SOCIOLGY’S BLIND EYE FOR HAPPINESS

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ABSTRACT
Empirical studies on happiness have found that: a) most people are happy in modern nations, b) average happiness in nations is rising, c) inequality in happiness is going down, d) happiness depends heavily on the kind of society one lives in, but e) not very much on one’s place in society. These remarkable findings are largely ignored in sociology, if not denied. This has several reasons. One reason is professional bias: most sociologists earn their living dealing with social problems are therefore not apt to see that people flourish. Another reason is ideological: many sociologists are ‘critical’ of modern society and can therefore hardly imagine that people thrive in these conditions. Lastly, some sociological theories play them false, in particular cognitive theories implying that happiness is relative. These theories and the evidence against them are discussed in this paper.

1 FINDINGS ON HAPPINESS

Happiness has long been a playground for speculative philosophy, but since the 1970s it has also become the subject of empirical research. In that research, happiness is conceived as overall life-satisfaction and measured using self-reports. This conception of happiness has appeared to be sound and this way of measurement has been proven valid (Veenhoven 1984, Diener 1999, Donovan et al. 2003, VanPraag & Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2010). This research tradition has yielded a growing body of knowledge, much of which is gathered in the World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven 2013). There are four main findings:

Most people are happy
The earliest investigations on happiness took place in modern western nations and observed that most people were happy. This appeared not only in responses to questions about life satisfaction, but also in measures of daily mood, such as the Bradburn (1969) Affect Balance Scale. An example is presented in figure 1, in which the distribution of responses in Western nations is shown to the following survey question:

All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as-a-whole these days?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
dissatisfied satisfied

About a quarter of the population in these countries rated 5 or lower on this question, while more than half rated their life 7 or higher. The reports may be somewhat inflated by

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desirability, but this bias appears to be marginal (Veenhoven 2008a). The validity of these measures is beyond doubt. People understand the concept and typically answer such questions properly.

Responses are not so positive in all countries of the world, but still the average is above neutral in most of day’s nations. This can be seen in figure 2, in which average happiness in nations all over the world is presented. Of the 148 nations on this map 37 score lower than 5, while average happiness is 7 or higher in 35 nations. The world average weighted by population size was 60; standard deviation was 0.9. The world average not weighted by population size (every country counted the same) was 5.9; the standard deviation was 1.3.

**Average happiness is rising**
Since the 1970s happiness has been periodically assessed in most western nations. Comparison over time shows an upward trend in most of these nations and few cases of decline (Veenhoven 2014 table 3). On figure 3 are some examples. Trend data on non-western nations are less abundant, but show greater gains in happiness. This rise in average happiness appears to be linked to economic growth, which goes against the famous ‘Easterlin paradox’ (Easterlin 1974; Veenhoven & Vergunst 2014).

Life-expectancy has also risen considerably in this era and this means that this generation has witnessed an unprecedented rise in ‘happy life years’. Americans gained 5,2 happy life-years between 1973 and 2010 and Western Europeans about 3,6 happy life years.

**Inequality in happiness going down**
This rise in average happiness has been accompanied by a reduction of the dispersion of happiness in the general public, which manifests in a lowering of standard deviations over time (see figure 4). This reduction is partly due to the rising average that causes a concentration of responses at the top of the scale, but not entirely. The lowering of inequality in happiness is also due to a reduction in unhappy responses. (Veenhoven 2005).

**Strong impact of kind of society**
Average happiness differs widely across nations (cf. Figure 2); from 2.6 on a scale of 0-10 in Togo to 8.3 in Denmark. There appears to be a pattern in these differences. Happiness is systematically higher in nations that combine a good material standard of living with good governance, freedom and a climate of tolerance(see figure 5). Together, such societal characteristics explain about 75% of the differences in average happiness across nations (Ott 2005). There are also societal characteristics that appeared to be unrelated to average happiness of citizens. This is the case for income inequality in nations (Berg & Veenhoven 2010) and for state welfare effort (Veenhoven 2000).

**Little impact of place in society**
Several surveys on happiness have been done in the context of marketing research for the welfare state and aimed at identifying client groups. Investigators expected social deprivation to be accompanied by unhappiness, which would legitimize policy intervention. Yet they
found little correlation between happiness and income position and between happiness and
the level of education of an individual. Together, social positional variables explain at best
10% of the differences in happiness found within nations. At least in modern affluent
nations, happiness depends far more on embedding in intimate networks and on
psychological characteristics (e.g. Headey & Wearing 1992).

2 RECEPTION IN SOCIOLOGY

There are good reasons to expect that these findings would attract considerable attention in
sociology. One reason is that the subject was on the agenda of the 19th century founding
fathers of sociology, such as Auguste Comte (Ple 2000) and Herbert Spencer (1857).

Another reason to expect avid interest is that these findings involve answers to long-
standing questions in sociology, the finding that most people are happy is indicative of how
livable modern society is; the finding that happiness is rising embodies an answer to the
question of social progress; the finding that inequality in happiness is going down is telling
about the relevance of ‘new’ social inequalities and the finding that happiness differs so much
across kinds of societies is highly relevant in the debate of what a good society is like.

Still another reason to expect close attention is that some of the findings flatly
contradict some common beliefs. The finding that inequality of happiness has diminished
during the last decades contradicts the common notion that inequality is rising in modern
societies. Likewise, the finding that income inequality in nations is unrelated to average
happiness contradicts the commonly held belief that socio-economic disparities cause deep
frustration. The same holds for the finding that the effects of income and education are small.

Yet the reality is that these findings are not acknowledged in sociology. This appears
in the following examples:

Not mentioned in textbooks
The subject of happiness is typically absent in sociological textbooks. For instance the word
does not appear in the subject index of the introductory books by written by Giddens (2006),
Marsh et al (1996) and Newman (1997). These books do mention negative mental states such
as anomie and alienation and do contain sections on (ill) health. A notable exception is the
introduction to macro-sociology by Nolan and Lenski (2006) where happiness is discussed in
the context of social progress.

Missing in Dictionary of Sociology
The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology, 2nd edition, does not include happiness, subjective
well-being, or quality of life as a keyword (Johnson 2002).

Marginal in sociological journals
The subject of happiness is only rarely addressed in sociological journals. This appears from
an analysis of the publications listed in the Bibliography of the earlier mentioned World
Database of Happiness, which contains some 9000 scientific publications on happiness.
From this source I selected texts published in a disciplinary source, searching on 'economic', 'psychologic' and 'sociologic'. The number of publications on happiness in each of these three disciplines over the years is presented on figure 6. As one can see, psychologists addressed the subject already in the early 1900s and increased their attention since the 1960. Economists stepped in later, but happiness economics is now booming. The first sociological publications on happiness appear in the 1950s and the number has hardly increased since.

In an earlier version of this paper I had used disciplinary abstract systems and counted the percentage of abstracts in which the words 'happiness' or 'life-satisfaction' were used. Yet such counts are misleading for two reasons. One is that these words do not always fit the concept at hand here. A problem particular to sociology is that the abstract system cover more that core sociological journals. Most hits come from two niche journals, Social Indicators Research and the Journal of Happiness Studies. One of the reasons I started this latter journal in 2000 was that mainstream sociological journals rejected my papers on happiness.

An advantage of using the Bibliography of Happiness is that this source limits to publications on happiness in the sense of an individual’s subjective enjoyment of his/her life as a whole. All texts have been read to see whether this subject is addressed and publications on other things called happiness were left out.

**Missing in sociological discourse on ‘quality of life’**

Still, the term ‘quality-of-life’ is not unknown in sociology. There are symposia under that name and also research institutes. Yet subjective enjoyment of life is typically not at stake in these contexts, quality-of-life being typically conceived as the degree to which life meets apriori standards of wellbeing. The 16th World Congress of Sociology provides a nice illustration: the conference theme was: ‘The quality of social existence in a globalizing world’ and the issues discussed in this context were conditions deemed beneficial, such as social identity, social cohesion and social mobility. Subjective appreciation of life in these conditions was markedly absent from the thematic sessions of this conference.

**Lost in a preoccupation with misery**

As noted above, sociology deals with problems in the first place. This appears for instance in the use of the word ‘satisfaction’ in sociological abstracts; in 41% of the abstracts that word is used to denote a negative state, that is, dissatisfaction, while in only 8% the word is used for a positive appreciation. Analysis of the sociological abstracts over time has also shown an increasing use of negative words such as ‘fear’ and ‘crime’ over the last decade (Elchardus et al. 2005). This narrowing of the focus on misery contrasts with the above mentioned findings of rising levels of happiness in nations.

The above general indications of disinterest fit my personal experience as a sociologist working on happiness since the 1970s. Colleague sociologist in funding and journals were skeptical about the subject and rejected most of my applications and submissions, typically with arguments mentioned in section 4 of this paper. This was one of the reasons why I started the Journal of Happiness Studies in 2000. I also met skepticism in my department of
sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam. Though the output of my research was welcomed, the topic was not seen as sociological and remained marginal in the research program. The department decided not to continue research on happiness after my time and for that reason I moved to the department of economics of Erasmus University, where a research organization on Happiness Economics was established in 2012.

3 REASONS FOR NEGLECT

Why do sociologists overlook this matter? I see three kinds of reasons: pragmatic, ideological and theoretical.

Pragmatic
Sociologists are more interested in what people do than in how they feel. Their main objective is to explain social behavior and happiness is at best a variable in that context. A related point is that sociology is about collectivities, while happiness is an individual level concept. A further pragmatic reason is that sociologists earn their living dealing with social problems. So, if they look at subjective well being at all, they focus on ill being in the first place.

Ideological
Many sociologists are committed to notions of objective wellbeing, such as social equality and social cohesion. They are therefore not eager to investigate how people actually feel in such conditions, and when they do, they often ignore contradictory results. For instance, when people appear to feel subjectively good in conditions deemed to be objectively bad, this is easily disposed of as 'social desirability bias' or ‘false consciousness'.

Theoretical
Sociologists tend to think of happiness as a mere idea that depends on social comparison with variable standards and that is, therefore, a whimsical state of mind, not worth pursuing and hence not worth studying. Below I will consider these views in more detail.

4 VIEWS ON HAPPINESS IN SOCIOLOGY

Sociologists are not specialized in matters of the mind, but still make psychological assumptions. They typically borrow from cognitive psychology, probably because that line of thought fits with their view on man as a socially determined being. In this line, sociologists see happiness as a cognitive ‘construct’ shaped by collective notions of the good life and as the result of comparisons, social comparison in particular.

4.1 Presumed social construction of happiness
Social construction theory is about how we make sense of things. It assumes that we
'construct' mental representations, using collective notions as building blocks. In this view, happiness is regarded as a social construction, comparable to notions like 'beauty' and 'fairness'. A common reasoning in this line is that happiness depends on shared notions about life and that these collective notions frame individual appraisals.

One of the ways this is assumed to work is seeing the glass half full or half empty, optimistic cultures tending to highlight the positive aspects of life, while pessimistic cultures emphasize its shortcomings. Americans have been mentioned as an example of the former view and the French of the latter, e.g. by Ostroot & Scheider (1985). In this line Inglehart (1990:30) has suggested that happiness is lower in France than in the US because life was harder in France for earlier generations, and this is echoed in a more pessimistic outlook on life today.

Another cognitive mechanism assumed to gear happiness is comparison with shared notions of the good life. In this view, happiness is the gap between perceptions of life-as-it-is with notions of how-life-should-be. In this line it is commonly argued that the advertising industry reduces our wellbeing, because it fosters dreams of a life that is out of reach for the common man (Layard 2005). Another example of this view is the claim that the high levels of happiness in modern nations result from giving up hope for a better life.

An additional mechanism that has been mentioned is that we see ourselves typically though the eyes of others and hence also judge our happiness though their eyes. In this view, happiness is a 'reflected appraisal'. We will be positive about our life when people around us deem us to be well off and negative when others see us as losers. In this vein the lower happiness among singles has been explained as the result of a negative stereotype: because singles are 'labeled' as pitiful they come to see themselves as miserable, in spite of the apparent advantages of single living (e.g. Davies & Strong 1977).

The constructionist view implies that there is little value to happiness, happiness being a mere idea. Since notions about the good life vary across time and culture, happiness is also seen to be culturally relative. A life that is deemed perfect in one idea of the good life may be seen to be a failure from perspective. For this reason this theory is popular among the critics of Bentham’s (1789) moral philosophy, i.e. that we should aim at “greater happiness for a greater number”; it reduces happiness to something insignificant.

**Theoretical plausibility**

It is beyond doubt that shared notions frame much of our appraisals, yet this is not to say that all awareness is socially constructed. We need no shared notions to experience pain or hunger; culture at best modifies our reflection on these experiences somewhat. Our understanding draws also on external stimuli and on inner signals. The question thus is: How does this work in the case of happiness?

When striking the balance of their life, people appear to use their mood as the prime source of information (Schwartz & Strack 1991) and consequently overall happiness correlates typically stronger with hedonic level of affect than with contentment. There is logic in this, since the affect system is evolutionary older and serves to ascertain that an organism’s basic needs are met. The cognitive system developed on top of this in homo sapiens, but it has not replaced the affective system. It is rather an additional device that allows better learning from experience and planning of activities. In this light it is unlikely that happiness
is merely due to cognitive appraisal. I have discussed this view in more detail in Veenhoven 2009.

**Empirical support**
The reality value of this view cannot be tested as such, because the human mind is still a black box. Yet we can check its aptness indirectly, when we consider the implications of the theory that happiness is a mere social construction.

**Culture specific?**
One implication is that conditions for happiness will be variable across cultures. If happiness is a culture specific construct, its determinants will also be culturally specific. Hence empirical studies on correlates of happiness must show considerable cultural variation and hardly any universal pattern. Yet the available data show otherwise.

Comparison of average happiness across nations reveals a common pattern. Happiness is systematically higher in nations that provide a decent material standard of living, that are politically democratic and well governed and where the cultural climate is characterized by trust and tolerance. Together objective societal characteristics explain about 75% of the differences in happiness across nations (Veenhoven & Kalmijn 2005).

Comparison of correlations within nations also shows much similarity. In all countries, the married appear to be happier than singles (Diener, 2000) and health is also a strong correlate of happiness all over the world, both physical health and mental health. Likewise, the differences in happiness across age and gender are typically small everywhere (Veenhoven 2010).

**Variable over time?**
A second implication is that happiness must be variable over time. If happiness depends on shared notions of the good life, it will vary with fads about that matter and this must be reflected in erratic movements in average happiness in nations, comparable to changes in political preferences and tastes for music. Yet again this not what the data show. Average happiness appears to be very stable over time, at least in western nations over the last 30 years, where happiness has risen slightly without many fluctuations (cf. section 1.2). Follow-up studies at the individual level also show considerable constancy over time (Erhardt et. al. 2000).

**Inconsequential?**
A third implication is that happiness is of little consequence. If happiness is sheer cognitive spin, based on fashionable ideas, it will not matter much whether it turns out positively or negatively. Happiness is then a petty appraisal, such as a person’s preference for one kind of wallpaper or another; nice in itself but of no consequence for anything more than that.

Once more, this appears not to be the case. Happiness appears to go hand in hand with objective thriving and follow-up studies have shown that happiness is a strong predictor of physical health and longevity (e.g. Danner et. al 2000, Veenhoven 2008b).
Together, these findings do not support the theory that happiness is mere thought silk. Note that these findings concern happiness-as-such, and not opinions about what adds to happiness. Happiness-as-such is something that we experience ourselves and which we can appraise without the help of others. Though we know how we feel, we often do not know why and in attributing grounds for our wellbeing we draw more on a shared view. In this respect happiness is comparable to a headache: a headache-as-such is not a social construction, it is an autonomous signal from the body. Yet our interpretations of what gives us a headache depend very much on hearsay.

4.2 Presumed product of social comparison

All sociologists learn in their student days about the exemplary case of ‘relative deprivation’ described in Stouffer's (1949) classic study ‘The American Soldier’. One of the things assessed in this study is the satisfaction with promotion chances and contrary to expectation the satisfaction with this aspect of army life appeared to be higher in units where promotion chances were low, such as the military police, than in units where promotion chances were high, such as the air force. This phenomenon was explained in terms of social comparison; because promotion was more common in the air force, air force personnel more often felt they were entitled to promotion. This case of satisfaction with promotion makes many sociologists think that all satisfaction depends on social comparison.

Social comparison theory is a variant of a wider comparison theory that links up with the above mentioned notion that happiness is the difference between life-as-it-is and how-life-should-be. The smaller these discrepancies are, the higher the happiness is assumed to be. In this theory there can be multiple discrepancies; among other things discrepancies between what one has and what one thinks that one could have, and discrepancies between what one has and what one feels entitled to (Michalos 1985). Perceptions of what one could have and what would be fair to have are seen to be drawn from social comparison. In this view, happiness is a matter of keeping up with the Joneses; we feel well if we do better and bad if we do worse than those we compare ourselves to.

In this theory there is little hope for achieving greater happiness for a greater number, since improving the living conditions for all will also improve the life of the Jones’s, leaving the relative differences as before. Social comparison is one of the mechanisms in the idea that we are on a ‘hedonic treadmill’ that presumably nullifies all progress (Brickman & Campbell 1971) and it is the main mechanism in Easterlin’s (1974) theory that economic growth does not add to happiness. In this view we can at best mitigate the effects of social comparison somewhat if we make the differences less visible. In this line Frank (1999) has advised that conspicuous consumption should be discouraged with heavy taxes on luxury goods and Layard (2005) recommends taxing high incomes more. Limiting advertisement is also suggested in this context, in particular commercials that use pictures of a life that is out of reach of the common man.

Theoretical plausibility

There are several problems with this psychological theory. First it is clear that social comparison does not apply to all subjective appraisals. When I hit my finger with a hammer, I feel pain and my finger does not hurt less if my neighbor Jones does the same thing. When
appraising our situation, we use various sources of information, and social comparison is only one of these.

This brings us to the question of what value social comparison could be for assessing how well one lives. Obviously, that value is limited to aspects of life where social comparison is possible, such as your income, but not to less visible aspects such your sex life or the pleasure you take from watching a sunset. Even where we can measure up to the Jones this evidently informs us about what is possible in life, but not necessarily about what is desirable or enjoyable. Looking over the fence of my neighbor Jones I can see that I lag behind in the number of beer cans emptied, but this does not tell me whether I would be better off if I drank more. Advocates of social comparison theory would retort that we compare only on things that are socially valued in society, such as money and fame, and this links up with the assumption that notions of the good life are socially constructed. Yet even if beer drinking were highly valued in my society, and if I wholeheartedly supported that value, I would end up less well if I drank more than my dipsomaniacal neighbor Jones. That is evident because drinking too much is bad for the body, irrespective of how I think about this.

This example illustrates a major flaw in comparison theory: it forgets that we are biological organisms. Obviously we cannot feel well if our body is harmed. Affective alarms start to ring when we do not get enough food or when our temperature falls too low. Less obvious, but no less present are psychological needs, such as the need to belong and to use and develop our potentials. We feel bad when lonely and bored when unchallenged. Humans are not born as tabula rasa, on which socialization imprints culture specific wants, we are pre-wired to need some things and as a result feel good when these needs are met.

In this respect we are very much like our fellow animals. Dogs and cats can also feel good or bad and evidently do not calculate their happiness by comparing shared standards of the good life. Evolution has simply programmed them to feel good or bad subjectively in situations that are good or bad for their survival objectively. Our affective system is not much different from that of dogs and cats, and also serves to make us do intuitively what is good for us. Human cognition has developed on top of this affective program and allows us to reflect on affective signals and even to ignore them to some extent. Yet this is not to say that cognition has replaced affective experience. Without affective information we are conatively blind as Damasio (1994) has showed in his studies of brain injuries. Hence without affective information we will also be unable to appraise the quality of our life.

I have discussed this alternative ‘need theory’ of happiness elsewhere (Veenhoven 1995, 2009) and Ed Diener has reviewed the strong and weak points of this view (Diener et. al. 2000). Though alien to mainstream sociology, this latter view on happiness would fit socio-biology; however, to my knowledge this field of sociology has not yet considered the issue.

**Empirical support**

Social comparison is at best one piece of information in appraisals of happiness and it is an empirical question how much it matters. We can see how much when considering some implications of the theory.

One testable implication of social comparison theory is that people will typically be neither positive nor negative about their life. If we feel good because we do better than the
Jones, the Jones must feel bad because they do not so well. This must manifest in an average around neutral in general population samples. Yet survey data do not support this prediction, average happiness being far above neutral in modern nations.

Another implication is that happiness must be higher among people who do well on socially valued standards. This is not always the case however. Though people in high status jobs are typically happier than people in low status occupations, there is no correlation between happiness and level of education. Likewise, there is only modest correlation between happiness and income and this correlation is at least partly due to an effect of the former on the latter, happiness adding to earning chances. See respectively correlational findings on happiness and Occupation\(^8\), Education\(^9\) and Income\(^10\) in the World Database of Happiness.

However, happiness does appear to depend on things that have little to do with social comparison, such as participation in voluntary organizations\(^11\), intimate ties\(^12\) and being an extraverted and conscientious person\(^13\).

5 CONCLUSION

Happiness is a relevant subject for sociology, in particular for comparative sociology. Yet happiness is a neglected subject in sociology. The main reason seems to be that common sociological theories continue to prevent us taking a proper perspective on the matter.
Figure 1
Life-satisfaction in western nations 2005-2008

Data: World Values Survey, round 5, 2005-2008. Pooled probability samples of 18+ aged general public in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Germany, France, Finland, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, New Zealand, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Canada, Australia, United States, Luxembourg. Reported in Daly et al. 2011
Figure 2
Average happiness around the world

Source: World Database of Happiness, collection Happiness in Nations
Figure 3
Trend of average happiness in some developed nations since 1970

Data: World Database of Happiness (WDH 2014), Data file Trends in Nations
Figure 4
Trend of inequality of happiness in 9 EU nations, Japan and the USA

Data: World Database of Happiness (WDH 2014), Data file Trend in Nations
Figure 5
Average happiness and modernity in nations in 2000

Data: World Database of happiness, Data file States of Nations
Figure 6
Trend of publications on happiness in different scientific specializations

Source: World Database of Happiness, Bibliography
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Notes:

2 World Database of Happiness, Trend report Trend Happy Life Years in Nations
3 World Database of Happiness, Correlational Findings, Summed Determinants S15.2.1
4 Analysis of 100 sociological abstracts using the word ‘satisfaction’ in the period September 2005 to September 2006. I thank Piet Ouweneel for this analysis.
5 http://www.eur.nl/ehero

6 A similar preoccupation with negative things exists in psychology. Recently that has given rise to a counter-movement called ‘positive psychology’. A comparable movement has not developed in sociology as yet.

7 Need theory of happiness is also named ‘livability theory’ and in this case the emphasis is on the conditions that allow need gratification
8 World Database of Happiness, Findings on Happiness and Occupation
9 World Database of Happiness, Findings on Happiness and Education
10 World Database of Happiness, Findings on Happiness and Income
11 World Database of Happiness, Findings on Happiness and participation in Voluntary associations
12 World Database of Happiness, Findings on Happiness and Intimacy, Friendship and Marital status
13 World Database of Happiness, Findings on happiness and Personality