In the last few decades western societies underwent major changes. The increase of wealth was unprecedented. Economic growth and a sense of social solidarity laid the foundations for the expansion and fortification of welfare states. Work, income and well-being in general became ever more protected, through various legislative and social insurance measures. Instead of being deferred to, authority was being confronted, criticized and undermined. Investigative journalism came into its own. Emancipation struck. Matters that had been considered personal or self-evident, such as gender relations, now became the subject of public discussion and government policy. Differences and distinctions that had been considered biological or otherwise natural, were now exposed as determined socially, often as instances of domination and exploitation.

Hence the `politics of difference', which takes its bearings from the experiences and aspirations of the new social movements and groups. Mainstream liberal philosophical theories of justice, it is claimed, in fact consolidate oppression, because they operate with a social ontology that has no room for a concept of social groups. Political philosophy, critics insist, should accomodate the agonistic nature of present-day `multicultural' society. In the postmodern style of philosophy emphasis accordingly shifts from universalistic, rationalistic styles of theory to theories that are expressive of particularity, otherness, heterogeneity, and dissonance.

The insurgence and the success of new social movements has had important repercussions for political culture. New social movements incite a much higher level of participation, enthousiasm and commitment than the parliamentary, representative style of politics. On the one hand, they thus constitute a renewal of politics, and stimulate commitment to important social causes. On the other land, the success of these movements may in large measure be due to their `one-issue' nature, which tends to preempt complex, difficult, and often awkward judgment calls. In any case, the enthousiasm and commitment they generate reflect a strong sense of identification with the movement or group, leading to what is now known as `identity politics'. The identification with such a group or movement is double-edged: it provides adherents with both a personal and a political identity.

In the traditional pluralist liberal model of politics, for instance Robert Dahls `polyarchy', the belonging of individuals to several different groups, movements, or institutions is also considered socially beneficial, because it is assumed that the `mixing' of loyalties tends to dampen conflicts and enhance toleration, solidarity, and cooperation. In such a model group membership has no inherent political function or meaning. Contrary to the new social movements, it does not replace political participation or commitment. But in the new social movement model, social harmony is not a primary concern. The movements function just as much as vehicles of the need, and indeed the right, of individuals to express themselves, to form and act out their own style of life.

Generally speaking, postmodern varieties of political philosophy spawn optimistic views of difference and diversity, considering these a sign of health of a political culture. Culture is good, multiculturalism is better. Is this optimism justified? Does the politics of difference rightly criticize mainstream political philosophies for their failure to fit non-material goods such as power, opportunity, and self-respect into their static egalitarian frameworks? Or does it simply cater for the need for identity, filling the void left by the demise of `grand theories' by providing local and particular identities as a substitute for ambitious, universalistic ones?

In this conference, we propose to take a closer look at such questions, by bringing together philosophical perspectives with more sociological and empirical approaches. If difference or identity politics really emanates from actual experiences of exploitation and marginalization, we should expect it to prove useful for such more concrete analysis.
We are especially interested in the relation between identity politics and national political cultures. We want to focus on two dimensions of this relation. First: we aim to analyze, compare and juxtapose the ways in which different national political cultures have þ or have not þ managed to come to terms with identity politics, or the politics of difference in its many forms, including ethnic, sexual, religous, linguistic, and physical difference. In what way and to what extent do national cultures provide room for the creation and development of group identities? What social, political and cultural factors are involved? How do national cultures differ from each other on this score?

Second, and in complement: in what way and to what extent does the appearance and proliferation of identity groups in (post)modern society in turn influence and modify national political cultures? To what extent do they claim to do so? Are such claims justified? As we aim to approach these matters both descriptively and normatively, both empirical and philosophical contributions will be solicited and welcomed.
In response to the first question, we would like to discuss whether a specific `Dutch model' for dealing with difference and group identity can be constructed. This model could then be compared with other European models, such as French, British and Belgian models; furthermore, we would like to consider salient differences between these European models and the American model (if it exists).

Some examples. Roughly speaking, in Dutch political culture pragmatic solutions predominate. This model accomodates difference by reconciling rivaling groups through reasonable debate and political compromise (cf. the analyses by Arend Lijphart). We could ask whether this Dutch habit of tolerance, or permissiveness, works to advance acceptance of new religious minorities, such as moslim groups. Or does it either stifle such groups by integrating them too thoroughly and purposely, or alienate them by what in fact is indifference toward their particularity? Or, alternatively, is this notion of typical Dutch tolerance rather a corollary of, or a disguise for, the pragmatic and mercantile attitude of the Dutch toward everything foreign?

As for sexual difference, the Dutch experience and policy also make an interesting case. One can think of pornography, prostitution, abortion, but also of the attitude toward gay and lesbian lifestyles. Dutch people consider American and French attitudes in this regard as moralistic, and their policies as ineffectual at best. On the other hand, what the Dutch see as permissiveness is perceived by the American and the French as indifference and inconsistency. And what about the recent experiences in Belgium? Do the famous `white marches' express a dignified civic response to public immorality and official corruption, or do we rather witness one more example of the doomed search for `purity', with its concomitant, even more terrifying demands for `purging' and `cleansing'?

On the other hand, the Netherlands, for better or for worse, has had virtually no experience with ethnic or linguistic difference, nor with difference based on physical disabilities. Regarding ethnic conflict, comparing the experiences in France, Great-Britain and the United States will certainly be fruitful. What role do nationalistic sentiment play in this respect? And there is of course also the context of the colonial past, in fact the main þ and not very felicitous þ Dutch experience with ethnic difference. Linguistic difference plays an important role in both the Belgian and the American political culture (not to mention the Canadians), while physical difference, at least up to a point, is a recognized policy factor in countries which, like France, Britain and the United States, have a considerable military history.

The second question highlights the second term of identity politics: politics. However one feels about the proper role of the state, it is arguably no longer the center of politics. Or rather, there is no center of politics anymore. Politics, and policy, have become decentered and fragmented, just as identities have. We want to ask whether identity politics can provide the resources for a new civic ethoc, a morality of citizenship that might replace the formal and legal guarantees of political ordered offered - or at least promised þ by the nation-state. Or should we conclude, alternatively, that the postmodern identity groups are themselves exponents par excellence of the rights culture created by mainstream liberalism, engaged in a competiton to exploit their respective powers and opportunities to use such rights for the advancement of their own particular lifestyle as best as possible? We think this might be an interesting way to revive the well-known confrontation between liberalism and communitarianism, that otherwise threatens to end in stalemate.

Framing the issues along a political dimension will also enable us to discuss identity politics in the context of the historical process of `withering away' of the traditional nation-state, as it can be witnessed today in Europe. The prospect of European unification makes the analysis of differing national styles of dealing with difference all the more pressing and salient. Already national policies are being overruled by European policy and legislation, most notably in the fields of finance and law enforcement. If this leads to a weakening of the identity of national cultures, what will be the consequences for the vitality of public morality in those cultures? Will European identity inspire anyone toward civic responsibility, public discussion and social criticism? Or will postmodern identity politics be able to take pride of place in the search for a new locus of political identity?

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