Regionalism and Tribal Insecurity in India

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Abstract

Observers have long been ambivalent about democratic representation by parties with a regionalist orientation. We estimate the causal effect of regionalist party representation on political violence in India and find regionalist parties who win power cause local violence, but not through increased conflict with the Center. Rather, successful regionalists tend to favor local ethnic majorities, causing heightened uncertainty for local minority groups. In particular, we show that the increased violence is explained entirely by electoral constituencies with significant tribal populations but no mandated political representation for tribes, and that regionalist parties further decrease local tribal persons' reported consumption of television and radio, cultural goods, and wages. Our results imply representation by local majorities further relegates local tribal minorities to the margins of society, and that they in turn respond with organized political violence.

JEL: D74, H19, H77, P48

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Regionalism is contentious as an organizing political principle. On one hand, it has produced political parties in democracies throughout the developed and developing world that are the primary vehicle for recognition and representation of minority groups.[1] On the other hand, it is often the basis for violent conflict between central governments and peripheral insurgent groups. The ambivalence towards regionalism is due in part to uncertainty about the role regionalist parties themselves play in intrastate political violence. While Brancati (2006) argues that regionalist parties can increase the salience of ethnic and regional identities, mobilize citizens for conflict, and promote legislation favoring supporters disproportionately over other local groups, Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino (2007) show that representation of ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union can reduce conflict when representatives carry policy influence. In a similar vein, Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) and Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) show that armed rebellion is more likely when ethnic groups are excluded from access to decision making.

We help resolve the uncertainty about the role of regionalist parties by providing the first causal evidence on the effect of regionalist representation on political violence. We show that regionalist parties that win power cause local violence, but not through increased conflict with the central government. Rather, the election of regionalist parties, who tend to represent and favor local ethnic majority groups, raises local minority insecurity which in turn precipitates violent conflict between local majority and minority groups.

Our setting is subnational (state) elections in India, where, in the period of our sample, 80 regionalist parties that represent a rich set of regions and ethnicities compete against India's two dominant national parties. Other countries usually have one or two significant regionalist parties to complement a small number of national parties. In this way, India offers the best option for identifying general regional party effects while reaping the benefits of within country micro-data. In addition, India's 28 states regularly elect Members of the

[1]Examples include: Sinn Fein (Northern Ireland), The Scottish National Party (Scotland), and Plaid Cymru (Wales) in the UK; the Parti Québécois in Canada; the Basque National Party in Spain; the Polisario Front in Sub-Saharan Africa; indigenous parties in Latin America; the SNLD in Myanmar; Kurdish parties in Iraq and Turkey; Tamil parties in India and Sri Lanka.

Legislative Assembly (MLA's) to represent parliamentary constituencies, our primary unit of analysis, and in total we observe elections in more than 4000 electoral constituencies over many years. The large number of elections and the structure of Indian electoral institutions facilitates a causal interpretations of the effects of regionalist parties on violence, as well as an understanding of the underlying mechanisms.

Our baseline identification strategy is based on a close elections regression discontinuity (RD) design that compares political violence in constituencies where regionalist party representatives won or lost the election. We find the election of a regionalist party representative increases the occurrence of violence and death by 7.2 percentage points and the number of violent events and deaths by 10 and 13 percent respectively. Exploiting the structure of political administration in India, we use a complementary instrumental variables (IV) strategy to show further that the effects of regionalist representatives on violence are local in nature. The effects are limited to the constituency they represent and do not spill over into constituencies won by national parties.

The constituency level effect is driven largely by cases where the regionalist candidate's party governs the state (as opposed to being a member of the opposition). In these cases, regionalist party representatives increase the occurrence of violence and death by 10 percentage points and the number of events and deaths by 15 and 23% respectively. By contrast, a regionalist party representative has no effect on local violence when either of India's two dominant national parties control state government.

India's states have wide ranging political and economic decision making authority. As such, the estimates suggest that when regionalist parties control resources and key institutions (including police and security forces), local representatives from the regionalist party cause local violence. Social scientists have long argued that the pacifying capacity of formal representation by these types of parties depends on whether local electoral success translates into meaningful authority (Lijphart 2004; Gurr 1993). One of the important insights in Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) and Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) is that

meaningful executive power reduces intrastate conflict by pacifying the demands of minorities within the state, while nominal authority has no such capacity to reduce conflict. Our results stand in contradiction to this line of reasoning, as they suggest that meaningful executive authority increases political violence. Accordingly, we further explore the mechanism underlying our results.

Why does more political power for regionalist parties lead to more political violence at the constituency level? Indian MLAs are generally viewed as "fixers", who play a role in mediating local disputes over land and resources (Asher and Novosad 2017) among other things. Moreover, regionalist representatives who belong to the governing party wield significant authority over the distribution of resources locally. As Indian regionalist parties tend to organize around the identity of local ethnic majorities, regionalist representatives favor the local ethnic majority supporters at the expense of local minorities. Despite being a significant fraction of the Indian population (104 million out of 1.2 billion according to the 2011 census) tribal populations are a marginalized minority wherever they exist in India. They share a modern history of dispossession, land alienation, and competition for land and resources with non-tribals. In response, tribes have mobilized for violence against the Indian state and local paramilitary groups.[2] We hypothesize that the increased violence that attends the election of regional candidates is a result of heightened tension between local majorities and tribes.

To test this hypothesis, we leverage the constitutional reservation of seats for members of a Scheduled Tribe (ST) together with local ST population information to categorize constituencies on the basis of ST representation. We show that the violence that follows regionalist representation is generated in constituencies where ST are formally under-represented - where there is a large ST population but no mandated tribal representation. We then show using direct evidence from the first national survey of ST-persons in India that increased

[2]Two prominent examples are in India's Northeast, where Bodo and Dimasa tribes (among others) have mounted insurgency against the state in pursuit of greater self determination and autonomy and the Naxalite conflict in central India, which relies heavily on the participation of aggrieved tribes, and is considered by many to be a tribal movement in practice (Roy 2011). We provide a case study in section 8.1.

representation by regionalist parties reduces ST household consumption of media (television, radio and newspapers) and cultural goods (attendance at cinemas or theatres). It decreases the earnings of ST persons in local labor markets. We conclude that regionalist representation further relegates ST persons to the margins of society, and that the violence caused by the local election of a regionalist candidate is a result of heightened tribal insecurity.

2 Related Literature

The number of political parties contesting elections in India has grown rapidly since Independence in 1947. A major part of this growth involves parties who concentrate their attention on a particular geographic region.[3] As Ziegfeld (2016) notes, the existence of these parties in India is usually attributed to the combination two factors. The first is regional cleavages, where national minority ethnic groups are territorially concentrated and political parties can have success by appealing to the demands and historical grievances of these groups. These parties are constrained to operate regionally because their appeals to voters will be less effective where the national minority is rare. The second explanation for their existence is decentralization of fiscal and political power to state and more local governments. The prospect of additional fiscal and political control strengthens incentives to run regionally without having to compete nationwide. The combination of concentrated ethnic populations and decentralized power is a powerful explanation for the rise of regional parties at the state level in particular.

The scholarship on the consequences of regional political parties grew out of a large number of case studies and raw statistical evidence (Banerjee 1984; Bhatnagar and Kumar 1988; Gassah 1992, e.g.).[4] Significant advances were made in (Brancati 2006) and Brancati

[3]Prominent examples in India include the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, the Asom Gana Parishad, Akali Dal, The National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir, and Telugu Desam who run candidates exclusively in Tamil Nadu, Assam, Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir and Andhra Pradesh, respectively.

[4]Some political scientists reference regional parties Brancati (2008). Others reference regionalist parties (Massetti and Schakel 2016). We view regional parties as parties whose support is limited geographically, whether by design or not. Support for regionalist parties is limited geographically by design. We use

(2008), whose systematic analysis of cross-national data supported the ideas that regional political parties are a consequence of political decentralization (Chhibber and Kollman 1999), even after conditioning on regional cleavages, and that these parties moderate the effects of decentralization on conflict among minority groups, between minority and majority groups, and between minority groups and the government. The Brancati (2006, 2008) analyses highlight the complexity of the relationship between regional parties and political violence from the perspective of separating cause from effect. Regional parties can be interpreted as both a cause and consequence of political violence. Regional parties and political violence both correlate with unobservables, such as the history of violence and overall inclusiveness of institutions. A primary contribution of our paper, therefore, is in providing the first causal evidence on the violent effects of regional parties. In doing so, we contribute to a growing literature on causal identification of the sources of intrastate violent conflict, i.e. (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004; Dube and Naidu 2015; Dube and Vargas 2013; Nunn and Qian 2014; Magesan and Swee 2018), and (Blattman and Miguel 2010) for a review.[5]

Our study contributes to a new literature that empirically identifies the role of regional identity as a determinant of the distribution of political power and economic resources. Hodler and Raschky (2014) show that politicians elected at the national level disproportionately divert resources to their sub-national region of origin. They show that regional favoritism is also more common in poorer countries with linguistic heterogeneity, which is the case in India, and suggests that the ability to politically organize around local ethnicity is an important factor. In subsequent work, Luca et al. (2018) show that electoral concerns are a key driver of regional favoritism, and that ethnic favoritism is more likely when ethnic parties are politically important. We contribute here by providing causal evidence about the role of political parties with regional and ethnic orientation in generating conflict.

regionalist throughout the manuscript except when referencing papers that use regional party. We elaborate on why we use regionalist when we discuss the definition and measurement in Sections **??** and 4.2.

[5]Though the violence in these papers is sometimes framed as "civil war," many of the civil wars of the last few decades are characterized by long and protracted asymmetric conflict between a state and one or several small groups, similar to the secessionist violence in India.

As a result, we contribute to an emerging literature on the causal effects of political parties on political violence. Nellis, Weaver, and Rosenzweig (2016) and Nellis and Siddiqui (2018) estimate the effects of party identity and party ideology on communal violence. Nellis, Weaver, and Rosenzweig (2016) use data from India to show that greater district level seat share for the Indian National Congress (INC) party in state assembly elections decreases Hindu-Muslim riots substantially. While we find a related result - that local representatives from a regionalist party do not cause violence when a major National party controls the state - the violence that responds to regional representation in our setting is not inter-communal in nature. It is violence involving state forces and armed insurgents.

We advance this literature in several ways in addition to focusing on the effects of regionalist parties rather than other party types. Unlike other articles, we identify effects at the level of the electoral constituency in addition to the aggregate district level (groups of constituencies) as other researchers were constrained to do by their data. Electoral constituency effects enables clean identification of the effect of the representatives themselves on violence. Electoral constituency effects let us delve cleanly into mechanisms because we can, for example, examine whether the effects differ depending on ethnic compositions of constituencies. Like other articles, we also identify effects at the level of the administrative district. This allows for inferences concerning the effects of regionalist representation on violence in neighbouring constituencies represented by other parties. These district level estimates, together with the constituency level estimates, help us investigate how the effect on violence differs depending on regionalist influence over central executive decisions.

We contribute to a political economics literature which studies the coexistence of political violence and democratic electoral politics. Wilkinson (2004) identifies circumstances where politicians are led to either curb or incite violence, arguing that constituency-level electoral incentives in India induces local representatives to incite Hindu-Muslim violence, as ethnic parties leverage incite violence to solidify perceptions that they are *the* party of their coethnics. Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos (2013) use a model to show incumbent

governments with re-election concerns would forgo the state's usual monopoly on violence in exchange for pre-election support from paramilitary groups. Chacon (2018) shows theoretically that subnational decentralization can increase violent insurgency because of higher rents to subnational government capture, and that the effect is more pronounced when the subnational government has weaker state capacity. These mechanisms are likely important in our setting, as many of India's regional parties have a natural tendency to sympathize or maintain ties with rebels while participating in conventional politics, with both having origins in the same political movement.[6] This increases the chances of the *quid pro quo* that Acemoglu et al. (2013) identify. The mechanism in (Chacon 2018) likely manifests in our setting as well, as regionalist parties have limited capacity to control violence relative to big national parties.

Our results for ST-reserved constituencies and open constituencies with large ST populations delivers new insights for a literature on quotas and reservation for disadvantaged groups in India. Pande (2003) famously examined whether mandated political reservation increases transfers to the historically disadvantaged groups (members of Scheduled Castes and Tribes). While Pande (2003) found improved outcomes for disadvantaged groups, Jensenius (2015) has recently exploited India's quota system to show that having an Scheduled Caste (SC) state level representative does not improve outcomes for SC persons. The fact that the effect on violence comes entirely from open constituencies with large ST populations suggests that seat reservation for the tribal community significantly weakens the link between party identity and political violence.

Our results complement a literature that examines the effects of the forced imposition of institutional and governance structures on ethnic groups with different backgrounds. (Dippel 2014), (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013), and (Gennaioli and Rainer 2007) and study the effects on economic performance. The regionalism, violence, and tribal isolationism we observe can be viewed as a manifestation of the forced imposition of such structures.

[6]The transition from violent political movement to legitimate political party is complex and not always successful. See Acosta (2001) for further discussion.

3 Context

3.1. State Political Systems. State governments have jurisdiction over a range of issues with local significance, including public health, internal security (through state police), education at all levels (concurrent with federal government) and public works, among others. State governments also have tax collecting powers, and receive income from a (VAT) sales tax.

States are partitioned into administrative districts. Administrative districts are politically significant units, as the state government appoints several officials at this level (i.e., District Magistrate and Superintendent of the Police, to administer law and order, tax collection and revenues, arbitration of land acquisition, etc.).

Administrative districts are further partitioned into partitioned into single-member State Assembly constituencies. Each constituency elects a representative to the State Assembly via first-past-the-post voting rule.

India has 4120 seats in state (or union territory) assemblies, 146 on average for the 28 states, and 66 on average for the union territories. More than 1100 of these seats are reserved, 570 for SC, and 532 for ST. The reservations are determined by SC and ST population in the state - the number of reserved seats in a state is in proportion to the population of SC and ST in the state. Reserved seats are in turn allocated to constituencies with the largest SC and ST populations.

The Election Commission of India classifies parties on the basis of their electoral success across India. A party is officially recognized as a "State party" in India if the party:

(a) has been active for at least 5 years and won no less than 1/25 of State's seats in lower house of national parliament (*Lok Sabha*) or 1/13 of lower house seats in state assembly.

(b) obtained 6% of popular vote in state in last national or state election.

A party who meets either criteria in more than 3 states is officially recognized as a "National

Party". The remaining parties are labelled "Registered Unrecognized" or "Independent." The designations bestow certain privileges to political parties relating to campaign spending and exclusive rights to a political symbol in national and state elections.

3.2. Regionalist Parties in India. Conceptually, we define a party as a *regionalist party* if it makes appeals on issues that disproportionately affect voters in a particular geographical region. Regionalist parties in India typically share two features that distinguish them from large National parties like the INC. First, the "politics of recognition" is key to their existence and success (Chhibber and Verma 2018). Regionalist parties serve to highlight ethnic identities and differences between groups. Second, regionalist parties often advocate for greater regional autonomy. Greater recognition of the local majority ethnic group and autonomy for the associated region likely benefits local ethnic majorities disproportionately in terms of resource shares. These two features characterize several well known parties in India: Dravidian parties (DMK and AIADMK) in Tamil Nadu who advocate primarily for otherwise backward castes and classes (OBC) that have a higher social rank than ST/SC persons; Telugu Desam Party (TDP) in Andhra Pradesh, who advocate primarily for OBC; Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) in Punjab who advocate for Sikhs who are the religious majority in the state; National Conference (NC) in Jammu & Kashmir who advocate for Muslims, also the religious majority in the state; Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) who advocate for the middle class *Axamiyā*, Hindus whose native tongue is Assamese, commonly labelled as "ethnic Assamese".

While national parties like the INC can in principle campaign to increase the resource share for the local ethnic majority, their party ideology constrains them to emphasize "Indian" identity over local identities. The "catch-all nature of the Congress" (Chhibber and Verma 2018) has prevented it from competing on this margin with new regionalist parties that enter to represent local majority interests. From its founding, the INC or Congress approach has been explicit about uplifting constitutionally protected (local) minorities at the fringes of

society,[7] and has placed less emphasis on the large socio-economically advantaged "middle class," to which the local majority often belongs.

National parties like the INC are further constrained by the federal structure in India. In our context, for example, if the national party were to favor the local majority over ST populations in one state, ST populations in other states will surely take notice because, as we note later, they are perhaps the most united minority in India (Hoeber Rudolph and Rudolph 1980). Thus, even though state boundaries are drawn across ethnolinguistic lines, there is enough commonality across states to make national party behavior in one state detrimental to their prospects in another state.

Why then would a regional majority person ever vote for a national party candidate if regionalist parties funnel more resources to their supporters and national parties are constrained to allocate resources equally? In other words, why would they vote for a national party who will allocate them a smaller (though more equitable) share of resources? First, ethnic majority voters are not a monolith with identical political preferences. There are certainly members of the local ethnic majority who support the INC's secularist-national ideological project, which includes the idea of a single Indian identity above all. Second, some regionalist voters may find it in their economic interest to align with the INC. While regionalist parties likely increase the resource share of their coethnics when elected over national parties, they may or may not increase the resource level. National parties may have a greater propensity for increasing resources available for everyone, including the plurality or majority population specifically advocated for by regionalist parties. For similar reasons, some regionalist party coethnics may in fact prefer a local representative who is aligned with the center (*c.f.* (Asher and Novosad 2017)).

3.3. Case Study of Assam. While the discussion above characterizes regionalist parties in many states, the Indian state of Assam provides a useful frame of reference for these features

[7] See https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/tribal-leadership-vs-congress-i-india for example.

and our study more generally. Assam has residents from a multitude of ethnic groups, the largest of which being: the *Axamiyā*; the Muslims of Assamese origin; Mongoloid tribal groups; Bengali speaking immigrants from other Indian states and Bangladesh. The *Axamiyā* and tribal groups both view themselves as the rightful Sons of the Soil in Assam. Large scale immigration and demographic change and in turn land, resource, and food scarcity over the last century has caused economic and cultural insecurity of both groups (Mukherjee 2006) and provided seeds for "Sons of the Soil" violence (Weiner 1978).

The insecurity precipitated the Assam Movement, or "Assam Agitation," a long-standing and large-scale nativist movement against immigrants. In the early years of the movement the middle class *Axamiyā* and the tribes, in particular the Bodos, were united by their anxiety towards immigrants. The movement gained momentum through the 1970s and early 1980s until the *de facto* leader, the All Assam Students Union (AASU), which largely represented the *Axamiyā*, agreed to the Assam Accord with the central government in 1985. In exchange for calling off the agitation, the center promised to help identify "illegal migrants" and either delete them from the electoral record or expel them from Assam altogether.

Violence often flared up between the *Axamiyā* and the tribes in the years preceding the Accord (Goswami 2014). Tribal leaders complained to the central government about Assamese chauvinism, language-based discrimination, and a fear that their cultures were being erased by Assamese assimilation (Dutta 2012). Tellingly, as Dutta (2012) notes, tribal leaders expressed their "fears of what would happen to the tribals once the leaders of the movement (the AASU) come to power in the state". With the signing of the Assam Accord, the agitation formally ended and the movement was transitioned to a regionalist party, the AGP (Asom Gana Parishad), and the fears of tribal leaders were slowly realized.

In 1987, the All-Bodo Students Union (ABSU) formed to press for secession from Assam and creation of a separate state called "Bodoland." The Bodo people perceived their land, culture, and even language as under threat from immigration and efforts by ethnic Assamese to "Assamize" Assam via the AGP (George 1994). At the same time, a perceived inability

of the political establishment to deliver on the Accord's promises led to the formation of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), an outlawed secessionist organization seeking an independent Assam through violent struggle.

A new but familiar dynamic emerged, where the AGP was the oppressor and the Bodos the oppressed. The AGP had the legitimacy and the capacity to use violence as a means of repressing tribal revolt whether using state power, or by using the ULFA as a proxy. In the 1990s the Bodos began to respond with violence on a much larger scale, as militant groups such as the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) became active in Assam. These groups have been accused of ethnic cleansing of non-tribal communities on multiple occasions (Goswami 2014).

3.4. Why Tribes? SC persons are a primary minority in several cases where a regionalist party emerges to represent the local majority. This was the case in both Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu for example, where the DMK and TDP emerged to represent otherwise backward castes and classes (OBC), whose social rank was above SC populations. Yet we observe no increased violence in associated constituencies whether SC persons are under-represented. Why might regionalist parties increase violence in constituencies where ST rather than SC persons are under-represented?

To address this question, it is useful to consider additional background on the ST/SC designation.[8] In 1946 a committee was organized to draft a constitution for an independent India. The committee consisted of representatives of various identities from across what would become India. A primary discussion point related to which identities should receive constitutionally scheduled privilege. SC privilege was justified via their economic and social backwardness. ST privilege was justified via their economic and social backwardness, their geographic isolation, and their distinct languages/cultures.

In these regards, regionalist party success poses an existential threat to ST populations in a way that is not true for SC populations and other minorities in India. Regionalist

[8]See (Ambagudia 2011) for an extensive discussion.

parties can do things like establish "language laws" that disproportionately harm isolated groups who are relatively unfamiliar with the language (most minority groups speak the majority language for their immediate surroundings). Regionalist parties can then further alienate and isolate ST populations. All this can manifest in decreased consumption by ST populations of goods that disproportionately reflect the views of mainstream society, such as media and cultural goods.

This is consistent with traditional patterns of political support among ST populations. While ST/SC populations are both thought to value their community identity more than the Hindu majority, and while both have traditionally supported the Congress party (which later became INC), the support for Congress was relatively stronger among ST populations. Further to this point, the various tribes were more unified than the various castes in their support for Congress (Hoeber Rudolph and Rudolph 1980). A change from a national to a regionalist party in these cases should then have a more pronounced affect on ST populations.

4 Data and Descriptive Statistics

4.1. Data. Our analysis relies primarily on three data sets: 1. elections data from the Election Commission of India; 2. violence data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) (Sundberg and Melander 2013; Croicu and Sundberg 2017); 3. tribal microdata from the 44th Round of India's National Sample Survey (NSS).

The elections data includes information on the party identity and party type (national, state, unrecognized, independent) of all candidates contesting a state assembly constituency, as well as their respective vote shares. It covers all state assembly elections that have taken place since elections were first held in India in 1951.

To our knowledge, the UCDP is the most comprehensive database on political violence in India, compiling information for 1989 onwards from a range of sources. Primary sources include army and police on the ground, while secondary sources include media outlets such as

Figure 1: Word cloud of description of violent events in UCDP's data on India.



the Associated Press and the BBC as well as more local media, and other violence databases such as the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP). The UCDP data includes the source, the precise date and location (latitude and longtitude) of the violence, whether it is one- or two-sided, as well as the number of casualties, which provides a measure of the severity. It also includes information on who was involved, state armed actors such as the state police or military, non-state armed actors including radical arms of secessionist movements, or civilians. Figure 1 presents a word cloud generated from the brief descriptions of violent events in the UCDP data.[9] The word cloud clearly confirms the political nature of the violence we observe in the data.

Our baseline dataset merges the elections and political violence datasets. Our baseline

[9]These descriptions, which are included for some but not all events, are typically created from NGO reports and newspaper headlines for the articles that comprise the secondary source for much of the UCDP data.

estimation sample runs from 1988 to 2012. It covers 144 statewide elections across 30 states, an average of 4.8 per state.

The 44th Round was the first ever enquiry by the NSS into living conditions of tribal populations. The sampling design specifically targets populations recognized by Article 342 of the Constitution of India as a Scheduled Tribe (ST) of their respective State (or Union Territory). Our analysis focuses on Schedules 29.1 (Level of Living of Tribals) and 29.2 (Economic Activity of the Tribals), which possess detailed household and individual information on the living conditions and activities of households and individuals. We briefly discuss the design here, focusing on the rural area design because the urban design was similar and because the urban sample is less than 10 percent of the 31000 households surveyed.

Each state is partitioned administrative districts or subdistricts on the basis of ST population. Districts or subdistricts with large ST populations are allocated to one stratum. Small ST-population districts or subdistricts are allocated to another. Two types of random samples were generated, a general sample that selected villages on the basis of state rural population and a special sample that selected villages on the basis of the ST population. The selected villages were further partitioned into hamlets, where hamlets were selected either at random or by their ST-population depending on whether the village population was distributed uniformly or not. ST-households were then identified and then selected at random for participation. There were four subrounds of interviews that took place between July 1988 and June 1989.

4.2. Regionalist Party Measurement. Our definition of a regionalist party in Section 3.2 is impractical from an analytical standpoint, as it would involve locating and interpreting thousands of party platforms over many election years and in several languages. Further to this point, there is a great deal of subjectivity relating to what constitutes a regional issue. With this in mind, we define a regionalist party more specifically as one that satisfies:

RP1. Official recognition as a State party by the Election Commission of India;

RP2. Electoral support for party is highly concentrated geographically.

RP1 rules out National parties, independent candidates, and small unrecognized parties that run for idiosyncratic reasons.[10] **(RP2)** is to restrict our set of regionalist parties to ones "that compete and win votes in only one region of the country" (Brancati 2006).

To operationalize this definition, we follow Ziegfeld (2016) in constructing a measure of geographic vote concentration at the level of the party (**RP2**). Our concentration measure is effectively a Herfindahl Index of how concentrated a party's total vote is across India's states, adjusted for differences in state population. The formal description of our concentration measure is in Online Appendix Section OA.1.

Figures 3(a) and 3(b) plot concentration distributions for State and National Parties in our sample. Support for National parties is spread across many states. Support for several State parties is also spread across many states, suggesting that these parties are not truly regionalist in nature. One prominent example of this is the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), an ethnic party which appeals to SC as well as ST persons and Other Backwards Castes across India, and which had State party status for many years, but has National status currently. To keep truly regionalist parties in our set, our definition only includes State parties with concentration greater than 0.5.

Our definition allows regionalist parties to obtain votes in more than one state. We allow for this possibility because several regionalist parties transcend state boundaries. This is the case in the Northeast for example. India's eight Northeast states were all part of one, "Assam", until the 1970s. While the division into several smaller states was meant to ease tensions, some ethnic groups straddle the new borders, and regionalist parties run in multiple states in this area.[11]

[10] In many ways **RP1** by itself is a useful starting point for categorizing a party as regional. In Online Appendix Table OA7, we check the robustness of our main results to using **RP1** alone for defining a regionalist party. However, we do not use this as our main definition because many State parties have national ambition and run on positions with broader appeal, but have simply failed to win enough seats or obtain enough of the popular vote.

[11] This method of dividing Indian states is notable in comparison to the partitioning during the "Scramble

Figure 2: Regionalist Party Success and Political Violence.



(a) Concentration for State Parties



(b) Concentration for National Parties

1 We use Figures (a) and (b) to identify political parties that accord with our regionalist party definition (formal recognition as a State party by the Election Commission of India + geographically concentrated support).

2 Figures (a) and (b) plot herfindal indexes for formally recognized State and National parties respectively. Index measures geographic concentration of a party's total vote across India's states after adjusting for population differences across states.

3 An index of 1 indicates that the party's total vote is concentrated in one state. An index of 0 indicates that it is spread across all states.

4 A regionalist party in our data has an index above 0.5.

Table 1: Summary Statistics by State.

	Candidates		Win Percentage		Political Violence		Scheduled Tribes (ST)	
State	National Parties	Regionalist Parties	National Parties	Regionalist Parties	Event Count	Death Count	Population Share	Total Number
Andhra Pradesh	2.0	1.1	47.8	42.2	446	1826	5.93	33
Arunachal Pradesh	1.8	0.3	82.3	2.7	11	77	69.82	20
Assam	2.3	1.7	56.2	28.4	1390	3862	10.99	7
Bihar	3.4	1.7	55.1	34.2	141	619	8.31	30
Chhattisgarh	3.5	1.1	100.0	0.0	528	1559	0	0
Delhi	3.5	1.3	96.8	0.4	9	61	0	0
Goa	2.1	1.3	70.0	23.5	0	0	0.99	5
Gujarat	2.9	0.5	95.3	0.9	77	823	14.22	29
Haryana	3.1	0.5	92.0	1.8	4	40	0	0
Himachal Pradesh	3.4	0.4	92.3	1.8	4	40	4.61	8
Jammu & Kashmir	2.6	2.2	28.4	52.9	6018	15351	0	0
Jharkhand	2.7	2.9	44.4	40.7	369	734	N.A.	N.A.
Karnataka	2.9	0.9	81.1	9.2	26	83	4.91	49
Kerala	2.2	0.5	42.6	22.1	4	15	1.03	35
Madhya Pradesh	3.3	0.6	95.4	1.1	551	1816	22.97	46
Maharashtra	2.5	0.7	65.1	19.0	148	2481	9.19	47
Manipur	2.4	1.8	55.8	33.0	527	1520	27.30	29
Meghalaya	1.8	1.5	51.3	33.0	46	99	80.58	17
Mizoram	1.2	1.8	44.5	41.5	2	18	93.55	14
Nagaland	1.3	0.8	59.7	23.7	240	617	83.99	51
Orissa	2.8	0.8	61.2	33.3	264	643	22.43	62
Pondicherry	1.6	1.4	42.2	38.9	0	0	0	0
Punjab	2.5	1.1	57.5	35.3	42	382	0	0
Rajasthan	3.0	0.6	91.7	0.9	7	24	12.21	12
Sikkim	1.1	1.6	1.9	96.9	2	2	23.27	2
Tamil Nadu	1.2	2.2	12.2	78.7	5	77	1.07	36
Tripura	1.5	0.6	24.7	10.0	392	1300	28.44	19
Uttar Pradesh	3.1	0.8	72.8	14.5	70	489	0.21	5
Uttarakhand	3.6	2. 3	90.6	1.6	0	0	N.A.	N.A.
West Bengal	1.9	0.9	16.5	31.6	298	450	5.63	38

[1] Table describes state level differences in national and regionalist party participation and success (left panel), political violence (middle panel), and ST presence across states (right panel). These are the key ingredients for identification of causal effects and mechanisms.

[2] Candidates refers to the average number of candidates across all state assembly constituencies and elections during our sample period. Win percentage is constructed similarly.

[3] Event and death counts are computed over the full sample period.

[4] Population share of scheduled tribes is computed using the 1991 population census. The total number of tribes is computed using the NSS 44th round.

[5] N.A.= Not Applicable. Jharkhand and Uttarkhand became states after the NSS 44th round.

4.3. Descriptive Statistics A state-by-state summary of the various data sets is provided in Table 1. The leftmost columns shows significant across-state variation in national and regionalist party entry and success across states. Many states have at least one regionalist party candidate contesting each constituency. Regionalists win seats a non-negligible fraction of the time. The middle columns show significant across-state variation in the number of events and deaths due to political violence, as most states experience some political violence, and a few experience large amounts of violence. The rightmost columns show there are hundreds of unique tribes spread across India. Many of the states with a large ST population share are located in the Northeast: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. Several other states have large absolute numbers of ST persons even though their population share seems moderate to small. These states form what is known as the tribal belt of India: Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, and West Bengal.

ST-persons have struggled to adjust to the trends of economic development, conservation practices, and interstate and international migration that have characterized India's post-independence period. The trends have created insecurity over the land and resources that have provided the tribes with their livelihoods for thousands of years. As they have become more insecure economically, they have begun to participate in militant political movements. In some cases the tribals join existing violent movements that were not inherently tribal to begin with, i.e., Naxalites in Central and Eastern states (the ideology and politics of the Naxals fits with the grievances of the tribal communities) and in other cases they start their own, i.e., Bodos and Dimasa in Northeast India. The demands of these groups range from a more equal share in resource wealth/even distribution of land, to secessionism.

Table 2 uses the NSS survey to give perspective on their plight. Panel A reports statistics for ST persons in strata with high ST-populations. Panel B does the same for ST persons in

for Africa," which left many ethnic groups on different sides of border lines in Africa. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) show that political violence today is more likely in the homelands of these split groups in Africa.

strata with low ST-populations.

The household characteristics in Panel A show 4.94 persons possess a 4.28 acre plot and live in a 18.52 square meter house. 20 percent of households share this space with livestock. The land is inherited 79 percent of the time. 80 percent of households have lived at the same spot for at least 10 years. The statistics paint a picture of a community living in close quarters with significant attachment to their land.

Panel A also shows that in 27 percent of households a household member watched television in the last month, 24 percent went to the cinema, 12 percent went to theatre, and 20 percent read the newspaper. 71 percent listened to the radio in the last month.

43 percent of households report working in some sort of subsidiary capacity over the last 365 days. 13 percent of respondents who reported working in a subsidiary capacity said that they were a causal wage laborer. Average cash and in-kind wages and salary last week among respondents was 790 Rupees, or approximately 160 per capita. The earnings distribution is highly skewed. The median cash and in-kind wages and salary last week was 70 Rupees. The top household took home 70000 Rupees last week.

Panel B shows ST populations outside ST-heavy strata possess 3 fewer acres and live in a house with approximately 6 fewer square meters. They are 37 percentage points less likely to own the land and 24 percentages points less likely to live at the same spot for more than 10 years. They are far less reliant on radio for information. They earn more than 200 Rupees more than their counterparts who live in ST-heavy strata.

In Online Appendix Table OA1 we consider a different benchmark for evaluating the socio-economic status of ST persons. Using 1991 population census and forest data cover from SHRUG, we compare villages with high ST and SC populations. Most of the ST/SC village differences are intuitive. For example, ST villages have more people, less educated populations, fewer paved roads entering the village, and more forest cover.[12]

[12]While ST villages have lower education levels on average, they have greater literacy rates than their SC counterparts. This is perhaps because they have greater literacy in their tribal language.

Table 2: NSS Summary Statistics.

	Panel A. High ST Population Strata					Panel B. Low ST Population Strata				
	Count	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	Count	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Household (hh) characteristics										
hh size	13224	4.94	2.48	1	35	3193	4.47	2.44	0	22
Male hh head	13230	0.91	0.28	0	1	3206	0.88	0.32	0	1
Land possessed (0.00 acres)	13014	4.28	76.04	0	5620.32	2961	1.13	3.20	0	95
Resided at site for $\geq$ 10 Years	13230	0.80	0.40	0	1	3206	0.56	0.50	0	1
Own land where dwelling is situated	13230	0.87	0.34	0	1	3206	0.50	0.50	0	1
Area of house site (m^2)	13147	18.52	67.82	0	2000	3146	12.23	82.08	0	4005
Living room shared with animal	13230	0.21	0.41	0	1	3206	0.10	0.30	0	1
Land is inherited	25805	0.79	0.41	0	1	2665	0.68	0.47	0	1
hh link with outside world										
hh member watched TV last month	13230	0.27	0.45	0	1	3206	0.29	0.45	0	1
hh member listened to radio last month	13230	0.71	0.45	0	1	3206	0.48	0.50	0	1
hh member watched cinema last month	13230	0.24	0.43	0	1	3206	0.28	0.45	0	1
hh member watched stage last month	13230	0.12	0.32	0	1	3206	0.09	0.28	0	1
hh member read newspaper last month	13230	0.20	0.40	0	1	3206	0.21	0.41	0	1
Member characteristics										
Working in subsidiary capacity	29660	0.43	0.50	0	1	5652	0.27	0.44	0	1
Subsidiary capacity = casual wage labor	29660	0.13	0.11	0	1	5652	0.09	0.08	0	1
Respondent reported earnings	29660	0.38	0.49	0	1	5652	0.64	0.48	0	1
Earnings last week (Rupees)	11402	789.97	3507.78	0	70000	3616	992.07	4526.35	0	98000

[1] Table summarizes the tribal household and individual microdata. It compares ST persons in strata with high ST-populations (Panel A) with ST persons in strata with low ST-populations (Panel B). The comparison is informative about the plight of ST persons living in traditional (ST-dominated) communities.

[2] Data is from 44th round of National Sample Survey conducted between July 1988 and June 1989. Most survey questions are found in Household Schedule 29.1 (Level of Living of Tribals). The inheritance question is found in Household Schedule 29.2 (Economic Activity of the Tribals).

[3] Wages and salary include in-kind as well as cash earnings. Median earnings last week for high and low ST strata 1 and 2 are 60 and 90 Rupees, respectively. This amounts to 12.15 and 20.13 Rupees per household per member. GDP per capita in 1989 divided by 52 is approximately 88 Rupees.

5 Baseline Analysis

Let Δs_j denote the difference between the vote shares of the most successful regionalist and non-regionalist party candidates in state assembly constituency j. Let R_j be a binary variable that equals 1 when the constituency was won by a regionalist, $\Delta s_j > 0$, and equals 0 when the constituency was won by a non-regionalist, $\Delta s_j < 0$. Let $V_j(R_j)$ denote violence in constituency j under regime R_j. Our interest is in the treatment effect at the cutoff

$$\mathbb{E}[V_j(1) - V_j(0)|\Delta s_j = 0]$$

where $\mathbb{E}$ is the expectation operator. We assume $\mathbb{E}[V_j(1)|\Delta s_j = 0]$ and $\mathbb{E}[V_j(0)|\Delta s_j = 0]$ are continuous at 0 (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw 2001).

Continuity implies the treatment effect is identified by

$$\lim_{x \to +0} \mathbb{E}[V_j|\Delta s_j = x] - \lim_{x \to -0} \mathbb{E}[V_j|\Delta s_j = x]$$

where x is a realization of Δs_j, V_j is the observed level of violence, and $+$ and $-$ indicate whether x approaches 0 from above or below. Continuity will hold if political elites have imprecise control over the constituency winner (Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik 2019a; Lee 1998), that is, when a close win by a regionalist party candidate can be attributed to idiosyncratic factors unrelated to future political violence. While the assumption is plausible given India's reputation for being a relatively well-functioning democracy and how difficult it is to control elections precisely, we will examine the assumption later via tests for discontinuities in the constituency density and observable imbalance around the threshold of 0.

We exploit variation across constituencies, states s, and elections e (years).[13] We estimate

$$V_{jse} = \alpha + \beta R_{jse} + f_-(\Delta s_{jse} - 0) + f_+(\Delta s_{jse} - 0)R_{jse} + \varepsilon_{jse}$$

[13]Election years are specific to the state, as states have elections at different times.

via weighted least squares with a triangular kernel, where β measures the effect of electing a regional rather than a non-regional party representative on political violence, $f_-(\cdot)$ and $f_+(\cdot)$ are linear polynomials that differ to the left and right of cutoff. ε_{jse} is a random variable that reflects unobserved differences in violence. We use bandwidths that are optimal relative to the mean square error (MSE) criterion (Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik 2019a). For inference we use bandwidths that are clustered at the level of the constituency.

Our baseline analysis considers four different violence measures: (i) binary indicator of whether a violent event occurred in constituency j between election e and $e+1$; (ii) logarithm of the total number of events occurring during this time; (iii) binary indicator of whether a death occurred; (iv) logarithm of the total number of deaths. We use logarithms for the total number of events and deaths to deal with the large spread and outliers in these variables across constituencies. We add 1 to all observations before taking logs.

In Figure 3 we preview our baseline result. The outcome is binary, whether an incident of political violence occurred in the constituency. The x-axis plots the difference between the vote share of the highest ranked regionalist party and the highest ranked non-regionalist party. There is a sharp increase in the incidence of violence when the difference in share crosses the 0 threshold. In the Online Appendix we show that the sharp increase presents itself when we use the larger MSE-optimal bandwidth from our baseline specification (Figure OA2) as well as when we use a second-order polynomial with the polynomial-adjusted MSE-optimal bandwidth (Figure OA3).

The online appendix also depicts the violence-margin gradient over the full support for the vote margin distribution (Figure OA4). The figure shows that violence is generally decreasing in the vote margin as one moves away from the cutoff in either direction. A negative violence-margin gradient is unsurprising because we expect more violence in tight elections and less violence whenever a regionalist or non-regionalist party won by a significant margin, for example because large margins reduce uncertainty about the electoral support for the winner and their appetite for consolidating their ethnic base via ethnic violence in turn.

The figure also shows that violence peaks a bit left of the cutoff. A leftward peak would be consistent with an increased (relative) propensity of regionalist supporters to engage in violence in constituencies where their most preferred regionalist candidate loses. Their increased propensity for violence following a defeat leads to a leftward peak and ultimately to the negative slopes that are local to the cutoff in many of our RD plots (Figures OA2 and OA3 below and Figure 3).

5.1. Baseline Estimates. Our baseline estimates are found in the top panel of Table 3. Electing a regionalist party representative increases the occurrence of a violent event by 7.2 percentage points and the number of violent events by almost 10 percent. It increases the occurrence of a death by 7.2 percentage points and the number of deaths dues to political violence by 13.4 percent. The estimates are significant statistically and substantively, explaining well over half of the dependent variable means in the latter case.

In the bottom three panels of Table 3 we let the estimates differ depending on who controls the state legislature.[14] The second panel shows that when the regionalist party controls the state government, the election of one of their representatives increases the occurrence of a violent event and death in the constituency by 10 percentage points and the number of events and deaths in the constituency by 15 and 23 percent respectively. The estimates are all statistically significant at the 5% level. The third panel shows smaller effects when a non-regionalist party governs the state, with the estimates in Columns 2 and 4 being statistically insignificant. The fourth panel shows even smaller effects when the state is governed by a major National party like the INC or BJP, with all four estimates being statistically insignificant at conventional significance levels. The bottom three panels show therefore that the main effect in the top panel is largely explained by cases where the regionalist party whose candidate won the local election also governs the state.

The bottom three panels of Table 3 are informative about which areas of India and which political parties generate our baseline estimates. During our sample period, a region-

[14]The associated RD plots for the 4 panels can be found in Figure OA5 of the online appendix.

Table 3: Baseline Estimates.

	Occurrence of Violent Event	# of Violent Events (in logs)	Occurrence of Death	# of Deaths (in logs)
		All		
Dep. Var. Mean	0.114	0.178	0.112	0.243
Regionalist Wins	0.072	0.099	0.072	0.134
	(0.005)	(0.037)	(0.004)	(0.042)
Bandwidth	0.119	0.139	0.118	0.137
Obs. (Effective)	2962	3305	2955	3271
	The Regionalist Party Governs the State			
Dep. Var. Mean	0.109	0.126	0.107	0.186
Regionalist Wins	0.101	0.149	0.101	0.228
	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.042)	(0.020)
Bandwidth	0.117	0.111	0.118	0.119
Obs. (Effective)	762	734	762	767
	A Non-Regionalist Party Governs the State			
Dep. Var. Mean	0.116	0.200	0.114	0.268
Regionalist Wins	0.065	0.088	0.065	0.124
	(0.027)	(0.142)	(0.026)	(0.110)
Bandwidth	0.130	0.140	0.131	0.158
Obs. (Effective)	2332	2432	2334	2608
	INC or BJP Governs the State			
Dep. Var. Mean	0.114	0.178	0.112	0.243
Regionalist Wins	0.032	-0.032	0.034	-0.063
	(0.361)	(0.589)	(0.9372)	(0.452)
Bandwidth	0.125	0.114	0.116	0.125
Obs. (Effective)	1541	1450	1462	1541

[1] All panels report RD estimates of effect of a regionalist party win on political violence. In bottom three panels estimates differ depending on who controls the state legislature. These panels show that the baseline effect in the top panel is explained largely by cases where the regionalist party whose candidate won the local election also governs the state.

[2] Unit of observation is constituency and election.

[3] Dependent variable means are based on subsample.

[4] Bandwidths for RD estimates are MSE optimal. Polynomial order is 1.

[5] Standard errors are clustered on constituency. p-values in parentheses.

Figure 3: Regionalist Party Representation and Political Violence.



1 Figure plots baseline RD estimate of the effect of electing a regionalist party candidate to represent the constituency on the occurrence of political violence inside the constituency.

2 Running variable is vote margin of victory or defeat for a regionalist party (against a national party).

3 Sample restricted to constituencies where a regionalist party candidate finished among top 2 candidates.

4 Each dot is the average occurrence of violence at a particular margin. If margin is greater than 0, then dots measure average occurrence of violence in cases where a regionalist party candidate narrowly won the election.

alist party controlled government in 11 states: Andhra Pradesh (Telugu Desam Party), Arunachal Pradesh (Arunachal Congress), Assam (Asom Gana Parishad), Haryana (Indian National Lok Dal), Mizoram (Mizo National Front), Manipur (Manipur State Congress

Party), Nagaland (Naga People's Front), Orissa (Biju Janata Dal), Punjab (Shiromani Akali Dal), Sikkim (Sikkim Democratic Front and Sikkim Sangram Parishad), and Tamil Nadu (ADMK and DMK). Of these states, political violence is relatively uncommon in Haryana and Tamil Nadu (an event occurs in about 1% of cases) and relatively common in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, and Orissa (an event occurs in over 10% of cases). The distribution of political violence across states suggests that our baseline estimates can be further isolated to the latter group of states and their regionalist parties. Note that the latter group consists of states with a significant tribal population.

As is the case in all RD studies which exploit close elections, our effects are "local" in the sense that they are identified from variation generated by relatively competitive elections only. We can not make causal claims about, for example, landslide wins by regional parties. Our estimates are also local in the sense that they are obtained from the subset of constituencies where a regionalist candidate was one (and only one) of the top two in terms of vote share. While this is the nature of the RD design (studies that examine the effect of electing a female politician relative to a male one for example, also have this feature), more than 25% of the constituencies in our baseline sample have a regionalist and non regionalist candidate in the top two. Moreover the presence (or absence) of a regionalist party is a permanent feature at the state level in most cases. States that have a large local ethnnolinguistic majority, i.e., Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, and the states of India's Northeast also tend to have successful regionalist parties that widely contest, and states that do not, i.e., Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, do not. Then the sample restrictions effectively amounts to selecting states that tend to have a permanent (over the horizon of our sample) regionalist party presence, which are the units of interest for this type of study in any case.

The estimates align with the idea that when regionalist parties, who tend to organize around the identity of local ethnic majorities, control resources and key institutions in the state (including police and security forces), electing a regionalist candidate can cause a

significant increase in violence in the constituency of the candidate. We investigate this possibility further in the next section.

In Online Appendix Section OA.3 we borrow elements of the framework developed by Bueno de Mesquita (2013) to show that our findings can be generated by a simple rational agent model. In the model, a regionalist political party competes with a national party, which is constrained to treat all groups equally, in local elections. Given the choices of the parties, citizen members of the local minority ethnic group (tribes) choose to mobilize for political violence or to participate in the political system. Then, given the decisions of parties and citizens, insurgent elites mount insurgent violence or not. The model generates our baseline results, that regionalist party wins result in insurgent violence, and that the effect is larger in constituencies with large local minority populations.

5.2. Falsification. Guided by Cattaneo et al. (2019b), we conduct a battery of falsification tests for the RD design, searching in particular for evidence of manipulation around the threshold. A standard concern when exploiting close-elections in an RD setting is that parties or candidates can manipulate the side of the threshold on which the candidate falls in a close-election. Recent work by Crot et al. (Forthcoming) shows that incumbent mayors in Philippines were substantially more likely to win close elections than challengers, and that the electoral fraud that underlies this outcome is an important reason for the post-election violence that is observed in the data. While India's electoral commission is a trusted independent institution, it is possible that incumbents or challengers manipulate outcomes by buying votes with money and goods or strong arming voters before they enter the voting booth. This is a concern for identification if regionalist and national parties differ systematically in their ability to manipulate elections.

If this were the case, we would observe a discontinuity in the density of the running variable around the threshold. If regionalist parties could systematically manipulate close-election outcomes, for example, we would observe a sharp increase in mass just to the right of the threshold. Figure 4 uses local polynomial techniques (Cattaneo et al. 2017; McCrary

Figure 4: Discontinuity in Density Test.



1 Figure illustrates identification test for our RD design. Discontinuity-in-density test statistic and p-value are 0.0343 and 0.9727 respectively. We cannot reject null hypothesis that density is continuous at cutoff.

2 Running variable is vote margin of victory or defeat for a regionalist party (against a national party).

3 Sample restricted to constituencies where a regionalist party candidate finished among top 2 candidates.

4 Density uses a first-order polynomal for density estimation and a second-order polynomial for bias-correction estimate (see CJM (2017)).

2008) to explicitly test for this type of discontinuity.

Online Appendix Figures OA6, OA7, and OA8 depict the effects of regionalist representation on various predetermined covariates. Figure OA6 depicts the effect on lagged violence.

Figure OA7 does the same but for voter turnout, the number of candidates, as well as lagged polarization and fractionalization measures that use lagged vote shares and that is inspired by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), Reynal-Querol (2002), Esteban and Ray (1994), and Esteban and Ray (1999). Figure OA8 depicts the effect for the vote share of the regionalist party. Most tests support the null hypothesis of no manipulation around the threshold. We do observe some weak imbalance in one variable, the lagged occurrence of violence. This is perhaps not surprising as this variable is highly persistent and has less over time and within constituency variation than the others. Nonetheless, the discontinuity raises concerns about reverse causality, namely the possibility that political leaders were using violence to mobilize co-ethnics and consolidate support in the period leading up to an election (Wilkinson 2004). We acknowledge the possibility of some link between pre-election violence, electoral outcomes, and post-election violence. Simply, some constituencies where there were close regionalist wins and post election violence will have also experienced pre-election violence. Accordingly, we provide an extensive discussion and a battery of empirical tests in the online appendix which make clear that our results can not be explained away by a reverse relationship between political violence and electoral outcomes.

5.3. Robustness. We checked robustness of the estimates to variants of our baseline specification. Figure OA9 and Figure OA10 show estimates for the occurrences of violent events and death are robust across a wide range of bandwidth choices and polynomial orders of 0, 1, 2.[15] The figures also show the number of violent events and deaths are a bit more sensitive to bandwidth and polynomial choice, most probably because of the significant measurement error that is typically associated with counts of violence and deaths. Figure OA11 plots the density for RD estimates at fake cutoffs of -0.130,-0.125,...,0.125,0.130, showing estimates at the true cutoff are extreme relative to the mean of the estimates at the fake cutoffs. Table OA6 shows how are baseline estimates change when we include fixed effects for the year,

[15]We checked polynomial orders of less than or equal 2 at the recommendation of Gelman and Imbens (2018), who argue against the use of higher-order polynomials in RD designs.

to adjust for the pooled nature of data, and thus for the possibility that our estimates are driven by periods of intense violence across India.

One concern with the violence data relates to the effects of regionalist representation on violence reporting. Figure OA12 uses information on who initially reported the violence to evaluate whether regionalist party representatives increase or decrease the ratio of the number of events initially reported by police sources to the number of reports by other sources, such as the army or other organizations. The reason we consider reports by police sources specifically is that these forces are the ones most likely to be manipulated by regionalist candidates - as we noted above, police forces are controlled by the states. The table shows the election of a regionalist party representative decreases the ratio of police reported violence, but that the estimates are insignificant statistically. This suggests that our estimates reflect the effects of regionalist representation on violence rather than their effects on the reporting of violence.

5.4. Spillovers MLA's are not elected in isolation. States are comprised by many constituencies, simultaneously selecting MLAs to office to serve concurrent terms. Above, we identified that on average, constituencies that elect a regionalist party candidate experience more violence than ones that elect a candidate from a national party. In this section, we exploit the structure of political administration in India to study how local the regionalist MLA's effect on violence is, that is, whether violence spills-over from one constituency to another.

The grouping into district allows us to study whether electing more regionalist politicians causes violence beyond the borders of elected representative.

Formally, we estimate generalized empirical specifications that utilize variation across districts, states, and elections:

$$V_{dse} = \alpha + \beta RF_{dse} + \eta_{dse}$$

V_{dse} is a district level measure of violence, either in the district as a whole, or in a subset of constituencies in the district, i.e., ones not held by regionalist parties. The variable RF_{dse}

represents the fraction of constituencies in the district that were won by a regionalist party.

Our interest is in parameter β. As we show in Section OA.4, β is a sum of effects across the different constituencies in the district, where the effect in each constituency itself can be decomposed into the direct effect of electing a regionalist in that constituency, and a weighted average of indirect effects of regionalists in other constituencies. So in the case where V_{dse} represents total violence in constituencies in the district where a regionalist candidate was *not* elected, $\beta > 0$ would tell us that violence spills over from regionalist held constituencies to others. $\beta < 0$ tells us that electing a regionalist candidate displaces violence.

To estimate β causally, we draw on the identification strategy developed in (Clots-Figueras 2011), [16] who proposes using the fraction of close elections in the district won by a regionalist candidate, RCF_{dse}, as an instrument for RF_{dse}. RCF_{dse} is powerfully related to RF_{dse} by construction, and importantly, RCF_{dse} should be exogenous to unobservable determinants of political violence with the appropriate controls. In our regressions, we allow for district level controls $\mathbf{X}_{dse}$, district level fixed effects α_d and state-election year effects α_{se}. That is,

$$\eta_{dse} = \mathbf{X}_{dse}\mathbf{\Gamma} + \alpha_d + \alpha_{se} + \varepsilon_{dse}. \tag{1}$$

$\mathbf{X}_{dse}$ includes the fraction of close elections in the district where a regionalist finished in the top 2 and one lag of the dependent variable. The close election fraction allows for the possibility that a higher number of close elections may explain both violence and close elections won by a regionalist party candidate. The dependent variable lag allows for persistently violent jurisdictions that may track regionalism in India. District fixed effects allow for unobserved district differences that may correlate with the fraction of constituencies barely won by regionalist party representatives and that may correlate with violence, including district

[16] And subsequently used by Clots-Figueras (2012), Bhalotra et al. (2014), Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras (2014), Nellis et al. (2016), and Nellis and Siddiqui (2018) among others

differences attributable simply to the number of constituencies. State-election year fixed effects allow for state-specific trends that may track violence and close wins by regionalists, relating to, for example, evolving secessionist sentiment at the state level. Our identification assumption, then, is that conditional on observables, district effects and state-election effects, districts that experience more political violence do not have systematically more close elections where a regionalist candidate won:

$$cov(RCF_{dse}, \varepsilon_{dse}) = 0 \tag{2}$$

Estimates are found in Table 4. Panel A uses the occurrence of violence as the dependent variable. Panel B uses the number of events. Each panel reports estimates of the effect of the regionalist party seat fraction on aggregate violence across all constituencies, violence that took place only in constituencies held by regionalists, and violence that took place only in constituencies held by other parties or independents. Moving left to right shows how the primary IV estimate varies with control variables and fixed effects. Online Appendix Table OA8 shows that the electoral covariates are balanced relative to the instrument. Online Appendix Table OA9 shows balance with respect to lagged violence once we condition on the close election seat fraction. Note that the mean and standard deviation of the regionalist seat fraction are 0.21 and 0.41.

The estimates in the first and second row of each panel confirm our RD results - more regional candidates in the district cause aggregate political violence in the district and specifically in the constituencies they hold. The estimate in the top row and third column of Panel A implies that a 5 percentage point increase in the regionalist seat fraction increases violence by 2.3 percentage points, statistically different from 0 at the 1 percent significance level. The estimate is substantively significant as well, representing approximately 10.9 percent of the mean occurrence of 21.1%.

Table 4: IV Estimates of Aggregate and Spillover Effects.

	Panel A. Occurence of Violence		
	All Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	0.615	0.508	0.459
	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.002)
	Regionalist Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	0.665	0.644	0.533
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)
	Non-Regionalist Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	0.258	-0.217	-0.251
	(0.001)	(0.195)	(0.115)
	Panel B. Number of Violent Events (in logs)		
	All Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	1.111	0.706	0.562
	(0.000)	(0.021)	(0.045)
	Regionalist Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	0.563	0.549	0.345
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.031)
	Non-Regionalist Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	0.219	-0.352	-0.263
	(0.003)	(0.030)	(0.074)
First Stage Coefficient	1.695	1.191	1.082
F-Test of Excluded	388.14	82.63	70.33
Instrument	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Degrees of Freedom	$F(1, 551)$	$F(1, 539)$	$F(1, 512)$
Controls	N	Y	Y
Fixed Effects	N	N	Y
Observations	2705	2153	2111

[1] Top row of each panel reports effects of regionalist party representation on violence across all constituencies in an administrative district. Middle row reports effects on violence in constituencies held by regionalist party. Bottom row reports effects on violence in constituencies not held by regionalist party. Bottom row effects measure spillovers or displacement from regionalist party representation.

[2] Unit of observation is administrative district, state, and election.

[3] Regionalist Seat Fraction is fraction of district constituencies held by a regionalist party. Instrument for regionalist seat fraction is fraction of close elections where a regionalist party won the seat. Close elections are decided by no more than than 2.5 percentage points.

[4] Controls include fraction of seats contested where the election was close and one lag of the dependent variable.

[5] Fixed effects include district and state-election combination.

[6] p-values in parentheses.

The final column of the third row in each panel shows that a higher regionalist fraction causes less violence in non-regionalist constituencies once controls or fixed effects are included. While the estimate in the top panel is not signficant at conventional levels, the estimate in the bottom panel is significant at the 10% level. So there is, if anything, some weak evidence for displacement of violence into regionalist constituencies, and no spillover into national constituencies.

In Online Appendix Table OA10 we report the OLS counterparts to the IV estimates in Table 4. The OLS and IV estimates have the same signs but different magnitudes. The OLS estimates are less pronounced, sometimes much less so. What confounds the OLS estimates? One natural candidate is lagged violence. In regionalist-held districts, lagged violence may correlate positively with both contemporaneous violence and regionalist party seat fraction. In districts not held by regionalist parties, lagged violence may correlate positively with contemporaneous violence but negatively with regionalist party seat fraction. Both patterns would fit with the regionalist versus national party differences generally observed in the data.

6 Tribal Insecurity

We hypothesize that violence increases when regionalists gain nominal power because they heighten insecurity for local minorities and specifically for tribal populations. We present two pieces of evidence supporting this narrative: RD evidence of regionalist parties increasing violence specifically in communities with high tribal populations but no mandated representation, and IV evidence showing regionalist parties further marginalize tribal populations.

6.1. Regionalism and Tribal Insecurity. We study this possibility in Table 5, which reports point estimates of our baseline regression applied to constituencies: i) reserved for ST-members; ii) unreserved, *i.e* open for anyone to contest and win; iii) unreserved with a below-median ST population; iv) unreserved with an above median ST population. Note that tribals rarely win seats in unreserved constituencies (less than 0.3 percent from 2004-

2015, *e.g.*), even though they are free to contest these seats. In this sense tribals will be under-represented in unreserved constituencies with large tribal populations.

Panels A and B show ST-reserved constituencies are generally more violent than unreserved constituencies. A violent event occurs 16.3 percent of the time on average, almost double that of unreserved constituencies. Despite the propensity for more violence, the effect of a regionalist representative on violence in ST-reserved constituencies is substantively smaller and imprecisely estimated relative to unreserved constituencies. In fact, the estimates in unreserved constituencies are similar to our baseline full sample results in Table 3. Panels C and D show these effects are explained entirely by unreserved constituencies with a large ST population, consistent tribal insecurity underlying the additional violence generated by regionalist parties.

Violence as a result of tribal insecurity could manifest in different ways. The violence could be targeted towards the state, as groups express their demands with violent attacks against government forces. Or the violence could target other ethnic groups, as groups resolve conflicts over land and resources, for example, using violent means. We investigate both possibilities in Online Appendix Table OA11 Panel A, where we sort violent events on the basis of combatants: State-insurgent violence between government forces versus insurgents or communal violence involving multiple insurgent groups or civilians. We show that the increased violence in unreserved constituencies with large tribal populations is driven by violence between insurgents and the State.

In Panel B of Online Appendix Table OA11 we study the role of major National parties (INC and BJP in particular) towards violence in unreserved constituencies with large tribal populations specifically. Tribals made up 8.2% of the Indian population according to the 2001 census. Major national parties thus have stronger incentives to appease tribals relative to regionalist parties because tribals are relatively more important for their electoral success, as they must necessarily cater to broader constituent base.[17] Accordingly, we expect greater

[17]See Nellis et al. (2016) for a similar discussion with respect to Muslim minority voters.

Table 5: Regionalism and Tribal Insecurity.

	Occurrence of Violent Event	# of Violent Events (in logs)	Occurrence of Death	# of Deaths (in logs)
		PANEL A. ST-reserved Constituencies		
Dep. Var. Mean	0.163	0.210	0.160	0.300
Regionalist Wins	0.041	0.024	0.040	0.109
	(0.622)	(0.841)	(0.639)	(0.423)
Bandwidth	0.117	0.124	0.116	0.154
Obs. (Effective)	609	625	607	698
		PANEL B. Unreserved Constituencies		
Dep. Var. Mean	0.086	0.135	0.085	0.183
Regionalist Wins	0.055	0.077	0.056	0.101
	(0.009)	(0.068)	(0.008)	(0.069)
Bandwidth	0.111	0.127	0.110	0.129
Obs. (Effective)	3482	3812	3465	3850
		B1. Unreserved with Small ST Population		
Dep. Var. Mean	0.037	0.049	0.037	0.066
Regionalist Wins	0.008	0.009	0.008	0.006
	(0.652)	(0.783)	(0.641)	(0.920)
Bandwidth	0.112	0.098	0.111	0.086
Obs. (Effective)	1285	1158	1284	1041
		B2. Unreserved with Large ST Population		
Dep. Var. Mean	0.158	0.283	0.156	0.368
Regionalist Wins	0.109	0.182	0.109	0.196
	(0.018)	(0.061)	(0.017)	(0.115)
Bandwidth	0.119	0.142	0.120	0.146
Obs. (Effective)	1260	1425	1274	1446

[1] Table reports estimates of baseline specification on subsamples that differ in the mandated ST reservation status and ST population of constituencies. The dependent variable mean is based on the relevant subsample.

[2] ST-reserved constituencies have state parliamentary seats that can only be contested and won by ST persons. A constituency has a large ST population if the population is above the median.

[3] Unit of observation is constituency and election.

[4] Bandwidths for RD estimates are MSE optimal. Polynomial order is 1.

[5] Standard errors are clustered on the constituency. p-values are in parentheses.

protections for tribal security when the state is ruled by a major party from the center. Further to this point, state governments make important decisions regarding policing and counterinsurgency, together with the center, and this is easier to do if the state is ruled by a major party from the center. To study the role of national party rule, as we did above in the baseline results, we split the sample into two groups, ones where a plurality of seats in the legislature are held by either the INC or BJP, and ones where a plurality are held by another party. We see that the effect in Tribe-underrepresented constituencies disappears completely in states where the INC or BJP hold the most seats in the legislature, consistent with national parties having greater incentives and means to protect the security of tribal populations. It is also consistent with the idea that regionalist representation heightens tribal insecurity.

6.2. Regionalism and Tribal Isolation. We investigate the idea that regionalist representation heightens tribal isolationism and insecurity further using self-reported outcomes in the NSS. The NSS data allows for such an investigation because reported consumption of tv, radio, etc. can proxy for participation in modern society and because reported wages can proxy for economic insecurity.

We estimate

$$y_i = \beta RF_{D(i)} + \mathbf{X}_i\mathbf{\Gamma} + \varepsilon_i.$$

where y_i is an outcome that measures social, cultural or economic marginalization of tribal household or individual i. The key explanatory variable is $RF_{D(i)}$, which measures the share of elections won by a regionalist calculated over all the constituencies in a superdistrict $D(i)$.[18] ε_i is the idiosyncratic error term. As with the district level data, we instrument for $RF_{D(i)}$ using the share of elections where a regionalist party barely won or lost. To this end, we include the fraction of close elections where a regional party was in the top two in

[18]We aggregate the elections data up to the superdistrict because the NSS strips the district from the data, presumably to protect the confidentiality of tribal persons. We contacted the NSS offices several times but were unable to obtain more specific geographic information concerning respondents.

$\mathbf{X}_i$. We include several fixed effects in $\mathbf{X}_i$ to mimic the sampling design underlying the data generating process, including fixed effects for state, stratum, village type (tribal majority or not), hamlet type (tribal majority or not), sample (general versus special), tribe, and survey round (4). Note that this data is cross sectional. We use the regionalist share from the first election prior to 1988, when the NSS started surveying ST persons.

Our interest is in β, which measures the percentage point change in tribal outcomes. The outcomes we consider are household consumption of TV, radio and newspapers (media) attendance at cinema or theatre (social and cultural goods) and wages. We estimate β separately for high and low ST population strata because of the vast differences in the ST population of these strata. We looked for variables that were predetermined and less susceptible to response for the purposes of testing for balance relative to the instrumental variable. The online appendix shows that we have balance relative to household and individual variables in Tables OA12 and OA13, respectively. We cluster standard errors at the level of the superdistrict. Estimates are found in Table 6. Panel A reports estimates for households living in tribal heavy strata. Panel B reports estimates for tribal light strata.

Panel A implies a 5 percentage point increase in the regionalist share in the superdistrict (1 out of 20 constituencies) decreases the propensity of household members to watch television by 12.5 percentage points. It decreases the propensity to listen to the radio by 12.8 percentage points and has a similar effect on the propensity to read the newspaper, though the newspaper effect is statistically insignificant. There is also a decrease in the propensity to consume cinema and the theatre, . We find coefficients of similiar signs in Panel B but none are significant statistically, consistent with the weak first stage estimate for this sample. Altogether the estimates suggest regionalist parties cause increased tribal isolation .

The last column reports estimates of the effect on earnings from the previous week. The estimate in Panel A implies a 5 percentage point increase in the superdistrict regionalist share decreases earnings by 18.3 percent. The estimate is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The estimate in Panel B shows a similar negative effect in areas with

Table 6: Tribal Isolation.

	TV	Radio	Cinema	Theatre	Newspaper	Earnings (in logs)
	Panel A. High ST Population Strata					
Regionalist Seat Fraction	-2.491 (0.001)	-2.559 (0.005)	-1.918 (0.001)	-2.118 (0.001)	-1.253 (0.114)	-3.663 (0.015)
F-Statistic for Excluded Instrument	41.93 0 (0.000)	41.930 (0.000)	41.930 (0.000)	41.930 (0.000)	41.930 (0.000)	34.980 (0.000)
Superdistricts	49	49	49	49	49	49
Observations	10722	10722	10722	10722	10722	9768
	Panel B. Low ST Population Strata					
	TV	Radio	Cinema	Theatre	Newspaper	Earnings (in logs)
Regionalist Seat Fraction	-4.680 (0.718)	-6.226 (0.736)	-10.645 (0.694)	-3.939 (0.750)	-3.859 (0.714)	-2.003 (0.831)
F-Statistic for Excluded Instrument	0.180 (0.676)	0.180 (0.676)	0.180 (0.676)	0.180 (0.676)	0.180 (0.676)	1.090 (0.302)
Superdistricts	56	56	56	56	56	55
Observations	2497	2497	2497	2497	2497	2869

[1] Table estimates of the effect of regionalist party representation on reported wages, media consumption, and consumption of social/cultural goods in ST population.

[1] Outcomes taken from 44th round of National Sample Survey (NSS) conducted between July 1988 and June 1989. Outcomes are self-reported.

[2] Unit of analysis in first four columns is household. Unit of analysis in remaining three columns is the individual. Panel A reports estimates for ST households and individuals living in ST-dominated areas.

[3] Regionalist seat fraction in close elections is fraction of superdistrict seats won by regionalist party candidates in elections that were decided by 2.5 percentage points or less and where a regionalist was in the top 2. Regionalist seat fraction is calculated over groups of districts (which we call a "superdistrict") because only the group identifier is available in the NSS data.

[4] Controls include the fraction of seats contested in elections with a win margin within 2.5 percentage points where a regionalist candidate was one of the top 2 candidates and one lag of the occurrence of violence. Regressions also include fixed effects for the state, stratum, village type (tribal majority or not), hamlet type (tribal majority or not), sample (general versus special), tribe, and survey round (4).

[5] Standard errors are clustered on the superdistrict. p-values in parentheses.

smaller ST populations but again the estimate is statistically insignificant. The wage effect in tribal areas is consistent with regionalist parties increasing the economic insecurity of tribal populations.

Altogether the results in this subsection support the existence of incentives to protest against regionalist party representation among ST persons. If regionalist party representation decreases wages and consumption of media/social/cultural goods, and ST persons anticipate this, then they will have strong incentives to protest if regionalist party candidates are elected. The results here are therefore consistent with the increased violence under regional party representation.

7 Conclusion

We show regionalist representation increases political violence substantially because regionalist electoral success amplifies tensions between the national minorities the regionalist party represents and local minority tribal communities. Regionalist representation decreases the propensity of ST-households to consume media and cultural goods, and ST-households in a district with higher regionalist representation also report earning lower wages. This evidence suggests regionalist representation further marginalizes ST-households in Indian society.

Our focus has been on the consequences of representation by regionalists who focus on the interests of a local majority to the exclusion of their other minority constituents and the rest of India. We have passed over the origins of regionalism and ultimately explanations for the supply of regionalist parties. We noted simply that the dominant explanations were regional cleavages and the devolution of fiscal and political power. There is however a literature that is emerging to fill the gap. Ziegfeld (2016) shows in the case of India that the rapid growth in such parties can be explained by a combination of the clientelistic nature of Indian politics (clientelism makes broad-based national party building costlier) with institutions (decentralized power, coalition governments) and demographic features

(regionally concentrated ethnic populations) that are favorable to regionalism. Recent work has shown that repressive policies by national governments can engender regionalist attitudes (Gehring and Dehdari 2019). This and future research into the origins of regionalism should prove useful for normative questions concerning the optimal design of federations.

Our study gives empirical grounding to theoretical insights from a branch of political philosophy that focuses on the politics of recognition (Taylor et al. 1994). Regionalist parties facilitate the pursuit of collectivist goals by a well-defined group of local persons, goals that include the means to enact legislation that ensures the survival of group identity and economic prosperity of group members. But the pursuit and achievement of these goals can infringe upon the rights, freedom, and welfare of other persons who belong to the same locality. This is a pattern that seems to repeat itself across ethnolinguistically diverse democracies around the world.

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Regionalism and Tribal Insecurity in India

Online Appendix
(Not for Publication)

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OA.1 Formal Definition of Regionalist Party

Let $V_{p,r}$ to be the total vote received by party p in state r during the sample period and $S_{p,r} = \frac{V_{p,r}}{\sum_{r'} V_{p,r'}}$, be the share of party p's vote coming from state r. We then measure geographical concentration using

$$C_p = \sum_r S_{p,r}^2,$$

effectively the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measure of market concentration.

We adapt this measure to account for vast differences in population size across states. This is important because a single vote in Uttar Pradesh (population over 200 million) has less value than a single vote in Assam (population around 30 million). To equalize the value of a vote across states, we divide votes received in a state by the relative electoral size of the region, θ_r, where:

$$\theta_r = \sum_p V_{p,r} / \sum_{p',r'} V_{p',r'}$$

That is, total available votes in a region divided by total available votes in the country. Then, let $\tilde{V}_{p,r} = \frac{V_{p,r}}{\theta_r}$, $\tilde{S}_{p,r} = \frac{\tilde{V}_{p,r}}{\sum_{r'} \tilde{V}_{p,r'}}$, and

$$\tilde{C}_p = \sum_r \tilde{S}_{p,r}^2,$$

which is our adjusted measure of geographical concentration.

OA.2 Reverse Causality

One of our balancing tests raises concerns about a potential reverse causality problem. The test is suggestive of a potential imbalance in the lagged occurrence of violence, with an RD coefficient that equals 0.052, and a p-value that equals 0.086 (top left RD plot of Figure OA6). The imbalance raises concerns about whether our estimates can be interpreted differently, as reflecting efforts by regionalist parties to use violence to sway outcomes in close elections. In this section, we investigate this possibility further and ultimately argue that it cannot be the primary force that drives our results.

Our argument is already supported by several results in the main text:

1. our main test for identification showed no evidence of a discontinuity in the density of constituency-elections around the cutoff.

2. we do not observe imbalance in the occurrence of death.

3. the occurrence of violence is a binary variable, which likely exhibits less variation over time than the count of violent events. Moreover, we do not observe imbalances in the number of events or deaths.

In this appendix, we first show that our baseline estimates are qualitatively robust to controlling for a lag of the dependent variable in Table OA8. While the RD coefficients decrease and the p-values increase when we control for lagged violence, we caution against reading too much into these results. Including a lagged outcome in a standard regression is problematic in any case (technically, including the lag of the outcome does introduce an endogeneity issue), but is even less well understood in the case of regression discontinuity. The sole takeaway here is that including the lagged outcome as a control does not change eliminate our baseline results.

In Table OA3 we show that regionalist representation increases violence in the 2 years following an election, which suggests at a minimum that regionalist parties are increasing violence outside periods when it will probably have the largest effects on election outcomes. While this is useful, we admit that increased violence in 2 years following election is not evidence against efforts by regionalist parties to influence the outcome of the next election. Even if the violence takes place right after an election, it could be part of a broad effort to influence the outcome of the next election.

To further assuage concerns about reverse causality, we estimate the effect of electing a regionalist in constituencies that had a regionalist incumbent in the previous election and the effect in ones that did not.[1] If indeed there is a systematic link between pre-election violence, electoral outcomes, and post election violence, we would expect qualitative differences in the estimates for these subsamples - previous election outcomes should significantly explain the relationship between current election outcomes and subsequent violence.

In Table OA4 we present estimates of our baseline effect on the two subsamples. In the top panel we present the estimate of the effect of electing a regionalist when a regionalist is the incumbent, and in the bottom panel the estimate of the effect of electing a regionalist when a non-Regionalist is the incumbent. Qualitatively, the estimates are quite similar. In the first column we see that the effect of electing a regionalist when the incumbent is also a regionalist is a 10.4 percentage point increase in the probability a violent event occurs, while there is an 8.3 percentage point increase in this probability when a non-regionalist is the incumbent. These estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level. The remaining estimates are also qualitatively similar, but, perhaps not surprisingly, not precisely estimated given that the sample size is significantly reduced. We see this as evidence against a strong role for reverse causality in producing our estimates.

As a further step to establishing that reverse causality is not the primary driver of our results, we tried to identify what type of election is most likely to exhibit this type of

[1] We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this idea.

relationship. In terms of pre-election political violence, perhaps the most notorious election in our sample (and perhaps in all of post-Independence Indian political history) is the 1996 election in Jammu and Kashmir. The previous scheduled election (both to the *Lok Sabha* and the state legislative assembly) had not been held due to ongoing insurgency. In fact in the years leading up the 1996 election, the state had been ruled from the center, and the state government suspended. Local groups that viewed the elections as illegitimate were accused of using violence to intimidate voters in the lead up to the election. [2]

Given this, we reconsider our main specification and our test for balance in lagged occurrence of violence by excluding the 1996 Jammu and Kashmir election. The results are in Table OA5. In the left column we present the estimate of our baseline effect in this restricted sample. The estimate, a 6.4 percentage point increase in violence is almost identical to our baseline effect in the full sample (a 7.2 percentage point increase). In the right column we present the effect on lagged violence. This estimate is now smaller and far from significant at any conventional level, with a p-value of 0.146. This suggests that much of the reverse relationship between political violence and close regionalist wins is explained by the 1996 episode in Jammu and Kashmir. Again, we do not claim is there is no scope for a reverse relationship, but we do maintain that it does not explain our baseline effect.

[2] See https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/India2.htm for example.

OA.3 Model

Why do regionalist parties increase violence when their powers are limited? Why does violence increase most in constituencies where tribes are prevalent but under-represented? We show that these patterns can be generated via a simple model of rational agents, key elements of which are borrowed from Bueno de Mesquita (2013).

There are of three types of agents: political parties, citizens, and an insurgent group I. Political parties can be regionalist (R) or national (N). Citizens can belong to the regional majority α (e.g., ethnic Assamese) or the regional minority τ (e.g., Bodos/tribes). With some abuse of notation, τ also measures the mass of the minority population, $\tau < 1/2$. η measures citizen distaste for violent insurgency, and is uniformly distributed on $[\underline{\eta}, \overline{\eta}]$. We assume $\underline{\eta} < 0$, so that some citizens have a preference for violence.

Agents play the following multi-stage game:

Stage 1: R contests the election or not. N is not strategic in it's entry decision. If R does not contest, N wins by default and allocates a resource share of τ to minority citizens and $1 - \tau$ to majority citizens. In this scenario, all citizens get equal share. If R contests, then it proposes $s_R \in [0, 1]$ for the minority resource share. $s_R < \tau$ means majority citizens get more resources per person. This stage captures the idea that while R is free to choose any feasible division of resources, N is constrained to share resources equally across groups.

Stage 2: Minority citizens make the decision to participate in (mobilize for) insurgency or participate in the political system and vote in elections.

Stage 3: Majority citizens and non-mobilized minorities vote for R or N. The winning policy s^* determined.

Stage 4: Insurgent group mounts a violent insurgency $a_I = 1$ or not $a_I = 0$.

Payoffs are as follows:

Insurgents: The payoff to insurgents is $\pi_I = a_I\lambda\theta + (1 - a_I)(s - c)$. $\lambda\theta$ is the minority share under insurgency, λ is the minority fraction mobilizing for violence, and θ measures insurgency technology. s is the minority share without insurgency. Insurgent groups that pay a cost $c > 0$ to sustaining the movement without violence.[3]

Citizens: The payoff to minorities from mobilizing is $\pi(1) = a_I\lambda\theta + (1 - a_I)s - \eta$, where minority mobilizers enjoy the share obtained by the insurgents $\lambda\theta$. The payoff to minorities from not mobilizing is $\pi(0) = a_I(\delta\lambda\theta) + (1 - a_I)s$. Non-mobilizers get a discounted share of insurgent rents, *i.e.* $0 < \delta < 1$. Finally, the (homogenous) citizens in the majority group receive $\pi_\alpha = a_I(1 - \lambda\theta) + (1 - a_I)s$. We assume that citizens vote for the option that yields the biggest share for their own group.[4]

Parties: R's payoff from contesting is $\pi_R(1) = a_I\big(1 - \lambda\theta\big) + (1 - a_I)\big(1 - s\big) - e$, where e reflects entry costs, such as pre-election violence involving national party operatives. Not contesting yields $\pi_R(0) = a_I\big(1 - \lambda\theta\big) + (1 - a_I)\big(1 - \tau\big)$.

The model is solved via backwards induction. In Stage 4 insurgents choose violence if $\lambda \geq \frac{s-c}{\theta}$. Equality defines $\overline{\lambda} = \frac{s-c}{\theta}$, which is the smallest mass of citizens that induces violent insurgency, given the resource share s determined in the election.

In Stage 3 we have two cases, depending on R's election contesting decision from Stage 1. The first case is trivial. If R stays out, then N wins by default and minorities receive $s = \tau$. In the second case, R contests. Citizens compare s_R with the τ offered by N while accounting for the possibility that the share of the winning party triggers insurgency. Let $s_R^I \in \{s_R, \lambda\theta\}$ and $s_N^I \in \{\tau, \lambda\theta\}$ be the minority shares that prevail when majorities vote for R or N, respectively. All majorities vote for R if $s_R^I \leq s_N^I$ and for N otherwise. All voting minorities vote for R if $s_R^I \geq s_N^I$ and for N otherwise.

In Stage 2, a type-η minority mobilizes for insurgency if $\pi_\eta(1) \geq \pi_\eta(0)$. The fraction that

[3]Sustaining and motivating members of a movement while not being active through violence is difficult and a common issue for rebel groups, who often use violence simply as a recruitment and morale-building tool.

[4]Any voting rule where citizens of a group all vote the same way is (weakly) dominant, as no individual can deviate and make herself strictly better off.

mobilizes will depend on citizens' conjectures concerning a_I. If citizens conjecture $a_I = 1$, then type-ηs mobilize if $\eta \leq (1-\delta)\theta\lambda$. [5]

The fraction that mobilizes $\lambda^*(1)$ is the fixed point of $\lambda = \tau \int_{\underline{\eta}}^{(1-\delta)\theta\lambda} dU(\eta)$, *i.e.* $\lambda^*(1) = \frac{-\tau\underline{\eta}}{\overline{\eta}-\underline{\eta}-(1-\delta)\tau\theta}$. One equilibrium of the sub-game is then $\lambda^*(1), a_I = 1$. This is an equilibrium if $\lambda^*(1) \geq \overline{\lambda}$. If citizens conjecture $a_I = 0$, then type-ηs mobilize if $\eta \leq 0$. The fraction that mobilizes is $\lambda^*(0) = \frac{-\tau\underline{\eta}}{\overline{\eta}-\underline{\eta}}$. A second equilibrium of the subgame is then $\lambda^*(0), a_I = 0$. This is an equilibrium if $\lambda^*(0) < \overline{\lambda}$. Note that $\lambda^*(0) < \lambda^*(1)$ is always the case given parameter signs.

$\lambda^*(0) = \frac{\overline{s}(0)-c}{\theta}$ and $\lambda^*(1) = \frac{\overline{s}(1)-c}{\theta}$ define thresholds $\overline{s}(0)$ and $\overline{s}(1)$ for the resource share that makes the insurgents indifferent between mounting an insurgency or not, given the fraction of citizens that mobilize for insurgency. We assume indifferent insurgents opt for no violence. For values of s less than $\overline{s}(0)$, the insurgent group mobilizes ($a_I = 1$) even if $\lambda = \lambda^*(0)$, and so $\lambda^*(0)$ can not be equilibrium mobilization. For values of $s \in [\overline{s}(0), \overline{s}(1)]$, we have two equilibria in the subgame, $(\lambda = \lambda^*(0), a_I = 0)$ and $(\lambda = \lambda^*(1), a_I = 1)$, and for values of s with $s > \overline{s}(1)$, there is only one equilibrium, $(\lambda = \lambda^*(0), a_I = 0)$. All this is depicted graphically in Figure OA1 in the appendix.

We make two additional assumptions before folding back the game to the first stage and fully characterizing the SPNE. We assume first that $\overline{s}(1) < \tau$ (A1). This assumption implies that the share offered by the National party guarantees no insurgency.[6] Second, we assume that, for any $s_R \in [\overline{s}(0), \overline{s}(1))$, citizens and insurgents coordinate on insurgency (A2). Under A2 the three regions of s_R reduce to two relevant regions from the perspective of the regionalist party: insurgency if $s_R < \overline{s}(1)$ and no insurgency if $s_R \geq \overline{s}(1)$.

In Stage 1, if R stays out, N wins by default and by A1 there is no insurgency. The

[5] There is a positive mass that mobilizes since $\underline{\eta} < 0$ and $(1-\delta)\theta\lambda > 0$.

[6] Simple algebra reveals that:

$$\overline{s}(1) = \theta\Big[\frac{-\tau\underline{\eta}}{\overline{\eta}-\underline{\eta}-(1-\delta)\tau\theta}\Big] + c \tag{3}$$

So $\overline{\eta}$ sufficiently large guarantees the assumption holds.

payoff to R is $1-\tau$. If R contests, R will not choose any $s_R \geq \tau$ because staying out would be better given the entry cost $e > 0$. It will instead choose $s_R < \tau$. R wins because this is the preferred policy of the majority. Since R's payoff is decreasing in s_R for any $s_R \geq \overline{s}(1)$, the highest payoff for R when it chooses a share that does not incite insurgency is $1-\overline{s}(1)-e$. R's payoff from inciting insurgency is $1-\lambda^*(1)\theta-e$. So the regionalist party that enters chooses an s_R that incites insurgency if $1-\lambda^*(1)\theta-e > 1-\overline{s}(1)-e$, which always holds as long as $c > 0$, and given the definition of $\overline{s}(1)$.

We can now fully state the equilibrium. If $1-\tau > 1-\lambda^*(1)\theta-e$ or

$$e > \tau + \frac{\tau\theta\underline{\eta}}{\overline{\eta}-\underline{\eta}-\tau\theta(1-\delta)}$$

then R stays out and N wins. There is no violence. Otherwise, R enters, chooses any $s_R \in [0, \overline{s}(1))$, thus triggering insurgency.

The equilibrium is consistent with our baseline results. First, it predicts that regionalist parties cause violence. In the model there is violence if and only if the regionalist party wins the election. For this to happen, the cost of entry e can not be too large. This gives a logic by which the state may want to ban or restrict regionalist parties via increases in e. Second, as we show in the appendix, violence is more likely the larger is τ. Larger minority populations mean a smaller share to the majority in any case, and a larger return to insurgency (through a higher value of $\lambda^*(1)$). This matches our other baseline result, that constituencies with large under-represented tribal populations are more likely to experience violence when a regionalist candidate is elected. Developing a model that predicts our key results for tribal isolation requires more machinery than we have space for here.

We illustrate how the equilibrium changes with τ, the size of the minority population. In equilibrium we have regionalist party entrance and political violence if and only if

$$1-\tau < 1-\lambda^*(1)\theta-e \tag{4}$$

Clearly the left side of this expression is decreasing in τ - a large minority population incentivizes the regional party to enter because the share to the majority group under national party rule decreases in τ. However, $\lambda^*(1)$ is *increasing* in τ, so that the right side is also decreasing in τ. The larger the minority population, the larger the mobilized force for violence, which decreases the share to the majority group conditional on the regionalist party's entry. A large minority population is not good for the share of the pie that goes to the majority regardless of the party in power, and whether there is violence. Re-writing, there is regionalist party entry and violence if and only if:

$$\tau > \lambda^*(1)\theta + e \tag{5}$$

By inspection, as τ approaches 0 the condition can not be satisfied, while it can be for larger values of τ. We have that:

$$\frac{\partial \lambda^*(1)}{\partial \tau} = \frac{(F - \underline{\eta})(\overline{\eta} - \underline{\eta})}{\left((\overline{\eta} - \underline{\eta}) - (1-\delta)\tau\theta\right)^2} \tag{6}$$

so $\lambda^*(1)$ is strictly increasing in τ. Moreover, $\lambda^*(1)$ is strictly concave in τ if $\tau > \frac{\overline{\eta}-\underline{\eta}}{(1-\delta)\theta}$ and convex otherwise. So in principal there can be changes back and forth between whether the regional party chooses to enter or not (and whether there is violence or not) as τ increases. But by the strict concavity in τ, there is an τ^* such that for all $\tau \geq \tau^*$, the regionalist party enters and there is violence.

Figure OA1: Multiple $\overline{s}$



OA.4 Spillover Derivation

In this section we show formally how the IV strategy developed in (Clots-Figueras 2011) identifies spillovers. For simplicity, suppress the election subscript e. Let S_d denote the number of seats in district d. Let

$$RF_d = \frac{1}{S_d} \sum_{j=1}^{S_d} R_j$$

denote the seat share of regionalist parties in district d, where $RF_d \in \{rf_0, rf_1, rf_2, ..., rf_{S_d}\}$, and $rf_k = k/S_d$. Our interest is

$$V_d = \alpha + \beta RF_d + \varepsilon_d$$

where V_d encapsulates various district level measures of violence, such as total violent events in the district as a whole, in constituencies held by regional parties, and in constituencies that are held by other types of parties. Causal identification of β rests on there being no covariance between the regionalist party seat share and unobserved district level factors: $Cov(RF_d, \varepsilon_d) = 0$.

Let C_j equal 1 if a regionalist party finished in the top two in a close election and 0 otherwise. The regional party seat share can then be written as

$$RF_d = \underbrace{\sum_{j=1}^{S_d} \frac{C_j R_j}{S_d}}_{RCF_d} + \underbrace{\sum_{j=1}^{S_d} \frac{(1 - C_j) R_j}{S_d}}_{RDF_d}$$

where RCF_d is the regionalist seat share in close elections with a regionalist in the top 2 and RDF_d is the share in all other cases. RF_d exhibits a high correlation with RCF_d and is non-decreasing in RCF_d by construction. Since close election victories by regional parties

are also plausibly exogenous to unobserved determinants of violence

$$Cov(RCF_d, \varepsilon_d) = 0,$$

RCF_d provides us with a candidate instrument for RF_d.

For the purposes of illustration, we assume $Cov(RF_d, RCF_d)/Var(RCF_d) \approx 1$ where $Var(RCF_d) \neq 0$. In this case the IV estimand can be approximated by the reduced form

$$\beta_{IV} \approx \frac{Cov(V_d, RCF_d)}{Var(RCF_d)}.$$

Let $\mathbb{P}$ denote probabilities and $p_j = \mathbb{P}(C_j = 1, R_j = 1)$. If $0 < p_j < 1$ and $C_j R_j$ is statistically independent of $C_k R_k$, and districts are identical $S_d = S$, the IV estimand equals

$$\frac{\sum_{j=1}^{S} \sum_{k=1}^{S} p_k \Big(\mathbb{E}[V_j | C_k = 1, R_k = 1] - \mathbb{E}[V_j] \Big)}{\Big(\sum_{j=1}^{S} p_j (1 - p_j) \Big) / S}.$$

The numerator equals

$$\sum_{j=1}^{S} \Big[p_j \underbrace{\Big(\mathbb{E}[V_j | C_j = 1, R_j = 1] - \mathbb{E}[V_j] \Big)}_{\substack{\text{Excess Violence in } j \text{ if Regional Party} \\ \text{Representative won } j \text{ in a close election}}} + \sum_{k \neq j}^{S} p_k \underbrace{\Big(\mathbb{E}[V_j | C_k = 1, R_k = 1] - \mathbb{E}[V_j] \Big)}_{\substack{\text{Excess Violence in } j \text{ if Regional Party} \\ \text{Representative won } k \text{ in a close election}}} \Big].$$

The first term in the square brackets is the p_j-weighted excess violence in the home constituency of the regionalist who barely won seat j. The second term is p_k-weighted linear combination of the excess violence in j attributable to regionalist party representatives who barely won seats in all $k \neq j$. Thus the IV estimand cumulates the excess violence that originates internally and externally across all constituencies in the district.

Our discontinuity estimates suggest that the first term is positive. The second term can be positive or negative. For example, the broken window theory predicts that increased violence in k can increase violence in j because it lowers the perceived cost of violence

in j. Alternatively, the increased violence in k may have displaced violence that would have otherwise taken place in j. The displacement translates into less violence in j. A positive second term generates an IV estimand that exceeds the excess violence that originates internally. A negative second generates an IV estimand that falls short of this internal effect.

OA.5 Figures and Tables

Table OA1: Comparison of ST and SC Villages.

	ST Villages			SC Villages			(3)	
	count	mean	sd	count	mean	sd	mean diff	t-stat
Rural Population Share	138199	1.00	0.04	114667	1.00	0.02	0.00***	(8.23)
Village Area (km^2)	52249	549.46	1581.29	67740	490.05	692.60	-59.41***	(-8.02)
Illiterate Population Share	140027	0.28	0.17	116464	0.35	0.14	0.07***	(114.54)
Primary School Count	136614	1.13	2.24	114258	1.41	1.65	0.28***	(36.11)
Middle School Count	85884	0.41	0.98	105821	0.46	0.76	0.05***	(12.42)
High School Count	74976	0.18	0.46	101153	0.21	0.51	0.02***	(10.26)
Pre-University Count	69963	0.03	0.19	97442	0.04	0.27	0.00*	(2.00)
Graduate College Count	68305	0.01	0.09	96548	0.01	0.10	0.00**	(3.07)
Approaching Roads Paved	112957	0.39	0.49	108193	0.61	0.49	0.23***	(108.77)
Approaching Roads Dirt	131816	0.76	0.42	110536	0.58	0.49	-0.19***	(-99.23)
Average Forest Cover	211645	9.42	12.77	116418	6.38	5.75	-3.04***	(-93.49)

[1] Unit of observation is the village.

[2] Demographic variables are taken from 1991 census of population. Forest cover data is take from satellite imagery. Both data sets are drawn from SHRUG.

[3] Villages are categorized as ST or SC if the number of ST or SC persons is in the 75th percentile or higher. The 75th percentile for ST villages equals 95 people. The 75th percentile for SC villages equals 246 people.

[4] ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.

Figure OA2: Regionalist Party Representation and Political Violence with Optimal Bandwidth.



1 Figure plots baseline RD estimate of the effect of electing a regionalist party candidate to represent the constituency on the occurrence of political violence inside the constituency. Endpoints of domain equal MSE-optimal bandwidth (0.119).

2 Running variable is vote margin of victory or defeat for a regionalist party (against a national party).

3 Sample restricted to constituencies where a regionalist party candidate finished among top 2 candidates.

4 Each dot is the average occurrence of violence at a particular margin. If margin is greater than 0, then dots measure average occurrence of violence in cases where a regionalist party candidate narrowly won the election.

Figure OA3: Regionalist Party Representation and Political Violence with a Second-order Polynomial in the Running Variable.



1 Figure plots baseline RD estimate of the effect of electing a regionalist party candidate to represent the constituency on the occurrence of political violence inside the constituency. Estimates based on a second-order polynomial in the running variable.

2 Running variable is vote margin of victory or defeat for a regionalist party (against a national party).

3 Sample restricted to constituencies where a regionalist party candidate finished among top 2 candidates.

4 Each dot is the average occurrence of violence at a particular margin. If margin is greater than 0, then dots measure average occurrence of violence in cases where a regionalist party candidate narrowly won the election.

Figure OA4: Bin Scatter over Full Support for Running Variable.



1 Figure plots the violence-vote margin gradient over the full support for the running variable.

2 Running variable is vote margin of victory or defeat for a regionalist party (against a national party).

3 Sample restricted to constituencies where a regionalist party candidate finished among top 2 candidates.

4 Each dot is the average occurrence of violence at a particular margin. If margin is greater than 0, then dots measure average occurrence of violence in cases where a regionalist party candidate narrowly won the election.

Figure OA5: Regionalist Parties and Political Violence by Party that Controls the State.

1 RD plots corresponding to baseline estimates in Table 3. Figure suggests that the RD estimate for the full sample (top left figure) can be explained largely by cases where the regionalist party controlled the state government, less so by cases where a non-regionalist controlled the state government, and not at all by cases where the state government was controlled by the INC/BJP.

2 Running variable is vote margin of victory or defeat for a regionalist party (against a national party).

3 Sample restricted to constituencies where a regionalist party candidate finished among top 2 candidates.

4 Each dot is the average occurrence of violence at a particular margin. If margin is greater than 0, then dots measure average occurrence of violence in cases where a regionalist party candidate narrowly won the election.

5 RD estimate and p-value for MSE-optimal bandwidth listed under subfigure title.

Figure OA6: RD Balance - Lagged Violence.



1 Each subfigure visualizes the balance test for one lag of political violence. The left subfigures do this for the occurrence of violence or death. The right subfigures do this for the number of events involving violence or death (in logs).

2 Running variable is vote margin of victory or defeat for a regionalist party (against a national party).

3 Sample restricted to constituencies where a regionalist party candidate finished among top 2 candidates.

4 Figures use evenly spaced bins. Dots are bin-level averages. Solid line is the outcome as predicted by a linear polynomial in the vote margin.

5 Polynomial is of order 1. Standard errors clustered on constituency.

6 RD estimate and p-value for MSE-optimal bandwidth listed above subfigure.

Figure OA7: RD Balance - Other Covariates.



1 Each subfigure visualizes the balance test for a different variable. Turnout and Candidates refer to percentage of eligible electors who turned out to vote and number of candidates contesting the constituency, respectively. Polarization is one lag of $\sum_p v_p^2(1-v_p)$, where v_p is vote share of party p. Fractionalization is one lag of $\sum_p v_p(1-v_p)$.

2 Running variable is vote margin of victory or defeat for a regionalist party (against a national party).

3 Sample restricted to constituencies where a regionalist party candidate finished among top 2 candidates.

4 Figures use evenly spaced bins. Dots are bin-level averages. Solid line is the outcome as predicted by a linear polynomial in the vote margin.

5 Polynomial is of order 1. Standard errors clustered on constituency.

6 RD estimate and p-value for MSE-optimal bandwidth listed above subfigure.

Figure OA8: RD Balance - Regionalist Party Vote Share.



1 Figure visualizes the balance test for the regionalist party vote share.

2 Running variable is vote margin of victory or defeat for a regionalist party (against a national party).

3 Sample restricted to constituencies where a regionalist party candidate finished among top 2 candidates.

4 Figures use evenly spaced bins. Dots are bin-level averages. Solid line is the outcome as predicted by a linear polynomial in the vote margin.

5 Polynomial is of order 1. Standard errors clustered on constituency.

6 RD estimate and p-value for MSE-optimal bandwidth listed above subfigure.

Table OA2: Robustness of RD Estimates to Lagged Violence Control.

	Occurrence of Violent Event	# of Violent Events (in logs)	Occurrence of Death	# of Deaths (in logs)
Dep. Var. Mean	0.093	0.138	0.091	0.190
Regionalist Wins	0.045	0.061	0.054	0.083
	(0.046)	(0.078)	(0.020)	(0.084)
Bandwidth	0.127	0.134	0.125	0.136
Obs. (Effective)	2528	2636	2498	2663

[1] Table checks for robustness of RD estimates to a control for one lag of violence.
[2] Unit of observation is constituency and election.
[3] Bandwidths for the RD estimates are MSE optimal. Polynomial order is 1.
[4] Standard errors are clustered on constituency. p-values are in parentheses.

Table OA3: RD Estimates - First 2 Years After Election.

	Occurrence of Violent Event	# of Violent Events (in logs)	Occurrence of Death	# of Deaths (in logs)
Dep. Var. Mean	0.096	0.145	0.094	0.198
Regionalist Wins	0.046	0.099	0.072	0.134
	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.005)	(0.042)
Bandwidth	0.127	0.139	0.118	0.137
Obs. (Effective)	3107	3305	2955	3271

[1] Table reports estimates of baseline specification for political violence in the two years following the election. It shows that the increased violence takes place well ahead of the lead up to the next election.
[2] Unit of observation is constituency and election.
[3] Dependent variable mean is based on subsample.
[4] Bandwidths for the RD estimates are MSE optimal. Polynomial order is 1.
[5] Standard errors are clustered on constituency. p-values are in parentheses.

Table OA4: Regionalist vs Non-Regionalist Incumbent

	Occurrence of Violent Event	# of Violent Events (in logs)	Occurrence of Death	# of Deaths (in logs)
		Regionalist Incumbent		
Dep. Var. Mean	0.104	0.175	0.102	0.231
Regionalist Wins	0.104	0.104	0.105	0.170
	(0.011)	(0.202)	(0.011)	(0.134)
Bandwidth	0.129	0.099	0.127	0.107
Obs. (Effective)	987	804	976	865
		Non-Regionalist Incumbent		
Dep. Var. Mean	0.113	0.184	0.126	0.259
Regionalist Wins	0.083	0.129	0.084	0.160
	(0.060)	(0.100)	(0.061)	(0.155)
Bandwidth	0.113	0.141	0.109	0.127
Obs. (Effective)	914	1044	894	980

[1] Table compares estimate in subsample where regionalist is incumbent (top panel) with estimate in subsample where non-regionalist is incumbent.
[2] The unit of observation is the constituency and election.
[3] Dependent variable means are based on the subsample.
[4] Bandwidths for RD estimates are MSE optimal. Polynomial order is 1.
[5] Standard errors are clustered at the level of constituency. p-values are in parentheses.

Table OA5: Excluding Jammu & Kashmir 1996

	Occurrence of Violent Event	Lagged Occurrence of Violent Event
Dep. Var. Mean	0.114	0.121
Regionalist Wins	0.064	0.043
	(0.011)	(0.146)
Bandwidth	0.122	0.131
Obs. (Effective)	2981	2573

[1] Table estimates effect on occurrence and lagged occurrence when we exclude Jammu & Kashmir's 1996 Election.
[2] Unit of observation is constituency and election.
[3] Dependent variable means are based on the subsample.
[4] Bandwidths for RD estimates are MSE optimal. Polynomial order is 1.
[5] Standard errors are clustered at the level of constituency. p-values are in parentheses.

Figure OA9: Robustness to Bandwidth Choice.



1 Figure visualizes the robustness of the baseline estimates to bandwidth choice.

2 Grey dots are defined by the point estimate and bandwidth combination. Vertical lines with bars at the endpoints depict 95 percent confidence intervals.

3 Polynomial is of order 1.

4 Standard errors clustered on constituency.

Figure OA10: Robustness to Polynomial Order.



1 Figure visualizes the robustness of the baseline estimates to bandwidth choice.

2 Grey dots are defined by the point estimate and bandwidth combination. Vertical lines with bars at the endpoints depict 95 percent confidence intervals.

3 MSE optimal bandwidths are used for each dependent variable. The bandwidths can be found in Table 3.

4 Polynomial is of order 1.

5 Standard errors clustered on constituency.

Figure OA11: Fake Cutoffs.



1 Figure shows that the estimate at the true cutoff is unusual relative to the estimates at fake cutoffs.

2 Density plots of RD estimates at fake cutoffs ranging from -0.130,-0.125,...,0.125,0.130.

3 Vertical red line corresponds to estimate at true cutoff.

Table OA6: Robustness of Baseline Estimates to Year Fixed Effects.

	Occurrence of Violent Event	# of Violent Events (in logs)	Occurrence of Death	# of Deaths (in logs)
		Baseline (Without Year Fixed Effects)		
Dep. Var. Mean	0.114	0.178	0.112	0.243
Regionalist Wins	0.072	0.099	0.072	0.134
	(0.005)	(0.037)	(0.004)	(0.042)
Bandwidth	0.119	0.139	0.118	0.137
Obs. (Effective)	2962	3305	2955	3271
		With Year Fixed Effects		
Dep. Var. Mean	0.114	0.178	0.112	0.243
Regionalist Wins	0.066	0.083	0.066	0.114
	(0.009)	(0.066)	(0.009)	(0.073)
Bandwidth	0.119	0.139	0.118	0.137
Obs. (Effective)	2966	3305	2959	3274

[1] Table compares baseline RD estimates with no controls (top panel) with RD estimates that are conditional on year fixed effects.
[2] Unit of observation is constituency and election.
[3] Dependent variable means are based on subsample.
[4] Bandwidths for RD estimates are MSE optimal. Polynomial order is 1.
[5] Standard errors are clustered at the level of constituency. p-values are in parentheses.

Figure OA12: Regionalist Representation and Violence Reporting.



1 Figure visualizes test for a discontinuity in violence reporting at the cutoff.

2 Dependent variable is number of violent events reported by the police relative to the total number of violent events. Dependent variable is in logarithms because of large outliers.

3 Unit of observation is constituency and election.

4 RD estimate and p-value for MSE optimal bandwidths listed in graph title. Polynomial order is 1.

5 Standard errors clustered on constituency.

Table OA7: Robustness of Baseline Estimates to Regionalist Party Definition.

	Occurrence of Violent Event	# of Violent Events (in logs)	Occurrence of Death	# of Deaths (in logs)
Dep. Var. Mean	0.093	0.138	0.091	0.190
Regionalist Wins	0.051	0.067	0.052	0.096
	(0.004)	(0.031)	(0.004)	(0.027)
Bandwidth	0.121	0.134	0.121	0.133
Obs. (Effective)	4520	4839	4524	4814

[1] Table examines baseline RD estimates to a different definition of a regionalist party. A regionalist party here is a party that is officially designated as a State party by the Election Commission of India.
[2] Unit of observation is constituency and election.
[3] Dependent variable means are based on subsample.
[4] Bandwidths for the RD estimates are MSE optimal. Polynomial order is 1.
[5] Standard errors are clustered at level of constituency. p-values in parentheses.

Table OA8: IV Balance - District Covariates.

	Voter Turnout	Number of Candidates	Polarization (One Lag)	Fractionalization (One Lag)
Regionalist Seat Fraction in Close Elections	0.030 (0.412)	-0.179 (0.860)	-0.006 (0.488)	-0.032 (0.193)
Observations	1685	2111	2081	2081

[1] Table regresses various pre-determined covariates on our instrumental variable, the regionalist party seat fraction in close elections. Regionalist seat fraction in close elections is fraction of district seats won by regionalist party candidates in elections that were decided by 2.5 percentage points or less and where a regionalist was in the top 2.

[2] Unit of observation is district, state, and election.

[3] Turnout and Candidates refer to the percentage of eligible electors who turned out to vote and the number of candidates contesting the constituency. Polarization is one lag of $\sum_p v_p^2(1-v_p)$, where v_p is the vote share of party p. Fractionalization is one lag of $\sum_p v_p(1-v_p)$. Both lags are averaged across the constituencies in a district.

[4] Controls include the fraction of seats contested in elections with a win margin within 2.5 percentage points where a regionalist candidate was one of the top 2 candidates and one lag of the occurrence of violence. Fixed effects include the district and state-election combination.

[5] Standard errors clustered on district. p-values in parentheses.

Table OA9: IV Balance - Lagged Violence.

	Panel A. Occurence of Violence		
	All Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	0.787	0.152	-0.138
in Close Elections	(0.000)	(0.555)	(0.468)
	Regionalist Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	0.598	0.041	-0.121
in Close Elections	(0.000)	(0.857)	(0.527)
	Non-Regionalist Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	0.498	-0.048	-0.164
in Close Elections	(0.001)	(0.811)	(0.337)
	Panel B. Number of Violent Events (in logs)		
	All Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	1.568	0.176	-0.523
in Close Elections	(0.000)	(0.735)	(0.104)
	Regionalist Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	0.552	-0.002	-0.126
in Close Elections	(0.000)	(0.993)	(0.426)
	Non-Regionalist Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	0.559	-0.016	-0.071
in Close Elections	(0.000)	(0.940)	(0.644)
Controls	N	Y	Y
Fixed Effects	N	N	Y
Observations	2153	2153	2111

[1] Table regresses one lag of political violence on our instrumental variable, the regionalist party seat fraction in close elections. Regionalist seat fraction in close elections is fraction of district seats won by regionalist party candidates in elections decided by 2.5 percentage points or less and where a regionalist was in the top 2.

[2] Unit of observation is district, state, and election.

[3] Controls include fraction of seats contested in elections with a win margin within 2.5 percentage points where a regionalist candidate was one of top 2 candidates. Fixed effects include the district and state-election combination.

[4] Standard errors clustered on district. p-values in parentheses.

Table OA10: OLS Estimates of Aggregate and Spillover Effects.

	Panel A. Occurence of Violence		
	All Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	0.304	0.165	0.050
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.318)
	Regionalist Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	0.422	0.355	0.299
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
	Non-Regionalist Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	0.116	-0.010	-0.226
	(0.000)	(0.723)	(0.000)
	Panel B. Number of Violent Events (in logs)		
	All Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	0.612	0.227	0.169
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.102)
	Regionalist Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	0.420	0.359	0.324
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
	Non-Regionalist Constituencies		
Regionalist Seat Fraction	0.107	-0.034	-0.204
	(0.002)	(0.144)	(0.000)
Controls	N	Y	Y
Fixed Effects	N	N	Y
Observations	2705	2153	2111

[1] Table provides OLS counterparts to IV estimates in Table 4 Top row of each panel reports effects of regionalist party representation on violence across all constituencies in an administrative district. Middle row reports effects on violence in constituencies held by regionalist party. Bottom row reports effects on violence in constituencies not held by regionalist party. Bottom row effects measure spillovers or displacement from regionalist party representation.

[2] Unit of observation is administrative district, state, and election.

[3] Regionalist Seat Fraction is fraction of district constituencies held by a regionalist party.

[4] Controls include fraction of seats contested where the election was close (decided by no more than than 2.5 percentage points) and one lag of the dependent variable.

[5] Fixed effects include district and state-election combination.

[6] p-values in parentheses.

Table OA11: RD by Combatants and Major National Party Presence.

	Occurrence of Violent Event	# of Violent Events (in logs)	Occurrence of Death	# of Deaths (in logs)
		Panel A1. Non-State Violence		
Dep. Var. Mean	0.118	0.175	0.117	0.473
Regionalist Wins	0.012	0.108	0.014	0.178
	(0.801)	(0.202)	(0.771)	(0.436)
Bandwidth	0.105	0.122	0.131	0.119
Obs. (Effective)	817	910	832	892
		Panel A2. State-Insurgent Violence		
Dep. Var. Mean	0.171	0.308	0.170	0.690
Regionalist Wins	0.123	0.201	0.123	0.416
	(0.022)	(0.097)	(0.022)	(0.135)
Bandwidth	0.130	0.122	0.131	0.123
Obs. (Effective)	947	910	954	911
		Panel B1. inc/bjp Government		
Dep. Var. Mean	0.131	0.171	0.100	0.231
Regionalist Wins	0.079	0.136	0.079	0.000
	(0.268)	(0.893)	(0.135)	(0.998)
Bandwidth	0.100	0.104	0.130	0.112
Obs. (Effective)	491	509	487	540
		Panel B2. non-inc/bjp Government		
Dep. Var. Mean	0.286	0.637	0.283	0.814
Regionalist Wins	0.234	0.521	0.235	0.686
	(0.037)	(0.097)	(0.036)	(0.071)
Bandwidth	0.116	0.112	0.127	0.119
Obs. (Effective)	332	325	332	668

[1] Panel A reports rd estimates of the effect of regionalist parties on non-state and state-insurgent violence. Non-state violence is violence between insurgent groups or between insurgents and citizens. State-insurgent violence is violence between the government and insurgents.

[2] Panel B reports rd estimates of the effect of regionalist parties on political violence in constituencies where st persons are underrepresented (large populations with no mandated representation) and when major National parties (inc and bjp in particular) own the most seats in the state legislature.

[3] Unit of observation is constituency and election.

[4] Dependent variable means based on subsample.

[5] Subsample is constituencies where the state parliamentary seat is unreserved and with a st population that is above the median.

[6] Bandwidths for the rd estimates are mse optimal. Polynomial order is 1.

[7] Standard errors are clustered on constituency. p-values in parentheses.

Table OA12: IV Balance - NSS Households.

	High ST Population Strata	
	Household Head is Male	Land Possessed (log acres)
Regionalist Seat Fraction in Close Elections	4.945	-4.539
	(0.302)	(0.664)
Observations	10722	10540
R^2	0.086	0.311
	Low ST Population Strata	
	Household Head is Male	Land Possessed (log acres)
Regionalist Seat Fraction in Close Elections	1.161	7.388
	(0.500)	(0.567)
Observations	2497	2312
R^2	0.161	0.294

[1] Table regresses various pre-determined covariates on our instrumental variable, the regionalist party seat fraction in close elections. Regionalist seat fraction in close elections is fraction of superdistrict seats won by regionalist party candidates in elections that were decided by 2.5 percentage points or less and where a regionalist was in the top 2.

[2] Unit of observation is ST-household.

[3] Controls include the fraction of seats contested in elections with a win margin within 2.5 percentage points where a regionalist candidate was one of the top 2 candidates and one lag of the occurrence of violence. Regressions also include fixed effects for the state, stratum, village type (tribal majority or not), hamlet type (tribal majority or not), sample (general versus special), tribe, and survey round (4).

[4] Standard errors are clustered on superdistrict. p-values in parentheses.

Table OA13: IV Balance - NSS Individuals.

	High ST Population Strata			
	Age	Male	Literate	School
Regionalist	-79.809	-2.825	-0.273	-3.301
Seat Fraction	(0.189)	(0.340)	(0.951)	(0.363)
	23851	23853	23853	23853
R^2	0.037	0.043	0.251	0.227
	Low ST Population Strata			
	Age	Male	Literate	School
Regionalist	-5.448	2.050	2.289	0.895
Seat Fraction	(0.947)	(0.338)	(0.436)	(0.761)
Observations	4584	4587	4587	4587
R^2	0.054	0.062	0.343	0.330

[1] Table regresses various pre-determined covariates on our instrumental variable, the regionalist party seat fraction in close elections. Regionalist seat fraction in close elections is fraction of superdistrict seats won by regionalist party candidates in elections that were decided by 2.5 percentage points or less and where a regionalist was in the top 2.

[2] Unit of observation is ST-individual.

[3] Controls include the fraction of seats contested in elections with a win margin within 2.5 percentage points where a regionalist candidate was one of the top 2 candidates and one lag of the occurrence of violence. Regressions also include fixed effects for the state, stratum, village type (tribal majority or not), hamlet type (tribal majority or not), sample (general versus special), tribe, and survey round (4).

[4] Standard errors are clustered on superdistrict. p-values in parentheses.