should have high status and financial wealth”. The original design comprises five different responses. I considered the choice of (1) “People should only receive as much as they *need*” and (2) “Everyone should receive the *same amount*” to be supportive of redistribution of wealth because either one favors allocation of societal resources for those in need or for the sake of sheer equality. From a comparative viewpoint, the latter appear to be more radical than the former—it favors levelling off inequality by giving the same amount to each person in an unconditional manner. On the other hand, the following three responses were grouped together to represent an unsupportive group: (1) People should receive more based on (1) their *achievements*; (2) their *effort*; and (3) *innate abilities*. The three expressions all justify disparities in gains and rewarding a person according to personal performance, abilities or efforts. In operation, the three major groupings are used as an ordinal variable for indicating differential degrees in support of redistribution.

Several demographic backgrounds are included in estimation. In addition to gender (male = 1), age (four age groups compared), education (measured in years), marital status (single, widowed and divorced, and married, with the latter being the reference group), occupation (manager, self-employed/family business worker, or permanent worker, compared to temporary worker), and yearly income (logarithm taken). I also consider the size of the city of residence. On the basis of the original design, four types of city are differentiated: (1) small town or village, (2) city with a population of less than 200,000, (3) city with a population larger than 200,000 and less than 500,000, (4) the “ordinance-designated cities” (population > 500,000). The latter are usually large cities in which the prefectural governments are located and public services are provided. Town and village are used as the reference group in estimation.

In the section of analysis that follows, I will first report descriptive statistics to show the level of perceived future well-being, relative income, and attitudes toward inequality and redistribution. I then perform regression analysis to test the proposed hypotheses.

Results and Analysis

Do the Japanese people look forward to a better life condition in the near future? Table 26.1 reports that on a ten-point scale, their average score is around the midpoint (5). This is frankly not indicative of perception of a brighter future to come, but signals a gloomy outlook among the working people in this wealthy

country. Relative income registers an average of 1,680,000 yen yearly, indicating that most Japanese believe their peers from the last school they attended fare much better now than they do in financial terms. It is found that tolerance of inequality is low, which is 3.6 on a 10-point scale. As for the three possible policy choices for redistribution, most Japanese opt for meritocracy, that is, allocation should be based on an individual's innate abilities or what he or she has accomplished. 14.2 percent of the working population endorse a radical option of "to each according to his need". Moreover, 6.9% percent of the respondents believe that everyone should receive the same, which represents an idealistic preference for a society without inequality.

Table 26.2 reports the estimation result for tolerance of inequality with the ordinary least squares techniques (see column 1). Prospective well-being as is perceived by respondents has a positive association with tolerance of inequality (supporting H1). From the tunnel effect viewpoint, this can be interpreted as inequality being less of a concern when one expects better life conditions to arrive in future. However, when relative income¹ becomes larger, the respondent tends to have less tolerance of inequality, which is opposite to the tunnel effect hypothesis but is favorable to the first prediction of H2. Moreover, higher personal income,² indicating stronger economic security, leads to greater tolerance of inequality.

This equation also evaluates the influence of several important covariates. While sex and age show little influence, education is a strong predictor. Respondents with more education appear to be in favor of a greater income gap. This is understandable because they, with better human capital, expect more returns from the labor market. Those holding a managerial or professional position are slightly in favor of a large income gap, but this difference (compared to temporary workers) is *not* significant in statistical terms. It is self-employed or family workers who are more likely to have higher tolerance of inequality. In the original design, this group is composed of business owners and those working for family enterprises. Conventionally, they are inclined to be protecting their "own" interest or profits and are hesitant about redistribution. For them, income difference should be maintained between the haves and have nots (Linos and West 2003). Those who are married do not show difference from those who are not. Breadwinners are less tolerant of a large income gap. Those who live in large cities are more likely to favor inequality, probably due to their immersion in the increased income gap of people living in cities.

Because preference for redistribution is a choice of three categories which express different magnitudes of social redistribution, this outcome variable is coded as an ordinal variable. To better capture this predilection, I performed ordered logistic

¹Many respondents were not able to provide information about income of their classmates, the missing information (3064 cases) of which, along with those of other covariates, reduced the number of observations in the equation to 4812. Because these missing values should not be seen as random, I did not perform any imputation for remedy. This limitation is noted in the concluding section.

²Although personal income is correlated with relative income ($r = -0.56$), this level of association does not affect the stability of the estimation in equation. The variance inflation factor was below 5.

Table 26.2 Tolerance of inequality and redistribution in Japan

| | Tolerance of inequality ^a | Redistributive preference ^b |
|---|--------------------------------------|--|
| Prospective well-being | 0.14*** (0.02) | -0.08*** (0.02) |
| Relative income | -0.11* (0.05) | 0.01 (0.05) |
| Tolerance of inequality | | -0.13*** (0.02) |
| Personal income (ln) | 0.33*** (0.06) | -0.20** (0.06) |
| Male | 0.18 (0.10) | 0.03 (0.10) |
| Age (Ref: 20–29) | | |
| 30–39 | 0.19 (0.12) | 0.18 (0.12) |
| 40–49 | 0.14 (0.13) | 0.15 (0.13) |
| 50–59 | -0.14 (0.13) | 0.32* (0.14) |
| 60–69 | -0.28 (0.16) | 0.20 (0.16) |
| Education years | 0.10*** (0.02) | -0.03 (0.02) |
| Occupational status (Ref: Temporary worker) | | |
| Self-employed/family worker | 0.31* (0.13) | 0.24 (0.12) |
| Permanent worker | 0.17 (0.11) | 0.01 (0.11) |
| Managerial | 0.30 (0.19) | -0.14 (0.20) |
| Married | 0.06 (0.10) | -0.21* (0.10) |
| Breadwinner | -0.27* (0.11) | 0.17 (0.11) |
| Urbanization (Ref: Town or village) | | |
| Less than 200 thousand in pop. | 0.19 (0.14) | -0.24 (0.13) |
| More than 200 thousand in pop. | 0.28 (0.15) | -0.20 (0.14) |
| Ordinance-designated city | 0.51*** (0.15) | -0.15 (0.14) |
| Constant | -0.99 (0.39) | |

(continued)

Table 26.2 (continued)

| | Tolerance of inequality ^a | Redistributive preference ^b |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|
| Adj. R^2 /Pseudo R^2 | 0.06 | 0.03 |
| N | 4812 | 4812 |

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

^acoefficients from the least squares regression

^bcoefficients from the ordered logistic regression

regression for estimation. The outcomes are shown in column 2 of Table 26.2. Those who are optimistic about future life conditions are less likely to endorse redistribution (supporting H1). Relative income has only trivial influence (failing to support the second prediction in H2). In comparison, personal income has a strong effect, because those having higher income tend to decisively disfavor redistribution. As is expected in H3, tolerance of inequality is negatively correlated with redistribution.

Demographic background has limited influence. One notable effect is observed for the age group 50–59, who are in favor of redistribution when compared to those aged under 29. Interestingly, this group also reports higher relative income than others (not shown in Table 26.2 to save space). It thus seems that relative deprivation might play a role in understanding why this group is in favor of redistribution. In addition, redistribution is less favored by those who are married, probably because they have a greater concern for keeping what they have earned for household spending.

It is possible that when relative income is smaller (that is, a lesser income gap with peers), tolerance of inequality might have a reduced effect in disfavoring redistribution. To check this possible effect, I generated an interaction term (relative income \times tolerance of inequality) and estimated it along with other covariates in the equation. However, the result is not substantial (not shown to save space). Thus, both predictors are additive in terms of their influence on redistribution.

Conclusion

The quality of life, both of the individual and the collective, is a function of a livable environment (Veenhoven 2007). Accumulative evidence from quality of life research in past decades on what makes for desirable, livable conditions, in short, a *good society*, has arrived at a consensus that although multilayered and many-sided, it in reality can be approached from a select number of objective and subjective indicators, such as the Human Development Index (UNDP 2019), Weighted Index of Social Progress (Estes 2019), Happy Life-expectancy Index (Veenhoven 1996), Sustainable Society Index (Sustainable Society Foundation 2014), and many other exemplary indexes (Michalos and Hatch 2020). What characterizes this tradition of *grand* comparative projects is an enthusiastic exploration into the secret of societal happiness and intensive investigation of causal

processes of what makes a society ideal for human living and flourishing (Estes 2019; Estes and Sirgy 2019; Land and Michalos 2017; Laurent 2018).

In light of, rather than in contrast to, this comparative tradition, this chapter proposes a distinct approach, focusing on a single society, to see whether the mass public see a good society of their own. By using Japan as a study case, this chapter contributes a fine-grained specification of the potential relationships among prospective well-being, perceived income gap and redistributive preference. Empirical analysis of a large sample obtained by way of online survey arrives at two major findings. First, the working Japanese appear to hold a somewhat pessimistic view about their living condition and evaluate the income gap in society as substantial. The mass public seem to consider Japan problematic. Second, the Japanese experienced relative income (income difference from their peers) in a way that reduced their tolerance of inequality. In a relevant study, Harada and Sumi (2020) documented that Japanese reported a reduced level of life satisfaction when their income is lower than their peers. The advancement of peers in terms of income does not constitute a signal as is comprehended by the tunnel effect perspective. That is, knowing their peers are faring better financially, the Japanese do not therefore develop an expectation that their income will increase. Rather, intolerance of income gap appears, probably out of envy and relative deprivation. Finally, tolerance of inequality, which appears to be low among Japanese, incites an opting for redistribution in a more fundamental manner, as was observed in previous research (Kim et al. 2018). Yet the majority of Japanese remain loyal to the current meritocratic system of reward allocation. This has an implication that institutional changes may arrive slowly, as the mass public do not seem to envision an action plan despite widespread discontent over growing disparities of income.

Some limitations are noted. Respondents this study recruited by way of online survey represent a better-educated urban middle class rather than a national sample. Thus, this finding is somewhat exploratory. Also, measurement of prospective well-being relies on a single indicator. Future research can improve upon this by measuring it as a multi-faceted phenomenon. Third, choice of redistribution in the original design listed some items that seem to be utopian (distribution according to needs or “all receive the equal amount”) for Japan. This might deter those who are in favor if other ‘doable’ policy choices are provided. Despite these limitations, this chapter offers one first attempt to understand how Japanese perceive of their future well-being and how this perception affects their attitudinal inclination toward inequality and redistribution to achieve a better society.

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Chapter 27

A Passion for Happiness: Ruut Veenhoven, Eudaimonia and the Good Life



Joar Vittersø

Every man hath . . . a variety of particular affections, passions and appetites to particular external objects . . . distinct from the pleasure arising from them.

Bishop Butler (cited in Duncker, 1941, p. 393)

Introduction

Everything alive searches for goodness. And Ruut Veenhoven is no exception. During a long and truly amazing career, Ruut has added more to the study of happiness than most of us can hope for. One of the lasting contributions come from his insistence that in order to understand happiness, our thinking must be grounded in a broad conceptualization of goodness, one that also includes moral reasoning (e.g., Kainulainen et al. 2018; Veenhoven 2009, 2020). According to this framework, goodness can be arranged within a two (outer vs inner) by two (life-chances vs life-results) scheme in which only the inner life-result quadrant counts as happiness (Table 27.1). Hence, what Veenhoven refers to as overall happiness can be defined as “the degree to which an individual judges the overall quality of his or her life-as-a-whole favorably. In other words: how much he likes the life he leads.” (Veenhoven 1984, p. 22). In this vocabulary, terms like wellbeing, quality of life and happiness in the broadest sense of the word are used interchangeable, whereas the term overall happiness is used as a synonym for satisfaction and subjective wellbeing.

An intriguing point about Veenhoven’s theory is the way in which elements of monist and a dualist approaches to wellbeing are merged into a third and alternative conceptualization. Before this idea is examined in detail, a few words about monism, dualism and pluralism about happiness may turn out useful.

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Table 27.1 Four qualities of life (adapted from Veenhoven 2000)

| | Outer qualities | Inner qualities |
|--------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| Life chances | Livability of environment | Life-ability of the person |
| Life results | Utility of life | Satisfaction |

Wellbeing monists believe that there can only exist one kind of goodness in the world, a view well known from hedonism (only pleasure reflects intrinsic goodness), and desire satisfactionism (only the fulfillment of an individual's desires or preferences counts as goodness). Both hedonism and satisfactionism cohere with the idea of maximization; the more pleasures experienced, or desires satisfied, the better. Dualists, on the other hand, combine the pleasure part of hedonism and the satisfaction part of desire satisfactionism, into a (no longer -ism) approach to suggests that wellbeing is about both pleasure (in the sense of a feeling state) and life satisfaction (in the sense of evaluating whether or not a person has gotten what he or she wants or aspires to in life). The approach can be recognized in Kahneman's distinction between an experiencing self and a remembering self (Kahneman and Riis 2005), and in Diener's conceptualization of subjective wellbeing (SWB; Diener 1984). Here it is suggested that pleasure and satisfaction are related, but separable elements of a good life.¹ However, no procedure to integrate or rank order the two elements have currently been agreed upon.

Finally, a pluralist position can be identified as a wellbeing taxonomy with more than two dimensions. The number of *elements* within a particular pluralist approach varies, and—more problematically—the number of pluralist *approaches* to the good life is about to grow out of hand. This unfortunate situation of dividing the concept of happiness into an endless number of new, and often idiosyncratic, lists of “components” has been referred to as a Balkanization of wellbeing research (Sheldon 2018). Hence, pluralism comes at the risk of violating the scientific ideal of simplicity.

Veenhovian Happiness

The position proposed by Ruut Veenhoven is elegant in the sense that it avoids the problem of Balkanization, while it, at the same time, allows for a rather broad inclusion of relevant biological, psychological and social mechanisms that contribute to establish the concept of “Veenhovian happiness.” This is partly achieved by conceiving pleasure and satisfaction,² not as competing ingredients in an either

¹Pleasure is in this context often is treated as a synonym for positive affect. As a component of wellbeing, pleasure can be further divided into the sub-dimensions of positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA), comprising a tree-legged rather than a two-legged model. For simplicity, however, I consider PA and NA as a bipolar affect balance dimension in the present chapter.

²Also referred to as hedonic level of affect and contentment, respectively.




Fig. 27.1 Veenhovian happiness as caused by human nature and culture and the interactions between them. (Adapted from Veenhoven 2009)

pleasure-only or satisfaction-only account of wellbeing, but rather as two interacting components. The interactions take place at multiple junctions in a vertically organized taxonomy grounded in human nature and culture. As illustrated in Fig. 27.1, the final product of these interactions is a one-dimensional happiness concept.

Further, the homogenous concept of overall happiness makes it well suited for maximization, an attribute normally earmarked for monist approaches. Without a proper theory to suggest how distinct dimensions should be weighted against each other, dualists and pluralists cannot justify how wellbeing comprises a value to be maximized (e.g., Arrow 1987). The component integration in Veenhovian happiness also makes it relevant as an informed, moral argument. After all, the prescriptive credo of classical utilitarianism is for us to act as maximizers in such a way that the consequences result in the greatest happiness—for the greatest number (e.g., Driver 2014).

In order to evaluate Veenhoven’s classification of human goodness, a closer look at his reasoning may be helpful. The unidimensionality of the approach stems from a series of interactions between affects and thoughts. First, as sentient beings, humans experience a continuous stream of feelings, some pleasant and some unpleasant (e.g., Damasio 2018; Kahneman 1999). Second, humans also make cognitive judgments about the goodness and badness of these feelings, along with other evaluations regarding the quality of their existence.

In Veenhovian happiness, the biological part of these processes is primarily associated with basic human needs. When these are fulfilled, a pleasant feeling is

generated in the body proper, and broadcasted to our minds. A pleasant feeling such perceived, operates as a messenger that informs us that our bodies—for the moment—are well taken care of. A mechanism that works like this is also a functional motivator, in the sense that it enables sentient beings to move away from unfortunate circumstances and towards a normal or more favorable state (Cabanac 2009).

Meanwhile, these subjective feelings blend with cultural standards about goodness, rightfulness and justice. The positive experiences associated with habits of, for instance, eating, drinking and keeping our bodies fit are augmented by cultural processes, particularly the widespread conviction that what “our group” is doing, is “the best and right way of doing things” (e.g., Kagan 1998; Tomasello 2016). The valuations of information that signifies the goodness of what we do or who we are, kicks in very early in the human ontogenesis (Tomasello 2019). It is further developed and maintained during the process of socialization. Hence, our cultural nature creates judgmental mechanisms that can overrule individual experiences grounded in our biological body. Humans are ready to evaluate painful experiences as something good and pleasant experiences as something bad. Examples could be a preference to be painfully stabbed by a needle, in order to get a tattoo, the wish to endure the displeasure of keeping a diet, or the guilt of having an extramarital affair. Sometimes such culturally derived standards of goodness can take extreme forms, as in circumcision or foot-binding (Edgerton 1992).

In Veenhoven’s taxonomy, this culturally based process is referred to as contentment. The concept intends to explain the satisfaction associated with the realization of a person’s wants (rather than needs) and how these wants are influenced by cultural standards and comparisons with others. A field experiment by David Card and colleagues may serve as an example (Card et al. 2012). Here, a randomly selected group of employees at the University of California was made aware of a website revealing the salaries of all workers at the university. Shortly afterwards, Card’s research group surveyed the university staff. Compared with colleagues with above average salaries, those earning less showed a jobs satisfaction decrease when learning about their relative income status. A follow-up study after three years further revealed that more people in the below average salary group had left their jobs. This effect was not found in a below average salary control group that was not made aware of the income website.

In Veenhovian happiness, both the hedonic level of affect and the processes involved in contentment influences overall happiness, but the former plays a more important role. The dominating cause of self-reported life satisfaction/overall happiness comes from feelings and not from thinking. Inspired by researchers like Zajonc (1980) and his credo that “preferences need no inferences,” Veenhoven’s model goes on to argue that the basic role of a pleasant experience is to inform us that a need has been fulfilled. Thus, what feels good is also functionally good. A thriving body will produce positive affect, which in turn gives a favorable balance between pleasures and pains. The impact of this hedonic tone on overall happiness may vary, but it generally contributes more to overall happiness than the cognitive comparison of one’s lives against some set of standards. A nice

illustration of the affect dominance in overall happiness comes from Røysamb, Nes, Czajkowski, and Vassend (2018), who used a large data set that included measures of life satisfaction and the 30 facets of the five factor model of personality. The authors showed that the important predictors of life satisfaction were the facets of depression, anxiety, positive emotions and activity. This result demonstrates that the avowal of life satisfaction/overall happiness is dominated by affective sources. This conclusion corroborates with previous studies. For example, Robinson (2000) found that mood provides a nexus through which the circumstances in life affect a person's contentment. Similarly, Eid and Diener (2004) used a sophisticated empirical design to analyze the relation between reported mood and life satisfaction. They found that the correlation between the two was 0.74. Hence, it seems fair to conclude that a hedonic disposition constitutes a significant part of overall happiness.

A Eudaimonic Perspective

Those of us who believe that a distinction should be made between hedonic and eudaimonic forms of happiness are pluralists about wellbeing. The plurality is particularly evident in philosophical eudaimonism, claiming as it does that only a perfect or complete life can be a happy life (e.g., Fletcher 2015). A truly eudaimon person lacks nothing that would make his or her life better, thus ancient thinkers typically held that happiness consists in a balanced mixture of all kinds of good (Tatarkiewicz 1976). Formally, such a completeness about happiness has been articulated as a situation in which “there is no good, X, not identical to happiness, such that X plus happiness is better for someone to possess than happiness alone” (Kraut 2015).

Nussbaum (2008) discusses how the notion of complete happiness contradicts the concept of life satisfaction, as this is handled in the mainstream literature on SWB. Given the variety of experiences and other valuable conditions in life, she argues, wellbeing researchers are actually bullying people by asking them to aggregate experiences and judgments from all stripes of life and thus “force” the survey participants to report this heterogeneity as a single satisfaction with life-as-a-whole response. Nussbaum follows up on her argument by confessing that “if I ever notice myself feeling feelings of satisfaction, I blame myself and think that, insofar as I have those feelings, I am like Mill’s “pig satisfied” or Aristotle’s “dumb grazing animals,” and thus, reflectively, I report dissatisfaction with my life as a whole” (Nussbaum 2008, p. s83).

The preference for being Socrates dissatisfied rather than a fool satisfied (Mill 2001)³ unveils a grim inconsistency, at least when held by a utilitarian like Mill. The

³In a 2001 edition of *Utilitarianism*, Mill’s phrase is: “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig,

inconsistency is between the claim that more pleasure is always better than less, and the competing idea that an unpleasant life can be better than a pleasant life. Two similar paradoxes can be observed in SWB research, including Veenhovenian happiness.

First, a one-dimensional conception of pleasure is unable to account for the quality and experiential variety that unfolds in human lives. Something homogenous cannot preserve heterogeneity, and phenomenological richness may in itself be important for the quality of a human life. Second, if affect balance dominates the thinking part of overall happiness, the rational basis of the “having all wants realized” element in cognitive wellbeing will (more or less) be eliminated. I will discuss the two paradoxes below.

Pleasure and the Quality of Feelings

The literature on pleasure is amazingly large and contradictory. Hence, the claim that a straightforward conceptualization of wellbeing can be achieved by reducing it to the experience of pleasure—alternatively to pleasant experiences plus life satisfaction—is misleading: The word pleasure is simply applied to too many different things. Among the many meanings to which pleasure has been applied, I will concentrate on only two. One is referred to as a common currency perspective, the other as a common factor perspective.

The common currency approach is hinted at in the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of pleasure as: “the condition of consciousness or sensation induced by the enjoyment or anticipation of what is felt or viewed as good or desirable” (Simpson and Weiner 1989). A bit more unpacked, the dictionary message aligns with James Mill’s early attempt to tell us what pleasure is:

I have one sensation, then another, and then another. The first is of such a kind, that I care not whether it is long or short; the second is of such a kind that I would put an end to it instantly if I could; the third is of such a kind that I like it prolonged. To distinguish these feelings I give them names. I call the first Indifferent; the second, Painful; the third, Pleasurable; very often, for shortness, I call the second, Pain, the third, Pleasure. (Cited in Sumner 1996, p. 90)

James Mill’s successor and friend, Jeremy Bentham, was also an early advocate of the common currency position. He believed that all positive experiences comprise a dimension that corresponds to “an agreeable or disagreeable sensation whose purely phenomenal qualities will provide an index of the (positive or negative) impact of the experience on our happiness.” (cited in Sumner 1996, p. 109). More recently, Frijda has defended a modern version of this position. He takes pleasure to be a general signal about bodily harmony, with no characteristic feeling tone.

are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.” (Mill 2001, p. 9).

Pleasure is not a feeling quality, but rather a “gloss of niceness” or “a specific irreducible experience” Frijda tells us (2010, p. 100).

Yet, the most detailed theory of pleasure as a common currency that I know of is worked out by Cabanac (e.g., Cabanac 1992, 2009, 2014). It suggests that pleasure is one of three dimensions of a feeling state. The first is quality, which identifies the nature of an object as virtually presented in mental space. The second dimension is intensity, which describes the magnitude of a feeling state. The third dimension is hedonicity, which is pleasure or displeasure. The hedonic dimension indicates the usefulness of a particular stimulus or situation, thus it motivates us to seek or avoid the object of our pleasure or displeasure. In order to be able to prioritize among competing behaviors, humans need a cue to suggest which is the better. Hedonicity is that cue. In this capacity, pleasure works as a common currency in the sense of enabling an organism to move from an unfavorable state to a favorable one.

To illustrate the distinction between the common currency dimension and the quality dimension of a feeling state, Cabanac (2010) uses the experience of body temperature. When being cold, taking a hot shower is felt as both warm and pleasant. By contrast, when the body is warm, a hot shower still feels warm, but now it is also experienced as unpleasant. The point is that the quality part of the experience is invariant while the pleasantness varies with the context. Thus, an important distinction between a feeling quality and hedonicity is that the former provides information about the kind of situation the experiencing person is in, whereas pleasure informs him or her about the goodness of that situation.

Meanwhile, the distinction between hedonicity and feeling quality is seldom articulated in the wellbeing literature. Here, pleasure is typically regarded as an overarching concept that reflects a subset of feeling qualities seen as favorable. Pleasure is used as a synonym for positive affect in the sense being a common factor of positive emotions, moods or feeling states.⁴ A widespread practice in this research domain is to simply lump a set of responses to measures of feelings/emotions/moods/affects into a composite score, and refer to it as positive affect or pleasure. The problem with such a procedure is that both the phenomenology and functionality of the many feeling qualities that unfold in a human’s life disappear (e.g., Tugade et al. 2014). The common factor approach misses out on both the experiential richness and behavioral consequences of a varied emotional life.

Some of us believe that a eudaimonic approach to wellbeing compensates for some of the limitations of the common factor approach. Vittersø (2016) has for instance proposed that a distinction can be made between two separate kinds of positive feelings. He refers to them as hedonic and eudaimonic feeling states. The idea is grounded in the seemingly trivial observation that simple things often are experienced as joyful or pleasurable, whereas complex things typically are experienced as interesting and engaging. According to this view, pleasant feelings indicate

⁴Affect, mood, emotion and feeling are often used interchangeably in the SWB literature. Mixing these quite distinct phenomena into an undifferentiated category illustrates once again the how wrong happiness researchers are when they consider SWB to be clearly conceptualized.

a kind of “simple goodness,” which serves the function of maintaining homeostatic stability. The feelings involved in “complex goodness,” are different. Complex goodness is experienced as interesting, engaging, awesome, or as being immersed in the task of overcoming a challenge. These feelings motivate for a temporal departure from the comfort zone of pleasant stability, and establish an emotional mindset that makes it easier for us to stretch out and grow as individuals and citizens. Although these feelings have a distinct phenomenology and functionality, their uniqueness tend to disappear in mainstream measures of positive affect. To give an empirical illustration, consider a survey that asks how frequent participants experience happiness and interest in their lives. If the items are presented in the standard way, i.e., one listed after the other on a multi-item Likert scale, the correlation between happiness and interest will typically be in the range of 0.70–0.80. However, if the survey design is changed, so that the participants first are asked to give an example of a situation in which they typically experience a happy feeling, and ditto for an interesting feeling, then the correlation drops to somewhere between 0.30 and 0.40 (Vittersø 2015). Hence, unless care is taken when measured, eudaimonic feelings tend to fuse with the more dominant hedonic feelings into a single factor of positive affect. The consequence is that situational cues provided by feeling qualities get lost. Information from bodily feelings; this is cold or that is sweet, and from mental feelings; this is an opportunity to learn (interest) or here is a person in need of care (empathy), disappears from the information we collect in order to analyze the quality of people’s lives.

In summary, wellbeing research runs the risk of throwing the baby out with the bath water if experiential richness is replaced with the “all-of-a piece” concept of affect balance—reflected in a common currency perspective or a common factor perspective. Both approaches leave us with a hedonic element that represents a signal that evolved to assist us in making quick priorities between behavioral options on a momentary basis. Should such a signal count as the only significant part of human experiences? If the answer is yes, ingredients that might be essential for a good life, such as contextual elements, phenomenological richness and being fully functioning, disappears from what we mean by being well.

The “Cognitive” Component

In wellbeing research, the notion of a one-dimensional affect balance plays the same role as utility plays in economics (Skidelsky and Skidelsky 2013). In principle, however, this extreme reductionism can be avoided by adding other elements to the happiness equation. Veenhoven’s concept of contentment is such an addition. An individual may for instance conceive phenomenological richness, the significance of context, and the value of being fully functioning as something he or she truly wants, and thus be contented only to the degree that these elements are realized. Indeed, a common interpretation of life satisfaction is precisely that the concept is able to sum up the realization of all important goals and values in a person’s life.

Helliwell and colleagues argue for example that the responses people give to questions about life satisfaction “is based on their focus on life as a whole, thereby permitting economics, health, trust, freedom and social relations to be *consistently* (italics added) taken into account, using survey-based life evaluations as the research base to establish what matters most” (Helliwell et al. 2014, p. 3). Similarly, the so-called Sarkozy Commission grounded their notion of wellbeing in the belief that people’s own judgment, as measured by a survey item about life satisfaction, “is a convenient shortcut and potentially provides a *natural way* (italics added) to aggregate various experiences in a way that reflects people’s own preferences. Further, this approach makes it possible to reflect the diversity of people’s views about what is important in their lives (Stiglitz et al. 2009, p. 145).

The assumption revealed in these quotes expresses a rather unrealistic faith in the human capacity to sort out, prioritize and compare goals and values in life. Indeed, if we really had such mental abilities, the hedonicity component in our lives would have been redundant. Think about what this approach expect from survey participants in terms of mental capacities: When asked about his or her life satisfaction, a person will be able—naturally and reflectively—to organize and compare all important diversities in life, and then—consistently—transform the answer into a number on a 0–10 scale. And all this information is processed within a couple of seconds⁵.

What a moment of natural reflection should afford instead, however, is a recognition that such a cognitive capacity is—consistently—beyond our reach. To get an idea about how far off the “all thing considered” assumption in life satisfaction research really is, consider Johnson-Laird, Girotto, and Legrenzi (2004) detailed account of the time required to process logical comparisons. Given that 100 propositions were to be compared, it will take over 40 thousand million years to systematically compare them all.⁶ The reason is that 100 dual propositions allows for 2^{100} possibilities, which is an unconceivably large number of comparisons to make. Clearly, what wellbeing researchers actually look at when analyzing data on satisfaction must be something quite different from what the definition suggests.⁷ Hence, to get the concept of life satisfaction straight, a very different idea of what it represents must be worked out.

If the information supplied from happiness surveys cannot be described as people’s overall, cognitive evaluation of their lives taken as whole, what are we then observing? Kahneman (2011) suggests that these scales tap into some kind of heuristic people use as a substitute for the assumed comparison of realized wants against actual wants. One frequently used heuristic, Kahneman argues, is the substitution of life satisfaction with current mood. Hence, an item that asks: “How

⁵For an analysis of response times in happiness surveys, see Robinson and Klein (2018).

⁶If the propositions are dual (requiring only a yes or no answer) and one spends one millionth of a second per comparison.

⁷This lack of validity constitutes yet another argument against the common claim about mainstream SWB as clearly conceptualized.

satisfied are you with your life as a whole” might be substituted with a question that asks: “What is my mood right now”.

Other kinds of heuristics may also be involved. For instance, it has long been known that people asked to make holistic judgments about multidimensional stimuli, typically make use of fewer cues than they say they do (Slovic and Lichtenstein 1971). Such a “simplification heuristic” corroborates with observations showing that people are reluctant to make deeper analyses of the item they are about to answer (e.g., Tetlock 1992). Rather than thinking each question through, survey responses are typically produced relatively spontaneously and automatized (Gilovich et al. 2005).

Still, some wellbeing researchers argue, a quick and spontaneous survey response could, in principle, reflect a complex evaluation. Oishi (2012) reasoned for instance that a speedy life satisfaction response could be valid if it is well-practiced. Given that we frequently reflect upon the quality of our lives, we will also have easy access to the relevant information needed for a thought-through reply—even when it comes quickly. Indeed, some studies show that most people think about happiness quite often (e.g., Freedman 1978, p. 4). However, Freedman also noticed that people tend to “avoid thinking about happiness too seriously” (p. 5). Few people, he claims, “spend much time considering the elements that may go into happiness” (p. 10).

A skeptic about the validity of life satisfaction measures finds further support for his or her doubt in Cantril’s classic studies Cantril (1965). Today, Cantril’s name is associated with measures of life satisfaction, particularly the so-called “Cantril ladder.” His major research interest was, however, not life satisfaction as modern wellbeing research defines it, but about what Cantril referred to as *value satisfaction*. Hence, the original ladder, entitled the “Self-Anchoring Striving Scale,” was designed to survey the many distinct values that people around the world would report—as important to them (in an open response format). The diversity of values registered in Cantril’s cross-cultural study, comprising nearly 20,000 participants from 13 countries, was categorized into 145 distinct “life values.” It was in relation to these, self-defined values, that participants reported their position on the ladder. When the original ladder (measuring the extent to which people had realized their most important life values) was compared with a life satisfaction version of the scale, the correlation turned out to be a moderate $r = 0.32$ (Cantril 1965, p. 265⁸). In other words, these data does not leave much empirical support for the assumption that life satisfaction captures what people value most in lives.

In sum, the arguments presented above illustrate that the concept of life satisfaction hardly endorses a rational calculation of what a person wants compared to what has been realized, neither does it capture a complex evaluation of the respondent’s life as a whole. Some mix between a mood state and a snap judgment, seems to be a better description of what the concept is able to explain. A clear drawback of this conceptualization, however, is that it does not account for important qualities in a person’s life, such as phenomenological richness and the importance of being able to

⁸This analysis was only conducted on a subsample of US Americans.

develop skills and personal capabilities. The difference between such a narrow and a fuller kind of happiness is captured by MacIntyre's (2007) distinction between "man-as-he-happens-to-be" and "man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature." Finally, hedonic wellbeing is silent about the reasons for our happiness—a limitation of the approach when confronted with the argument that happy feelings only indicates quality in life if it is experienced for the right reasons.

A Brief Note on Morality

The final aspect of Veenhovian happiness to be treated in this chapter regards morality. The strong hedonic component in the theory qualifies as morally utilitarianism, more precisely as a variant known as 'Rule-Utilitarianism' (e.g., Veenhoven 2020). There is no reality ground, Veenhoven argues, "for rejecting the greatest happiness principle as a moral lead" (Veenhoven 2009).⁹

Not quite right, a sceptic might dispute. If what a person finds pleasure in—or what he or she wants from life—is harmful to others, hedonism is bad rather than good. Eudaimonic happiness, by contrast, can only be achieved by a person who both lives well and do well (morally and otherwise), or by "being well and doing well in being well" as (MacIntyre 2007) formulates it.

A utilitarian may counter, and say that the consequences at stake in hedonism is not the maximum happiness of a single individual, but the sum (or average) for the greatest number of humans (or perhaps all sentient beings?).¹⁰ But this addition creates a new list of problems. To move from a moral obligation that asks you to maximize your own happiness to one that demands you to seek the happiness of everyone is a dramatic step to take (e.g., Churchland 2018). On what ground should a person be convinced that he or she is better off by serving others in such a way?

A further, and more serious objection to the greatest happiness for the greatest number principle, has to do with human rights. The classical illustration of letting a minority suffer to increase the happiness of a majority is a well-known objection to utilitarianism. The idea that the greatest pleasure for the greatest number is the only value to care about, leaves all of us unprotected in our capacities of being individuals. According to utilitarianism, an unspecified number of individuals must be ready to suffer, even severely, in the service of a "Common Good." The eudaimonic

⁹The statement is from the abstract. It is not part of the book chapter, but from a draft version retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228364106_3_How_do_we_assess_how_happy_we_are_Tenets_implications_and_tenability_of_three_theories.

¹⁰Taken literally and to its extreme, the idea of maximization can only be achieved by eliminating all those whose happiness are below the absolute top score. Alternatively if a sumscore is preferred, an endlessly large population with a happiness balance tilting microscopically towards the positive side of zero must be preferred to any substantially smaller population—no matter how happy the latter is. As these grotesque thought experiments illustrate, maximization can never be upheld as a sole moral value.

alternative, at least in its Aristotelian version, protests sharply against these utilitarian principles. Rather than striving to maximize a single value, eudaimonism suggests that a balance should be found between a multitude of more or less competing values and goals. A universal moral rule will never be the trick of solving moral problems, and goodness cannot be found by selecting one value and then maximizing it. By contrast, eudaimon morality is an ongoing growth process, anchored in knowledge about the human nature. At the level of individuals, it unfolds as life-long striving towards some kind of improvements, at the societal level it progresses as the continuous developments of good institutions.

Concluding Comments

Ruut Veenhoven is a pioneer in the science of quality of life. He has developed an impressive theory that integrates a clear and easily measurable concept of overall happiness, with a comprehensive chain of generative mechanisms that are able to account for its biological, psychological and social determinants. On top of this, the concept has proven to be a surprisingly powerful predictor. Overall happiness explains a long list of important conditions in life, both at the individual and the societal level. It even offers a good prediction of whether a government gets reelected or not (Ward 2019). Ruut Veenhoven's merits are in other words those of a true scientist.

As with all science, however, Veenhoven's work has also been the target of critical examination. The present chapter has illustrated that the concept of overall happiness struggles when it comes to explaining the richness of human feelings and the realization of the variety of important goals and values in a person's life. Measured against the ambition of getting to grips with something as elusive as overall happiness, the concept comes out as a bit narrow. To supply the ambition of the concept with sufficient explanatory power, Veenhovian happiness might gain from a reinforcement from other approaches to the study of good lives. For example some of those inspired by the concept of eudaimonia.

Science is, by its very essence, a never-ending work in progress. Inevitable, improved concepts will gradually be worked out and contribute to the growth of knowledge and understanding. In this perspective, Ruut Veenhoven stands out as an excellent path finder and scientific role model. He inspires new generations of wellbeing researchers from all over the world, and will do so for a long time to come.

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Chapter 28

Wellbeing and the Four Qualities of Life



Dan Weijers

Introduction

In his seminal *The Four Qualities of Life: Ordering Concepts and Measures of the Good Life*, Ruut Veenhoven (2000) provides a conceptual matrix that helps organise concepts, theories and measures related to the good life. Then as now, terms like wellbeing, quality of life, happiness, and the good life are used and understood in a variety of ways across and even within academic disciplines. Veenhoven's (2000) conceptual matrix—Four Qualities of Life—is revisited here in order to assess its suitability for various purposes and to attempt to build on it to better suit the purposes of policy makers and especially western philosophers of wellbeing.

It is fitting that the inaugural issue of the *Journal of Happiness Studies* led with Veenhoven's (2000) Four Qualities of Life. The *Journal of Happiness Studies* was set up to encourage more scholarly work on happiness and wellbeing, especially work that was multi-disciplinary or interdisciplinary in nature.¹ Four Qualities of Life ambitiously drew on quality-of-life-related research from an impressively wide range of disciplines, and, in so doing, set the scene for years of productive cross-pollination between many disciplines with an interest in happiness and wellbeing. Providing an example of productive interdisciplinary research was one thing, but Four Qualities of Life also helped clear up myriad confusions and provide a way for scholars from different disciplines and using different methods and measures to talk to each other rather than *past* each other.

In addition to the importance of Four Qualities of Life, Veenhoven's work with the *Journal of Happiness Studies* and the *World Database of Happiness*, encouraged

¹For more details, see: <https://www.springer.com/journal/10902>.

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and enabled a huge amount of research on happiness, including important interdisciplinary research. Of course, his teaching, supervision of research students, and voluminous other research outputs all also count as considerable contributions in this regard.

In this chapter, Veenhoven's Four Qualities of Life is assessed for its effectiveness for policy makers and for its ability to capture the distinctions western philosophers of wellbeing tend to think are conceptually important. In the next section, Veenhoven's matrix is reproduced and explained, including pointing out why it is useful and how it might have been more impactful on public policy. "Veenhoven's Application of His Matrix to Western Philosophical Approaches to Wellbeing" section revisits Veenhoven's application of his matrix to some philosophers and their views. "Veenhoven's Matrix and Western Philosophical Approaches to Wellbeing" section consists in an analysis of whether and how the most important theories and distinctions of western philosophy of wellbeing are captured by the matrix. To help further clarify the approach of western philosophy, "A Western Philosophical Wellbeing Matrix Inspired by Veenhoven" section presents a novel matrix that attempts to borrow Veenhoven's clarity of presentation and one of his key distinctions while also more precisely capturing the distinctions that matter to western philosophers of wellbeing.

Veenhoven's Matrix: Four Qualities of Life

Veenhoven (2000) begins Four Qualities of Life by highlighting the disunity of happiness, quality of life, and wellbeing terminology. Even then there were myriad terms and even more ways in which those terms were understood. Veenhoven's (2000, p. 1) intervention was designed to combat the natural tendency of the connotations of these terms within disparate disciplines to "become more specific and manifold". The different understandings occurred and still occur at many levels and within and between academic disciplines. For example, Veenhoven (2000, p. 2) laments the fact that philosophers have not decided on an ultimate definition of quality of life, while empirical happiness scholars tend to measure things idiosyncratically and then compare "apples and pears" in an attempt to create an overall measure of quality of life. In the end, Veenhoven (2000) is more comfortable with there being several qualities of life, with only one of those qualities (subjective appreciation of life) possibly being suitable as an overall measure of quality of life.

Veenhoven (2000, pp. 4–5) uses two important distinctions to create his matrix and group the myriad potential qualities of life into what he dubs the Four Qualities of Life: Life chances versus life results and outer qualities versus inner qualities.

Veenhoven (2000, p. 4) characterises the distinction between life chances and life results as "the difference between potentiality and actuality" or "[o]pportunities and outcomes". Providing the example of good nutrition being required for good health, Veenhoven (2000, p. 4) suggests that work in public health seems highly conscious of this chances-results distinction. Indeed, much of it seems to investigate the

relationship between various possible determinants of health and health itself (e.g., Marmot and Wilkinson 2005).

But not every discipline seems to distinguish between chances and results so clearly. Veenhoven (2000, p. 5) identifies social policy as an area that sometimes uses result terms like wellbeing to represent chances. The new politics of wellbeing, as Bok (2010) would call it, also appears to group opportunities and outcomes together. Several nations, including New Zealand,² are adapting the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Framework for Measuring Wellbeing and Progress (Durand 2015; OECD 2015). The OECD framework (Durand 2015, p. 5) primarily distinguishes between stocks and flows; the economic, natural, human and social capitals that create the flows of individual wellbeing, which are further divided into "material conditions" and "quality of life". Within the quality of life grouping, the OECD framework includes "education and skills", "environmental quality", and "health status" alongside "subjective wellbeing" (Durand 2015, p. 5). In contrast, Veenhoven's distinction between chances and results would classify "education and skills", "environmental quality", and "health status" as chances and "subjective wellbeing" as a kind of result. Essentially, Veenhoven's matrix usefully points out that better health, education, and environmental conditions provide individuals with a better chance of achieving wellbeing. Improvement in these internal and external states of affairs seems to provide opportunities for individuals to better appreciate their own lives and contribute to society. Of course, focussing on Veenhoven's (2000) chances versus results distinction also highlights instances in which good results are achieved without good chances and vice versa.

The other main distinction in Veenhoven's (2000) matrix is between outer qualities and inner qualities. Drawing on Lane (1994) and Musschenga (1994), Veenhoven (2000, p. 5) sees the distinction as being between a person and their environment, with the latter understood broadly so as to include everything outside of the person that is relevant to the person's quality of life. Again, Veenhoven (2000, p. 5) points out that work in public health, but not social policy, tends to get this distinction right. In public health, outer qualities like environmental health hazards are often investigated for their effects on health. For example, Brunekreef and Holgate (2002) examine the connection between air pollution (an outer quality) and health (an inner quality). Yet, the same OECD framework for measuring wellbeing mentioned above groups "environmental quality" and "health status" together under the banner of "quality of life" (Durand 2015, p. 5). Essentially, Veenhoven's (2000) framework draws attention to the difference between qualities of life that lie outside of the person in question and qualities that lie inside that person. It also has the useful effect of highlighting when outer qualities of life are and are not correlated with inner qualities of life.

²For more details, see: <https://treasury.govt.nz/information-and-services/nz-economy/higher-living-standards/our-living-standards-framework>.

Table 28.1 A recreation of Veenhoven’s Four Qualities of Life, a matrix of qualities of life (from Veenhoven 2000, p. 6)

| | Outer qualities | Inner qualities |
|--------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| Life chances | Livability of environment | Life-ability of the person |
| Life results | Utility of life | Appreciation of life |

Veenhoven combines these two distinctions to create a matrix with four distinct qualities of life. The matrix is recreated in Table 28.1. Each quality is discussed in turn.

According to Veenhoven (2000, p. 6), livability of environment captures “good living conditions”. I would understand good living conditions to mean conditions conducive to wellbeing, but Veenhoven (2000, p. 6) claims ecologists and sociologists understand the terms quality of life and wellbeing as meaning livability of the environment. It makes sense for ecologists to talk about the livability of ecosystems for particular organisms as an outer quality of life for specific organisms, but it makes much less sense for the wellbeing of ecosystems to be an outer quality of life for that ecosystem. Perhaps livability makes the most sense when the particular target of interest is clearly identified and then everything outside of that target that affects the target’s chances of good quality-of-life results is viewed as an outer quality. For example, if humans are the target of interest, then livability of the environment should mean the things outside of humans (including culture, political institutions, air quality, and so on) that affect humans’ chances of living a good life.

The other life chances quadrant in Veenhoven’s matrix (2000, p. 6) is dubbed the life-ability of the person. For Veenhoven (2000, p. 6), a person’s life-ability is the inner qualities they have, such as strength of body and mind, that help them achieve good life results. Veenhoven (2000, p. 6) likens this to Sen’s capabilities, but Sen’s capabilities approach really combines livability of environment with life-ability of the person in a specific way. Sen (1992, p. 311) explains that he thinks “quality of life [can] be assessed in terms of the capability to achieve valuable functionings”, where functionings are described as “doings and beings”. This may sound like life-ability so far, but Sen (1992, p. 33) is especially concerned with capabilities as the *substantive* (not merely formal) abilities to do and be various valuable things, hence his claim that “[t]he capability of a person depends on a variety of factors, including personal characteristics and social arrangements.” Sen (1992, pp. 33–35) is especially concerned with the kinds of freedoms that are clearly outer qualities on Veenhoven’s matrix, such the particular sets of social, political, and economic factors that enable people to enact any inner capabilities they may have. So, Sen’s capabilities are not a good example of the life-ability of a person, but we could say that a person’s *inner capabilities* are a way to understand the life-ability of a person—the person’s inner qualities that affect their chances of achieving a quality life.

Moving on, Veenhoven (2000, p. 7) labels the outer qualities of lives that are results as utility of life. It is not uncommon to believe that one of the plausible qualities of life consists in what comes of the life in question—what use did the life

have for something outside of itself? Certainly if one believes that there is a particular purpose *for* human life, perhaps ordained by a higher power, and that purpose concerned results outside of us, then producing certain kinds of results can be seen as an important part of living the good life. Secular views about contributing positively to society can also be seen in a similar way. Joshanloo and Weijers (2019, p. 11) recently found cross-cultural evidence for “existential relatedness[—]the characteristic of being meaningfully interconnected with things other than oneself”. Existential relatedness seems to capture both secular and spiritual or religious views about producing some positive results as a quality of life. Veenhoven (2000, p. 7) is careful to clarify that, as an outer quality of life, the utility that arises from the life doesn’t need to be known by the person whose life is in question.


The final quadrant of Veenhoven’s (2000, p. 7) matrix covers the coincidence of life results and inner qualities, and is labelled “appreciation of life”. Veenhoven (2000, p. 7) describes this quality of life as being “in the eye of the beholder” and stresses the subjective nature of this quality of life. Veenhoven gives examples of appreciation of life, including subjective wellbeing, life satisfaction and happiness, which are variously known as concepts, theories, and measures related to the good life and especially our inner experience of or judgment about our lives.

A key strength of Veenhoven’s (2000) Four Qualities of Life matrix is the emphasis it places on the two important distinctions, the combination of which leads to the four distinct qualities of life. Each of the quadrants represents aspects of lives that many people care about, and some other understandings of quality of life or wellbeing seem to conflate these distinct qualities. The distinctions between internal and external chances and internal and external results also helps illuminate the kinds of qualities of life that different groups might have more or less direct influence over. For example, policy makers might find it hard to directly affect someone’s subjective appreciation of life, but they may have considerable control over certain aspects of the person’s outer life chances by manipulating the livability of their environment. Similarly, an individual that can’t easily relocate might have much less control over many aspects of the livability of their environment compared to their control over the utility of their life.

Veenhoven’s (2000) Four Qualities of Life matrix has proven highly influential in the literature on quality of life; it is still discussed regularly, for example, to disambiguate qualities of life and happiness (e.g., Ludwigs et al. 2019). But perhaps it could have been even more impactful. The key distinctions in the matrix and Veenhoven’s (2000, p. 33) argument that only subjective appreciation of life can plausibly be used to assess total or holistic quality of life (or wellbeing) seem not to have been considered in the majority of models of wellbeing used by governments and policymakers (as discussed above). Furthermore, despite discussing how philosophical approaches to wellbeing fit with his matrix, Veenhoven’s (2000) Four Qualities of Life has not received a great deal of interest from philosophers working on wellbeing. The public policy issue is discussed briefly below before turning in a more substantive way to the philosophical issue for the remainder of the chapter.

Although in his discussion of the Four Qualities of Life matrix Veenhoven (2000) made it clear that the two life chances quadrants were likely to affect the two life

Fig. 28.1 A policy-oriented wellbeing model of Veenhoven's (2000) Four Qualities of Life



results quadrants, and that the appreciation of life quadrant was the best overall measure of wellbeing, some readers may not have viewed the matrix as a model of wellbeing. Veenhoven might have discussed his two important distinctions, and then the interrelationships between the resulting quadrants, and then created a process-type model instead of a matrix of qualities of life. The resulting model may have made it more obvious to readers how the quadrants could influence each other and which quadrants were more important to individuals or to policy makers. For example, Fig. 28.1 attempts to capture what a model of wellbeing for policy makers based on Veenhoven's (2000) Four Qualities of Life matrix might look like.

Instrumental prudential goods are the things that make life go better for the one living it, but only through affecting some intrinsic prudential good—something that directly contributes to or is a part of wellbeing (Weijers and Mukherjee 2016). The arrows represent the ability for one of the groups to affect the other groups or variables. The model shows that capital stocks affect the flows of instrumental prudential goods and that those flows affect wellbeing. The model also shows the potential for virtuous and vicious cycles, as changes in wellbeing can have flow on effects for flows of instrumental prudential goods. For example, happier people tend to be healthier (Howell et al. 2007). Changes in the flows can also affect the capitals, such as when higher flows of education lead to higher human capital stocks.

Presumably different versions of the model in Fig. 28.1 could be more or less specific and more or less faithful to Veenhoven's (2000) Four Qualities of Life matrix. For example, contributions to others (utility of life) could be removed on the assumption that contributing the appropriate amount to others relative to one's preferences affects one's subjective appreciation of life. Another possibility would be to highlight the interrelationships and perhaps even the relative weights of the interrelationships between the flows of instrumental prudential goods.

Veenhoven's Application of His Matrix to Western Philosophical Approaches to Wellbeing

Veenhoven (2000) applies his Four Qualities of Life matrix to a few western philosophical views of wellbeing and quality of life. I have already discussed Veenhoven's mention of Sen's capabilities approach above. I will discuss some of his other mentions of how the views of western philosophers fit into his matrix directly below before discussing some of the features of the matrix that don't fit perfectly with the conceptual norms in western philosophy of wellbeing.

Veenhoven (2000, pp. 12–13) mentions Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia in relation to the live-ability quadrant of his matrix because Aristotle stressed that living the good life was an activity. Veenhoven (2000, pp. 12–13) discusses this as a kind development of inner capabilities, which is certainly an interest of Aristotle's. Aristotle thought that the good life for the one living it consists in developing and expressing the virtues that best represented the natural kind of being that the subject is (Crisp 2014). Despite the moralistic connotation of "virtues", Aristotle viewed virtues as character traits—dispositions to act well in a wide variety of contexts (Crisp 2014). Perhaps not surprisingly for a philosopher, Aristotle viewed intellectual virtues and philosophising as the most prudentially valuable traits and activity (Roche 2019). Perhaps most importantly, and somewhat confoundingly for Veenhoven's (2000) matrix, Aristotle viewed the activities of developing and expressing the appropriate virtues as both a cause of living the good life and a result because he is clear that pleasure or subjective wellbeing are not the goals of virtuous activity (Crisp 2014). Rather, virtuous activity is both the method and the goal or *telos* of human activity (Crisp 2014).

Veenhoven (2000, p. 13) also mentions John Stuart Mill and his famous claim: "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides." (Mill 1861, p. 9). Veenhoven (2000, p. 13) uses Mill's claim while explaining different kinds of utility of life—the various ways in which a life can be high quality because of what comes from it. Veenhoven uses Mill's famous point as an example of how some people judge the quality of a life at least partly based on its moral or aesthetic value. This use of Mill's quote may not be appropriate. Mill uses this famous claim to help explain the difference in prudential value between lower (animalistic/base) pleasures and higher (human-only/intellectual) pleasures, such as the pleasure of philosophising (Mill 1861). Mill is essentially pointing out that higher pleasures are more valuable because those with experience of both prefer higher pleasures to lower pleasures, as shown by our preference to be the consummate philosopher even if his life lacked many of the lower pleasures. There is some debate about whether Mill was a secret virtue ethicist like Aristotle or a hedonist like his God father and tutor Jeremy Bentham (e.g., Nussbaum 2008, p. S85), but either way Mill's view of wellbeing (as opposed to his

Utilitarian view of moral theory) would place him squarely on the inner qualities side of Veenhoven's (2000) matrix.

On much surer footing, Veenhoven (2000, p. 15) places Bentham and his hedonic calculus in the appreciation of life quadrant of the matrix. Without a doubt, Bentham (1789) thought all and only pleasures (defined broadly to include feelings of satisfaction, joy, and so on) made life go well for the one living it (and the opposite for pains). For Bentham, the inner results of pleasure and pain were the only qualities of life that ultimately matter. Just to be clear, it should be noted that Bentham was much more interested in quantities of pleasure and pain than qualities generally (Weijers 2011).

Veenhoven's Matrix and Western Philosophical Approaches to Wellbeing

Moving on from the views of specific philosophers, modern western philosophy of wellbeing tends to focus on three main groups of theories and, less explicitly, a few important distinctions that don't perfectly map onto Veenhoven's (2000) distinctions between chances and results and inner and outer qualities. In this section, Veenhoven's (2000) matrix is applied to the three main groups of western philosophical theories of wellbeing. Then the key distinctions in the field and the extent to which Veenhoven's (2000) matrix accommodates them is discussed.

Mainly following Derek Parfit (1984), most modern western philosophers of wellbeing think there are three main competing groups of theories of wellbeing: hedonistic theories, desire-satisfaction theories, and objective list theories (Crisp 2017; Weijers 2020).

Most hedonistic theories of wellbeing essentially claim that all and only pleasures directly make a life go better for the one living it and all and only pains do the opposite (Weijers 2011). Different versions of hedonism about wellbeing define pleasure differently, or value some kinds of pleasure more than others (as we saw earlier with Mill). But these differences are not enough for any hedonistic theory of wellbeing to escape from Veenhoven's (2000, pp. 7, 14–15) appreciation of life quadrant because they are all inner qualities that result from a combination of inner and outer chances.

As mentioned above, Veenhoven (2000, p. 7) explains that the appreciation of life quadrant is "subjective", in the sense of being "in the eye of the beholder". This use of "subjective" risks conflating two concepts: subjective and internal. Qualities that are internal to a person include many features, but only those that are valuable based on the subject's specific beliefs or preferences are considered subjective. Subjective is usefully understood in contradistinction to objective theories of wellbeing, which effectively tell subjects what ultimately makes their lives go well for them, and doesn't blink if the subjects claim not to agree with the theory. Most hedonistic theories of wellbeing are objective in this sense—they claim that all and pleasure

ultimately makes lives go better for everyone *regardless* of whether some people do not believe pleasure is intrinsically prudentially valuable or would prefer a non-pleasure good over pleasure. So, pleasure and pain are inner qualities, but they are not subjective qualities on most western philosophical interpretations of subjective.

The second main group of western philosophical theories of wellbeing is made up of the desire-satisfaction (or desire fulfilment) theories (Heathwood 2016). These theories share a focus on the idea that getting what you want is the only thing that ultimately makes a life go better for the person living it. The main variations within the group are based on which desires count. Simple Unrestricted Desire Satisfaction Theory lets all desires count, while a range of Restricted Desire Satisfaction Theories only let some desires count, such as just the deeply held ones or the ones based on adequate knowledge of the relevant facts (Lukas 2010).

Desire satisfaction theories will in most cases use the whole of Veenhoven's (2000) matrix in the sense that most people will desire various inner and outer life chances and results. Unfortunately, the nature of desire satisfaction theories means that the relations Veenhoven (2000) discusses between the quadrants of the matrix don't fully explain where the prudential value is supposed to come from according to desire satisfaction theories. For desire satisfaction theorists, it is the perfect coincidence of a desire with an inner or outer state of affairs that generates intrinsic prudential value. Desires are subjective inner qualities, but they are not really viewed as results (even though they are clearly a product of our environment and previous experiences). Rather, desires are a vital input into the all-important desire satisfaction process. The other input is the satisfaction, which really means the inner or outer state matching the desire. For example, if I desire for another person to love me, my life goes better for me if they do love me and worse if they don't. This effect on my wellbeing occurs even if I have no idea whether the person loves me. This feature of desire satisfaction theories—that one's *experience* of the desire being satisfied is not directly relevant—is very important because it is widely thought that it allows these theories to avoid the central problems with hedonistic theories of wellbeing (e.g., Kagan 1998, p. 36). An implication of the experience of the desire being satisfied not being directly relevant is that the subjective measures of satisfaction used by psychologists and mentioned by Veenhoven (2000, pp. 30–31) fail to get directly at the right inner quality (the desire). Just to be clear, the pleasantness of pleasure only makes a life better for the one living it, according to desire satisfaction theories, if the person desires that pleasure. So, the inner result of positive affect is not necessarily a quality of life on this view.

This brings us to the final group of theories of wellbeing for western philosophers: Objective list theories. Objective list theories of wellbeing are a list in the sense that each one comprises of a number of identified intrinsic prudential goods—things that directly contribute to a person's wellbeing. Many lists are short, including perhaps just friendship, knowledge, and pleasure, while others have ten or more items, such as Nussbaum's (1995) list of ten core human capabilities (which includes health, pleasure, freedom, and connection with nature). When Veenhoven's (2000) Four Qualities of Life is applied to these theories as a group, again the whole matrix is

needed. There is very little agreement about which goods constitute wellbeing (as opposed to merely being instrumentally good by causing some intrinsic prudential good to come about), but bringing about good in the world (utility of life), social connections with others (livability of environment), practical wisdom (life-ability of the person), and enjoyment (appreciation of life) are all plausible candidates. The upshot of this is that Veenhoven's matrix could help reveal key differences between rival objective list theories, but may suggest some qualities of life that specific objective list theories would not see as important.

The distinction between subjective and objective theories of wellbeing becomes even more salient with the introduction of this group of theories. Recall that subjective theories, like desire satisfaction theories, essentially allow each person to decide what makes their lives go better for them by directing their desire to those things. Objective list theories usually don't allow for so much freedom. Like hedonistic theories of wellbeing, objective list theories state the constituents of the good life and say to everyone: these are the things that "are good or bad for us, whether or not we want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things" (Parfit 1984, p. 493). But this means that someone could have the inner result of being highly appreciative of their life but not be deemed to be living the good life by various objective list theories of wellbeing because those theories don't have any or the relevant inner results on their list.

Without rehashing all of the history of the western philosophical debate about wellbeing, suffice it to say that the subjective-objective distinction is of utmost importance. To that end, because Veenhoven's (2000) matrix does not use the subjective-objective distinction as one of its two main distinctions, it does not helpfully differentiate between groups of views that are considered opposite by western philosophers. Veenhoven's matrix does capture the difference between inner and outer, but the inputs to the most subjective group of theories spans that distinction in pretty much the same way that the most objective group of theories spans it. Recall also that subjective in the sense that most western philosophers of wellbeing are using it is just a small part of the quadrant dubbed appreciation of life and that the goods that philosophers view as objective can be placed in any of the quadrants, including being completely placed in the appreciation of life quadrant (e.g., hedonism).

Another issue for western philosophers of wellbeing with Veenhoven's (2000) Four Qualities of Life stems from the purpose of the matrix. Veenhoven's (2000, p. 1) goal was to provide a way to disambiguate and understand the relations between several key terms used by scholars from a diverse range of disciplines, including quality of life and wellbeing. As such, his matrix was conceptually broad, broad enough to capture the myriad uses of quality of life that apply to both the causes and constituents of wellbeing. The resulting broadness of the matrix's scope means that philosophers (who tend to view only one or a very few things as constituting wellbeing) view some parts of quadrants, and perhaps even whole quadrants, as being outside of the scope of a targeted analysis of wellbeing. An attempt to resolve this difficulty and the lack of clarity about the subjective-objective distinction follows in the next section.

A Western Philosophical Wellbeing Matrix Inspired by Veenhoven

In this section, I attempt to retain the clarity and some of the applicability of Veenhoven’s Four Qualities of Life while addressing the two issues raised in the previous section. Table 28.2 shows a matrix that captures two important distinctions for western philosophers of wellbeing: The distinction between objective and subjective theories and the distinction between internal and external theories.

The internal-external distinction helps identify the proper target or targets of the theory of wellbeing. The internal-external distinction is the essentially Veenhoven’s outer versus inner qualities distinction. Internal states are those that occur inside of the person whose wellbeing is in question. Internal states include beliefs, desires, pleasures, pains, character traits, levels of health, and bodily and mental functioning. External states are all the rest—the states that lie outside of the person whose wellbeing is in question. External states include friendships, income, and the weather.

The subjective-objective distinction helps set the rules for how the theory of wellbeing interacts with the people subject to it. The subjective-objective distinction follows the discussion of modern western philosophical views above. Subjective means consciously endorsed by the subject of the life in question through a belief or desire such that they are deciding what ultimately makes their life go well or badly for them. Objective means the opposite; the subject of the life in question doesn’t get to decide what ultimately makes their life go well or badly for them.

The upper left quadrant represents objective theories that identify only internal goods, such as pleasure and pain, as the ultimate bearers of prudential value. Most hedonistic theories of wellbeing fit into this category.

The upper right quadrant represents objective theories that identify only external goods, such as being employed and having a certain level of income. People sometimes seem to behave like they adhere to a theory of wellbeing in this quadrant, especially those that seem to slavishly pursue money and material possessions. An objective list theory based on such people would fit into this quadrant.

The lower left quadrant represents subjective theories that identify only internal goods, such as pleasure and feelings of satisfaction, as the ultimate bearers of prudential value. A theory that allowed people to decide for themselves which

Table 28.2 A matrix of four kinds of philosophical wellbeing

| | Internal | External |
|------------|--|--|
| Objective | You have the “right” internal states (e.g. pleasure is good whether or not you desire it) | The “right” circumstances apply to your life (e.g. employment, being loved, etc.) |
| Subjective | You have the internal states that you think make your life go well (e.g. pleasure, satisfaction) | The circumstances that you think make your life go well do apply to you (e.g. employment, being loved, etc.) |

Table 28.3 An extended matrix of kinds of philosophical wellbeing

| | Internal | External | Relational/both |
|------------|--|--|---|
| Objective | You have the “right” internal states (e.g. pleasure is good whether or not you desire it) | The “right” circumstances apply to your life (e.g. employment, being loved, etc.) | The “right” internal states and external circumstances (or relations thereof) hold for you (e.g., pleasure, truly satisfied desires, friendship, etc.) |
| Subjective | You have the internal states that you think make your life go well (e.g. pleasure, satisfaction) | The circumstances that you think make your life go well do apply to you (e.g. employment, being loved, etc.) | What you desire to be the case about the internal and external things (and relations between them) that you think make your life go well are the case (this is the <i>most</i> subjective type) |

internal states they thought made their life go better and worse for them would fit into this quadrant.

The lower right quadrant represents subjective theories that identify only external goods, such as money and housing, as the ultimate bearers of prudential value. A theory that allowed people to decide for themselves which external goods they thought made their life go better and worse for them would fit into this quadrant.

As readers may notice, objective list and desire satisfaction theories have not yet been clearly represented on the matrix. Adding a third column to the matrix helps to remedy this issue. As shown in Table 28.3, the third column identifies that both internal and external states (perhaps in a specific relation) might be the appropriate targets of a theory of wellbeing. At the expense of simplicity, the inclusion of this extra column makes the matrix more useful because, as discussed below, it helps differentiate between the main groups of theories that western philosophers take to be significantly different.

Objective theories of wellbeing that include both internal and external states as their appropriate targets now have their own category. Most western objective list theories of wellbeing will end up in the top right category of Table 28.3 since, despite only having a few things on their lists, they usually include pleasure or some other internal state and friendship or some other external state. A relational version of an objective list might claim that only enjoyment (internal) of specific external states, such as justice and beauty ultimately contributes to wellbeing (see, e.g., Arneson 1999).

Subjective theories of wellbeing now have the opportunity to be fully subjective by adopting the bottom right category of Table 28.3. A subjective theory that can have either or both internal and external states as its target allows each subject of a life to decide exactly what they think will make their life go better or worse for them without restriction. Simple Unrestricted desire Satisfaction theory would be in this category (see, e.g., Lukas 2010).

Despite being enlarged by a column, the above matrix still fails to capture all of the relevant distinctions to philosophers of wellbeing. Matched and Multi-perspective theories can combine subjective and objective elements in various ways to generate more complex theories of wellbeing, perhaps including some Restricted Desire Satisfaction Theories. But adding further to the matrix in Table 28.3 would make it very different to Veenhoven's (2000) Four Qualities of Life, and thereby beyond the scope of this chapter.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I explained and briefly assessed Ruut Veenhoven's seminal *The Four Qualities of Life: Ordering Concepts and Measures of the Good Life*. The matrix at the heart of Veenhoven's (2000) paper, which clearly identified four important qualities of life, provided guidance for hundreds of scholars working in the area, and is still regularly cited. I identified the paper as a beacon for interdisciplinary work in general and interdisciplinary work on qualities of life, wellbeing, and happiness in particular. I then briefly attempted to build on Veenhoven's matrix in a way that might make it more user-friendly to policy makers, some of whom still seem to miss his important distinctions between inner and outer qualities and chances and results. Following this I applied some important western theories of wellbeing to Veenhoven's matrix and identified some issues. Finally, I tried to tease out the difference between subjective theories and inner qualities to make a matrix inspired by Veenhoven's that would more directly demonstrate the distinctions that western philosophers of wellbeing take to be the most important.

I hope by engaging deeply with Veenhoven's Four Qualities of Life, and attempting to build on it in a way that may be of use to policy makers and especially philosophers, that I have done justice to some of his aims for the paper and for his research generally. It is certainly the case that no young happiness and wellbeing researchers would be able to do the research we currently do if it were not for the excellent research and service work of the giants whose shoulders we stand on. Ruut Veenhoven is certainly a giant in the field of interdisciplinary research on qualities of life, wellbeing, and happiness, and I thank him sincerely for all that he has done.

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Chapter 29

Ruut Veenhoven and the Latin-American Paradox in Happiness



Eduardo Wills-Herrera

In development studies as well as in sociology and social psychology there is a recent move beyond the dominant economic focus on growth as the indicator of human progress and well-being. The dominant discourse in development studies was trapped in a narrow economist view that prioritizes minimization of costs over the well-being of people which implies the fulfilment of basic needs, and the creation of social relationships of quality (Gasper 2009). The recent debate has been fuelled by the acknowledgment of the negative consequences and impacts that the idea and practice of development as economic growth only is creating in peoples' wellbeing as well as its' environmental and social damages and questionable impacts on the planet and society. There is an acknowledgment and a call by numerous social actors and movements as well as the academia in this sense of understanding development from an ethical point of view which includes and puts in front peoples' values and well-being.

All these questions are closely related to the important literature on happiness, subjective wellbeing and quality of life that emerged in the 80s and has now a significant record of scientific publications and public policy applications. The contribution of Ruut Veenhoven in this regard has been of tremendous importance due to his influential ideas, longstanding research program and publications and his active voice in public debate. It has also been of tremendous influence for my on thinking and writing.

In this chapter I will summarize how Ruud Veenhoven (1991, 2000) influenced my thinking and research and how he opened to me important venues of looking to the reality of countries such as the Latin-American countries in order to apply public policies that may enhance the quality of life and wellbeing of their inhabitants.

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The consideration of happiness as a significant variable to understand the development of individuals and nations can be considered as an unconventional approach. It has opened the possibility of doing research and applied public policies in other than traditionally considered development variables. It has been proposed from an interdisciplinary orientation combining psychological, cultural and sociological points of view. The debate is central and important for Latin-American studies of development linked to ideas of progress and sustainability.

In this particular context an important paradox in happiness and wellbeing takes place: Despite poor objective conditions in Latin-American societies such as poverty, unequal income distribution and internal conflict, people seem to be happier, with higher subjective well-being (Diener et al. 1985) and with high contentment as compared with other regions and countries that have higher objective conditions of living. This poses an interesting question: if there are different qualities of life (Veenhoven 1984, 2000) or if people approach differently the question of quality of life from different cultural and historical perspectives. ¿Are their differences in ideas of wellbeing and how can they be studied, assessed and measured?

I consider the idea of human well-being or human flourishing as the ultimate end to be achieved by prosperity in a nation or society. The school of human development thinking has contributed greatly to this debate as well as the research in happiness studies pioneered by Veenhoven. Originally proposed by Amartya Sen (1999) and rooted in the United Nation Development Program for Development—UNDP—human development became an academic, social and political movement, who was influential to shift the discussion of which goals, objectives, and expectancies of individual and social groups should be achieved, reducing GDP from and end in itself to just an instrument to achieve more profound human objectives and ends. These ends should be discussed from people themselves, through their agency, feelings, and evaluations and should be properly stated in a public debate, generating a bottom-up approach. The debate should also include the necessary means, rules and, procedures to achieve those ends.

The question of the extent to which people can participate and decide in their economic, social and cultural life is therefore in the public debate. It will depend on the particular contextual conditions of each nation and society to find the proper road to achieve them. The process should also pursue to empower people, and their agency and voice, to discuss and decide the ultimate goals to aim at the collective level and with social and collective actions. This school proposes a special concern for individual lives and liberties embedded in the idea of defining development by the people, centered in broadening people's concerns, expectancies and hopes for solving essential needs. Human development and development as freedom were the alternative schools of thought that were led by Amartya Sen (1999), as well as Manfred Max Neef (1986), the late Chilean alternative economist. Both authors proposed to put the people in the centre of the debate about the ends and measures of development. In particular, Max Neef spoke about the "economía descalza" or the barefoot economy, meaning that economics should be put in service of the people, particularly the most vulnerable groups. Max Neef did also proposes the threshold hypothesis of quality of life meaning that after a certain level or threshold of

per-capita income the quality of life of a person begins to diminish. He understood development as a process of emancipation of the creative capabilities of individuals to follow a life that is worth living.

Economics and management should be seen as a means to achieve higher and superior ends and not as an end in themselves. Which were those superior ends? Could happiness and satisfaction with life as a whole orient such concepts? And, ¿ how can human flourishing be related to happiness and prosperity? Importantly, this discussion leads to a more fundamental question: ¿ Does capitalism, as an economic system but also as a system of thinking with particular values associated with it, be based solely on extreme individualism and egoism. ¿ Did these values fit well with the conceptions of well-being, as the fulfilment of substantive needs? It seemed that its unending drive for expansion, growth, and progress with the idea of maximizing the supply of goods and commodities, and their recurrent replacement could lead societies to non-satisfaction with life and unsustainability and put a threat to the limit of the planet for its sustainability. Related to this question, interestingly, Veenhoven (2017, pp. 9), discussed how in the eighteen-century thinkers challenged the notion that happiness is possible in earth life, not only in heaven, and asked himself if this promise came true, especially if happiness is mainly related to thinking and behaving according to reason. According to Veenhoven (2017, pp. 9), ‘thought in the middle ages was dominated by the church which glorified suffering instead of happiness’. Happiness did exist in ‘Paradise earlier and would bestow to earlier believers in afterlife but was not to be found in earthly time’.

As it turned out, Max Neef and Veenhoven shared common insights and interest about what the good life means for individuals and how this concept can be applied to measuring the level of development of societies and countries. Defining well-being is a challenging question since economists, philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists have different views about this. Jolibier, Ch., Max Neef, N (2011) postulates the existence of nine universal human needs that can be fulfilled by different cultural and social satisfiers. (‘subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, participation, leisure time, creativity, identity, and freedom’. Most of these are very similar to the domains of life that have been studied in the literature. Life domains can explain the levels of satisfaction with life as a whole. Well-being, happiness, identity, fulfilment, flourishing, and transcendence become the ultimate ends towards which the economic means should be oriented. At the same time, Ruut conducted an extensive survey of happiness comparing different countries creating what is known today as the World Happiness Data Set (Veenhoven 2010).

This discussion has been well summarized in the Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2010) report¹ and it becomes clear that there is a search for an alternative view of development that highlights the importance of taking into account individual’s subjectivity through their cognitive evaluations of life and its domains, their affective feelings and, expectancies. Agency should be exerted based on particular competences, rights, and, values of each individual. This debate stems from an

¹Stiglitz, J., Sen, A und Fitoussi, J.P (2010) *Mismeasuring Our Lives*. The New Press, New York.

important challenge to modernity: ¿How can we understand the roles of individuals in a world that is threatened by recurrent crises, anonymity in cities, mass society and virtual networks, which contribute to a sense of losing identity, purpose and meaning. Traditional values and identities that came from traditional affiliations and reason and which tended to prevail are being lost. Thus it raises the question for each individual: “¿Who I am? ¿” How can I live a well-lived life? ¿How can I obtain significance for what I do and how can I transcend in my life?

¿How can each individual and different social groups work for obtaining a life that is significant and well-lived. ¿Which are the external conditions that enhance and facilitate this process? Acting from what an individual thinks and feels by its autonomy and liberty. Of particular importance in this process is the creation of meaning through an emphasis on the interconnections with others and with nature. All these questions have been considered by Ruud Veenhoven extensive program of research.

When I think about Ruut, three main aspects of his academic life come into my head: (1) his predisposition to hear, comment and discuss any kind of new ideas or insights related to happiness research in different cultural settings as well as his rigor in academic research. To study happiness with scientific rigour using theory, measures and methodology is not a simple task, (2) his activism in defending human rights, freedom of thought and people’s dignity, and, (3) his friendship and openness in academic discussion, as was the case when I spent a sabbatical period in Utrecht, Netherlands, near his hometown of Vleuten. We spent interesting hours of discussion in Erasmus University in Rotterdam where we met several times in the newly created “Center for Happiness Studies”² in the Business School of Erasmus University.

I had known Ruut at the ISQOLS³ Congress that was celebrated in Grahamstown South Africa in the year 2005. It was my first time I attended such a Congress and at that time, I did not know any researcher there. That conference introduced me to the networks of researchers who became friends and colleagues later on as Alex Michalos. Joe Sirgy, Bob Cummins, Joan Viterso, Dave Webb, Leslie Lackso, Gloria Mayorales, Fermina Rojas, Ferran Casas, Filomena Maggino and so many others. I was very impressed with Ruut in this first encounter both as an academic and as a person. He was so vital and interested in the research that an unknown researcher coming from a far Colombia had to say. As a person, he gave me some lights about his earlier ideas on euthanasia, freedom, abortion as well as the social movements on which he participated around these important areas of social discussion.

I was intrigued at that time in how to explain what I called the Colombian or Latin-American paradox in Happiness, namely why in a nation that faces relatively poor objective conditions of quality of life, such as high-income distribution, high levels of poverty, social conflict and political instability, their inhabitants seem to

²Erasmus Happiness Research Organization <https://www.eur.nl/en/ehero/>.

³International Society for Quality of Life Studies.

value higher their satisfaction with life and their happiness as compared to other nations. ¿Was this a momentary state (hedonic happiness) or was it possible to explain this level of happiness by a more profound sense of satisfaction of life, “Eudaimonia”, as I learned was the originally concept proposed by Aristoteles, meaning a complete and flourishing human life, by which an individual works for giving the best of himself. Separating both notions of happiness ¿which were the factors that could explain them?

At that time, I was working at an interdisciplinary research center for development studies—CIDER—at Universidad de los Andes. My main area of research has been development studies, a topic I studied at the Institute of Social Studies ISS in the Hague, today an institute that is part of Erasmus University, where Ruud advanced his notable academic career. I had the opportunity to live in different periods in the Netherlands where I learned to appreciate how is it to live in a country that puts humans rights and welfare of people first, despite ideological and political confrontations, an opposite situation as in Colombia. Later, I completed my academic studies with a Ph.D. in organizational behavior at Tulane University, where I was introduced to subjective approaches to explain motivations, expectancies, goals, values, and behaviors of individuals and groups, a view that was rarely considered in development studies where objective facts and pieces of evidence mainly from an economic point of view were considered.

Ruut introduced me to many insights for studying subjective well-being. I was particularly interested to study happiness or subjective wellbeing as an alternative approach and measure for the development of individuals and societies from an intercultural point of view. The intercultural study of this important social and psychological construct was very relevant taking into account what later was called the Latin-American Paradox in happiness.⁴ The importance of family and social circles such as friends, work colleagues and neighbours appeared as possible explanatory factors for creating emotional and affective support and hence increase the levels of subjective wellbeing of an individual.

This was my entry door to subjective wellbeing studies, advised by Arthur Brief (1985), my dissertation chair, who insisted in bottom-up approaches to health and wellbeing, instead of the predominant top-down approaches for measuring those psychological states (Brief et al. 1993). Later, I had the opportunity to invite Ruut to Colombia to Universidad de los Andes in 2012 where he gave many conferences at the University, worked with Ph.D. students and attended the press and meetings with a leader of the Colombian private sector and of Colombian society. At the end of his visit, he told me: “It is right that Colombians are very happy people despite all that is said about this country and his citizens”. We had many opportunities to discuss the Latin-American paradox in happiness a topic that I was working with my colleague and friend Mariano Rojas from Mexico. We discussed that the understanding of the quality of social relationships as an explanatory variable for the higher levels of happiness in Colombia and other Latin-American countries should be emphasized.

⁴See Wills (2009).

In this respect, the quality of social relationships and its contribution to subjective wellbeing should be studied from a social capital point of view distinguishing the differentiated contribution of its instrumental dimension vis a vis the emotional or affective dimension to subjective well-being.

Important questions to be discussed at that time pointed to (1) how many approaches to quality of life exist and how can they be related, (2) the need for an interdisciplinary approach for studying happiness, and (3) how can a public policy of happiness that benefits the majority of people of a society could be implemented. Wellbeing is then a concept that is understood from many dimensions: (1) well-being as pleasure or avoidance of pain or hedonism; (2) as a choice of preferences as an economist has mainly defined it and, (3) objective conceptions of well-being.

Amartya Sen and Veenhoven added to this list three additional criteria: (1) well-being as freedom; (2) as a choice instead of measuring preferences fulfillment and (3) as opulence derived from having and possessing material goods. Veenhoven (2002) explicitly added to these different views the idea that wellbeing—defined as happiness—denotes how well one feels most of the time and to what extent life meets one's standards of how life should be lived. He also theorizes that the affective component of well-being or satisfaction with life as a whole reflects the gratification of human needs while contentment depicts the fit with the cultural variables of how life should be lived. According to Veenhoven (2017), these components vary across cultures and countries, and interestingly, he also empirically found, using the Gallup data set, that there are countries where people are fairly contented but feel bad as in the previous communist countries and a cluster of countries as the Latin-American countries where people feel very good but are discontented.

I heard from Ruut his approach to the four qualities of life that he was studying and the many questions theoretically and empirical that emerged from the combination of those four visions. When I returned to my University and began to read more carefully the discussion and research that was going on the important subject of happiness I felt very much intrigued by paradox of adaptation of people to levels of happiness or satisfaction with life and I began to think in this as the explanatory factor of the Colombian paradox.

Veenhoven stated in his now classical paper about the four qualities of life that the terms wellbeing, quality of life and happiness denote different meaning and that sometimes they are used as an umbrella term and that it is very important to assign specific meanings to those terms to improve their measures and correlations with causal factors. He proposes a classification based on a taxonomy that considers as a first axis, inner (subjective) and outer (objective) qualities of life as well as making the distinction between life chance and life results. Objective quality of life refers to a life that is objectively and externally assessed by an observant whereas subjective means the inner assessment of ways of thinking and feelings towards satisfaction with life. Opportunities for a good life, good life in itself and the utility that is derived from this for the person should also be considered (Table 29.1).

From this taxonomy, he implied four qualities of life: (1) the livability of the environment, (2) the life-ability of the individual, (3) the external utility of life and (4) an inner appreciation of life.

Table 29.1 Veenhoven's (2000) Taxonomy of qualities of life

| | Outer qualities | Inner qualities |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Life chances | The livability of the environment | Life-ability of the person |
| Life results | Utility of life | Appreciation of life |

Source: Veenhoven (1991)

Of particular interest for me was quadrant I, that is related to measures of live-abilities of societies that concern foremost nations. Veenhoven mentions the index of social progress proposed by Estes and which includes such items as the wealth of nations, peace with neighbors, internal stability and democracy. All these important social, economic and political variables should be the pre-requisite for a good appreciation of life by individuals. Contrary, Veenhoven (1991) also mentions deprivation as the opposite of social progress which would focus on differences between citizens of a nation in such issues as income, opportunities, quality of work and social contacts which in turn are associated with the differential access to scarce resources.

As it turned out, quality of social contacts does not completely fit with restrictions in materialism, income, and access to other resources. It is precisely the quality of the social contacts, particularly related to family, colleagues, and friends which tends to explain the high sense of subjective wellbeing in Latin America despite the scarcity of opportunities. The significance of opportunities according to Veenhoven (1991) is not the same for everybody but depends on the particular capabilities an individual is able to develop during his lifespan. In certain cultures such as the Latin culture—found in Colombia and other countries of South America—, the social skill of giving and receiving emotional support within the social circles to which an individual belongs is a skill that is acquitted during the early socialization process of the individual, in her inner and extended family and school and which becomes a very important capability for the formation of social capital. Social capital will explain higher levels of subjective well-being despite poor livability conditions of the environment related to low income, insecurity and lack of opportunities to express voice in a limited democratic system (Wills-Herrera et al. 2011).

The difference between subjective appreciations of life versus the objective utility of life obtained by an individual in society can be explained by numerous factors. Latin-Americans consistently score higher levels on happiness or subjective well-being SWB than other regions of the world (Rojas 2017; Wills 2009). This empirical result highlights a theoretical paradox (Easterlin 1974) which is interesting to explain. The subjective evaluation (both affective and cognitive) of life by part of L.A. individuals does not correspond to objective indicators of development in the region. In particular, Latin-Americans display less economic growth as has been stated, lower levels of personal income, suffer higher levels of the income distribution (indicated by Gini coefficients), have higher levels of poverty and higher levels of violence and social conflict. These countries also show higher rates of out-migration of the population as compared to other regions. (See for instance Gallup poll (Clifton 2019) and other Latin-American scholar such as Rojas et al.

(2011, 2017), Wills-Herrera et al. (2011), and Beytía (2017), among others. Political instability, weak institutions and high levels of corruption (as indicated by the perceived corruption index developed by Transparency International) are also common dimensions of development in these countries (Acemoglu et al. 2001). Therefore, it would be expected that subjective wellbeing SWB of the L.A countries should be lower as compared to other regions of the world. However, empirical results consistently show the opposite.

With the important influence of Veenhoven's thinking, I tried to explain the Latin-American paradox of Happiness in the following terms: ¿do close social ties in Latin-American families have a buffer effect in relation to bad objective conditions of the environment (live-ability)? And, if so; ¿Which are the specific variables that create such a buffer effect?

As the income level per capita in these countries is significantly lower as compared to the income level found in developed countries such as USA or Europe, it can be stated that family plays a buffer effect for the wellbeing of their members in the sense that people share affect (both positive and negative) and find social support in family which compensates the lower income levels, maintaining the same or higher sense of wellbeing.

Social support by family allowing helping behaviors and the sharing of positive emotions in life provides the buffer effect that protects the individual from the unfavorable or negative conditions of its objective environment. The intensity and frequency of social relationships create supportive functions for the individual which in turn influences his/her higher sense of wellbeing. However, the debate continues about the relative sources of social support as well as how positive and negative interactions affect subjective wellbeing. Therefore, we expect that the level of subjective wellbeing associated with the perceived close or distant members of inner and outer groups will vary between cultural contexts and countries. The civil status of the person will also influence the conformation of different circles. For instance, it is interesting to note that unmarried individuals may include friends and other relatives in their inner circle.

I began to study how the quality of social relationships (Helliwel and Putnam 2004) influences SWB and how this relationship depends on the social and cultural context on which the individual is embedded. The social context is created by the existence of different (close, distant) social circles or convoys that vary with the age and life-span of the individual. Inner circles are associated with close family whereas distant circles are associated with extended family, friends, and colleagues. Social relationships are defined as relationships with which you feel close, those who are important to you and those that do things for you, those who are related to you and those with whom you spend a lot of time. It is possible to ask for a list of roles between members and create a list with spouse, children, parents, grandparents, members of the extended family such as uncles and cousins, friends and coworkers.

In this perspective, close family members provide sources of support that are qualitatively and quantitatively different than those that can be found between friends and colleagues while all these frequent meetings work presumably towards a positive association with subjective wellbeing—SWB. Convoys allow the sharing

of positive emotions between the individual and her inner group. Each convoy, depending on their proximity (close, outer), generates different levels of positive affect and of helping behaviors. These levels depend on the meeting frequency of the individual with his close family. Convoys are linked to group characteristics such as social class, educational level, income and age. I expect to find spillover effects between convoys so that the positive values arising from social relationships in the family also enable positive values such as helping behaviors and sharing of positive affect across convoys, generating a virtuous circle for to the quality of social relationships and SWB.

According to the convoy model (Antonucci et al. 2014), ‘individuals are surrounded by supportive others who move with them throughout the life course. These relationships vary in their closeness, their quality (e.g., positive, negative), their function (e.g., aid, affect, affirmation exchanges), and their structure (e.g., size, composition, contact frequency, geographic proximity). The structure, function, and quality of convoys are influenced by personal (e.g., age, gender, social class), economic (income) and situational (e.g., role demands, norms, values) factors’. Relationships with members of the inner circle tend to be stronger and more intense about positive experiences and emotions, suggesting that these types of relationships contribute higher to their subjective wellbeing. Previous research has indicated consistently that both positive and negative exchanges with a spouse are most prevalent and intense, followed by interactions with children and extended family.

These hypotheses were empirically tested using a representative sample of 3100 participants in four countries (US, Mexico, Costa Rica and Colombia) which was funded by the Templeton Foundation. In our research, hypotheses were confirmed although not all of them in the predicted direction. These findings provide additional support to explain the “Latin-American paradox” in happiness which states that the higher levels of SWB found in these countries do not necessarily correspond to objective conditions of economic growth as compared with richer countries such as the USA. The discrepancy between SWB levels and objective conditions can then be explained by the buffering effect that family provides for increasing the feelings of well-being despite poor objective conditions. During her life cycle, an individual creates and belongs to different convoys (family, friends, neighbors, colleagues). Convoys can be defined as inner or outer circles which provide different types of social support.

We (Wills-Herrera and Schorch 2019) state that the relationship between social circles and SWB is fully mediated by social support. We test the hypothesis that in LA countries meeting frequency as an indicator for social support is directly linked with SWB. In the US, the instrumental and affective value of social support must arise to increase higher levels of SWB.

Results show that relationships towards closer members of the in-group tend to be highly associated with SWB as compared to peripheral members. The perception of the closeness or distance of the social relationship varies cross-culturally, so that for instance, in Latin-American countries, it is perceived a close association with members of the extended family such as cousins, uncles, and grandparents whereas

in other countries or contexts those family members are not associated as being part of a close family.

As results show there is an affective buffer effect from close families in Latin-American individuals. The meeting frequency, the positive emotional support and helping behaviors between members of close families are higher in Latin-American countries as compared to USA families and this may explain the higher levels of SWB to be found in these countries despite their objective as compared to richer countries.

This is a small account of how Ruud's thinking and research influenced my own research with theoretical and applied implications for public policy in Latin-American countries.

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Chapter 30

A Critique of the Conventional Methods of Survey Item Transformations, with an Eye to Quantification



Bruno D. Zumbo and Pamela Woitschach

Our contribution to the Festschrift for Professor Ruut Veenhoven in celebration of his many contributions to happiness and social indicators research over the past fifty years focuses on the theme of making valid claims based on questionnaire response data from social surveys and assessments. In a series of publications since the early 1990s, Veenhoven has been calling for the development of survey research methods, as well as statistical and mathematical techniques, aimed at constructing reliable and valid measures to assess progress in societies using large-scale questionnaire studies among samples of the general population in different countries (Veenhoven 1993, 2008). The motivation for his call to action stems from the observation that many of us have had, that various surveys ask about the same topic, but the survey questions may not be the same. This difference could be due to personal preferences or styles for writing survey questions within the same country, or cross-cultural or cross-lingual differences between countries. Even a cursory review of different social surveys shows that there is a *mélange* of ways of asking about and recording a survey respondent's characteristics such as age, not to mention the jumble of survey questions and response formats for measures of wellbeing and quality of life.

Veenhoven remarked on several occasions that this methodological question was motivated by his need to prepare the data in his *World Database of Happiness* for a research synthesis such as a meta-analysis. The fundamental problem comes down to the fact that the questions that make up social surveys have response formats (also referred to as response rating scales) that may differ for different questionnaires within or between countries. The different response options of the rating scales for various surveys are not a problem, from a statistical point of view when analyses are

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conducted and reported separately for different questionnaires of exchangeable (or homogenous) survey respondents. There is, however, a thorny problem when one needs to pool the data from the various surveys for comparative study or research synthesis. We add to the complexity of Veenhoven's call to action by noting that within the same study, subgroups of individuals may respond differently to a survey question. For example, gender differences in responding to wellbeing or quality of life questions reflecting socio-cultural experiences and gender expectations may confound comparisons across gender categories (Woitschach et al. 2019; Zumbo et al. 2015).

With great admiration for Professor Veenhoven's program of research, we respond to his call to action arriving at our answer from a different path—one that is well travelled by others, and a road not entirely unfamiliar to Veehnoven, but a different way, nonetheless. Therefore, this essay is organized into two sections. In the first section of our essay, we will take a critical look at the class of methods that have been in use for nearly a century (e.g., The Linear Stretch Method, Hull 1922) and have spawned modern algebraic variations (Percentage of Scale Maximum Method, Cummins 1997, 2003). These methods are applied extensively to resolve Veenhoven's call to action but lack mathematical definition and justification. The most common of these methods transforms a set of positive integers from the response options, for example, $\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$, to the range 0 to 10, or 0 to 100, using an intuitive justification of "stretching" or "spreading" the elements of the set $\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$ on to a finite or bounded discrete interval—with the oft unstated and unproven implication that this 'stretching' also brings about continuity in the resultant transformed responses. In the second section of our essay, we describe our response to Veenhoven's call to action that is, in essence, advocating several variants of quantification, and more precisely, quantifying the survey item responses by using nonlinear model-based multivariate statistical methods. This closing section will also take a broader view and point to a framework of questionnaire response modelling that gives directions for further development.

A Critical Look at a Class of Widely Used Transformation Methods

Veenhoven's methodological research program resulted in a recent comprehensive volume wherein he and his colleagues reviewed existing methods and proposed new ones (de Jonge et al. 2017) to transform existing survey response data. These methods operate to homogenize the item response data to allow comparisons among groups and across countries from the resulting pooled data. From a mathematical view, one may describe these methods as determining a class of order-preserving response scale transformations that invoke a type of invariance that does not disturb the interpretation of the item responses while simultaneously mapping

the questionnaire response data from different response scales on to a universal scale and range.

To provide a mathematical sense of the methodological problem and the various options available to survey researchers, we will begin with survey questions that have a response scale with an inherent metric structure and then turn to those that do not. The former lay the groundwork of terminology and approach for the more complex mathematical structure of the latter.

Survey Questions Whose Response Scale Have an Inherent Metric Structure

An example of a widely used survey question will highlight the mathematical structure of the data transformation methods. A demographic question on a survey may ask the respondent to report their age in years, whereas another in years and months old. At first glance, this appears to be a simple matter of precision and a conversion to a standard scale by rounding to the nearest integer. Certain subtleties of transformation approaches are highlighted by approaching this transformation process more formally. One may conceive of this transformation of reported age as invoking an approximation such that, for example, $23.75 \approx 24$, where \approx denotes ‘approximately equal to.’ In this example, three key features define the rounding transformation.

(1) The rounding transformation method is characterized by a function $f: A \rightarrow B$, which associates to each element $a \in A$ an element $b \in B$. As such, f is described as “well-defined” (or “unambiguous”) if its definition assigns it a unique interpretation or value. Otherwise, the expression is said to be not well-defined or to be ambiguous. Furthermore, rounding transformations are generally idempotent and monotonic, hence order-preserving.

(2) The domain of a function, $f(x)$, is the set of all values for which the function is defined, and the range of the function is the set of all values that f takes. Therefore, for f to be considered a rounding function, the range will be a subset of the domain—in typical uses, the range is the integers, \mathbb{Z} .

(3) Statistical results such as descriptive statistics and fitting statistical models based on the values of the standard scale that is the resulting value in \mathbb{Z} should be in some sense as close as possible to those done without applying the rounding transformation (i.e., in our example, the values reported initially in years and months). This describes a type of approximation that becomes important because many of the commonly found statistics in survey research involve fitting models using variants of least-squares estimators or likelihood theory. Reminding ourselves of the motivating example of age demographics of $23.75 \approx 24$, when one applies elementary concepts in the mathematics of approximation theory, the vague idea of “close as possible” may be best understood by recasting it as a problem of best approximation in a normed linear space. This normed linear space may be invoked by the widely used generalized linear mixed models in computing statistical results.

Given the formal characterization of the rounding transformation, it should be of no surprise that there is not one, and only one, transformation function to satisfy the three key features. In short, many rounding transformation methods exist and are available to the survey scientist trying to homogenize the survey response data before pooling the various data sets to conduct a research synthesis or comparison of subgroups within the samples. The survey researcher would have to choose between round-up, round-down, round-ceiling, round-floor round-half-up, arithmetic rounding, round-toward-zero, round-away-from-zero, stochastic rounding, or even the blunt option of truncation (chopping), to name but a few. Of course, one might resolve (perhaps, more accurately described as ‘sidestep’) the *inherent embarrassment of riches of rounding transformations* if one had an agreed-upon algorithm for rounding numbers. *However, therein lies the rub.* If we could agree to a standard survey method, then this problem would not have arisen originally.

We learn a great deal about the formal properties and varied options from an analysis of the comparatively concrete and straightforward problem of transforming survey responses to the question of the survey participants age. Age has the simplifying feature of having an inherent unit or scale of measurement that is widely accepted in our western society. This inherent unit is also found with survey questions asking about time such as “how much time per week do you spend in leisure time” reported in minutes, hours, days, or months, and likewise income in different currencies or denominations within a currency. However, this becomes far more complicated and more difficult to resolve if two surveys asked the respondent to report their age using different age categories that differ in granularity so that the natural structure of the numbers is no longer present. In this case, $f(x)$ converting the various response formats to a common scale is said to be ambiguous (or poorly, or not well, defined) because its definition does not assign it a unique interpretation or value.

Survey Questions Whose Response Scale Do Not Have an Inherent Metric Structure

The question of interpretation adds additional complexity and one that is characteristic of the more general survey problem of transforming survey responses to a common scale. That is, the matter of reporting one’s age in a social survey is also a performative social act that carries with it the respondent’s socio-cultural expectations and experience over their life course—a subjective aspect to age. As such, responding to a question about one’s age may invoke long-learned and possibly long-held social schemas about age identity resulting in under- (or possibly over-) reporting. This reporting is undoubtedly also accurate of survey questions about income and accessing governmental and state social services and socially stigmatized behaviour such as the number of sexual partners, smoking, and drug or alcohol consumption. In these cases, even though the response format may be numbers that appear to have a robust metric structure and a common scale, subgroups within

survey samples (or respondents from different countries) may interpret those numbers with potentially different inherent meaning. In short, if one considers these responses as reflecting a mental representation or cognitive schema, then the common inherent scale or metric in the numbers may not hold. One can get a sense of this problem if one considers age in years versus the subjective representation of one's age in a shared cognitive schema among subgroups of respondents.

Akin to the subjective aspect of reporting one's age, this lack of an inherent unit or metric is a fundamental characteristic of survey item responses to psychosocial measures such as wellbeing, quality of life, happiness, or mental health. However, the lack of an inherent unit of responding is mitigated by the fact that the response format of these psychosocial survey questions is typically on an ordered-categorical scale. Furthermore, the fact that the survey respondents are assumed to be exchangeable or homogeneous is a mitigating feature that helps survey researchers interpret survey responses and pooling data across surveys. That is, without the exchangeability of the item response function, subgroups of respondents (and in the extreme, each respondent) would interpret and use the response options differently and hence confounding scale interpretation.

In a spirit of the analysis of the rounding transformation described above, a brief formal characterization provides the mathematical definitions to support choosing a transformation function of responses to psychosocial survey questions for pooling across sample surveys. It was this question that is the main focus of Veenhoven's call to action. To illustrate, imagine three different surveys are asking the question, "I am satisfied with my life," and the survey instructs respondents to select one of the options provided that reflects their level of agreement with the statement. However, the three different surveys used either a 4-point, 5-point, or 7-point order-categorical response options to reflect, for example, the response: "Strongly Agree," "Agree," "Slightly agree," "Neither Agree Nor Disagree," "Slightly Disagree," "Disagree," or "Strongly Disagree" for the verbal description of the 7-point response options. It should be noted that the response options are assigned the numbers 1 to 7, but that it is mathematically arbitrary whether the assignment is 1 to 7, or 7 to 1.

Building on the approach described for the rounding transformation, a function mapping the scores on one response format to the other is described with the following key central features. In general terms, a function $\phi(\cdot)$ from the set A , consisting of the objects a_1, \dots, a_p , of the originating survey p -point response format to the set of the ordered codes S , which corresponds to a set of arbitrary, but ordered, numerical values defining the common target r -point response scale:

$$A \rightarrow S = \{s_i, i = 1, 2, \dots, r\} \subset \mathbb{Z}. \quad (30.1)$$

It is interesting to note that described in this manner, the values of the target common response scale, s_i , are in a bijective relationship with a subset of $\mathbb{Z} = \{\dots, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, \dots\}$ and thus satisfying the empirical ordering, which already exists among the rating scale responses invoked by the labelling of the response options as "Strongly" and "Slightly" and the numerical ordered categorical values. It is noteworthy that it is a matter of interpretational convenience that most survey item response scales are positive whole numbers because there are cases in which they

are presented as integers that, by definition, include zero and negative numbers. Furthermore, as noted above and worth highlight again, the ordering direction is arbitrary so that the number 7 could be assigned to either “Strongly agree” or “Strongly disagree.”

One could further formalize this framework by invoking the algebraic structure and results of representational measurement theory (Krantz et al. 1989). In this case, one would apply Krantz et al.’s Theorem 1 (p. 15) that asserts the existence of a transformation function $\phi(\cdot)$ establishing the relationship in Eq. (30.1) with the intended order-preserving mapping; however, the assignment of numbers through $\phi(\cdot)$ is indeterminate. What this means is that an order-preserving target response scale is obtained even if the numbers s_i are transformed using a monotone increasing function $g(\cdot)$. That is, in this case, $\phi(\cdot)$ establishes a mapping from A to T , from the originating survey p -point response format to the set of the different target common response scale of ordered codes T . For example, one function could be from an originating 7-point response scale to a target 4-point scale, S , whereas there may be a different target of a 5-point scale, T . It is instructive that this 5-point scale could also be the result of applying either the Percentage of Scale Maximum Method or the Linear Stretch Methods described below. It is noteworthy that the two sets S and T are related by means of a bijective relationship only when $g(\cdot)$ is a strictly monotone function, and hence the same ordering in the two sets is preserved in a weak sense.

With this formalism in hand, let us turn our attention to the two conventional scale transformation methods for items described by Veenhoven and his colleagues (de Jonge et al. 2017) in the opening chapters of their landmark volume. Both transformation methods, the Linear Stretch and Percentage of Scale Maximum Method (Cummins 1997, 2003), make assumptions about the response scales and the transformation functions that are unwarranted considering the formalization described above. For example, the linear stretch method is used to transform numerical response scales with 5-point or 7-point response options to a common scale such as 0 to 10. As Veenhoven and his colleagues describe, for example, this is done by assigning the lowest response option a 0 and the number highest a ten and all the intermediate options are given equally distanced numbers in between. Likewise, the Percentage of Scale Maximum Method transforms ordered response categories to a standard form with a range from 0 to 100 wherein a score of 0 is given to the lowest scale anchor up to k to represent the largest scale anchor and any mean score on this scale can subsequently be converted into %SM units by converting the score into a percentage of the scale maximum value. See de Jonge et al. (2017) for more details about both methods.

Numerically these two transformations seem quite straightforward, but several common problems emerge upon close inspection. We will speak to the Percent of Maximum approach because it is more recent and is mathematically a somewhat trivial adaptation of the linear stretch method. Therefore, criticisms of the Percentage of Scale Maximum approach apply to the linear stretch method. First, the Percentage of Scale Maximum approach ignores that the ordering direction in the transformation function (Eq. 30.1) is arbitrary so that the number 7 could be assigned to either “Strongly agree” or “Strongly disagree.” Furthermore, the Percentage of Scale

Maximum computations incorrectly invoke a mathematical structure that is not warranted, by definition, in Eq. (30.1); imposing by way of their calculations that the distances between the response options are equal whereas Eq. (30.1) is far less restrictive.

It should be noted, however, that a transformation may be specified that aggregates two or more adjacent categories that may justify the unique direction of the relationships between A and S in Eq. (30.1). In the same light, it should also be noted that Eq. (30.1) does not encode the cognitive schema invoked by the labels of the response options. Therefore, although the direction is irrelevant for the mathematical definition in Eq. (30.1), it may be relevant for the survey respondent. In either case, the aggregates of two or more categories or the cognitive schema, do not provide the justification for the equal distancing and algebraic structure necessitated by the Percentage of Scale Maximum computations.

Summary Remarks on a Class of Methods to Transform Extant Data before Pooling

It was shown above that when put to formal analysis, even the simplest case of homogenizing survey responses to demographic questions about the age of respondents does not result in unique justified transformations from one response scale to the next. This lack of justification also applies to the two conventional scale transformation approaches for psychosocial survey questions, Percentage of Scale Maximum or the Linear Stretch Method. The matter is further complicated if there are more than two surveys involved in the data pooling. More than two surveys are very likely to occur in large databases such as Veenhoven's *World Database of Happiness* or a comprehensive research synthesis involving potentially hundreds of research articles, and a different transformation may exist for each pair of surveys being mapped to a common scale. Thus, the task, following formal mathematics, becomes practically insurmountable if not impossible. Of course, many of the transformations, such as the Percentage of Scale Maximum Method, have informal heuristic appeal and ease of computation. However, upon formal analysis described above, they do not stand to formal scrutiny, including Veenhoven and his colleagues' critique (de Jonge et al. 2017).

Concluding Remarks

Enough with the Conventional Transformations

It is not our intent to suggest that anything is basically amiss with seeking to (a) compare survey response data across different surveys for comparison or research synthesis, and (b) resolve the problem that different surveys may use different

response scales by seeking to homogenize them by transformation before pooling the different surveys. Quite the opposite. What has happened in this data transformation tradition is convincing evidence that powerful advances in survey science methodology are possible when rigorous thinkers are willing to put some intellectual muscle into the enterprise. The goal of transforming questionnaire responses to foster research synthesis or valid comparison between subgroups is laudable because it contributes to the scientific goal we share with Professor Veenhoven of making valid claims from questionnaire response data from social surveys and assessments to improve the quality of life and wellbeing of people of all nations.

Even so, we find the two conventional and widely used methods disquieting. Enough with these conventional transformations. The argument for transforming response options, for example, $\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$ to the range 0 to 10, or 0 to 100 is made by a plea to an intuitive sense of “stretching” or “spreading” the elements of the original response options. However, upon closer inspection, these conventional transformations are one-to-one mappings that, in essence, reshuffle the labels of the order-categories. They map the initial responses from a bounded set of positive integers to a bounded set with the same number of elements. The labels of the resultant elements are arbitrary. As such, by converting the various responses by the Percentage of Scale Maximum or the Linear Stretch Methods does not, by definition, assign a unique interpretation to the resultant transformed scores. They are, at best, justified by appeal to quantitative intuition and agreed-upon reasonableness of the resulting labels. The resulting transformed numbers are, as we are instructed by the title of one of the methods, merely the percentage of the maximum response scale score. However, because these transformations are not well defined, their unique interpretation comes from a social convention that this particular reshuffling of the initial responses should be the accepted standard in the discipline. As such, one has ruled out alternative reshufflings and hence interpretations by social agreement. Of course, if our quest were a social convention, would it not have been more reasonable to simply all agree to use the same response format ahead of time and save ourselves all this trouble?

A New Way Forward

Veenhoven and his colleagues summarize the fundamental problem of the conventional scale transformations most clearly when they write: “This has to be attributed to the fact that if a discrete primary scale is transformed by one of these methods, the resulting secondary scale will still be discrete” (de Jonge et al. 2017, p. 71). As shown in the mathematical analysis above, these conventional transformations make the unwarranted claim, implied or otherwise stated, that they map from a discrete to a continuous variable. In this light, a very promising approach can be found in the closing chapters of Veenhoven and his colleagues’ volume (Chaps. 7, 8, 9 and 10) based on the foundational work of Kalmijn (Kalmijn 2010, 2013; Kalmijn et al. 2011). In these chapters, they describe an underlying variable approach wherein one

specifies a latent continuum of variation on which to map the variation of the item responses. As they acknowledge, the underlying variable approach has affinities with item response theory and multivariate latent variable modelling approaches. The underlying variable approach is not optimal for all situations, but it does cover many situations we confront in survey and assessment design and analysis.

The underlying variable approach has a long history in multivariate statistics and psychometrics. This approach can be conceptualized as a two-step strategy conducted simultaneously. That is, a multivariate statistical model is specified in which, in the first step, the original ordered categorical data are transformed onto an intermediary continuous latent variate. In the second step, the statistical model (e.g., factor analysis, regression, item response theory) is fit to the intermediary variable using conventional multivariate linear models. Historically, this two-step process was conducted using a tetrachoric or polychoric dispersion matrix. Biostatistics journals from the early 1990s are littered with arguments about the choice of the “appropriate” correlation coefficient. Pearson-Heron and Yule created much smoke but no fire (no definitive answer), about the use of Pearson’s tetrachoric correlation. A close inspection of the original derivation of the tetrachoric correlation shows that the central tenant was the transformation from discrete binary data to a continuous variable. As such, the tetrachoric correlation shares much in common with the mathematical notion of quantification. The same applies to the polychoric correlation.

In this light, many multivariate statistical models invoke a type of quantification inherent in their computation. The quantification has its social history in the tradition of psychophysical and psychometric scaling. Kalmijn’s approach shares this same feature with the important distinction that the latent variable is a beta random variable rather than a Gaussian variate. As such, the possible multivariate methods that could be used in quantifying (transforming) the ordered categorical variables to a continuous variable is greatly expanded. For example, one could apply a scaling method such as Thurstone-Bradley-Terry-Luce models for paired comparisons (Bradley and Terry 1952; Luce 1959), Coombs’ unfolding technique (Coombs 1964), Shepard-Kruskal non-metric multidimensional scaling (Shepard 1962a, b; Kruskal 1964a, b), or Nishisato’s Dual Scaling (1993, 1996). Any of these methods would provide a unique and interpretable continuous variable depending on the data situation. Of course, one could also use structural equation modelling, treating the survey response questions as ordinal. Finally, any of the unidimensional or multidimensional item response theory models may apply as well. In all of these cases, the multivariate statistical or scaling model serves as an elaborate transformation function from the ordered categorical questionnaire responses to a common continuous variable.

From this multivariate point of view, one may construct a uniquely defined random variable. The uniqueness comes from the constraints specified in identifying the solution space of the multivariate models. From this vantage point, the traditional psychometric techniques frame the observed score arising from the questionnaire response process as an interaction between the item and test respondents (Ruhe and Zumbo 2009; Zumbo and Gelin 2005; Zumbo et al. 2015).

In highlighting the centrality of the interaction of the item and the questionnaire respondent, we force the questionnaire respondent back into the equation. The conceptualization and intuitive justification of the conventional transformations, Percentage of Scale Maximum or the Linear Stretch Methods, were devoid of any questionnaire respondents. In reintroducing the survey respondent, the development of survey research methods, as well as the statistical and mathematical techniques, must come hand-in-hand with a more holistic and integrated view of the contextual variables that shape the response process and that can influence the survey environment. Our response to Veenhoven's call to action demands a more comprehensive view that goes beyond descriptive models. We are calling for a focus on explanatory theories of questionnaire responding that account for the observed variations in comparing countries and subgroups of questionnaire respondents.

The ecological model of responding to survey questions was introduced by Zumbo and Gelin (2005) and expanded by Zumbo et al. (2015) and Woitschach et al. (2019). This model allows the survey researcher to focus on sociological, structural, community and contextual variables, as well as psychological and cognitive factors, as explanatory sources of questionnaire responding. This line of research has been successfully applied to explore sources and explanation of variability of item response and test performance in the context of large-scale educational testing, and cross-country comparability by Chen and Zumbo (2017), and Woitschach (2018).

An analogy that describes the essential difference between the traditional survey approach and the ecological framework comes from an artistic point of view. In art, the form and content/background are considered distinct aspects. The artist flows their inspiration between the form (survey respondent and questionnaire characteristics) and the background (the survey environment). The traditional survey methodology perspective does not deny the presence of contextual influences; however, it focusses its attention on the survey respondent and the number of scale points and questionnaire characteristics such as the level of the language or number of questions. From the ecological perspective proposed by Zumbo et al. (2015), the contextual characteristics, whether they are from the respondent's family, social, or political context emerge as relevant elements that contribute to understanding the mechanisms (cognitive, behavioural and affective) immersed in the process of responding to survey questions.

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Chapter 31

Photographs to Remember




Alex C. Michalos



Ruut with his eldest child, Joris, at home in Harmelen 1973

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Ruut at home in Harmelen, 1979



Meeting of *Working Group 06: Social Indicators* of the International Sociological Association in New Delhi, India 1986. Front row from left: Deborah C. Poff, Alex C. Michalos, Wolfgang Glatzer, Rudolf Andorka; standing from right side: Ruut, Arne Mastekaasa, unknown, Bruce Headey, Torbjorn Moum, Hanneke de Haes, unknown, Denis F. Johnston.




Ruut, Joachim Vogel, Torbjorn Moum, Alex C. Michalos, Wolfgang Glatzer and Valerie Møller at Alex and Deborah's home during the International Society for Quality of Life Studies (ISQOLS) conference in Prince George, British Columbia in 1995.



Joachim Vogel and Ruut at ISQOLS conference in Girona, Spain 2000



Ruut's Inaugural Lecture, Erasmus University, Rotterdam 2002



Graciela Tonon, Ferran Casas and Richard J. Estes at ISQOLS conference in Frankfurt 2003.



Ruut and Wolfgang Glatzer, ISQOLS conference in Grahamstown 2006



ISQOLS group dayoff at Amakhala Game Reserve, South Africa in 2006.

Front row: unknown, Wolfgang Glatzer, Ruut Veenhoven, Valerie Møller, Alex Michalos, Richard Estes, Claudius Claibourne, Linda Guerrero, Filomena Maggino.

Back row: Nova de Villiers, Deborah Poff, David Webb, Don Rahtz, Mahar Mangahas, Esther Otten, Welmoed Spahr, Heinz-Herbert Noll, Denis Huschka, Dong-Jin Lee, Robert Cummins.



Ruut cartoon from the magazine Opzij in July 2007



Ruut and his wife Kiki at ISQOLS conference in Florence, Italy 2008.



Robert Biswas-Diener and Ruut at Robert's dissertation defence at the University of Tromsø, Norway 2009.



Ruut and Robert A. Cummins, ISQOLS conference in Venice 2012



Ruut at the Ruut Veenhoven Award ceremony for Mohsen Joshanloo in Rotterdam 2019.



Ruut and team of the Erasmus Happiness Economics Research Organization at Erasmus University, Rotterdam 2019.