Regionalism and Political Violence

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Abstract

We study the effect of representation by regional political parties on political violence in India. Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits close elections, we find that the election of a regional-party candidate increases the probability of a violent event in the subsequent inter-election years by 6 percentage points and the number of violent events by 9 percent. It increases the probability of a death due to political violence by 6 percentage points and the number of deaths by 16 percent. The increase in violence is explained by insurgent groups being more able to carry out violent attacks when the local elected official is a member of a regional party, suggesting that regional officials lack either the will or the capacity to control violence.

JEL: H19, H77, P48

Keywords: Elections, Political Violence, Regional Political Parties.

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1 Introduction

Political violence is a pervasive and persistent feature of democracies worldwide, including those commonly understood to be "mature" and "stable." It is well documented that decentralization - the devolution of political and economic power to regionally elected leaders - is associated with an increase in the presence and electoral success of regional political parties.[1] In diverse polities regional parties can offer citizens a vehicle for voicing region specific preferences, and are able to tailor policies to specific demands of the local population. However, regional parties are often accused of fostering inter-communal tension by favoring one ethno-linguistic group at the expense of another in the pursuit of political power. Moreover, as regional parties operate at smaller scale and are peripheral in nature relative to national parties, they possess a lower capacity to prevent or curtail violence.

This paper studies the effect of regional-party representation on political violence in India. We consider elections to the State Legislative Assemblies and identify the causal effect of electing an MLA from a regional party on the occurrence and severity of political violence in the subsequent inter-election period. Using a Regression Discontinuity (RD) approach that exploits close elections, we show that the election of a regional candidate increases in both the occurrence and severity of political violence. A regional candidate win increases the probability of a violent event occurring in the subsequent inter-election years by 6 percentage points and increases the number of violent events by 9 percent. Constituencies that elect a regional candidate experience a 6 percentage point increase in the probability of death due to political violence and a 16 percent increase in the number of deaths due to political violence. The effect is driven primarily by the states in India's border region, which are notorious for their long history of tension and violence with a disparate set of underlying causes.[2] The increase in violence is explained by insurgent groups being more able to carry

[1] By regional parties we mean parties whose electoral candidacy and success is geographically limited. See Chhibber and Kollman (1999) for a discussion in the context of India.

[2] India's border areas, beginning with the tribal areas of the Northeast (i.e., Assam) and extending to

out violent attacks when the local elected official is a member of a regional party, suggesting that regional officials lack either the will or the capacity to control violence.

2 Context and Data

The origins of the division of India into subnational units (states) lies in the States Reorganization Act 1956. With this Act, the boundaries of Indian states were drawn to roughly correspond with the dominant language spoken in the area, and by consequence with the dominant ethnicity, religion, and culture in the area. Differences in dominant ethno-linguistic groups across states, together with the mass devolution of economic and political power to local governments, makes India fertile ground for the emergence and growth of regional parties.[3] Differences and tensions among ethno-linguistic groups within states makes states fertile ground for the emergence of violence among ethno-linguistic groups. All this makes India a natural venue for estimating the effect of regional-party representation on political violence.

We classify parties as regional if they are officially recognized as a State party by the Election Commission of India. The Commission recognizes a party as a state party if:

(a) it has been active for at least 5 years and won no less than 1/25 of the State's seats in the *Lok Sabha* (National Parliament) or 1/13 of the seats in the *Vidhan Sabha* (State Parliaments).

(b) The party obtained 6% of the popular vote in the state in the last National or State election.

Gujarat in the West have witnessed a great deal of violence with wide-ranging causes. While episodes of religious tension are common during our sample period in Punjab (Hindu-Sikh) and Gujarat (Hindu-Muslim), the violence in India's Northeast states is driven by conflict between indigenous groups and immigrants from bordering countries. See Lacina (1996) for a careful discussion of the origins and recent history of this violence.

[3]See Ziegfeld (2016) for a recent and comprehensive study on the growth of regional parties in India.

A party who meets either of these criteria in more than 3 states is recognized as a National Party. A party who fails to meet either of these criteria in any state is a "registered unrecognized" party.

Our definition is such that regional parties are parties whose success is confined to a limited geographic area. By this definition, "registered unrecognized" parties can also be deemed "regional," as in many cases their success is even more geographically limited than that of state parties. We prefer to define regional parties according to the Commission's definition of a state party for several reasons. First, Unrecognized parties rarely win the constituencies they contest, winning less than 2% of the time in our estimation sample, and therefore have little bearing on our estimates. Second, Unrecognized parties contest few constituencies, often only one. A limited geographic presence makes any claim to represent a regional interest unreasonable. Lastly, Unrecognized parties tend to differ qualitatively from state parties. Many campaign on very narrowly-defined issues. A few are former factions of major national parties. These parties rarely make regional appeals in the pursuit of political power.

Our analysis draws on elections data from the Election Commission of India and political violence data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). The elections data includes information on the identity and party of all the candidates contesting a State-Assembly constituency, as well as their respective vote shares. The ACLED data includes information on the location of and number of deaths that occurred during an episode of political violence, in addition to detailed information on the primary actors and the nature of the violence. Importantly, these events include much more than what is commonly thought of as "conflict." They include protest and violence in the form of political assassination among others. We assigned events to State Assembly constituencies on the basis of the Haversine distance from the latitude and longitude of the event to the latitude and longitude of constituency, and on the basis that the event took place in the years between the current

and next election in the constituency.[4] Our key outcome variables here are therefore the occurrence or number of violent events and deaths due to violence at the level of the State-Assembly constituency.

A summary of the full sample is provided in Table 1. The table provides a state-by-state summary of the number of national and state party candidates in each constituency, their success in terms of the percentage of seats won, political violence, as well as the most dominant state party or parties in the state. The table shows significant across-state variation in national and state party entry, seats won, and political violence. Many states have at least one state party candidate contesting in each constituency, and seats which are won by a state party a non-negligible fraction of the time. Most states experience some political violence, and a few experience large amounts of violence.

Figures 1(a) and 1(b) plot the number of violent events against the state-level win percentages for State and national parties. Figure 1(a) shows a positive association between the number of violent events and the win percentage for state parties, while Figure 1(b) shows a negative association when we use the win percentage of national parties. Our main conclusions are thus supported by aggregate correlations in the raw data.

Our primary estimation sample covers elections to the State Legislatures (Assemblies) and political violence that took place between 1988 and 2001. The year 1988 is the first year of elections for which we have data on political violence in the ensuing inter-election period. The year 2001 is the last election year before electoral boundaries in India were modified.[5] The sample is restricted to elections where a state party was the winner or runner-up, the relevant comparison for our purposes. This restriction leaves us with 3925 constituency-election observations in our primary estimation sample.

Figures 2(a) and 2(b) preview our main results. The figures plot the occurrence of violent

[4]State elections typically occur at regular 5-year intervals.

[5]Parliamentary and State Assembly boundaries were officially changed by the conclusion of 2001. Because state elections are more frequent (across states) than the national elections, the first state election with the new boundaries took place in 2002.

events and death against the vote margin between the most successful state and non state party candidates in close elections. Note that each of the dots in the figure represent bin-level averages for bins of size 0.002.

The figures have several notable features. There is a 6 percentage point increase the probabilities of a violent event and death around the threshold. There are many more instances where there is no violence or death to the left of the threshold, when the election is won by a non state party candidate. This is consistent with the additional variability to the right of the threshold, when the election is won by a State party candidate. The figures ultimately support the notion that state party representation increases political violence.

3 Main Results

We estimate:

$$Violence_{jse(s)} = \alpha + \beta SPW_{jse(s)} + f(z^*_{jse(s)} - 0) + f(z^*_{jse(s)} - 0)SPW_{jse(s)} + \varepsilon_{jse(s)}$$

where j denotes the state assembly constituency, s the state, and $e(s)$ the election year. $e(s)$ is indexed by s because states have elections in different years. The running variable, $z^*_{jse(s)}$, is the difference between the vote shares of the most successful state and non state party candidates. $SPW_{jse(s)}$ is a binary that equals 1 when the constituency was won by a state party candidate, $z^*_{jse(s)} > 0$, and equals 0 when the constituency was won by candidate with no formal affiliation with a state party, $z^*_{jse(s)} < 0$. $f(\cdot)$ is a polynomial in $z^*_{jse(s)}$. The interaction $f(z^*_{jse(s)} - 0)SPW_{jse(s)}$ allows the polynomial to differ depending on whether the constituency was won by a state party candidate.

Our baseline analysis considers four different violence measures: (i) a binary indicator of whether a violent event occurred in constituency j between election $e(s)$ and $e(s) + 1$; (ii) the logarithm of the total number of events occurring during this time; (iii) a binary indicator of whether a death occurred; (iv) the logarithm of the total number of deaths. We

use logarithms for the total number of events and deaths to deal with the large spread and outliers in these variables across constituencies. As there are many zeros, we add 1 to all observations before taking logs.

Our interest is in β, which measures the effect of state party representation on political violence. Our primary estimates of β will be based on the data-driven bandwidths of CCT (2014) and a first-order polynomial in $z^*_{jse(s)}$. Standard errors are clustered on the constituency. Note that the estimates will have a causal interpretation when political actors have imprecise control over who wins the constituency (Lee 1998), that is, when a win by a state party candidate can be attributed to idiosyncratic factors which are unrelated to future political violence.

Our baseline estimates are found in Panel A of Table 2. Panel B reports naive OLS estimates of the effect of State-party representation. Panel C reports RD estimates for the border regions of India, upon which we will elaborate shortly. The top row of the table reports sample means for the violence measures. Note that sample means and OLS estimates are based on the full sample of elections.

Representation by a state party increases the probability that a violent event occurs by 6.2 percentage points and the number of violent events by 9.3 percent. It increases the probability of a death by 6.2 percentage points and the number of deaths dues to political violence by 16.2 percent. The estimates are statistically significant at conventional significance levels. The estimates also have substantive significance, explaining at least 82 percent of the dependent variable mean in each case.

The OLS estimates are smaller than the RD estimates. Given the causal interpretation of our RD estimates, this suggests the presence of an omitted variable that correlates positively with political violence and negatively with a win for a state party, or vice versa. India's states have been host to a large number of insurgencies with wide ranging and disparate causes. In response, the central government has used a series of Armed Forces Special Powers Acts (AFSPA) to grant the military special powers in counterinsurgency operations

in areas deemed "disturbed." While India's counterinsurgency operations are widely viewed as successful in controlling and curtailing violence (Rajagopalan 2007), they have also been accused of unjustifiable abuse of power and violations of fundamental human rights, fostering disaffection in the local population.[6] As the Army is controlled by the central government, which is itself controlled by a national party (usually the Indian National Congress in our sample period), it is likely that more intense counterinsurgency operations are associated with a general decline in local support for national parties to the benefit of regional parties, explaining the downward bias in our OLS estimates.

As the potential for large scale political violence (and thus, the presence of the Indian military) is a precondition for this story, it should be the case that our estimates in Panel A of Table 2 are explained largely if not entirely by the effect of regional candidates in states where the military has maintained an extensive presence due to insurgency. We check this by estimating the causal effect of a State-party win on political violence in Indian border states, which are the states with a historical record of violence (Lacina 1996) and intervention from the center. [7]

The table shows State-party representation increases the probabilities of violent events and deaths at the constituency level by 9.2 and 9.0 percentage points and the number of events and deaths by 15.1 and 27.2 percent. The estimates are 45%-68% larger than the coefficients in Panel A. The estimated effect on non-border states, by contrast, is far from significant and small in magnitude (not presented here). Our main results are explained entirely by events in the states where the central government has had a significant military presence with the potential to use wide-ranging powers, consistent with the story we put forward above.

[6] See the Human Rights Watch report "Getting Away With Murder" for a detailed overview: https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/2008/india0808/.

[7] The border states are Jammu and Kashmir, Assam, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Punjab, Rajasthan, Gujarat, West Bengal, Mizoram, Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Tripura, Sikkim, and Himachal Pradesh. The majority of these states have had designated "distubred areas" meaning that the Armed forces have the special powers contained in the AFSPA.

Our estimates suggest that electing an MLA that belongs to a regional political party has dire consequences for political violence in the ensuing inter-election period by increasing the likelihood and severity of political violence. Why do MLA's have such influence on violence? Members of the State Legislative Assembly are the most important elected representatives in terms of determining the amount of political violence in the area, as the state government has the power to prevent and stop the escalation of political violence with force (Wilkinson 2004). This is for two reasons. One, state governments control police and paramilitary forces. Two, the Indian constitution mandates that forces from the center (i.e., the army) may only intervene to stop violence in the states if they are invited to do so by state officials.[8]

3.1. Falsification and Robustness. Falsification tests for the RD design and robustness checks of our main estimates can be found in the Online Appendix. We elaborate on them briefly here.

We conducted several falsification tests for the RD design, searching in particular for evidence of manipulation around the threshold. Figure OA1 uses local polynomial techniques to explicitly test for a discontinuity in the density for the vote margin between state and non state parties (Cattaneo et al. 2017; McCrary 2008). Figures OA2 and OA3 and Table OA1 estimate the effect of state party representation on various covariates, including one lag of the dependent variable, voter turnout, the ratio of state to national candidates, and the number of effective parties.[9] All the tests support the null hypothesis of no manipulation around the threshold. The sole marginal estimate is for the lagged number of violent events, which has p-value of 0.11 (Table OA1, Panel A, Column 2). Accordingly, to rule out the possibility that the estimates are spuriously driven by past violence, Panel B of Table OA1 shows our conclusions are robust to redefining our dependent variable as the growth in the occurrence

[8]Moreover as Lacina (2010) and Bhavnani and Lacina (2015) argue, the ties between state governments and the central government are another important factor in determining Sons of the Soil political violence, because the central government may help guarantee the economic security of natives, thereby preventing a violent response.

[9]Effective number of parties is the inverse of the sum of squared vote shares of candidates in the constituency.

or number of violent events or deaths. Finally, Panel C of Table OA1 shows representation by a state party increases violence in the 2 years following an election, providing evidence against reverse causality, namely the possibility that political leaders were using violence to mobilize co-ethnics and consolidate support in the lead up to an election itself (Wilkinson 2004).

We checked the robustness of the estimates to variants of our baseline specification. Figure OA4 shows the estimates are robust across a wide range of bandwidth choices. Figure OA5 shows the estimates are robust to polynomial orders of 0, 1, 2.[10] Figure OA6 plots the density for RD estimates at fake cutoffs of -0.130,-0.125,...,0.125,0.130, showing that the estimates at the true cutoff are extreme relative to the mean of the estimates at the fake cutoffs.

3.2. Types of Violence To the best of our knowledge, these are the first causal estimates of the effect of regional-party representation on political violence in India. While there has been important work on riots in India,[11] the violence in our data is wide ranging in terms of protagonists, underlying cause, and the way the violence manifests.[12] In this subsection we study more specifically which types of violence respond to the election of a State-party candidate.

We are able to observe two important features about the violent events. First, we see the start and end dates of the violence, allowing us to construct a measure of the duration of the event. Second, we observe the main protagonists. In particular, we observe whether the violence was either between the government of India and another armed non-state actor (insurgents), was between two armed non-state actors, or was between an armed non-state

[10] We checked polynomial orders of less than or equal 2 at the recommendation of Gelman and Imbens (2018), who argue against the use of higher-order polynomials in RD designs.

[11] Wilkinson (2004); Mitra and Rey (2014) study the determinants of Hindu-Muslim communal violence, while Bhavnani and Lacina (2015) study "Sons of the Soil" Native/Migrant riots.

[12] Common examples include Tribal and Separatist violence in the Northeast, anti-immigrant violence in Bangladeshi border states, Naxalite-Maoist violence in the "Red corridor," separatist violence in Kashmir, Hindu-Sikh violence in Punjab, and Hindu-Muslim violence in Gujarat. In these cases we observe riots, assassinations, bombings etc.

actor and civilians. Estimates of the effects on the various types of violence are found in Table 3.

In Panel A we see that regional party representatives increases the number of short (one day or less) and long (two or more days) events, as well as the duration of a violent event. The increase in duration is consistent with elected representatives from regional parties being less effective in stopping violent episodes, though we can not say specifically why. In Panels B and C we see that the election of a regional candidate increases the incidence and frequency of violence between government forces and insurgents, "two sided violence" in the language of Besley and Persson (2011), as well as the frequency of violence between insurgents and civilians, a category of violence not considered in the work of Besley and Persson (2011). There is no increase in violence between insurgent groups.

4 Conclusion

We exploited close elections to estimate the causal effect of regional candidates on political violence in India. We showed that the election of regional-party candidate increases the incidence and severity of violent events. Our analysis shows the increase in violence is explained by insurgent groups being more able to carry out violent attacks when the local elected official is a member of a regional party, consistent with regional parties lacking either the will or the capacity to control violence.

While the devolution of power to regionally elected leaders provides citizens with policy that is more responsive to location specific needs, our findings highlight a potential pitfall of power sharing between central and regional governments in a federal structure. The devolution of power strengthens incentives for the emergence of regional political parties which can exacerbate local tensions, have fraught relations with the central government, and lack the scale to control political violence. In such cases, where decentralization is a necessity, the federal government may wish to retain complete control over local military

decision making.

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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics.

State	Candidates		Win Percentage		Political Violence		
	National Parties	State Parties	National Parties	State Parties	Number of Events	Death Count	Established State Parties
Andhra Pradesh	2.0	1.1	41.8	53.3	241	1,394	Telugu Desam Party
Arunachal Pradesh	1.8	0.3	83.3	2.8	2	10	Arunachal Congress
Assam	2.9	1.5	56.0	30.1	790	2,842	Asom Gana Parishad
Bihar	4.1	1.7	68.2	21.9	74	480	Rashtriya Janata Dal
Delhi	3.7	1.5	96.4	0.0	4	29	-
Goa	2.1	1.2	60.8	32.5	0	0	Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party
Gujarat	3.0	0.7	93.4	0.9	63	756	All India Rashtriya Dal
Haryana	3.1	1.2	45.9	18.9	7	47	Haryana Vikas Party, (Indian National) Lok Dal
Himachal Pradesh	3.2	1.0	93.1	2.5	4	40	Himachal Vikas Congress
Jammu and Kashmir	2.7	1.8	25.3	71.3	2,577	8,152	Jammu & Kashmir National Conference
Karnataka	3.5	0.5	89.7	1.8	15	57	Karnataka Congress Party
Kerala	2.4	0.6	69.8	22.9	3	13	Kerala Congress, Indian Union Muslim League
Madhya Pradesh	3.2	0.9	94.6	2.0	6	195	Bahujan Samaj Party
Maharashtra	2.3	1.2	58.7	25.6	23	2,104	Shiv Sena
Manipur	2.9	1.7	57.1	37.1	153	1,488	Manipur People's Party
Meghalaya	1.5	1.6	41.7	42.8	9	23	Hill People's Union (Regional Democratic Front)
Mizoram	1.2	1.4	37.5	41.7	2	18	Mizo National Front
Nagaland	1.0	0.7	68.9	22.8	52	294	Naga People's Congress
Orissa	3.1	0.8	78.0	17.5	12	151	Biju Janata Dal
Pondicherry	1.7	1.7	48.3	41.7	0	0	Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK, ADMK)
Punjab	1.7	1.4	56.8	37.6	39	376	Shiromani Akali Dal
Rajasthan	3.1	0.6	93.7	0.2	4	19	-
Sikkim	1.0	2.1	2.1	95.8	0	0	Sikkim Democratic Front, Sikkim Sangram Parishad
Tamil Nadu	1.1	2.3	15.2	79.8	4	76	Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK, ADMK)
Tripura	2.4	0.3	87.8	10.6	282	1,092	Tripura Upajati Samiti
Uttar Pradesh	3.3	0.8	72.6	15.1	51	444	Samajwadi Party, Bahujan Samaj Party
West Bengal	2.7	0.9	74.7	21.3	16	27	All India Forward Bloc, All India Trinamool Congress





Figure 1: Party Success and Political Violence.



Figure 2: State Party Success and Political Violence. The running variable is the vote margin between the winner and runner-up. The sample is restricted to constituencies where either the winning or runner-up candidate belonged to a state party. The figures use evenly spaced bins. The dots are averages within bins of size 0.002. The solid line is the outcome as predicted by a linear polynomial in the vote margin.

Table 2: Baseline Estimates. The unit of observation is the constituency and election. The dependent variable mean is based on the full sample. The bandwidths for the RD estimates are CCT (2014) optimal. The polynomial order is 1. Standard errors are clustered at the level of constituency. p-values are in parentheses.

	Occurrence of Violent Event	# of Violent Events (in logs)	Occurrence of Death	# of Deaths (in logs)
Dep. Var. Mean	0.077	0.113	0.075	0.173
		Panel A: RD		
State Party Wins	0.062	0.093	0.062	0.162
	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Bandwidth	0.132	0.135	0.138	0.134
Obs. (Effective)	2338	2365	2411	2364
		Panel B: Naive OLS		
State Party Wins	0.012	0.024	0.011	0.028
	(0.171)	(0.130)	(0.188)	(0.227)
Obs.	3925	3925	3925	3925
		Panel C: RD for Border Areas		
State Party Wins	0.092	0.151	0.090	0.272
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Bandwidth	0.121	0.146	0.126	0.128
Obs. (Effective)	1197	1325	1228	1233

Table 3: Mechanisms. The unit of observation is the constituency and election. The dependent variable mean is based on the full sample. The bandwidths for the RD estimates are CCT (2014) optimal. The polynomial order is 1. Standard errors are clustered at the level of constituency. p-values are in parentheses.

	Panel A: Durations (in logs)		
	# of One-off Events	# of Lasting Events	Duration of Event (in days)
Dep. Var. Mean	0.109	0.024	0.065
State Party Wins	0.091	0.023	0.057
	(0.011)	(0.085)	(0.016)
Bandwidth	0.153	0.110	0.154
Obs. (Effective)	2510	2047	2523
	Panel B: Event Occurrence (binary)		
	Government vs. Non-Government	Non-Government vs. Non-Government	Non-Government vs. Civilians
Dep. Var. Mean	0.078	0.019	0.049
State Party Wins	0.051	0.002	0.018
	(0.021)	(0.808)	(0.255)
Bandwidth	0.129	0.135	0.141
Obs. (Effective)	2304	2366	2436
	Panel C: # of Events (in logs)		
	Government vs. Non-Government	Non-Government vs. Non-Government	Non-Government vs. Civilians
Dep. Var. Mean	0.093	0.006	0.048
State Party Wins	0.072	-0.001	0.043
	(0.028)	(0.934)	(0.042)
Bandwidth	0.126	0.153	0.123
Obs. (Effective)	2245	2521	2216

Regionalism and Political Violence

Online Appendix
(Not for Publication)

July 25, 2018



Figure OA1: Discontinuity in Density Test. The running variable is the vote margin between the winner and runner-up. The sample is restricted to constituencies where either the winning or runner-up candidate belonged to a state party. The histogram on the left has 50 bins. The density right uses a first-order polynomal for density estimation and a second-order polynomial for bias-correction estimate (see CJM (2017)). The discontinuity-in-density test statistic and p-value are -0.65 and 0.51 respectively, implying that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a continuous density around the cutoff.

Figure OA2: Lagged Violence Around the Threshold. The running variable is the vote margin between the winner and runner-up. The sample is restricted to constituencies where either the winning or runner-up candidate belonged to a state party. The figures use evenly spaced bins. The dots are bin-level averages. The solid line is the outcome as predicted by a linear polynomial in the vote margin.



Figure OA3: Further Covariate Balance Around the Threshold. Turnout, SN Ratio, and Effective refer to the percentage of eligible electors who turned out to vote, the ratio of State to national party candidates, and the number of effective parties. The running variable is the vote margin between the winner and runner-up. The sample is restricted to constituencies where either the winning or runner-up candidate belonged to a state party. The figures use evenly spaced bins. The dots are bin-level averages. The solid line is the outcome as predicted by a linear polynomial in the vote margin.



Table OA1: Anticipation Effects. The unit of observation is the constituency and election. The bandwidths for the RD estimates are CCT (2014) optimal. The polynomial order is 1. Standard errors are clustered at the level of constituency. p-values are in parentheses.

	Event Occurrence	# of Events (in logs)	Death Occurrence	# of Deaths (in logs)
	Panel A: One Lag of Dependent Variable			
State Party Wins	-0.018	0.132	-0.033	0.122
	(0.479)	(0.112)	(0.373)	(0.145)
Bandwidth	0.140	0.132	0.154	0.122
Obs. (Effective)	2424	1754	2546	1652
	Panel B: Election-over-Election Growth			
State Party Wins	0.089	0.057	0.101	0.122
	(0.021)	(0.071)	(0.008)	(0.048)
Bandwidth	0.152	0.126	0.161	0.127
Obs. (Effective)	2522	1699	2620	1704
	Panel C: Within 2 Years of Election			
State Party Wins	0.049	0.060	0.051	0.118
	(0.016)	(0.035)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Bandwidth	0.136	0.141	0.134	
Obs. (Effective)	2373	2411	2421	2343

Figure OA4: Robustness to Bandwidth Choice. Grey dots are defined by the point estimate and bandwidth combination. The 95 percent confidence interval is based on standard errors which are clustered at the constituency level. The polynomial order is 1.



Figure OA5: Robustness to Polynomial Order. Grey dots are defined by the point estimate and bandwidth combination. The 95 percent confidence interval is based on standard errors which are clustered at the constituency level. The CCT (2014) optimal bandwidths are used for each dependent variable. The bandwidths can be found in Table 2.



Figure OA6: Fake Cutoffs. The density plots RD estimates at fake cutoffs ranging from -0.130,-0.125,...,0.125,0.130. The vertical red line corresponds to the estimate at the true cutoff.